Northwest

@Silas While this is true, the alternative renders the ‘final book’ a mystery (in the classical sense), inaccessible to scrutiny, given that it cannot be proved scientifically. Since science, or empiricism, also relies on logic, this means that to put metaphysics beyond science is to sideline mechanistic explanations, so that there is no meaningful way to verify (i.e., test) the ‘final book’ based on explanatory means such as the scientific method. We end up pitting metaphysics, or an abstraction, against real-world observation(s) and/or facts, however unintentionally; further, this does not help us choose between rival metaphysical claims. Of course, science cannot provide a final answer either, but at least it does not pretend to do so (unlike scientism, an offshoot of materialism), if properly used and presented. This is also valid, but it runs into the fact that a) to ‘recognize’ (the) Truth is to involve reason and b) moral intuition is, by its very nature, subjective. Subjectivity and reason, moreover, are often at odds. The problem with this is that no two men can agree as to the definition of ‘innocence’—certainly not in each and every case. Theologians differ as much as laymen or secularists on this and other matters. So far the level of disagreement among men, and the wide range of societal models, implies that this goal—having insight as to the bedrock on which these truths are based, as well as the nature of the truths themselves—is either unattainable or unrealistic. And norms, by and large, are culturally contingent, that is, customary, usually varying wildly between cultures. As noted before, there is no way to confirm or disprove these, given their metaphysical basis. The need for finality does nothing to address the importance of veracity. That something is regarded as ‘final’ does not mean that it is truthful and/or reflects (the) Truth. ‘Genocide’ as a term was invented after World War II, but existed as a concept and practice throughout history. The Bible itself, and Muslim rulers historically, have condoned ‘genocidal’ practices now and then, so your objection to ‘genocide’ is hardly based on religious grounds. Moreover, re: biological sex, your approach faces a roadblock. We do not defer to metaphysics in order to ‘know’ that there are two distinct sexes with corresponding traits, or that a male cannot be female (or vice versa). Instead, we rely on scientific logic. Yet you propose that we discover the ‘final book’ without recourse to reason.

@Silas ^ In addition to the above, I wish to address your claim about absolute monarchs. While having total power in theory, an ‘absolute’ sovereign wielded it within limits, as set by custom and religion—unlike, say, his secular equivalent, such as a Marxist despot. The monarch was still accountable to a Divine Sovereign, Who bound him to certain obligations, including those that concerned treatment of his subjects. The monarch could only act in accord with a spiritual end. So the notion of a traditionalist sovereign without a ‘transcendent ... final mandate’ is curious, given that it was far from the norm historically, and has more basis in a secular world.

I would pay more attention to Iran’s immediate neighbors than to the GCC, given that only Turkey, Azerbaijan, and/or Pakistan have the land forces to occupy Iran were the government to collapse. ‘Neutral’ Turkey is acting as a logistical base for U.S. operations vs. Iran, allowing NATO AWACS craft to gather intelligence using Konya Airport. Last July its Azerbaijani client also allowed Israel to use its airspace for strikes on Iranian targets and also provided information. So far there is nothing to suggest it is involved in the current war, but if the U.S. and Co. were smart they would have secured Azerbaijani cooperation beforehand. If the Anglo-Zionists continue to rely solely on their air assets, psychological warfare, and/or economic strangulation, they will fail once more. There is a massive disconnect between Trump’s harping on the ‘Iranian threat’ and his unwillingness to commit substantial ground forces (the only thing that could really make a difference in favor of the U.S. and Israel).

Once again the Anglo-Israelis and their Sunni clients seem to have succeeded in lulling the Iranians, using talks as cover, hence the large numbers of key casualties. FM Araghchi is already admitting, indirectly, the deaths of defense minister Nasirzadeh, IRGC commander Pakpour, and Defense Council head Shamkhani. There are also reports of other IRGC and/or senior officials’ deaths. This is very similar not just to the July war, but also the ‘negotiations’ the West proposed before sanctioning the IDF’s moves on Lebanon in 2024 (including the Nasrallah killing, the pager attacks, and so on). Also, so far Iran has not managed to close the Strait of Hormuz, giving the attackers a further advantage. A question is whether neighboring states such as Azerbaijan and Pakistan will also send in proxy forces to foment ‘civil war’ or insurgency.

Since this thread came first (i.e., before this one), shouldn’t it be the main one? All war-related posts could go here.

