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In the Name of God بسم الله

Clerical involvement in the 1953 CIA backed Iranian coup of Mossadegh

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A couple of observations:

Sir Francis Shepard's proclamation that the lranians could not run their own oil industry is the same as the "Egyptians can't run the Suez Canal" in the run-up to the Suez Crisis in 1956 or with the US in its "the Panamanians can't run a canal." 

Princess Asfra's 1980 "memoire" was written for her. There needed to be another counter-narrative to Kermit Roosevelt's 1979 "Countercoup" -which the original edition the FBI had to go around and buy up every unsold copy. So "Countercoup" was rewritten with a few critical changes (one paragraph, sentences in other paragraphs, the captions under pictures -Kermit R. with  Zahedia on a staircase as one example-, that ties and especially ballpoints pens(status symbols) were used to pay rioters.

One paragraph in the middleasteye.net that is not elaborated on is: "The idea of looking into the mirror in  search of answers to political weakness, vulnerabilities or failure does not exist in lranian political culture" --which is another Sir Francis styled proclamation.

Trouble brewing.

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Even if this is true that would not shocked me so much. 

Clerics are here for respecting Allah laws not human laws. 

So if someone tend to go agaisnt this they will do their best to be against him even by collaborating with America. 

And son of pahlavi was probably seen as less secular than his father at this time. 

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3 hours ago, Mohammadi_follower said:

Even if this is true that would not shocked me so much. 

Clerics are here for respecting Allah laws not human laws. 

So if someone tend to go agaisnt this they will do their best to be against him even by collaborating with America. 

And son of pahlavi was probably seen as less secular than his father at this time. 

"Taghoot ka tahwan say jeehad "  

That is the justification given by wahabi clerics too in the 80s I remember when they pocketed foreign money to sent recruits to support the Afghan bandits against red army.

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:salam:

It's like discovering the clergy was collaborating with the Shah.

Naming one of them just because he was Khomeini's predecessor (to what btw ?) is like saying : 'hey before you kicked us out, you were friends with us !' even though the truth was 'you were our dogs'.

And that pic with Khomeini... must date back to the 30s, if that's even him.

 

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On 1/22/2020 at 8:44 AM, Propaganda_of_the_Deed said:

@Ashvazdanghe any thoughts?

Salam at begining Mr..Mosadegh & Ayt Kashani had anti tyranical ideas that they could force Shah to peacefully leaved power in their hands & left Iran but Mosadegh & his party turned to communists & made good relation with soviet unions beside that they were seeing Ayt Kashani & clerics like him just as a tool for controlling masses of people because politicians like Mosaddegh & his party had no connection with people like other elites but for turning toward communists Ayt Kashani becomes neutral about him & his party that America & Britain take the time & created false stories about receiving money by him through them to destroy image of Ayt Kashani between his followers & preventing people to join again to people like as Imam Khomeini (رضي الله عنه) that used ayt Kashani heritage which Americans again made stories about supporting him also after Iran revolution political  inheritors of Mosadegh like as Mr. Bazargan & Bani Sadr became first two presidents of Iran that first one resigned after ho staging American embassy & second one showed their true face that tried to replace clerics with MKO terrorists as their old communists ally by support of sovite union  that now all of their remnants are receiving financial aids but their only presence limited in gathering of old politicians beside othet Iranian opposition parties.

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6 hours ago, Panzerwaffe said:

"Taghoot ka tahwan say jeehad "  

That is the justification given by wahabi clerics too in the 80s I remember when they pocketed foreign money to sent recruits to support the Afghan bandits against red army.

I don't think they really imagined that would form al Qaida later. 

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26 minutes ago, Mohammadi_follower said:

I don't think they really imagined that would form al Qaida later. 

al-Q, 'the Base', was an entry point through which several thousand volunteers entered the fight in Afghanistan.

Later, UBL used the name al-Qaida so the same people -and referred people- would know who was involved as they assembled in Sudan.

lf l remembber correctly, three thousand of these were Americans.

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1 hour ago, hasanhh said:

al-Q, 'the Base', was an entry point through which several thousand volunteers entered the fight in Afghanistan.

Later, UBL used the name al-Qaida so the same people -and referred people- would know who was involved as they assembled in Sudan.

lf l remembber correctly, three thousand of these were Americans.

I mean that I don’t think they imagined that a global terror group would be formed as we know nowadays.

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37 minutes ago, Mohammadi_follower said:

I mean that I don’t think they imagined that a global terror group would be formed as we know nowadays.

ln the beginnng, al-Qaida was an umbrella organization that quickly got some affiliations from lsIamic groups that were/are "globalists" but very few "localists" interested only inside their home countries. Their objective and the objective of their supporting sponsors was to attack US interests in the Eastern Hemisphere. The August 1997 wag-the-dog missile strikes changed that -in the mind of AQ's leadership. While all this was going on, the ClA's UBL Center was watching and in the media making UBL out to be somekind of 'hero'/'resistance leader'. After 9-ll, aQ lost its sponsors.

So, l disagree with this statement.

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2 hours ago, hasanhh said:

ln the beginnng, al-Qaida was an umbrella organization that quickly got some affiliations from lsIamic groups that were/are "globalists" but very few "localists" interested only inside their home countries. Their objective and the objective of their supporting sponsors was to attack US interests in the Eastern Hemisphere. The August 1997 wag-the-dog missile strikes changed that -in the mind of AQ's leadership. While all this was going on, the ClA's UBL Center was watching and in the media making UBL out to be somekind of 'hero'/'resistance leader'. After 9-ll, aQ lost its sponsors.

So, l disagree with this statement.

OK but do you think they really realized that these persons would struggle against leaders of Muslim countries (Saudi Arabia also included) and doing terrorist attacks like 9/11. Honnestly I don't think so. 

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24 minutes ago, Mohammadi_follower said:

OK but do you think they really realized that these persons would struggle against leaders of Muslim countries (Saudi Arabia also included) and doing terrorist attacks like 9/11. Honnestly I don't think so. 

Offhand, l remember such groups being arrested and 'punished' in Libya, Egypt and KSA in the 90s.

