Epistemology in Sharif Murtada's Dhakhira

[guest 34193]

as-salam `alaykum,

I wrote this after writing that last piece on epistemology in Shaykh Mufid's Nukat I posted earlier here. It was done as part of a philosophy course in epistemology I took (so yes, I have actually done some formal study in this field that I've elsewhere on this forum critiqued ;-) Anyhow, this piece was a follow up of sorts to it, but this time going over some of the epistemological ideas present in Sharif Murtada's adh-Dhakhira which is written on kalaam. I'd wanted to revise it some prior to posting adding in some information that I neglected to mention but which Murtadha (ar) does go over, but haven't seemed to have gotten around to it and would rather just ahead and put it out there than not doing so at all, so here it is rather unrevised.

In connection with recent discussion, I would like to point out though how Sharif Murtada is an example of someone writing on profoundly intellectual topics, with critical reasoning and argument, etc., but who is not counted as a "philosopher", that is in the sense of being a proponent of "falsafa". Anyhow, here's the paper:

Necessary and Acquired Knowledge

in Sayyid Murtada’s Dhakhira

In Shaykh Mufid’s Nukat al-`Itiqadiyya, we saw the definition of knowledge as being a belief of something upon what it really is, accompanied by the tranquility of the self capable of resisting presented objections. What the Shaykh did not go into in this brief work however was the further division of knowledge into necessary knowledge (al-`ilm ad-daruri) and acquired knowledge (al-`ilm al-muktasab) which occupies a prominent place in other Muslim scholastic theological (kalami) discussions. For that, we will turn to the book adh-Dhakhira fii `Ilm al-Kalam by his student (and respected scholar in his own right) Sayyid Murtada (d. 436 AH). The schema he presents is summarized below, with explanation to follow:

In adh-Dhakhira, the Sayyid defines necessary knowledge as that which the knower cannot deny to his self, such as the witnessing of the senses. In turn, necessary knowledge is further subdivided into two categories. The first type is that necessary knowledge which occurs due to a cause, without which the knowledge would not be. The second type is that which occurs in the rational individual initially, that is, without a prior cause or other knowledge.

The necessary knowledge that occurs via a cause may be divided into two sub-divisions. The first type is that knowledge which is necessary when its cause occurs, such as the knowledge that comes about via the perception of the senses provided the individual’s intellect is sound and with the absence of disturbance. So for instance, if a viewer who is sane, in possession of his faculties and isn’t blind, sees a book in front of him on a table, he therefore necessarily knows that there is book in front of him with the sense of sight being the cause at hand. Even where he to play the skeptic and outwardly deny he knew there was a book in front of him, he would not be able to deny it inwardly to his self (again, assuming he is sane).

The second type of necessary knowledge that occurs via a cause is that which described as that which occurs by habit (b’il-`adda). This second type is further subdivided into knowledge that is based on a custom which is continuous, and that which differs on an individual level. The first of these appears to be referring to the notion of the khabar al-mutawatira, that is, the report that is so widespread (having many different chain of narration reporting the same event, to the point denial of said event is not possible). The second is referring to the knowledge one has after one has learned a skill, craft, and so forth. Once you’ve learned the latter, you cannot actively unlearn it.

The second division of necessary knowledge, that knowledge which occurs initially in the individual, is logical tautologies. Examples given are than the existent can only be originated or eternal, that the known can only exist or not exist, the impossibility of a single body occupying two places while in a single state, and so forth. These would appear as self-evident truths.

The second major division of knowledge is acquired knowledge, which is defined as being that knowledge which the knower can deny it in his self with the appearance of objections, that is, one is able to change their mind about it. Acquired knowledge is also divided into two categories: that which is born by speculation in an indication, and that which occurs without speculation.

As to first type of acquired knowledge, that born by speculation, he says it comes by discussion via the permission of God. The word here for discursion is kalam, literally meaning speech, but which is also the term used for scholastic theology. What he might be saying here is that rationale speculation in theology is in fact a means to knowledge albeit a knowledge that is acquired and capable of change with the new appearance of an objection. The other type of acquired knowledge is that which the waking person knows prior to their sleep, and which acts upon it in their sleep. This is unclear to me, however what he might be saying is that the knowledge that one has in the state of dreaming is acquired from whatever one knows in the waking state, however it is an acquisition minus the actual process of speculation and thinking, i.e. a direct, passive reception of the knowledge from the waking state.

Acquired knowledge comes about by our own actions (i.e. our own speculations in the first subset), whereas necessary knowledge comes about by an action of another within us (e.g. our knowledge of their being a book on the table is in reaction to the book actually being on the table in the case of sensual perception).

Knowledge is furthermore described as being correct (sahih) in that the knower is at peace with what he knows while doubt is lifted from him. Man is able to have this attribute of knowing when disturbance and objections are removed from him. Due to this, we see that rational people base their acts on the presence of this attribute. That is, they withdraw themselves from fire when it is brought close, they flee from wild animals upon seeing them, etc. These primal urges indicate a state of knowledge in the individual (i.e. that fire will burn and wild animals may eat you). One’s reaction to said knowledge though is going to depend of course on other factors than simply knowing their likely consequences (perhaps the person is masochistic or suicidal and thus might act in a contra-rational fashion). The Sayyid then states that there is no basis to the sophist’s objection to this (or we might say, the skeptic’s) as it is known that even the sophist will act on the above knowledge that they are denying. Thus, the sophist is a liar.