^ There is already a thread here. Maybe this topic should be merged with it?

@Silas I think Russia and Iran are distinct concerns for the U.S.; they certainly are for Israel. In fact Putin has long had a good rapport with Netanyahu; Russia–Israel ties are multivalent, not least due to the Jewish diaspora (Biden’s efforts to sever this link strained U.S.–Israel ties). In the early 2000s Putin strongly backed U.S. efforts to pressure Hamas, denuclearize Iran, and minimize Shia influence in Iraq, as former Bush officials attest. Russia also allowed Israeli strikes on Iranian interests in Syria. Overall, Russia has no interest in empowering a historical and ideological rival. I would not call Iran a Russian ‘ally’, given that it lacks a military treaty with the latter. Also, Russia, like China, trades far more of its energy with states other than Iran, while the latter has enough supplies of its own. India is far closer to Russia than the latter is to Iran, yet its trade with Iran is almost minuscule (and India is now distancing itself from Russian energy). Therefore, the U.S. campaign against Iran has more to do with other factors than Russia. To some extent Iran benefits from a strong Ukraine, given that a NATO–Russia war would divert focus from its own territory. Aside from drones (?), Iran’s role in Ukraine is not very significant; Israel has never given it much attention, despite its ties to Russia. Zelensky, on the other hand, has complained that the Gaza war and Israel–Iran standoff absorb U.S. hardware that would otherwise be sent to Ukraine. Iran is also disappointed in Russia’s willingness to let Israel to strike its nuclear sites (Putin even sent a congratulatory message to Netanyahu’s office), so it is less willing to lend diplomatic support to Russian positions. Most Iran-friendly circles tend to view Russia negatively. I partially agree with this, but Ukrainian behavior leaves much to be desired. Its military and intelligence elites have openly talked about using WMD in false flags to implicate Russia, such as strikes on critical nuclear and other infrastructure. Even pro-Ukraine sources have more or less admitted to some of these tactics, along with Ukraine’s use of human shields, Syria-like stunts (like the Bucha incident), and so on. (Also, Ukraine has never concealed its desire to join NATO, which antedates the current war.) Neither side has used its full power, obviously. Even if Israel were not a factor, U.S.–Iran relations would be strained due to the nature of the Iranian system. Americans still do not forget the embassy crisis or Iran’s support for actors such as Cuba and Venezuela, both of which have been linked, rightly or wrongly, to drug trafficking. If Israel were eliminated, the U.S. would be Iran’s next target. It would still be the ‘main foe’ or ‘Great Satan’—with or without Zionism. Trump has his own reasons to back a strike on Iran, quite apart from Israeli pressure (though the latter plays a role too).

@Silas And I pointed out NT verses that also seem to accept slavery as a given, along with the tendency of Christian and Muslim elites to tolerate it (unless pressed by shifts in public opinion). That abolitionism arose in tandem with secularism, both in Christian and Muslim societies, says a lot; I enumerated historical evidence, so I wish you had addressed it. Furthermore, there is a distinction between slavery as an abstraction and as a practice. No one views slavery as desirable for himself or his offspring, but other people—typically of a different social class, ethnicity, or faith—might be another matter. Given that neither secular nor religious ethics can be proven using a science, this further complicates things, notably for laymen. As noted, the average person often lacks the means or ability to reason independently, and if his creed cannot be assessed from the outside, then he is as much a prey to falsity as under a secular equivalent. Both Islam and Catholicism rely on tradition as well as scripture, yet each comes to very different conclusions about the nature of God. An ordinary man is in no position to determine which vision is closest to the Truth, given the competing claims of Catholic and Muslim clerics. That leaves over a millennium in which the Church tolerated slavery, whether grudgingly or not. Also, that slavery came to be regarded as impermissible and sinful at the same time as abolitionism—a mass movement that arose only in the Western Enlightenment—is suggestive. But the layman is, as mentioned, at a loss as to how to distinguish between the rival claims of Catholic and Muslim clergies. This is true, but I think it misses its target. The real problem is that men treat their ignorance and subjectivity as a faith, rather than exercising caution or humility. This applies equally to secular and religious claims. My view, personally, is that a ‘religious’ mentality exudes certitude, divorces an ideal from empiricism, and takes many forms. As incisive as this observation is, it still runs against the fact that the ‘final book’ cannot be verified using a science, so either way we end up deferring to a secular or religious absolutism that stands above scrutiny. I think men should rely less on abstractions and more on observations, while retaining internal coherence or consistency. This appeal says nothing about the veracity of a specific worldview. The desirability of one or another model does not in and of itself prove its validity (although one could marshal evidence to show that an Islamic system is better attuned to human nature or is economically sounder than a Marxist utopia). In my view, a fantastical system: involves various ‘utopias’ based on unrealistic standards of human behavior; subjective perceptions, i.e., based on ‘feelings’ or ‘intuitions’; claims or entities that cannot be independently verified; anything that contradicts data and/or experience(s) The ‘worst’ worldview, if any, is one that does not admit the possibility of ignorance and/or uses unreason.

