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In the Name of God بسم الله


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  1. Salaam,

    Bro, is that a self portrait? oO (Your profile picture)

  2. The icon things and emoticons work for me when I am on internet explorer, but not on mozilla firefox. Is there a way to make it work on mozilla firefox again? Wa Salaam.

  3. Salaam. None of the icon things work for me. When I click the emoticons symbol it doesn't work. I do not see the emoticons to my right. Also none of the icon things above work except for Twitter, the drop down box that says Other Styles, and the question mark that says help when you hover with the cursor over it.

  4. Theres way too much to be said in any substantive manner in one post ... and I don't have time to think and write right now. But I promise I'll start a thread later explaining my perspective on things. Right now, I'll leave you with this to chew on: Think about what Imam Khomeini established in the Islamic Republic, and how remarkable and significant it was ... from a Shi'a historical perspective. Think about the real political capital that Imam Khomeini weilded in Iran, verses that of Ayatollah Khamenei today, and the systemic need for such a person to weild that type of political capital and the repurcussions of this reality. Think about the written history if the Islamic Republic from 1979 until today understanding that it is always the victors who write history. Look at the Islamic Republic in historical terms, and think to yourself: How would Hegel describe it? How would Marx describe it? How will historians characterize 100 years from now ... and what kind of changes and reformations will have to be neccesitated upon it the Islamic Republic for it to endure for another 100 years? Most people don't understand what is happening because they are looking through a very small and concentrated lense ... probably based on their support for one individual or another, or perhaps one "line" or another. But in doing so, they are completely missing the point. Compound this with the fact that, in Iran, nothing is really as it seems (for example, Ayatollah Khamenei and Ahmadinejad are not on the same side of recent events - in fact the opposite is true), and it is easy to understand why most individual are confused or simply lost. You can't understand what is happening now unless you have a strong grasp of the history that lead to this point in nuanced and sophisticated terms. So widen your perspective ... and I'll post mine later on.
  5. 1. Mousavi is not a central player in any of this. He is the face of something much bigger than him. 2. The only thing any of the parties in this want ... is power. Either to gain more or retain what they have. 3. None of this is really about a contested election or Ahmadinejad's power. Ahmadinejad is nothing more than a face and figurehead, and is relatively powerless in Iran. Mousavi would be just as powerless in his place as President. 4. Most Muslims actually have no clue or understanding of what is actually going on.
  6. This is quite simply a false perversion of history. Lebanon was never a "fantastic" country, and the romanticized versions of it that you referring to are fabricated myths, completely detached from reality. The pre-civil war Lebanon was Lebanon of the elite. Lebanon of the ruling class Maronites. It was a deeply sectarian and elitist country, that neglected its people both on the basis of class and sect. The majority of people lived in poverty and ignorance; none more so than Shi'as. The only area that say prosperity was a portion of Beirut. Why do you think civil war broke out, and when it did the Shi'as largely stayed out of it (in the beginning)? Because it wasn't about them. They never had a stake to fight for. It was the changing demographics and the rules of class-struggle that governed the Lebanese civil war. An elite and primarily Christian sector of society held all the power, and Sunni Muslims were rising politically (backed by their growing demographics as opposed to declining Christian demographics) and they wanted an equal share of the pie. It wasn't about Palestinians. It was about class struggle, sectarian calculations, and clan-based ruling families wanting to assert their continued monopoly on political representation in the country, with regional and international elements eventually arbitrating the battles and conflicts as the civil war spread out of control. Please go learn some history dude. What you're saying simply isn't true.
  7. Totally untrue. The US, Saudis, and Egyptians have been interfering openly and blatantly. The US embassador to Lebanon literally dictated to March 14, on tv, what they should and shouldn't do. Hariri spent more time in Saudi Arabia taking orders from the monarchy than he did in Lebanon doing anything useful. And Egypt had a direct hand in a lot of the political stages during the past 4 years, and its "mediators" were widely reported on and covered in the media. This is massively different than supporting a party. If all the Americans, Saudis, and Egyptians did was throw money at March 14 and not dictate the red lines and policy issues, then Lebanon would have seen 4 years of internal peace. No, there isn't. Lebanon's economy has been steadily in decline, not growth. If this was true, Hariri wouldn't have been able to fly in tens of thousands if Lebanese to vote for his lists with Saudi money, and the results of the elections would have been different. The fact is that the Lebanese are a sectarian-minded people, and they are willing to not only to accept, but to justify and make excuses for the subservience of their sect-affiliated political parties for foreign interests. How else do you explain 80% support for Hariri, who just spent over a week in Saudi Arabia after the elections and came back with a miraculous reversal of attitude towards Hezbollah? Or 70% Druze support for Walid Jumblatt, who in the past 5 years has gone from a self-proclaimed socialist and Arab-nationalist, to a self-proclaimed democrat and best friend of Wasthington's neoconservatives, and back again to a self-proclaimed socialist and Arab-nationalist? Or Maronite support for a Patriarch that is obviously racist towards Muslims, or for political chiefs who have allied themselves with Israel in the past (Jeajea and Gemayel)? Lebanese have never put Lebanon first. The only thing that has ever come first in Lebanon is sectarian considerations.