The above summarizes the view of Sayyid Murtada on the division of necessary and acquired knowledge. It may be objected that some of what is termed necessary knowledge, particularly that knowledge which occurs via a cause, is actually acquired (such as the knowledge one has via learning a craft). However, this would be confusing the concept of necessary knowledge with that of a priori knowledge. A priori knowledge appears to correspond with the necessary knowledge that is described as appearing in the individual, that is, those logical tautologies which are impossible to deny. Necessary knowledge however is wider than this, and refers to that knowledge that cannot be denied and undone even if the means to obtaining said knowledge where of a posterior nature (we’ll exclude the cases where an individual loses possession of their mental faculties here as they are not the ordinary case). Acquired knowledge however is mutable.

It ought to be mentioned that not all theologians would have agreed with the division which has been laid out here. For example, some denied that there was actually such a thing as acquired knowledge; rather, all knowledge was regarded as necessary. For instance, the Zahirite theologian Ibn Hazm believed that knowledge was the conviction of something according to its actual state (as it really is), and as such, cannot be overturned. If something is not actual knowledge, which he would classify perception under, then it is relegated to supposition, presumption (zann) instead. Other theologians who accepted the two-fold division might none the less have understood it differently. For instance, the Mu`tazilite theologian `Abd al-Jabbar divided necessary knowledge into three parts: 1) initial knowledge which occurs without an external means, further subdivided into a) knowledge of one’s own state b ) knowledge based on experience (under which ethics is understood) and c) knowledge of two alternatives, that is, that something either exists or doesn’t, that an existent is either eternal or temporal, etc. (similar perhaps to Leibniz’s non-contradiction) 2) knowledge which take place via a means, that is, via perceptibles and 3) knowledge which takes place via something that resembles a means. This latter case refers to that knowledge which depends on the knowledge of something of, for example, one cannot know that God is Eternal and Knowing unless one first knows that God exists.

Bibliography

Abrahamov, Binyamin (1993) “Necessary Knowledge in Islamic Theology” in British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 20-32

Ash-Sharif al-Murtadha ad-Dhakhira fii `Ilm al-Kalam. Qum, Iran Mu’assis an-Nashr al-Islami 1991

Muhammad ibn Nu`man (Shaykh Mufid) an-Nukat fii Muqaddimat al-Usool. Qum, Iran al-Mu’tamir al-`Alimi li-Alfiyya ash-Shaykh al-Mufid 1993

Edited October 30, 2008 by macisaac

[zuhair_naqvi]

In Shaykh Mufid’s Nukat al-`Itiqadiyya, we saw the definition of knowledge as being a belief of something upon what it really is, accompanied by the tranquility of the self capable of resisting presented objections. What the Shaykh did not go into in this brief work however was the further division of knowledge into necessary knowledge (al-`ilm ad-daruri) and acquired knowledge (al-`ilm al-muktasab) which occupies a prominent place in other Muslim scholastic theological (kalami) discussions. For that, we will turn to the book adh-Dhakhira fii `Ilm al-Kalam by his student (and respected scholar in his own right) Sayyid Murtada (d. 436 AH). The schema he presents is summarized below, with explanation to follow:

From my study of western philosophy, that sounds suspiciously similar to Plato's tripartite theory of knowledge, where Plato says that for a phenomenon to be considered "knowledge", it must meet three conditions:

1. The phenomenon should be true.

2. The knower must believe in the phenomenon.

3. The knower must have justification (the tranquility of the self capable of resisting presented objections)

In official words:

A subject S knows that a proposition P is true if, and only if:

1. P is true

2. S believes that P is true, and

3. S is justified in believing that P is true

The tripartite theory has been around since Plato, and though it is still widely used by many philosophers as a working model of knowledge, is false. This was shown to the satisfaction of most philosophers by Edmond Gettier, who developed what are now known as Gettier cases.

Gettier cases are cases in which the tripartite theory’s three conditions for knowledge are satisfied, i.e. in which a person does have a justified true belief, but in which there is no knowledge. The existence of such cases shows that there is something more to knowledge than justified true belief, and so that the tripartite theory of knowledge is false.

Suppose that two students, Mark and Sam, have taken a test. Mark is a straight A student, while Sam consistently fails any work he is set. Mark has attended the lessons in preparation for the test, while Sam has been absent due to illness. Mark revised hard for the test, while Sam stayed out all night at a party. Mark wrote furiously for the full duration of the test, while Sam wrote a few lines and then walked out in disgust. Mark says that the test went well, while Sam says that he didn’t even understand the question.

Reflecting on the test, and on a book that he has recently been reading, Sam forms the following belief: the student that will get the highest grade on the test shares a name with the author of The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn." Sam clearly has excellent evidence for this belief, he is justified in believing it; he has excellent evidence that Mark will get the highest grade on the test, and can see from the cover of his copy of "The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn that it was written by Mark Twain. Furthermore, the belief is true; the student that will get the highest grade on the test does indeed share a name with the author of "The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn." According to the tripartite theory of knowledge, therefore, Sam knows that the student that will get the highest grade on the test shares a name with the author of "The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn."

Sam, however, does not know this. Mark, despite his excellent grades in the past, perfect attendance, hours of revision, furious writing, and confidence, failed the test. He did not appreciate the subtlety of the question, and so missed its point entirely. Sam, on the other hand, despite his previous poor grades, frequent absences, late night partying, and pessimism concerning his performance, did understand the question. In the few lines that he wrote he managed to s[Edited Out]e a passing grade. Sam, therefore, rather than Mark, got the highest grade on the test.

Unknown to Sam, though, he does share a name with the author of The Adventure of Huckleberry Finn." Its author, who used the pseudonym Mark Twain, was in fact called Samuel Clemens. Sam, therefore, the student who will get the highest grade on the test, does share a name with the author of Huckleberry Finn."