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I recently relocated this thread. I am bringing up the following data because, in my view, I haven’t found credible pro-IRI evidence to counteract these, and the pieces fit together to form a coherent picture. It seems that the notion that Islam is the greatest threat to the Western-led, Zionist-sponsored “global arrogance” contradicts historical evidence and experience. The West has always feared secular nationalism, and especially Marxism-Leninism (communism), more than it has ever feared any religious ideology and/or system.

https://www.shiachat.com/forum/topic/235062656-trump-us-iran-tensions-analysis/?page=11&tab=comments#comment-3304074

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The initial U.S. reaction to Mossadegh's appointment was mixed. ... The dispatch lauded his proposed reforms, seeing them as necessary to reduce unrest and counter the appeal of Communism, and it argued that U.S. support for Mossadegh might help him resolve the oil dispute and avoid coming under the domination of “radical leftist elements” in the National Front. ... The CIA station chief in Tehran stated that the new prime minister (Mossadegh – ed.) seemed favorable to the United States and recommended supporting him as a bulwark against the Tudeh. ...

Although Mossadegh had released some Tudeh leaders from prison and allowed Tudeh front organizations to hold rallies that drew 10,000–20,000 participants, he had had other Tudeh members arrested, refused to legalize the party, and rejected other Tudeh demands. ... This embassy study also applauded the establishment of the staunchly anti-Communist Toilers Party and Pan-Iranist Party, which supported Mossadegh. ... The Toilers and other anti-Communist groups thereafter remained a potent source of opposition to the Tudeh, regularly attacking its rallies and vandalizing its facilities. The CIA supported some of these attacks and carried out “black” operations in which provocateurs posing as Tudeh members fomented unrest, sometimes creating an exaggerated impression of Tudeh activity.

In August (1951 – ed.), the CIA reported that the government had become “markedly” more hostile toward the Tudeh, though Mossadegh was reluctant to use force against it. Tudeh newspapers regularly criticized him, especially over signs of compromise with Britain. ... The NIE argued that, although a Tudeh coup was not imminent, the possibility of one would grow if the government did not adopt authoritarian measures. U.S. State Department officials worried that the oil crisis might eventually lead Mossadegh to sell oil to the Soviet Union or seek Soviet assistance. Mossadegh was beset by opposition throughout the spring of 1952. The Tudeh continued to agitate, holding frequent rallies and producing a steady stream of propaganda attacking the oil negotiations and the West. ... The Tudeh then staged a series of strikes and repeatedly clashed with anti-Communist groups after martial law was suspended in mid-August, leading Mossadegh to reinstate it. ...

More ominously, a retired general, Fazlollah Zahedi (a central player in the 1953 coup – ed.), aligned himself with Kashani and other National Front dissidents and began plotting with the British (against Mossadegh – ed.). Tudeh newspapers published dire warnings of a coup plot in September. The Mossadegh government retaliated in mid-October by issuing arrest warrants for several Zahedi associates and breaking diplomatic relations with Britain. ...

The Tehran embassy produced a detailed study of the Tudeh in late October (1952 – ed.), examining its organizational structure, auxiliaries, front organizations, propaganda apparatus, leadership, membership, and tactics. This study estimated that the Tudeh had 6,000–8,000 members in the Tehran area and 15,000–20,000 nationwide, with two to three times that many “sympathizers and fellow travelers.” This estimate was somewhat smaller than the 25,000 reported in the July 1949 CIA study and much smaller than the embassy's October 1951 estimate of up to 35,000. The Tudeh had “highly penetrated” the education ministry and had infiltrated several other ministries. The secret Tudeh network in the army now comprised an estimated 162 junior officers and 260 non-commissioned officers, with an additional 111 Tudeh members in air force training schools. The military was purging these Tudeh personnel, but the party presumably was replacing them. In addition, the embassy's labor attaché reported that pro-Tudeh union strength was growing. The embassy believed the party wanted to avoid or delay using force in its effort to seize power, continuing with its united-front strategy. A subsequent study by the embassy detailed the Tudeh's new campaign against the United States and the Iranian government's recent crackdown on the party, including the temporary closure of all Tudeh newspapers. ...

The CIA produced another NIE on Iran in mid-November (1952 – ed.) that echoed the conclusions of the recent Special Estimate but extended them through the end of 1953, concluding that Mossadegh or another National Front leader would likely remain in power until then. Kashani remained Mossadegh's strongest opponent and most likely successor but probably would not try to oust him. Mossadegh or a successor would increasingly have to use force to remain in power. The Tudeh would likely grow in strength but remain too weak to seize power in 1953. The Soviet Union was unlikely to use military force against Iran. Mossadegh almost certainly wanted to maintain U.S. support. ...

There was no indication that the Tudeh had a paramilitary organization or substantial weapons and ammunition. Consequently, although the Tudeh could mobilize large crowds for rallies and demonstrations, it was not capable of seizing power forcibly. Rather, it would aim to seize power through constitutional means. But only 6 of the 80 current members of parliament had Communist connections, and no more than 10 of Iran's top 200 state officials were “potentially sympathetic” to Communism, and not a single one was a Tudeh member. The Tudeh's main competitor was the National Front, whose ability to come to power was inversely proportional to the government's success in carrying out socioeconomic and political reforms. The National Front (under Mossadegh – ed.) had been encouraging the Pan-Iranists and other anti-Communist groups to attack the Tudeh, and the police were collaborating with these groups.

In any case, sometime in March the CIA was authorized to begin planning a coup. The agency sent $1 million to its station chief in Teheran on 4 April (1953 – ed.) to “bring about the fall of Mossadegh.” Eisenhower gave final approval for the coup on 11 July, though it could have been stopped at any time before it actually occurred on 19 August. Thus, even though the U.S. decision to overthrow Mossadegh occurred in a series of steps from late 1952 through mid-August 1953, the most crucial steps seem to have been taken in March 1953. ...

To pressure Mossadegh, the Shah threatened to leave the country. Kashani, Zahedi, and other opponents of Mossadegh organized raucous demonstrations on 28 February that sharply criticized the prime minister and implored the Shah to remain in Iran. ... On 2 March, the embassy reported that Tudeh leaders were trying to align their party with Mossadegh and were again calling for a united front. Mossadegh rebuffed these demands, and the security forces dispersed Tudeh demonstrations while allowing pro-Mossadegh demonstrations to proceed. ...

The CIA produced a series of estimates of the situation in early March. The first, dated 1 March (1953 – ed.), stated that the Tudeh was working to increase tension “in every possible way” and that a Communist takeover was becoming increasingly likely. The second, dated 3 March, stressed the dire consequences of a Communist takeover. Another estimate that same day stated that the Tudeh was not yet ready to seize power and was seeking a united front with pro-Mossadegh forces; it also stated that Mossadegh remained “the chief barrier to communist control” in Iran. An estimate a week later stated that Mossadegh had rebuffed the Tudeh and had given no indication that he would collaborate with it, though a Communist seizure of power remained possible. This estimate also affirmed that Mossadegh was continuing to purge the officer corps (of Tudeh sympathisers and/or members – ed.) and that a coup attempt was unlikely to succeed.