@AbdusSibtayn I think Iran and the AoR’s plight is a bit more fluid than it might appear. A saving ‘grace’, if one may so call it, is the still-unsettled NATO–Russia war in Ukraine. There is a nonzero chance that it develops into a direct clash, with all that entails for the world. A full-on MAD would take out Israel’s Western patrons, while Iran and Co. would lose or gain little from Russia’s unraveling. Plus, any nuclear fallout would mainly affect areas northward vs. more-equatorial regions like the MENA. (Of course, I am assuming here that Trump and Co. are dumb enough to launch WWIII before finishing off Iran or installing the Golden Dome [still a few years off] to intercept Russia’s now-invincible hypersonic missiles. Another prospect is that the U.S. could botch the planning of its Iran War 2.0, thinking it need only repeat the June episode to ensure regime change.) In a way, world war diverts forces from Iran’s frontline neighbors; therefore, I would not despair if I were Iran or its allies. @Haji 2003 Pezeshkian has also been in charge of the nuclear talks, choosing staff, dictating Iran’s case, etc. This could explain the varying reports—now over a year or so—about the terms Iran has (or has not) agreed to as part of a ‘deal’. Some insiders want to ban enrichment outright, echoing the U.S. view, while others prefer limited or no bargains; (maybe) Pezeshkian’s reformists want the former. Russia has offered to restore the JCPOA format whereby Iran conveyed uranium to third parties; the U.S. has outlined a consortium, under its aegis, that would do so, in return for joint power generation. At any rate, I do wonder why the leadership is allowing Pezeshkian leeway to oversee talks, given the ‘results’ of the last such meeting(s).

Given all the planning that has been made to date, I think the rumors of the Sunni states’ ‘neutrality’ are PSYOPs. They reflect an effort to a) lull Iran and b) limit the scope of its response. I will explain why. Given the scale of the likely attack (dubbed “unprecedented” by reliable sources), I think that the chance of a tactical nuclear strike on Iran are nonzero. This brings me back to the massive Saudi–Pakistani defense deal that Turkey has just joined. By all accounts this pact seems to involve nuclear-sharing among the parties listed. Both the KSA and Turkey have shown an interest in nuclear capability, the former to deter Iran; Pakistan could certainly act as supplier and/or proxy. Furthermore, Israeli actors have implied that they would back such an extreme measure as a last resort. (Recall Trump backer and Netanyahu ally Sheldon Adelson’s nuclear threats vs. Iran.) Low-yield nukes might be used to hit sensitive targets such as the remaining nuclear bases. Plans for a joint Sunni–U.S.–Israeli nuke strike on Iran—along with an alleged ‘R2P’ partition agenda by Turkey, Azerbaijan, and/or Pakistan—certainly would warrant putting a lid on the full scope of the agenda.

@Shaheed786 The U.S. leadership evidently thinks it can repeat the June ‘25 war (or the Venezuela strikes): a “surgical“ attack that does not involve masses of ground forces. It then expects anti-regime “protesters” to start a revolt that would topple the government (though *no one* came out against the regime in June). If so, then Trump thinks he can earn a cheap win that does not require a real investment. Honestly, I am stunned that no one in his military or diplomatic corps, much less his Israeli allies, learned a lesson from last June, not to mention the Millennium Challenge (2002) war-games. Iran is so well guarded—by geography, demographics, popular support, ideology, and other factors—that a serious effort at regime change would need an invasion from adjacent states (at least on par with Iraq’s force in the 1980s), both on land and at sea. Yet Trump does not seem to realize any of this, thinking he will only need peacekeepers (at best) after the fact. Is the quality of his advisers and/or his IQ so poor?