Although Sam clearly did have a justified true belief, he equally clearly did not have knowledge. His justification for his belief, far from helping him to discern the truth, threatened to lead him astray. The truth of his belief had nothing to with his reasons for holding it; it was nothing more than good luck that the belief that he formed was true.

This example, and other Gettier cases like it, show that it is possible to have justified true belief without having knowledge; the tripartite theory of knowledge, which holds that justified true belief and knowledge are precisely the same thing, is therefore false.

Just curious, did Sheikh al Mufid or al Murtada manage to beat Gettier's cases?

[guest 34193]

Ah Gettier problems... Yeah, the class I took on epistemology was largely concerned with contemporary responses to this. However what you've quoted about Plato is incorrect (though it's a common mistake). While the JTB (justified true belief) definition of knowledge is widely credited to him, what's often not mentioned is that he also rejected this idea. From his Theaetetus:

SOCRATES: So, apparently, to the question, What is knowledge [epistémê]? our definition will reply: 'Correct belief [dóxa orthé] together with knowledge [epistémê] of a differentness'; for, according to it, 'adding an account [lógos]' will come to that.

THEAETETUS: So it seems.

SOCRATES: Yes; and when we are inquiring after the nature of knowledge, nothing could be sillier [euéthes] than to say that it is correct belief together with a knowledge of differentness or of anything whatever.

So, Theaetetus, neither perception, nor true belief, nor the addition of an 'account' to true belief can be knowledge.

THEAETETUS: Apparently not.

From http://www.friesian.com/knowledg.htm

As to the definition accepted by al-Mufid and al-Murtada, they differ from the JTB by the "tranquility (or stillness) of the self" part. That latter is not the same as justification but rather refers to an internal condition of the knower themselves. This is what I wrote in the last paper (S is subject, p is proposition, Bp is belief in p, and Sn is sukun an-nafs, tranquility of the self):

Shaykh Mufid (apparently agreeing here with the earlier Basran scholar, Abu Hashim (d. 933)) defines knowledge (`ilm) as being the belief of something upon what it is, accompanied by the tranquility (sukun) of the self that believes in. The word here for tranquility can also be translated as calm, quiet, and so on. The tranquility of the self is explain to mean a nature by which the capability to deny doubt (shubha) about that which is contrary to the belief results, by way of its setting in from contemplation and proof. Later on, the shubha is defined as being that which befalls the self from a falsehood (batil, void) that strips from it a truth (haqq).

Thus, we may understand that S knows p if and only if p and Bp and Sn (sukun an-nafs, tranquility of the self). Comparing Sn to modern epistemological theories, it does seem to share some basis with Lehrer’s indefeasibility theory, wherein K knows p if and only if a) p b ) S accepts p c) p is evident for S and d) there is no false proposition f such that if were doubtful for S, then p would not be evident for S. The sukun an-nafs would appear to share some common features with both c) and d) in Lehrer’s formulation. That is, in the event a doubt (objection, shubha) is presented to the subject, something which is in opposition to the belief that the subject is said to be knowing, then the subject will continue to believe in what it knows due to the knowledge having set in by reason of contemplation and proof, this latter qualifier lining up with c) in Lehrer’s thought. The denying of the shubha, necessary to the sukun an-nafs, here seems close to Lehrer’s notion of competing and beating. If this is not the case, the shubha causes one to not believe in p, then S did not actually know p. In the following definitions, this idea implicit in Lehrer’s competition (of a duality of opposition), is carried out to a number of core concepts of truth and knowing, e.g. truth and falsehood, doubt and certainty, good and evil, etc.

Edited October 30, 2008 by macisaac

[The Persian Shah]

In connection with recent discussion, I would like to point out though how Sharif Murtada is an example of someone writing on profoundly intellectual topics, with critical reasoning and argument, etc., but who is not counted as a "philosopher", that is in the sense of being a proponent of "falsafa"

Highly amsuing. Do you imagine that epistemology was an issue not covered in the writings of those you are continually degrading and whom you are referring to in this statement ? Yet somehow you manage to attribute praise to the former, but kufr to the latter. If such topics are indeed prasieworthy, then you should give it to all those who discuss it..

This imaginary distinction you make between the classical and post-classical philosophers is evidently an unsupported one. And fyi, imho, this is a better way to refer to them, rather than just "proponents of philosophy", and "proponents of falsafa", which I've seen you repeatedly using (and both mean exactly the same thing btw)..

[guest 34193]

Highly amsuing. Do you imagine that epistemology was an issue not covered in the writings of those you are continually degrading and whom you are referring to in this statement ? Yet somehow you manage to attribute praise to the former, but kufr to the latter. If such topics are indeed prasieworthy, then you should give it to all those who discuss it..

One can discuss economics without thereby becoming a Marxist, and one's discussing of it does not mean you have to heap praise on commies because they talk about it too... Similarly, one can discuss epistemology and other intellectual topics without thereby becoming a faylasuf (whether of the Masha'i, Ishraqi, or Isfahan schools).

Edited October 31, 2008 by macisaac

[The Persian Shah]

One can discuss economics without thereby becoming a Marxist, and one's discussing of it does not mean you have to heap praise on commies because they talk about it too... Similarly, one can discuss epistemology and other intellectual topics without thereby becoming a faylasuf (whether of the Masha'i, Ishraqi, or Isfahan schools).

The qiyas is flawed. If you were to match it up correctly, it would be:

- Discussion of an economic issue - such interest for example - is labelled an economic discourse.