Mossadegh “unquestionably” recognized the threat posed by the Tudeh, though he might “play along with [it] for the time being,” as Qavam had in 1946. He could be expected to retain firm control over the security forces, resist Tudeh efforts to infiltrate government ministries, and prevent Tudeh demonstrations from getting out of hand. The Soviet Union recently had made overtures toward Mossadegh, but it was “extremely unlikely” he would allow large-scale Soviet penetration of Iran or break with the United States. He was pursuing the traditional Iranian approach of balancing the great powers against one another. He remained popular, and an economic crisis was not imminent. ...

(During the August 1953 coup – ed.) Anti-Mossadegh units gradually subdued loyalist forces and seized control. Mossadegh surrendered the following day. The Tudeh made no real effort to stop these actions.

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But since the revolution took place in 1979, that is, in an era when the world was split into the Soviet and anti-Soviet camp, it was important for the organizers of the so-called Great Game to strengthen the anti-Soviet camp, even if it is both anti-Western and anti-American, or even anti-Israeli in an extremist way. The organizers of the Great Game did not care about all this. It was important for them to weaken the USSR by pitting it against the radical Islamic world (Zbigniew Brzezinski’s idea) and even against radical anti-Soviet communism of a Maoist or other type (Henry Kissenger’s idea). ...

...(per Brzezinski’s acknowledgment – ed.) the United States began to destabilize Afghanistan long before Soviet troops were sent there, and this destabilization was openly Islamist in nature. (Quote from Brzezinski interview with Le Nouvel Observateur, 1998: “Indeed, it was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention [emphasis added throughout].”) ...

The West, even before the Islamic Revolution, constantly expressed concern that the Iranian Shah was too worried about Iran’s modernization (just as Mossadegh and his pro-modernist National Front were, hence the West’s support for the pro-Shah coup in 1953 – ed.) and could inadvertently turn Iran into an excessively strong Persian state. (At the time, too, the West was concerned that the rapid industrialisation of Iran, including the growth of its industrial working class and uprooted peasantry, would precipitate a communist takeover were the Shah’s regime to be undermined, and the Shah was known to have contracted lethal cancer as early as 1974, thus casting doubt on the future of Iran’s stability. –ed.)

...some groups of Western shadow players (the so-called anti-Sovietists) supported the Iran’s Islamic revolution because of the anti-Soviet character of Iranian Islam. By virtue of the same, they supported other Islamist radical movements. And other shadow groups of Western players (the so-called anti-modernists) supported the Islamic Revolution in Iran for more fundamental reasons. They considered preventing rapid modernization of Middle Eastern countries as a top priority, and they expressed indignation at the desire of the Shah of Iran to acquire modern industry (metallurgical and otherwise), as well as everything else, including nuclear weapons. ...

My partners in conversation insisted that without the support of these Western groups, the Khomeini circle would have been eradicated in the West before the members of this circle started returning to Iran with direct support from the French, and not only the French. And that without the help of SAVAK, which was a toy in Nassiri’s hands not only while he was in an official position, but also later, Khomeini’s plane simply would not have reached Iran. 

Source (see also here for information on the Iran-Contra saga)

All this evidence seemingly belies that contention that the West has always viewed Islam as its greatest threat. The West’s number-one enemy is Marxism-Leninism.

Edited by Northwest
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On 1/23/2020 at 12:07 AM, Mohammadi_follower said:

Even if this is true that would not shocked me so much. 

Clerics are here for respecting Allah laws not human laws. 

So if someone tend to go against this they will do their best to be against him even by collaborating with America.

And son of Pahlavi was probably seen as less secular than his father at this time. 

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The phony stories Ledeen was involved in concocting was were that there was a KGB Mole in the Carter administration, who was the cause of the loss of Iran and Nicaragua; that the Soviet Union was behind an International Terror Network, and tried to kill the Pope; that the Libyans ... tried to kill President Reagan; and that Fidel Castro and Tomas Borge are major narcotics dealers. The first four of these hoaxes, explains Landis, were the “Mossad Party Platform” for the 1980 US elections. To peddle its expertise in the area of combating terrorism and to dupe American conservatives, pitched a Soviet threat. It tried to gain favor with the CIA and to further discredit the American foreign policy establishment by launching a witch-hunt against purported “moles.” ...

Just two weeks before the October 1980 election, the New Republic published a widely publicized story co-authored by Ledeen and former Newsweek editor Arnaud de Borchgrave that helped Ronald Reagan unseat President Jimmy Carter. Headlined “Qaddafi, Arafat and Billy Carter,” they asserted the president’s brother borrowed money from Qaddafi of Libya, and had met secretly with PLO leader Yasser Arafat. ... Ledeen was influenced by Sterling’s best-selling 1981 book, The Terror Network, which alleged that all terrorist groups, from the PLO to the Baader-Meinhof group in Germany and the IRA were secretly operated by the Soviet Union. According to Melvin Goodman, the Head of Office of Soviet Affairs at the CIA from 1976-1987, the claims of a (far-left, secularist – ed.) terror network were in fact black propaganda created by the CIA.

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@Mohammadi_follower

All the same, it does reek of hypocrisy when the IRI’s authorities, including FM Zarif, “criticise” the US for a coup that the leading clergy supported, doesn’t it? The civilian FM Zarif repeatedly criticised the US for overthrowing Mossadegh, while the facts seemingly show that the clergy backed the US-directed coup against Mossadegh. Also, if Islam is the greatest all-time threat to the global, arrogant powers that be, including the Zionist West, then why did the West and the clergy work together against Mossadegh in 1953? Even if one doesn’t like secular nationalism and/or Marxism-Leninism, the facts do seem to suggest that the IRI, then and now, has always been perfectly willing to side with the West against secular nationalism and/or Marxism-Leninism, unless the West happens to back a nominally secular leader against Iran, e.g., Saddam Hussein (1979–89). The point is that Islam is supposed to be the greatest threat to the global power structure, so one would have expected the clergy to support Mossadegh, his National Front, and/or the pro-Soviet Tudeh against the West, or at least remain neutral rather than accept funds and backing from the West, up to and including the promotion of Western narratives against Mossadegh, the Nationalists, and/or the Tudeh (Communists).