Another hint that Iran is next on the list is the U.S.–China détente (the U.K. acting as mediator), with improved U.S.–Pakistan ties. The U.S. is also working on a Russia–Ukraine peace deal that freezes the fronts, allows NATO peacekeepers, and gives Ukraine time to rearm. Stiff tariffs on both states, along with low prices, did significant damage to their banking and energy networks, likely forcing them to compromise. All this makes sense in light of U.S. efforts to focus on Iran before targeting Russia and then China.

The Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity Source Balochi separatist groups with Salafi ties such as Jaysh al-Adl and Jundallah have operated out of Pakistan for decades, with support from the U.S., U.K., Saudi Arabia, and Israel. Obviously these groups could not act without backing from Pakistan’s ISI and military as well, given their overlap with Taliban and al-Qaida factions. A few years ago Iran targeted militant bases on the Pakistani side of the border, indicating that Pakistan does little or nothing to curtail these entities. (During the June ‘25 war, moreover, Jaysh al-Adl called on Iranians to support its operations vs. the government.)

I think one reason as to why a large-scale attack—as opposed to a more limited operation like the June ‘25 war—has been delayed is the state of the West’s defense-industrial base (DIB). Under Biden, for instance, the U.S. had to split its stockpiles among three theaters: Ukraine (Russia), the MENA (Israel–Iran), and Asia (China [i.e., the Taiwan Strait]). It was forced to alternate between conflicts, limiting the amount of air-defense systems, such as Patriot missiles, it could deliver at once to both Ukraine and Israel, for example—a factor of salience in any Israel–Iran conflict. Also, until now the framework to aid a full-scale war with Iran had not been implemented (i.e., Syria’s inclusion in a “Sunni NATO“ and the Abraham Accords). But now virtually all the preconditions are in place, such as a strong Saudi–Qatari–Turkish rapprochement, the ongoing HTS–Israel deal (in which the U.S. abandons the SDF), the role of Pakistan, and so on. Re: Syria, Israel’s only issue is with the Golan (Mount Hermon) and the Druze, but I think all sides are prioritizing the Iran war now; an HTS–Israel war and/or Kurdish revolt would spoil everything, as would renewed quarrels within the GCC (KSA/UAE). Some caveats: Internal divisions within the Trump administration over Syria: supposedly only Special Envoy Barrack backed Trump’s deal with Jolani, with other advisers, CENTCOM, and GOP loyalists backing the original Israeli view(s), e.g., a decentralized Syria Divisions among the Kurds: pro-Turkish and/or anti-PKK (YPG/YPJ) Kurdish factions such as the Barzani clan, along with Iraq, are urging the SDF to agree with Jolani, but much of the rank and file, aligned with the PKK, backs an insurgency In 2016 Iran and the PKK were at odds over the Turkish coup, with the Iranian leadership backing Erdoğan and the PKK opposing him—the latter (for ethnic reasons) fearing the long-term consequences of a Sunni Islamist regime entrenching itself in Syria The PKK has indicated that, were a war with Damascus to break out, it would seek support from anyone, including Israel and Iran (via the Iraqi PMUs), as part of a general minorities‘ revolt vs. Jolani’s Islamist (Salafi) regime Ironically, both Israeli factions and religious minorities, such as the Alawites, Christians, and Shia, find themselves in a similar position vis-à-vis HTS, but for very different reasons, so a tactical tandem might emerge Even Iran has tactically cooperated with or reached out to the U.S. and/or Israel in the past (vs. al-Qaida in 2001 and vs. Saddam at various points [Iran–Contra]), while not giving up its core principles Some thoughts: Syrian minorities arguably had a better grasp of geopolitical nuance than Iranian officials, rightly discerning the future impact of Erdoğan’s regime surviving Iran’s support for the “Arab Spring” ended badly where ‘successful’, as ascendant Sunni Islamists such as Egypt’s Morsi persecuted Shia and other groups The West, as in the past, views Sunni Islamism as a better bet in countering rivals—such as Iran, Russia, and China—than secularist liberal democracy Besides other factors, factionalism within the U.S. government alone makes it an unreliable partner Simplistic notions about any Islamism being “better” for Shia and other minorities than pluralistic secularism must be rethought or thrown out the window