- Discussion of an philosophical issue - such as epistemology for example - is labelled a philosophical discourse.

Now, the view one holds in a particular field is irrelevant. If you are arguing for or against it (socialist, capitalist, etc), you would still be an economist regardless. Likewise, if you are arguing for against a specific model/concept of a particular theory, you would still be a philosopher regardless (whether you be masha`i, al-hikmat al-muta`aliyah, etc)

But anyway - that wasn't my main point. Let's have a look at what you said again:

In connection with recent discussion, I would like to point out though how Sharif Murtada is an example of someone writing on profoundly intellectual topics, with critical reasoning and argument, etc

You attribute praise to this man, because he is "writing" on "profoundly intellectual topics" (i.e. epistemology), with "critical reasoning and argument"..

If this is the case, then what of the proponents of other schools of thought, which "write" on exactly the same "profoundly intellectual topics" with "critical reasoning and argument" ? How is that you issue one of these scholars praise, and the other takfir ?

[guest 34193]

Now, the view one holds in a particular field is irrelevant. If you are arguing for or against it (socialist, capitalist, etc), you would still be an economist regardless. Likewise, if you are arguing for against a specific model/concept of a particular theory, you would still be a philosopher regardless (whether you be masha`i, al-hikmat al-muta`aliyah, etc)

You attribute praise to this man, because he is "writing" on "profoundly intellectual topics" (i.e. epistemology), with "critical reasoning and argument"..

If this is the case, then what of the proponents of other schools of thought, which "write" on exactly the same "profoundly intellectual topics" with "critical reasoning and argument" ?

The faylasuf does not have exclusive rights to thinking... Anyhow, tell you what. Why don't you actually study the history of falsafa in the Muslim world (how it arose, who it's main proponents were and what were the various schools of thought amongst them), the schools of thought in kalaam and its major figures, the conflict between the proponents of kalaam and those of falsafa, etc. and then maybe we can talk. I say this because evidently you've not done so, and trying to discuss these things without that background study is not only futile, it's really annoying. You seem to continually equate all intellectual discourse with philosophy, which in the context of Muslim history is just flat out wrong and demonstrates a basic lack of historical background in the subject.

How is that you issue one of these scholars praise, and the other takfir ?

You know, this is really tiring. I've seen you go off accusing me and others of being wahabi-like, that we do takfir, that we're extremists, blah blah blah. You know, there's this thing called critique and disagreement. Your philosophers actually did quite a bit of that, are you going to accuse them of all being wahabi-like now too?

And finally, WHAT DOES THIS HAVE TO DO WITH THE TOPIC OF MY PAPER??? At least Zuhair was up to discussing that with his question about Gettier problems. All you've done is come in with more ad hominem attacks that have little to nothing to do with the topic of the thread.

Edited November 1, 2008 by macisaac

[zuhair_naqvi]

Ah Gettier problems... Yeah, the class I took on epistemology was largely concerned with contemporary responses to this. However what you've quoted about Plato is incorrect (though it's a common mistake). While the JTB (justified true belief) definition of knowledge is widely credited to him, what's often not mentioned is that he also rejected this idea. From his Theaetetus:

SOCRATES: So, apparently, to the question, What is knowledge [epistémê]? our definition will reply: 'Correct belief [dóxa orthé] together with knowledge [epistémê] of a differentness'; for, according to it, 'adding an account [lógos]' will come to that.

THEAETETUS: So it seems.

SOCRATES: Yes; and when we are inquiring after the nature of knowledge, nothing could be sillier [euéthes] than to say that it is correct belief together with a knowledge of differentness or of anything whatever.

So, Theaetetus, neither perception, nor true belief, nor the addition of an 'account' to true belief can be knowledge.

THEAETETUS: Apparently not.

From http://www.friesian.com/knowledg.htm

As to the definition accepted by al-Mufid and al-Murtada, they differ from the JTB by the "tranquility (or stillness) of the self" part. That latter is not the same as justification but rather refers to an internal condition of the knower themselves. This is what I wrote in the last paper (S is subject, p is proposition, Bp is belief in p, and Sn is sukun an-nafs, tranquility of the self):

Shaykh Mufid (apparently agreeing here with the earlier Basran scholar, Abu Hashim (d. 933)) defines knowledge (`ilm) as being the belief of something upon what it is, accompanied by the tranquility (sukun) of the self that believes in. The word here for tranquility can also be translated as calm, quiet, and so on. The tranquility of the self is explain to mean a nature by which the capability to deny doubt (shubha) about that which is contrary to the belief results, by way of its setting in from contemplation and proof. Later on, the shubha is defined as being that which befalls the self from a falsehood (batil, void) that strips from it a truth (haqq).

Thus, we may understand that S knows p if and only if p and Bp and Sn (sukun an-nafs, tranquility of the self). Comparing Sn to modern epistemological theories, it does seem to share some basis with Lehrer’s indefeasibility theory, wherein K knows p if and only if a) p b ) S accepts p c) p is evident for S and d) there is no false proposition f such that if were doubtful for S, then p would not be evident for S. The sukun an-nafs would appear to share some common features with both c) and d) in Lehrer’s formulation. That is, in the event a doubt (objection, shubha) is presented to the subject, something which is in opposition to the belief that the subject is said to be knowing, then the subject will continue to believe in what it knows due to the knowledge having set in by reason of contemplation and proof, this latter qualifier lining up with c) in Lehrer’s thought. The denying of the shubha, necessary to the sukun an-nafs, here seems close to Lehrer’s notion of competing and beating. If this is not the case, the shubha causes one to not believe in p, then S did not actually know p. In the following definitions, this idea implicit in Lehrer’s competition (of a duality of opposition), is carried out to a number of core concepts of truth and knowing, e.g. truth and falsehood, doubt and certainty, good and evil, etc.