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Roots Of US - Iranian Relationship

In 1942, US established two military missions to balance the British and Russian presence. ... Brigadier General Norman H. Norman Schwarzkopf, (father of the Gulf War general Schwarzkopf) was the head of GENMISH and the Gendarmerie. He was appointed to the post in Tehran by Roosevelt. Schwarzkopf virtually ruled the large Iranian force of internal security police (SAVAK). The Gendarmerie took part in the re-conquest of Azerbaijan in December 1946, which was under Soviet Union control. ... In 1947 and 1948, the US embassy staff grew considerably in size, enhancing diplomatic, commercial and cultural interactions between the two nations. More importantly, the Office of Strategic Services, the predecessor to the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency – ed.), established a station in the Tehran's military attaches and embassy political officers.

In the late 1940s, unrest began growing steadily among the politically active in Iran, but mainly by the help of the Americans. This was because of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), a British-owned firm which was earning large profits from its monopoly over Iran's oil industry. The National Front became extremely popular and managed to elect eight of its members to the Majlis in late 1949 which was greatly influenced by the American General Schwarzkopf. The National Front was led by Muhammad Mussadiq, a charismatic Majlis deputy from a wealthy land owning family who had established a reputation as an ardent nationalist and democrat. By all accounts, it seems that Mussadiq was brought into power with the American help.

After Mussadiq assumed office, the Truman administration publicly expressed strong support for him. Recognizing that he could serve an effective alternative to the (pro-Soviet, Communist, Marxist-Leninist – ed.) Tudeh Party, "Washington concluded that Iran must be kept in the Western camp at all costs because of its strategic location and that a protracted oil crisis might weaken the US economy and threaten US and Western security. Accordingly, for the remainder of Truman's term in office the administration pursued a policy of supporting Mussadiq, opposing British efforts to overthrow him, and attempting to mediate an agreement that would satisfy both parties to the oil dispute and minimize disruption of the world oil market." ...

In the deal, Iran conceded production and marketing rights which were given to a consortium, including 40% US participation. This formally ended the British oil monopoly in Iran.13After the deal was reached by the Americans, the CIA officers in Tehran began to turn some of their anti-Soviet covert operations in directions that undermined Mussadiqis base of support. Under a propaganda operation code-named BEDAMN, they distributed newspaper articles and cartoons that depicted Mussadiq as corrupt and immoral and portrayed him as exploiting Aytullah Kashani. They provided financial assistance to certain clergymen to drive them away from Mussadiq.

Hand in hand with the CIA, the British were carrying out very similar, but more extensive covert activities against Mussadiq. Christopher Montague Woodhouse, who had been heading British intelligence operation in Iran, was sent to Washington in November to present US officials with a plan to oust Mussadiq.15 ...

The American administration, under President Carter, charged that the CIA had failed in its mission to protect the Shah. However, such a claim must be completely rejected because, as mentioned in the previous sections, ... there were more than 40,000 American military advisors in Iran who worked in the Ministries of the Interior and Foreign Affairs, as well as in the security offices (SAVAK), and the oil companies. These advisors had the most sophisticated spying devices and were free to move within Iran as well as in the Gulf region. They also constituted one seventh of the Iranian army. For every F-14 and F-15, there was an American advisor. Then, how can anyone believe that what happened in Iran (in 1977–9 – ed.) was a surprise to the CIA? ...

Shah wanted to build an empire that he claimed would be the sixth greatest power in the world. To make his dream a reality, he wanted to buy the most modern and sophisticated weapons in the world. To accomplish this, the Shah spent more than $20 billion in the military field. This was a great concern for the U.S. because this would create an imbalance between Iran and its neighbors. Such a point was mentioned in the documents seized from the Embassy, right after the revolution. One of these documents stated that the Iranian military buildup would have serious consequences on the future cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which the U.S. at that time was supporting. 17 This relationship was strategically important in securing the Gulf region. In addition, the Iranian arms buildup might have forced Iraq to move closer to the Soviet Union for protection and armaments, which consequently could have increased the rise in armaments in the region, jeopardizing U.S. efforts to have a friendly relationship with Baghdad. 18

Shah visited the USSR and met with some of leaders by his initiative, which angered the U. S. America's patience ran out when Shah began dealing with the Americans as an independent partner. In an interview with U.S. News & World Report, Shah said that if the U.S. would take an unfriendly attitude towards Iran, then Iran "can hurt you (U.S.) as badly, if not more so, than you can hurt us (Iran). Not just through oil, we can create trouble for you in the region. If you force us to change our friendly attitude, the repercussions will be immeasurable."19

Concern over Shah's attitude towards the oil policies, which differed from America's point of view. This was another point mentioned in the seized documents from the American Embassy in Tehran. ...

In an interview with Muhammed Hasanayn Heikal, the Egyptian Journalist, Shah said, "Some people accuse me of being an American puppet, but give me one reason why I should accept such a role You have no idea the number of clashes I have had with the Americans. The last of these was over OPEC. The Americans wanted to break it up from the inside and tried to do so. The Saudis were terrified. It was I who had to bear the brunt of the confrontation. I can exercise power on my own. Why should I want to exercise power on behalf of somebody else?"20 ...

Some would still find it hard to believe that Khomeini had a relationship with the Americans while attacking the US at the same time? In this regard, we should remind ourselves of Abdul Nasser who used to badmouth U.S. in the media and U.S. would do the same. However, Nasser was a US puppet (who was initially brought into power to undermine British influence in Egypt, but who soon turned against the US and faced the opposition of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, the latter of which cooperated with the British, French, and Israelis in 1954–6. After an assassination attempt in 1954, the MB retreated to Saudi Arabia and received broad Western and Israeli support against pan-Arab, secular nationalism, socialism, and Marxism-Leninism. –ed.). Miles Copeland, the CIA operative in the region, used to write his speech in which he (Nasser – ed.) heavily criticizes the U.S. along with making the announcement to buy arms from Czechoslovakia.25 ...

Ibrahim Yazdi

Yazdi studied for sixteen years in the United States, and he had both the American citizenship along with his Iranian citizenship (his wife and children carried only the American citizenship).54 Yazdi was formerly responsible for the activities and the hostile demonstrations against the Shah when he visited the White House in November of 1977. ...