  8. Lebanon was neither prosperous nor peaceful before 2005. Israel committed over 12,000 violations of Lebanese sovereignty between 2000 and 2005, including cross-border raids, kidnapping of citizens, and bombings. As for prosperous, during the Rafik Hariri era, between 1992 and 2004, Lebanon's national debt went from 4 billion to 40 billion. Lebanon was never the Geneva or Paris of the Middle East. What people refer to, when they use this false and inaccurate expression, is an era when Lebanon was in the hands of an elite sector of society dominated by a portion of the Maronite sect, and the government neglected the overwhelming majority of the Lebanese population and Lebanese people, who were mired in extreme poverty and illiteracy, and any development and government services catered only to a narrow class of Beiruti's. Rafik Hariri represented for Lebanon the Sunni equivalent of that Maronite elitist era. He focused on developing Beirut, neglected the rest of the country - especially Shi'as - and increased the national debt ten-fold in doing so ... but not before laundering billions for himself in the process. If there is one thing we will not allow, it is a return to this type of elitist mentality where priority is given on the basis of class instead of need, and economic policies that are so far to the right are pursued that they end up drowning the Lebanese people in debt, inflation, and unemployment - forcing many of the youth to emigrate. Nasrallah is the only person in Lebanon who has ever dared to challenge the political status quo that I have described above, and the whole world waged war against him because of it ... and he still came out on top and prevented Hariri and his state sponsors from overtaking the country. I dare you to point to one specific example where Iran has interfered in Lebanon's internal affairs since 2005. I can name dozens of examples of blatant and outright Saudi, Egyptian, and US interference in Lebanese affairs during this time period.
  9. Fyst, perhaps it is time that you develop a less confrontational and more amiable method of discourse; one that isn't grounded in asserting your intellectual prowess over others, partly by resorting to only responding when you can absolutely prove someone else wrong (or yourself right), and partly by abasing others with terms such as "fool", "idiot", and "thick-skulled". Perhaps it would be just as smart, and much more wise for you to engage in discourse that has context and substance; discourse that is qualitative in its intellectual value and representative of your thoughtfulness and whit; discourse that isn't limited to a quantitative exercise of scoring points on others by proving them wrong over matters that are almost entirely besides the point in the larger scheme of things. You are a very bright individual, and I wish we could benefit from more of such contributions on your behalf in the future, if you would do us all the favor and apply yourself in a manner that is deserving of your intellect. We would be most indebted.
  10. I understand that emotions are high and that these are tense times for the Islamic Republic and all those who want to see it thrive, but allow me to assert that one shouldn't be depressed over the situation. I don't want to explain in detail (yet) but what is happening right now is, in a way, quite overdue and quite inevitable, and will probably be for the better. What we are witnessing is history taking its course and catching up with Islamic Republic; a course that is convoluted in the helical clash of dialectic discourse, and just like any good part of history, it is necessarily turbulent. Look at the bigger picture my brothers and sisters. Don't look at Iran through a 30 year old lens. Instead, consider it through a 1400 year old lens, and inform your perceptive through the past 30 years in a historical context. The Islamic Republic isn't going anywhere; instead, history is necessitating reformation upon the Islamic republic. There will be violence, there will be blood, and there will be setbacks; but out of the chaos and rubble, a better Iran will emerge and the Islamic Republic will see its spring once again.
  11. The someone else is Ayatollah Khamenei. The elements here are the military leadership of the IRGC, AN, and the clerical elements that usually back AN, and the IRCG's considerable presence in Parliament. It really isn't a 'takeover' or a proper coup. Its more like the eventual culmination of what has been a gradual process. Ayatollah Khamenei has been steadily in decline and the IRGC has been steadily on the rise, but the scales have always been tipped in Ayatollah Khamenei's favor up until the elections which tipped them the other way.
  12. Did that conversation ever take place between the IRGC and Mousavi? No, that is obviously false. I will refrain from answering what you were really asking though..
  13. ^The article's tone approaches that of reality, but in some of its evaluations and conclusions of what transpired and what may transpire, it is not accurate. Small example: That the IRGC implemented a coup against Rafsanjani. This is a half-accurate evaluation. It is true that the IRGC has grown immensely powerful and increasingly independent lately, and that it implemented a coup. However, the coup wasn't against Rafsanjani (or Mousavi). It was against someone else. Someone who represented the establishment ... not someone in relative opposition.
  14. No comment. Untrue. Iran is and has been an oligarchy comprised primarily from the post-revolution clerical ranks (non-dissidents). The supreme leader is still the most powerful single person in Iran, but his power is in decline and his status is greatly diminished from that of Ayatollah Khomeini; the most powerful non-clerical body in the country are the revolutionary guards. Ahmadinejad, as President of Iran, has almost no influence in Iran and makes no real decisions. The only thing he effects as President is the budget, and he as an individual is nothing more than a small part of a much larger and more powerful faction in Iran, which I will not label; this faction may very well be more influential and powerful than Ayatollah Khamenei right now.
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