"Tranquility (or stillness) of the self" or "sukoone nafs" is no more than a justification with which one's self is satisfied and is still vulnerable to Gettier's cases because it can't escape false premise

And in reality, i.e., in application, it's impossible to escape false premise because it arises due to imperfect knowledge which is inherent in all humans. But on the other hand Gettier CANNOT be correct because if you believe in creationism and you believe that the creator has created with a purpose then there needs to be a criterion of perfect / complete knowledge, not vulnerable to false premise. Otherwise purpose will have to be based on chance.

The following verse of holy Quran solves this problem:

[Aale Imran : 7]

åõæó ÇáøóÐöíó ÃóäÒóáó Úóáóíúßó ÇáúßöÊóÇÈó ãöäúåõ ÂíóÇÊñ ãøõÍúßóãóÇÊñ åõäøó Ãõãøõ ÇáúßöÊóÇÈö æóÃõÎóÑõ ãõÊóÔóÇÈöåóÇÊñ ÝóÃóãøóÇ ÇáøóÐöíäó Ýí ÞõáõæÈöåöãú ÒóíúÛñ ÝóíóÊøóÈöÚõæäó ãóÇ ÊóÔóÇÈóåó ãöäúåõ ÇÈúÊöÛóÇÁ ÇáúÝöÊúäóÉö æóÇÈúÊöÛóÇÁ ÊóÃúæöíáöåö æóãóÇ íóÚúáóãõ ÊóÃúæöíáóåõ ÅöáÇøó Çááøåõ æóÇáÑøóÇÓöÎõæäó Ýöí ÇáúÚöáúãö íóÞõæáõæäó ÂãóäøóÇ Èöåö ßõáøñ ãøöäú ÚöäÏö ÑóÈøöäóÇ æóãóÇ íóÐøóßøóÑõ ÅöáÇøó ÃõæúáõæÇú ÇáÃáúÈóÇÈö

Therefore the response to Gettier's cases and the only possible refuge from false premise is the concept of ismah.

[misbah 2004]

Rather off-topic but now that falsafa has been brought up, there is this really detailed and informative book called A history of muslim philosophy that I am currently reading. Anyone who wants to talk for/against falsafa should read this, I think.

It's available online too.

A History of Muslim Philosophy - Edited and Introduced by M. M. SHARIF

[The Persian Shah]

The faylasuf does not have exclusive rights to thinking...

No-one claimed so. But yes - certain topics, such as epistemology, do without a shadow of doubt fall under the field of philosophy (is it not suprising how it has come up in your philosophy degree ?). Philosophy = Falsafa. It is just the Persian word for it. This is a direct translation; and I see no more extra connotations (at least none of those you are implying) being attached to the word "falsafa", then there being so to the word "philosophy". This is also why I told you to define the term more precisely (e.g. classical/post-classical), and I am interested to see how {a} you will do so and achieve your objective of only including certain thinkers that you like, and excluding those that you don't and {b} how accurate such a definition actually is in real life.

You know, this is really tiring. I've seen you go off accusing me and others of being wahabi-like, that we do takfir, that we're extremists, blah blah blah. You know, there's this thing called critique and disagreement. Your philosophers actually did quite a bit of that, are you going to accuse them of all being wahabi-like now too?

And finally, WHAT DOES THIS HAVE TO DO WITH THE TOPIC OF MY PAPER??? At least Zuhair was up to discussing that with his question about Gettier problems. All you've done is come in with more ad hominem attacks that have little to nothing to do with the topic of the thread.

I have no problem with intellectual disagreement - such as that between Tabataba`i [QS] and Mutahhari [QS] (yes, even the best don't agree on everything); which can be likened to that of you and zuhair_naqvi - but what I have a problem is with unjustified disagreement of the entire field and an outright ban on all it's topics & thinkers included. If the other thread was still available, then I would post direct arguments of yours which explicitly mentioned this. You have told me them so many times that I know them off by heart now (:P): "No textual references for such topics => Not real 'Imamism' => Bid`at", "Thinkers disagree => Entire field is bogus", etc. In light of such comments, this is why it was "amusing", that you have taken up a "philosophy degree" and written an article on "epistemology"..

And yes, this is relevant to the thread, otherwise you wouldn't have mentioned it yourself in the first post..

[Hannibal]

I believe that the issue here with some members is that they confuse philosophy which has very general meanings and falsafa in the Islamic world. Falsafa does not refer to 'philosophy' as we know it in the West which has a very general meaning. Falsafa specifically refers to peripatetic philosophy. For the non-specialists, peripatetic philosophy is Aristotelian philosophy (sometimes mixed with Platonic and neo-platonic themes).

The problem here is not philosophy in general which is what Sharif al-Murtada was doing, but falsafa, or peripatetic philosophy which makes some specific claims that tend to breed controversy amongst Muslim scholars. Some of the followers of this branch have been Ibn Rushd, Ibn Sina, Suhruwardi, etc.

I do agree that in modern days, falsafa has become synonymous with philosophy in general, however in technical terms, falsafa refers to a specific kind or branch of philosophy.

Edited November 2, 2008 by Hezbullahi

[The Persian Shah]

I believe that the issue here with some members is that they confuse philosophy which has very general meanings and falsafa in the Islamic world. Falsafa does not refer to 'philosophy' as we know it in the West which has a very general meaning. Falsafa specifically refers to peripatetic philosophy. For the non-specialists, peripatetic philosophy is Aristotelian philosophy (sometimes mixed with Platonic and neo-platonic themes).