In a talk with the United States Press on March l, l 979, Senator Jim Abu Rezk said that he gave Khomeini's representative, Ibrahim Yazdi, some political as well as non-political support in Washington. ... When Yazdi was the Foreign Minister, it was his idea of not cutting but improving relations with the U.S.56 He also negotiated with some American figures to import some military spare parts. Yazdi, together with Bazar, an agent, (met) Brzezinski in Algiers in November 1, 1979, three days before the American Embassy had been taken over. ...

After brining Khomeini to power, the US had already made a back up plan of bringing "secularist" to power, in case the revolution failed or got out of hands. However, the revolution succeeded. Now, the US had to control it, so that the situation did not get out of hands. In pursuing this policy, Iraq's Saddam Hussein was 'encouraged' to attack Iran.

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(Translation)

Due to the climate in which he was educated, he (General Hossein Fardoust/Ferdows – ed.) was strongly anti-communist. For this reason, in all the organizations in charge, he quickly identified and purged those with leftist or "mass" leanings. This sensitivity was so deep that even at times he doubted that his second wife (Tala) might have entered his life according to the KGB plan. [8] The enmity between Ferdows and the Tudeh Party continued even after the revolution. It was found that after the operation to arrest the leaders of the Tudeh Party at the end of 1982 and the beginning of 1983 and the subsequent collapse and dissolution of this party, the supporters and leaders of this party considered this operation as the result of Ferdows's help and planning for the Revolutionary Guards. ...

From February 13, 1978 to November 4, 1983, General Hossein Ferdows lived freely in Tehran without being summoned or arrested. During this time, revolutionary executions, civil strife, and imposed war changed the Iranians' perception of social life as if a century had passed between the five years. ...

First, during the revolution, with the dissolution of SAVAK and other intelligence agencies in the country, the Provisional Government and the Revolutionary Council strongly felt the need to establish a new intelligence agency. Simultaneously with the first attempts to establish this institution, the Tudeh Party and the rest of the left forces tried to control or at least infiltrate this new institution. But the religious forces, although lacking the organizational order and experience of the left forces, not only prevented the influence and control of the left, especially the masses, but also suppressed them all within a short period of time. The fact is that at the time of the revolution, the only information network that operated secretly and remained unharmed was a network affiliated with the "Special Intelligence Office" under (General Hossein) Ferdows. This small and cohesive network was designed to deal with the Russians and their affiliates. This network was led by General Safapour. Since Ferdowsi was in contact with some of the heads of the Provisional Government, he probably warned them of the dangers of the left and the Soviet-affiliated forces and offered the revolutionaries the use of the network's facilities. ...

The third issue to consider is the date of Ferdows' arrest. His arrest came six months after the Revolutionary Guards' intelligence operation against the Tudeh Party and the trial of its main figures. [16] This becomes all the more interesting when we look at the date of the formation of the Ministry of Intelligence of the Islamic Republic. [17] The opposition of the Islamic Republic was talking about Ferdows's role in the formation of an ... organization called Savama (the post-Revolutionary successor to SAVAK – ed.) (18), and the need for experienced and organizing people to form a fledgling Ministry of Intelligence was fully felt.

According to the owner of this keyboard, the arrest of Ferdows in November 1983 had two main purposes. The first is to protect his life from the repressed groups' attempt to assassinate him, especially after the attack on the Tudeh Party, and the second is to use his expertise to establish a unified intelligence agency called the Ministry of Intelligence of the Islamic Republic. Ferdows had once successfully reorganized SAVAK after ousting Timur Bakhtiar from SAVAK. ...

Of course, this assumption may also be true that, at the behest of the intelligence service, he remained in Iran to influence the Iranian revolution and prevent the Communists from influencing the new Iranian government.

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He (Iraqi Prime Minister ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim/Qassim – ed.) had taken Iraq out of the anti-Soviet Baghdad Pact. In 1961, he threatened to occupy Kuwait and nationalized part of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), the foreign oil consortium that exploited Iraq's oil. In retrospect, it was the ClA’s favorite coup. We really had the Ts crossed on what was happening, James Critchfield, then head of the CIA in the Middle East, told us. We regarded it as a great victory. Iraqi participants later confirmed American involvement. We came to power on a CIA train, admitted Ali Saleh Sa'adi, the Baath Party secretary general who was about to institute an unprecedented reign of (anticommunist – ed.) terror. CIA assistance reportedly included coordination of the coup plotters from the agency's station inside the U.S. embassy in Baghdad as well as a clandestine radio station in Kuwait and solicitation of advice from around the Middle East on who on the left should be eliminated once the coup was successful. To the end, Qassim retained his popularity in the streets of Baghdad. ...

The Ba'athist coup resulted in the return to Iraq of young fellow-Ba'athist Saddam Hussein, who had fled to Egypt after his earlier abortive attempt to assassinate Qasim. Saddam was immediately assigned to head the Al-Jihaz al-Khas, the clandestine Ba'athist Intelligence organisation. As such, he was soon involved in the killing of some 5,000 communists. Saddam's rise to power had, ironically, begun on the back of a CIA-engineered coup! ...

Iraqis have always suspected that the 1963 military coup that set Saddam Husain on the road to absolute power had been masterminded by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). ...  The book, A Brutal Friendship: The West and the Arab Elite (1997), sets out the details not only of how the CIA closely controlled the planning stages but also how it played a central role in the subsequent purge of suspected leftists after the coup. The author reckons that 5,000 were killed, giving the names of 600 of them--including many doctors, lawyers, teachers and professors who formed Iraq's educated elite. The massacre was carried out on the basis of death lists provided by the CIA.

The butchery began as soon as the lists reached Baghdad. No-one was spared. Even pregnant women and elderly men were killed. Some were tortured in front of their children. According to the author, Saddam who 'had rushed back to Iraq from exile in Cairo to join the victors, was personally involved in the torture of leftists in the separate detention centres for fellaheen [peasants] and the Muthaqafeen or educated classes.' ... The CIA's (and MI6’s – ed.) royal collaborator (King Hussein of Jordan – ed.) also gives an insight into how closely the Ba'athist party and American intelligence operators worked together during the planning stages. 'Many meetings were held between the Ba'ath party and American intelligence--the most critical ones in Kuwait,' he says.

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6 March 1975: under Algiers Agreement, Iran ceases its support for the CIA and Mossad’s KDP/Barzani insurgency against Baathist Iraq, angering the West

1977–9: certain parties in the West quietly sponsor the overthrow of the Shah and the installation of Shia Islamic forces aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood

16 July 1979: pro-Soviet Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr displaced by CIA agent Saddam Hussein, who purges pro-Soviet Baathist elements and plans war vs. Iran

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Has anyone seen the documentary, The Queen and the Coup ?

ln it, one of the tricks used by the US was to send a message to the US Ambassador in Tehran, Loy Henderson, which originally read that Clement Attlee and Queen Elizabeth hoped the Shah will not leave the country. Henderson communicated this to the Shah. So the Shah stayed and Zahideh and the military had a symbol to seize power for the US.