The problem here is not philosophy in general which is what Sharif al-Murtada was doing, but falsafa, or peripatetic philosophy which makes some specific claims that tend to breed controversy amongst Muslim scholars. Some of the followers of this branch have been Ibn Rushd, Ibn Sina, Suhruwardi, etc.

I do agree that in modern days, falsafa has become synonymous with philosophy in general, however in technical terms, falsafa refers to a specific kind or branch of philosophy.

This is much closer to a proper definition, but the ultimate claim is still an unsupported one - besides being highly inaccurate anyway. Where has it ever been the case that the word falsafa was used to refer to solely peripatetic philosophy ?

I noticed that you included Suhruwadi amongst this group, whereas it is known by all that he was not a peripatetic philosopher at all. So you've already shot yourself in the foot. And I haven't even asked about the likes of Mulla Sadra who makes a mix between certain other schools of thought, and sufi metaphysics which are to be seen no where on the radar if you are talking about being a masha`i..

So to sum up, as I said in post #10, you have neither {a} achieved your objective to provide a rigourous definition to refer to those thinkers who like and exclude those who you don't nor {b} given a real and accurate definition of the word..

[guest 34193]

This is much closer to a proper definition, but the ultimate claim is still an unsupported one - besides being highly inaccurate anyway. Where has it ever been the case that the word falsafa was used to refer to solely peripatetic philosophy ?

I noticed that you included Suhruwadi amongst this group, whereas it is known by all that he was not a peripatetic philosopher at all. So you've already shot yourself in the foot. And I haven't even asked about the likes of Mulla Sadra who makes a mix between certain other schools of thought, and sufi metaphysics which are to be seen no where on the radar if you are talking about being a masha`i..

So to sum up, as I said in post #10, you have neither {a} achieved your objective to provide a rigourous definition to refer to those thinkers who like and exclude those who you don't nor {b} given a real and accurate definition of the word..

Yes, you are correct that Suhrawardi was not a Masha'i philosopher, rather he was the founder of the Ishraqi (Illuminist) school. And then you do have the later philosophers of the school of Isfahan, such as Mulla Sadra and then his later followers. The point is though (and the reason why I am often specifically using the term falsafa here instead of philosophy) is that in the context of Muslim history, philosophy and philosophers refers to very specific schools of thought and their adherents which traditionally were considered to be distinct from say the kalam and the mutakallimeen. Sharif Murtada for instance would be considered a mutakallim, not a faylasuf. In a layman's sense yes, what he was writing about might be considered as "philosophy" or philosophical, but in the Muslim context it would not be. And this key distinction is something that if you'd do a proper study of the history of different schools of thought amongst Muslims should be very apparent.

As to myself, my criticism is first specifically to philosophy in the "falsafa" sense. That is, it's these schools of thought that I find to have some serious problems in them, and to not be fully compatible with Imami doctrine. That said, this is not to deny that there might be some useful material found in their arguments, but what's very critical there is to separate the chaff from the wheat, something I'd imagine very difficult (if not impossible) for the untrained layman without a proper background in Imami teachings (from it's primary sources) to do. Now take someone like `Allama Hilli for instance, who was very conversant in falsafa (and multiple other disciplines, hence, `Allama...) and who might use some of that material as a means of explaining/defending his beliefs and apparently wrote some material explaining Ibn Sina'in material, but still where the falsafa and kalam would differ, the falsafa would go out the window. As such, he also is not counted as a faylasuf.

Extending the above, I would also have a problem with certain broader philosophical tendencies, where everything can get subjected to their limited rationalism, and I also would question the validity of certain philosophical topics as to whether there is actually any meaning in the concept beyond the conceptual framework itself (sort of like the logical positivists' (like Russell) rejection of metaphysics, though again I'd stress I'm certainly no positivist). And as an Imami, I would also stress that for someone wanting to understand the more important and deep truths of reality, the Quran and teachings of the Ma`sumin need to be his beginning, middle and end in terms of where he's getting those truths from.

Arguing with you though, it's really apparent you haven't done a broad study of this, and are arguing against straw men. Your "opponent" in your mind is some narrow minded wahhabi-like extremist who labels anything slightly different from his limited viewpoint as a being shirk or bid`a. I'd argue that's not what I am, but anyhow this is irrelevant. Like I said, do some proper study then we can discuss, in sha Allah.

[The Persian Shah]

I think I have figured out the problem: You are deliberately trying to be as vague as you can (Most likely because you are not sure yourself or don't know what you are talking about).

Ok, so now after failing to provide a definition for falsafa/philosophy, you've moved to talking about philosophy/theology [i.e. kalam] instead. This distinction is much more clear - however, now I am 100% certain you have no idea what you are on about (as will be evident from later questions/comments) - besides which, you still haven't reached your objective of accurately defining your target group :P..

Sharif Murtada for instance would be considered a mutakallim, not a faylasuf. In a layman's sense yes, what he was writing about might be considered as "philosophy" or philosophical, but in the Muslim context it would not be.

There is no such thing. Nowhere - in any history - does epistemology come under kalam as opposed to falsafa. Do you even have any idea what kalam/theology means and the differences between it and falsafa/philosophy ? In addition, it does not matter what Sharif Murtada is "considered" to be (or at least, what you consider him to be) - what matters is that the topic specifically under question is universally & unanimously recognised as a being categorised under falsafa, not kalam.

As to myself, my criticism is first specifically to philosophy in the "falsafa" sense. That is, it's these schools of thought that I find to have some serious problems in them, and to not be fully compatible with Imami doctrine.

You have mentioned this general statement many times, but have consistently failed to show any specific case where this is true (again, because I think you don't actually know any)..

and I also would question the validity of certain philosophical topics as to whether there is actually any meaning in the concept beyond the conceptual framework itself (sort of like the logical positivists' (like Russell) rejection of metaphysics, though again I'd stress I'm certainly no positivist)

This is a very serious problem if you reject metaphysics altogether (provided you even know what that means). However, this deserve a thread in it's own right and I will not further elaborate on it here. I just advise you read Baqir Sadr's work on this, and should you wish to discuss it further, start a thread entitled "Validity of metaphysics" or the like..

And as an Imami, I would also stress that for someone wanting to understand the more important and deep truths of reality, the Quran and teachings of the Ma`sumin need to be his beginning, middle and end in terms of where he's getting those truths from.

Now that's interesting. So let's apply this same principle to your own work: Where did your start, middle and end contain ayat or ahadeeth ?

This is why I said in post #10:

You have told me them so many times that I know them off by heart now ():

"No textual references for such topics => Not real 'Imamism' => Bid`at"

, "Thinkers disagree => Entire field is bogus", etc. In light of such comments, this is why it was "

amusing

", that you have taken up a "philosophy degree" and written an article on "epistemology"..

If by virtue of the fact there are no textual references in those works which you oppose, then how is yours any different, let alone better ?

Arguing with you though, it's really apparent you haven't done a broad study of this, and are arguing against straw men. Your "opponent" in your mind is some narrow minded wahhabi-like extremist who labels anything slightly different from his limited viewpoint as a being shirk or bid`a. I'd argue that's not what I am, but anyhow this is irrelevant. Like I said, do some proper study then we can discuss, in sha Allah.

How is it "really apparent" ? Because I don't agree with your invalid and clearly fabricated claims ? And I do not know why you keep repeating this last sentence, padding out your posts with repeated irrelevant basic information, etc - ever since you've mentioned your "degree". You speak with arrogance as if you are a leading authority or something (which I'd be more than happy if you were because you would only prove me right further that philosophy is not rubbish !) or have actually conducted a "broad study" yourself (which is ironic, because you seem to have missed even the most basic of them like LWM). Just like a child who has read a couple of books (or wikipedia articles in this case) and now wants to the tell the whole world..

And I'll put you out of your misery with the definition challenge, but before I do, let me say one last point: The switch from "falsafa" => kalam is just another contradiction. Nasir al-Din al-Tusi who was Shi'ite Islam's biggest theologian (and whose Tajrid-al-'Aqaid lasted as a textbook in the field for a _very_ long time) is actually a hardcore peripatetic. Contrast this with post #11 where an attempt was made at defining the distinction between "falsafa" and "philosophy":

Falsafa specifically refers to peripatetic philosophy => :!!!:

The answer, which I'm sure we all know by now: is that it is not possible (a child could even tell it is ludicrous to even try to with one glance). You oppose certain individuals with specific arguments that apply equally as well to those thinkers that you do like. There is no consistency in this. I was wondering when you were going to realise and admit this, but looks like the arrogance is gonna make things a lot worse before they get better..

Edited November 2, 2008 by The Persian Shah

[guest 34193]

I've tried rational discourse with you on this, but it's obvious that you're not interested, seemingly preferring instead to go on throwing more ad hominem attacks left and right. What's the point then of continuing further? was-salam.

[Hannibal]

This is much closer to a proper definition, but the ultimate claim is still an unsupported one - besides being highly inaccurate anyway. Where has it ever been the case that the word falsafa was used to refer to solely peripatetic philosophy ?

I noticed that you included Suhruwadi amongst this group, whereas it is known by all that he was not a peripatetic philosopher at all. So you've already shot yourself in the foot. And I haven't even asked about the likes of Mulla Sadra who makes a mix between certain other schools of thought, and sufi metaphysics which are to be seen no where on the radar if you are talking about being a masha`i..

So to sum up, as I said in post #10, you have neither {a} achieved your objective to provide a rigourous definition to refer to those thinkers who like and exclude those who you don't nor {b} given a real and accurate definition of the word..

1) Obviously you did not read my post attentively or else you would have completely understood what falsafah is, which in the Islamic world, also gets heavily mixed with platonic and neo-platonic philosophy at times (thus falsafah having been a mixture of both which I stated before). You would have understood this, for example, if you had studied al-Farabi (for example) in an academic setting.

2) I would agree with br. Masiaac, there is no point in discussing with you since you have not studied the history of Islamic philosophy. Insh'Allah when you do take a few graduate, or at least undergraduate courses in Islamic philosophy, then we can discuss (this of course including your intentions in discussing for the sake of learning, and not feeding your own ego which was demonstrated by your ad hominem attacks against brother Masiaac although he discussed with the best of manners).

Edited November 3, 2008 by Hezbullahi

[The Persian Shah]

1) Obviously you did not read my post attentively or else you would have completely understood what falsafah is, which in the Islamic world, also gets heavily mixed with platonic and neo-platonic philosophy at times (thus falsafah having been a mixture of both which I stated before). You would have understood this, for example, if you had studied al-Farabi (for example) in an academic setting.

Platonic & neo-platonic ? Wow - that is only "slightly" different from what you mentioned in your last post. You say this and hence imply that you actually know the difference between platonic/neo-platonic and peripatetic, whilst simulatenously claiming to hold a "few graduate courses in Islamic philosophy" ?