Later, it was corrected to Clement Attlee aboard the [HMS] Queen Elizabeth hoped the Shah will not leave the country.

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By July 1953, CIA documents indicate:

Nearly all important [Iranian] religious leaders with large followings [were] firmly opposed to Mosaddeq. Both the U.S. field station [CIA] and the [SIS-MI6] British group [had] firm contact with such leaders.” In its Initial Operational Plan, TPAJAX, the CIA portrayed “Mosaddeq Government basically anti-religious.”  To spread rumors of “ties between Mosaddeq and Tudeh (communist party); and Mosaddeq and USSR,” just prior to the coup day, “CIA would give widest publicity to all fabricated documents proving secret agreement between Mosaddeq and Tudeh (Appendix A, IX-B #1 of the CIA’s “Secret History of 1953 coup in Iran,” The New York Times, April 2000).”

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB28/index.html

http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/041600iran-cia-index.html

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB28/appendix%20B.pdf

In Appendix B-5 (C) Final Action: Immediately preceding the coup the CIA document instructs:
  1. On the appointed day, stage attacks will be made against respected religious leaders in Tehran.
  2. Other religious leaders will at once say that these attacks were ordered by Mosaddeq as his reaction to the disfavor in which his government is held by religious leaders of the entire country
  3. A number of the more important leaders will at once take sanctuary in the Majlis [Parliament] grounds
  4. At this time, these religious leaders will release statements through their followers denouncing in the strongest terms the anti-religious attitude and behavior of Mosaddeq.
  5. At the same time… the fullest publicity will be given to the US station [CIA] fabricated documents which prove and record in detail a secret agreement between Mosaddeq and Tudeh [communist party], with the latter promising to use all their force in support of Mosaddeq and against the religious leaders, the army, and the police….”.

The CIA portrayed Mosaddeq as a premier who “favors the Tudeh party and the USSR (This will be supported by black [forged] documents.),” and that “Mosaddeq is an enemy of Islam since he associates with Tudeh and advances their aims.”  Ayatollah Kashani, Navvab Safavi and the Fada’ian-e Eslam celebrated the coup d’etat as a victory over the danger of Communist and Soviet domination over Iran.  Five days after the coup, on 25 August 1953, Ayatollah Borujerdi, the Grand Source of Imitation of Shiis, congratulated the Shah on his return from brief exile in Rome.  On the same day, Navvab Safavi published a declaration rejoicing over Mosaddeq’s fall and asking the Shah to follow the rules of Islam. ...

According to Robert Dreyfuss (Devil’s Game, pp. 114-115, 2007), Ayatollah Kashani posed for (CIA agent John) Waller so that he could paint a portrait of “Mullah Kashani, in pastel.”

CIA and MI6 field intelligence officers certainly understood the concept of Navvab Safavi’s program for Shi’a Islamic government, because it induced them to collaborate with him and with Kashani to overthrow “red” premier and “communist collaborator,” Dr. Mossadeq, who was “against Islam.”  Which they did!

One thing we know for certain is that Safavi had interviews with the New York Times in April 21, 1951 and on May 13, 1951.

He could wield greater influence over Iranian Communists, though not himself a Communist, than could Premier Stalin.” He went on to say, “In Iran, 95 per cent of the people are devout [Twelvers Shi’a] Moslems and even the Tudeh (Communist) party will first follow me rather than Stalin.” ...

The fundamentals of Ayatollah Khomeini’s vision for the establishment and maintenance of [Twelvers Shi’a] Islamic Government rests on three key factors:

  1. Power [Governance] as reflected in today’s Twelvers Shi’a Islamic Government of Iran.
  2. Might [The Islamic military might] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PHB0-_S_1ZQ
  3. Battles

The battles would be waged at any cost for the welfare of Islam,  the seizure of a certain facility ... the burning of a certain house ... (or) annihilation of a certain race [Tayefeh] whose existence [seems] harmful to Islam, [and] Muslims,” are all considered just order. As Khomeini stressed, these “distinct qualities are the essential part of a believer [a Shi’a Islamist] whenever he courageously performs justice with power, and shows no emotion.” ...

In 1943 or 1944, Ayatollah Khomeini “began his political career with typical Shi’a ambiguities.” In his first political tract, Kashf al-Asrar Kashf al-Asrar (The Unveiling of Secrets), he “denounced the recently deposed Reza Shah for a host of secular sins: for closing down seminaries, expropriating religious endowments, propagating anticlerical sentiments, replacing religious courts with state ones… If on rare occasions they (the Shia – ed.) had criticized their rulers, it was because they opposed specific monarchs, not the “whole foundation of monarchy.” He also reminded his readers that Imam Ali had accepted “even the worst of the early caliphs.”

“The most Khomeini asked in Kashf al-Asrar was that the monarch respect religion, recruit more clerics into Parliament (Majles), and ensure that state laws conformed with the sacred law. The sacred law, he argued, had prescriptions to remedy social ills; and the clergy, particularly the fuqaha, who specialized in the sacred law, were like highly trained doctors with knowledge of how to cure these social maladies.”

Khomeini “explicitly disavowed wanting to overthrow the throne and repeatedly reaffirmed his allegiance to monarchies in general and to “good monarchs” in particular. He argued that the Shi’a clergy had never opposed the state as such, even when governments had issued anti- Islamic orders, for “bad order was better than no order at all.

“However, one would search it in vain to find any discussion of such key subjects as revolution (enqelab), republic (jomhuri), martyrdom (shahdat), the oppressed masses (mostazafin), and even jurist’s guardianship (velayat-e faqih).

Khomeini retained traditional attitudes toward the state throughout the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. Even in 1963 when he emerged as the most vocal anti-regime cleric, he did not call for a revolution or for the overthrow of the monarchy.”

Ervand Abrahamian (Khomeinism 1993, pp.16-17)

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The ensuing (post-coup – ed.) regime was not the royal dictatorship of the shah, but the repressive regime of General Fazlollah Zahedi, a tough one-time collaborator of Nazi efforts in Iran (and the father of Ardeshir Zahedi, the shah’s former foreign minister and his last am­bassador in Washington).