And let me tell you, before you repeat this insult another thousand times: How do even know what my education is ? Did I tell you what I have or have not studied ? So don't just assume things and answer my questions instead - if you can, or just politely say if you can't - don't use this insult as a scapegoat.

2) I would agree with br. Masiaac, there is no point in discussing with you since you have not studied the history of Islamic philosophy. Insh'Allah when you do take a few graduate, or at least undergraduate courses in Islamic philosophy, then we can discuss (this of course including your intentions in discussing for the sake of learning, and not feeding your own ego which was demonstrated by your ad hominem attacks against brother Masiaac although he discussed with the best of manners).

1) This and the similar patronising attempts by macisaac are an ad-hominem itself.

2) The only thing I mentioned, which may even slightly be considered an ad-hominem is at the end of post #14, where I was replying to the ad-hominem attacks of macisaac (which I had ignored upto that point).

3) You guys give wishy-washy answers, claim to be experts, insult & tell me to go read up and then just stop there - failing to respond to any of my arguments/questions/comments. This is all just clearly a feeble attempt to avoid answering anything I have said, which is due to your incompetence to do so..

However, I do agree with macisaac on one thing:

I've tried rational discourse with you on this, but it's obvious that you're not interested, seemingly preferring instead to go on throwing more ad hominem attacks left and right. What's the point then of continuing further? was-salam.

The statement is however, somewhat, slightly hypocritical (if we were to count the number of ad-hominem's and how many times they have been ignored by the other).

109:6

To you be your Way, and to me mine.

[zuhair_naqvi]

"Tranquility (or stillness) of the self" or "sukoone nafs" is no more than a justification with which one's self is satisfied and is still vulnerable to Gettier's cases because it can't escape false premise

And in reality, i.e., in application, it's impossible to escape false premise because it arises due to imperfect knowledge which is inherent in all humans. But on the other hand Gettier CANNOT be correct because if you believe in creationism and you believe that the creator has created with a purpose then there needs to be a criterion of perfect / complete knowledge, not vulnerable to false premise. Otherwise purpose will have to be based on chance.

The following verse of holy Quran solves this problem:

[Aale Imran : 7]

åõæó ÇáøóÐöíó ÃóäÒóáó Úóáóíúßó ÇáúßöÊóÇÈó ãöäúåõ ÂíóÇÊñ ãøõÍúßóãóÇÊñ åõäøó Ãõãøõ ÇáúßöÊóÇÈö æóÃõÎóÑõ ãõÊóÔóÇÈöåóÇÊñ ÝóÃóãøóÇ ÇáøóÐöíäó Ýí ÞõáõæÈöåöãú ÒóíúÛñ ÝóíóÊøóÈöÚõæäó ãóÇ ÊóÔóÇÈóåó ãöäúåõ ÇÈúÊöÛóÇÁ ÇáúÝöÊúäóÉö æóÇÈúÊöÛóÇÁ ÊóÃúæöíáöåö æóãóÇ íóÚúáóãõ ÊóÃúæöíáóåõ ÅöáÇøó Çááøåõ æóÇáÑøóÇÓöÎõæäó Ýöí ÇáúÚöáúãö íóÞõæáõæäó ÂãóäøóÇ Èöåö ßõáøñ ãøöäú ÚöäÏö ÑóÈøöäóÇ æóãóÇ íóÐøóßøóÑõ ÅöáÇøó ÃõæúáõæÇú ÇáÃáúÈóÇÈö

Therefore the response to Gettier's cases and the only possible refuge from false premise is the concept of ismah.

I'd be interested to learn if there's an alternative to ismah when it comes to answering false premise weakness.

[guest 34193]

I'd be interested to learn if there's an alternative to ismah when it comes to answering false premise weakness.

Well contemporary philosophers in epistemology like Nozick have certainly been trying to answer the Gettier problem... But please explain, what do you mean by saying that `isma is the only way to answer it? Where does that leave us non-ma`sum individuals? How can we be said to know anything? I'm not necessarily disagreeing with you here , just want some clarification (though I do disagree that the sukun an-nafs quality is just another version of justification in the JTB, as "evidence" I'd posit how impressed my professor was by the formulation :-) If I get you right, I think I might know where you're going with this, and if so, it's an interesting perspective, but do elucidate further.

[zuhair_naqvi]

Any thoughts? I want to be presenting this as philosophical proof for need of perfect/complete knowledge in a masoom.

[zuhair_naqvi]

With the pretext of belief in creationism, I've added a superstructure to your knowledge map:

If guidance towards alignment with purpose of creation is to be based on fallible knowledge then you cannot prove that there is a _definite_ purpose of creation (as there is chance involved) and this would lead to negating the existence of a conscious creator.

Therefore, the only way to protect creationism is to assume the existence of infallible knowledge which complements _definite_ purpose of creation and is the criterion of guidance towards alignment with the will of the conscious creator.

We cannot.

ÞóÇáõæÇú ÓõÈúÍóÇäóßó áÇó Úöáúãó áóäóÇ ÅöáÇøó ãóÇ ÚóáøóãúÊóäóÇ Åöäøóßó ÃóäÊó ÇáúÚóáöíãõ ÇáúÍóßöíãõ (2:32)

2:32 They replied: "Limitless art Thou in Thy glory! No knowledge have we save that which Thou hast imparted unto us. Verily, Thou alone art all-knowing, truly wise.

Our best chance is to base our knowledge [through reasoning] on akhbar of a masoom so that we can limit false premise to chain of narrators.