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...in referring to religion as an opium, Marx was aware of the healing properties of religion, while still maintaining that it is an ideology that has been used to further oppression in society. To illustrate an example of how religion can be used to further oppression, consider how in Islam there is the concept of zakat, in which Muslims are obliged to give a part of the earnings to the poor. Zakat is one of the fundamental components of Islam as one of the five pillars of the faith, alongside praying, pilgrimage, fasting, and faith. Yet, one could argue that the concept of Zakat which is like charity within Islam normalises class inequalities by insinuating that there will always be a need to give to the poor, because class inequalities will always exist.2

...Cold War propaganda from the US played up on ideas of the ‘godless’ communists—and this fear of the anti-religious communists was effective because Christianity was, and continues to be, an important part of American values. Lenin, former leader of the USSR, wrote an entire piece dedicated to the topic of religion. In Religion, he writes that Marxism is “absolutely atheistic, and definitely hostile to all religion”3 (emphasis added to original). ...

In his book, Marxism and Other Western Fallacies: An Islamic Critique, (Ali) Shariati argued how Marx and European Marxism have conceptualized religion through a Western lens. He argued that Marx understood only the Western religions that consisted of gods that had tyrannical relationships with the humans. This explains why Marx dismissed the value of religion in revolutions, because he had no understanding of the ‘Eastern’ religions, like Islam and Hinduism, in which God had a more pleasant relationship with humans based on unity—according to Shariati. ...

Some Marxists may argue that nationalism is “a tool used by the ruling class,” but “[f]or Shariati, the peoples of the Third World could not defeat imperialism, overcome social alienation, and mature to the point when they could borrow Western technology without losing self-esteem unless they first rediscovered their national heritage and their popular cloture (culture? –ed.)”.8...

For Shi’ism, in Shariati’s own words, was not an opiate like many other religions, but was a revolutionary ideology that permeated all spheres of life, including politics, and inspired true believers to fight all forms of exploitation, oppression, and social injustice. He often stressed that the Prophet Muhammad had come to establish not just a religious community but an ummah [community] in constant motion towards progress and social justice. The Prophet’s intention was to establish not just a monotheistic religion but a nezam-i towhid [unitary society] that would be bound together by public virtue, by the common struggle for “justice,” “equality,” “human brotherhood” and “public ownership of the means of production,” and, most significant of all, by the burning desire to create in this world a “classless society.”9

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...Shari‘ati the public speaker who had to weigh his words very carefully, not only because the ever watchful secret police were eager to accuse him as an “Islamic Marxist,” but also because the high-ranking ‘ulama’ instinctively distrusted any layman trespassing on their turf, reinterpreting their age-old doctrines. ...contemporary Iran was at a similar stage of development as pre-Reformation Europe, and consequently political reformers needed to learn from Luther and Calvin, take up tasks appropriate for their environment, and always keep in mind that the Shi‘i ‘ulama’, unlike the medieval European clergy, enjoyed a great deal of influence over the city bourgeoisie as well as over the urban and the rural masses. [2]...

While teaching, he (Ali Shari‘ati – ed.) translated — in a somewhat liberal manner — an Arabic work entitled Abu Zarr: The God-Worshiping Socialist. Written originally by a radical Egyptian novelist named ‘Abd al-Hamid Jawdat al-Sahar, the book traced the life of an early follower of the Prophet who, after Muhammad’s death, had denounced the caliphs as corrupt and had withdrawn to the desert to lead a simple life and speak out on behalf of the hungry and poor against the greedy rich. ...

...the peoples of the Third World could not fight imperialism unless they first regained their cultural identity. In many countries, this was interwoven with their popular religious traditions. Thus, Shari‘ati insisted, the countries of the Third World had to rediscover their religious roots before they could challenge the West. [5] ... Intellectual hacks hired by the (Imperial Iranian – ed.) government accused Shari‘ati of “leading youth astray with anti-clerical propaganda. [6] ...

Third World countries such as Iran need two interconnected and concurrent revolutions: a national revolution that would end all forms of imperial domination and would vitalize — in some countries revitalize — the country’s culture, heritage and national identity; and a social revolution that would end all forms of exploitation, eradicate poverty and capitalism, modernize the economy, and, most important of all, establish a “just,” “dynamic,” and “classless” society. ...

Furthermore, the Prophet’s rightful heirs, Hussein and the other Shi‘i Imams, had raised the banner of revolt because their contemporary rulers, the “corrupt caliphs” and the “court elites,” had betrayed the goals of the umma and the nezam-e tawhid. [12] For Shari‘ati, the Moharram passion plays depicting Hussein’s martrydom at Karbala’ contained one loud and clear message: All Shi‘is, irrespective of time and place, had the sacred duty to oppose, resist and rebel against contemporary ills. [13] Shari‘ati listed the ills of contemporary Iran as “world imperialism, including multinational corporations and cultural imperialism, racism, class exploitation, class oppression, class inequality and gharbzadegi (intoxication with the West). [14]

...he accepted the view that human history was a history of class struggles. In his own words, since the days of Cain and Abel mankind had been divided into two antagonistic camps: On one side stood the oppressed, the people; on the other side stood the oppressors, the rulers. He also dispelled the notion that Marx had been a crude materialist who viewed mankind as a cynical, self-seeking animal uninterested in ideals. Shari’ati even praised Marx for being far less “materialistic” than most “self-styled idealists and so-called religious believers. ...

It is significant that Shari‘ati, in his polemics, did not resort to the stock argument that the clergy invariably used against the left: that Marxists are atheists and blasphemers, and blasphemers are by definition amoral, corrupt, sinful and wicked. On the contrary, in discussing Marxism he argued that what defined a true Muslim was not possession of a “subjective” faith in God, the soul and the afterlife, but rather the willingness to take “concrete” action for the truth:

Examine carefully how the Qur’an uses the word kafir. The word is only used to describe those who refuse to take action (for the Truth – ed.). It is never used to describe those who reject metaphysics or the existence of God, the Soul and the Resurrection. [17]

Shari‘ati accused the ‘ulama’, of becoming an integral part of the ruling class, of “institutionalizing” revolutionary Shi‘ism, and thereby betraying its original goals. ... He sharply criticized the clergy’s oppostion to progressive ideas formulated in the West, particularly the radical concepts advocated by the constitutional revolutionaries of the 1905-1911 period. ... He claimed that the clergy refused to look ahead and instead looked back at some mythical “glorious age,” and treated the scriptures as if they were fossilized, scholastic parchments rather than inspirations for a dynamic revolutionary world outlook. ...

...if revolutionary Islam was the only true Islam, then scholastic Islam was false Islam. If deeds rather than piety were the sure mark of a genuine believer, then revolutionaries — even if uneducated — were better Muslims than the learned but conservative ‘ulama’. If faith rather than learning gave one true understanding, then devout lay fighters had a better understanding of Islam than the scholastic clergy. And if social science was the key to understanding the dual national-social revolutions, then concerned Iranians study study sociology and political economy rather than theology. ...

Shari‘ati’s name has now become a major prize, fought over by rival political groups. The clerics heading the dominant Islamic Republican Party eulogize him, write sermons about his life, and often cite his works concerning Shi‘i roots, cultural revolutions, shortcomings of communist movements and the need to struggle against foreign imperialism. Not surprisingly, they often censor his anti-clerical views and deny that he was ever influenced by the West.

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But, as practice has shown, no religious ideas or doctrines are capable of suppressing people’s natural, indestructible urge not only to preserve their existence, but also to improve the material conditions of their lives and defend their vital interests and rights.

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(As of December 1987)

Iran is militarily significant to the United States in containing the southward expansion of the Soviet Union. But the vicissitudes of U.S. policy toward Iran suggest that there has been no crystallisation of a conclusion as to whether the Islamic Republican regime is a greater liability than an asset.Résumé (Abstract)

Fears of a pro-Soviet Iran waned when confronted with a revolutionary regime that was, at the very least, fiercely independent. ... Brzezinski, relieved by the intensity of Khomeini's anti-Soviet attitudes, was less sanguine regarding Bazargan's prospects and somewhat attracted to the idea of a functional alliance with a charismatic, tough, anticommunist, religio-political leader in Iran. 15 ... (p. 35) 

For several years following the release of the hostages, the Reagan administration seemed little concerned with the implications of the Iranian revolution as it had evolved. ...

The new Islamic regime in Iran, fiercely independent and obviously able to command the loyalty of a significant section of the population, remained the United States' most natural ally in the struggle against Soviet expansionism. In addition, it proved to be a good economic partner for friendly states and was not perceived in Israel as a significant threat. ...

It was this logic that provided much of the rationale for the covert and exploratory move toward Iran that occurred in the arms-for-hostages deal. (pp. 36–7)

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On 1/23/2020 at 3:09 PM, Ashvazdanghe said:

Salam at begining Mr..Mosadegh & Ayt Kashani had anti tyranical ideas that they could force Shah to peacefully leaved power in their hands & left Iran but Mosadegh & his party turned to communists & made good relation with soviet unions beside that they were seeing Ayt Kashani & clerics like him just as a tool for controlling masses of people because politicians like Mosaddegh & his party had no connection with people like other elites but for turning toward communists Ayt Kashani becomes neutral about him & his party that America & Britain take the time & created false stories about receiving money by him through them to destroy image of Ayt Kashani between his followers & preventing people to join again to people like as Imam Khomeini (رضي الله عنه) that used ayt Kashani heritage which Americans again made stories about supporting him also after Iran revolution political  inheritors of Mosadegh like as Mr. Bazargan & Bani Sadr became first two presidents of Iran that first one resigned after ho staging American embassy & second one showed their true face that tried to replace clerics with MKO terrorists as their old communists ally by support of sovite union  that now all of their remnants are receiving financial aids but their only presence limited in gathering of old politicians beside othet Iranian opposition parties.

Though, I was clear on this. But for the reality check, a good answer for those who really 'care' about Iran.

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1 hour ago, Zainuu said:

Though, I was clear on this.

? Do you kindly care to point out just where you did so?

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But for the reality check, a good answer for those who really 'care' about Iran.

Did you read all the excerpts and sources I posted?

Are you Iranian? Do you have firsthand knowledge to share?

The balance of evidence I’ve seen and researched suggests that the clergy, at least in part, did collaborate with the U.S. and Britain to remove Mossadegh and restore the Shah to power. Additionally, other excerpts I’ve posted suggest that the West and Israel viewed the USSR as a bigger threat than the nascent Islamic Republic at the time of the Revolution. That would explain all the Iran-Contra dealings. Brzezinski and Kissinger, in particular, did support Islamic/Islamist movements, both Sunni and Shia, to counter secular nationalism and Soviet communism. Cf. U.S. support for Sadat, Zia, and other pro-Islamist, pro-Zionist clients in the MENA and its environs, from Egypt to Pakistan and Afghanistan (the mujahideen: Muslim Brotherhood, al-Qaida, Taliban...). As for Iraq’s invasion of Iran, maybe the West supported that as well to solidify Imam Khomeini’s dominance—vis-à-vis the “rally-around-the-Leader/nation” effect—as well as weaken both sides of the conflict, while keeping the Soviets out and hindering secularist, leftist influence(s), especially Soviet-oriented ones such as that of the Tudeh Party. Of course the West also used Trotskyist terrorists such as those of the MKO to harm Iran, but also made sure that no single anti-IRI force became dominant. Nevertheless, documentation seems to support the theory that the West and Israel viewed Islamic fundamentalism/revivalism as a lesser threat than secular nationalism and/or Soviet-style communism, and even viewed the former as a strategic asset to be deployed against potential Soviet incursion(s). Religious movements were viewed as means to strengthen foreign control, undermine industrialisation, and prevent the formation of large working classes, while preventing the masses from having access to modernisation.

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31 minutes ago, Northwest said:

Do you kindly care to point out just where you did so?

It is logical. I don't know what plans Ayatullah Kashani had in 53 or what was the stance of Shia clerics in Iran during 1953. Even if what you said is true. Logically, it leads us to nowhere. After 79, Iran and US have been one of the biggest enemies. So, how will you justify this with that? 

And regarding collaborations:

Well, Iran collaborated with US through Qassem Suleimani to attack Taliban in Afghanistan. Iran even wanted to help US topple Saddam because he was a common enemy but Bush turned against Iran itself. 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/01/03/when-united-states-qasem-soleimani-worked-together/

Iran presented a 5-point plan to US with oustanding concessions even to the level of recognizing Israel if Palestinian land is given back. But Bush didn't even read it. 

31 minutes ago, Northwest said:

Did you read all the excerpts and sources I posted?

No, I have not read what you wrote completely. But I'm not even answering you brother. This was for those who try to spew hate about Iran without a reason. And yes, criticism should be answered. So, your points need to be addressed.

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