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Leibniz

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About Leibniz

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  1. With all due respect , you are implying that one should first accept the dogma of infallibility of Imams as you understand it and then should understand the whole event of Karbala in the light of that. It is the fallacy of circular reasoning. Its akin to saying 1. All colors are white 2. If you believe grey is grey 3. Then refer to premise #1
  2. Such conspiracy theories only strengthen the Sunni position. How come Malik ibn Nuwayra be be the only one to raise up for Ali in the outskirts of Madinah while Ali himself along with the other pro Ali Hashimites , Ammar etc kept silent ? And surprisingly it would be Omar who would take Khalid to task for killing a Shia of Ali. To add to the soup , it was one Malik among the hundreds of thousands who remembered the Ghadeer and rose his voice for Ali in the light of it. At times the Shia argument from history stoops down to the level of Alex Jones conspiracy theories.
  3. WS bro , I shall open a thread about the Sunni doctrine of Sahabas and we can discuss it there. Its not very clear to me either and most of my information about it comes from what I have heard from the Sunnis.
  4. WS , thank you. This is what I was looking for.
  5. I have seen many Malikis and Shafis keeping subtle beards and I think both of these schools allow trimming beard.
  6. How does that hadith entail that the Ummah should raise up to appoint Hassan as Caliph instead of Mu'aviya? The "Ummah" did not rising up for this cause is simply an indication that people in majority did not interpret this Hadith in the political terms you want.
  7. The Sunni doctrine of Sahabas , as far as I know , is not as rigid , puritan and idealistic as the Shia doctrine of Imamah. The Sunnis don't take Sahabas as infallible and would admit that they did make mistakes. They either don't want to highlight those mistakes or they feel that their mistakes don't add up to the degree of Fisq so they swallow them without reluctance. In the Mu'aviya Ali and later Hassan Mu'aviya conflict they would say that Ali and Hassan were on the righteous side but would refrain from branding Mu'aviya a Fasiq and Kafir. I find this approach a sympathatic approach towards the nutshell of Islam albeit not historically pure.
  8. Right. History focuses on major events but like in the case of Ali you see him around , may be after long intervals , here and there during the caliphate of the first three caliphs but Hassan and Hussain for those long 19 years are out of picture absolutely. It was the perfect time for them to educate their Shia circles in Madina and we should have seen abundant Hadiths , during that era , being narrated from them and about them in the Shia sources. But we find nothing.
  9. Fine , its understandable that 'they' don't want to mention them but I could not find anything in the Tashayyu sources about those 19 years. Whatever little I could dig out was from the Sunni sources. I have infact found two more narrations of those 19 years in Sunni sources which I shall past some time.
  10. What I have heard from the Shias goes like this. They have two types of responses to Ridda campaigns and other military conquests during the caliphate in general. 1. They would either brand them as unnecessary bloody battles ensued for expanding the empire and got nothing to do with Islam , castigating it from modern pacifistic perspective. They would explain away the presence of the "good sahaba" like Ammaar by Taqayyah' card. If Ali is seen anywhere in the pic "He did this to save Islam" 2. This is one is more interesting as it is like " God of the gaps" argument. I have seen Shias who find grey areas in history and fill them with their own conspiracy theories. So no one infact apostatized and rebelled as such but these were supporters of Ali who revolted and were branded as apostates etc to massacre them. This is an open admission that the smaller tribes living in the outskirts of Hejjaz were far more braver than Hashimites.
  11. May be this interpretation supports WF and the ousting of Shah so that's why we are seeing it from Ayatullah Khamenei. One more such interpretation comes from the Jihadist and Ikhwani Salafis who use Hussain's uprising as an argument against the Madkhali Salafis who tend to emphasize on abiding by the ruler no matter what.
  12. On a light note : I was talking to a Sunni who told me that there is such an authentic hadith in Sunni sources and when I asked him , then why did Hussain go there ? , he said "May be Hussain did not hear this hadith".
  13. Hussain's action are the best argument against 'Taqayyah'. Yet you would see that those who praise Hussain for his metal , steadfastness and sacrifice would always keep the 'Taqayyah' card in pocket and would explain away anything that contradicts their theological view of history with the Taqqayah card. So much so that Imam Reza's becoming crown prince of Mamun is branded as Taqayyah on his part.
  14. Machiavellian model is the only model which works , atleast in the medieval history. There are almost no exceptions to it except for a very few benevolent dictators. As far as the decline of Uthman , I see it more as a naturalistic decline of caliphate coupled by a larger ungovernable empire with various issues and the Hashimites waiting for the final showdown , in case of Uthman they found the aging caliph who was a political underdog by nature. The ansari caliph scenario would have been ideal but whether the imiggrant Quraish would have accepted that , I don't think so. Ummayads and especially Mu'aviya were very liberal secular people and I don't think so they ever tried to middle into religious affairs. No notable scholar issues a decree against Hussain , not even after his death. We don't find much Hadith's in favor of Mu'aviya , they could forge many during their reign. Even in the Sunni world , Mu'aviya is excluded from the Rashidoon and is taken as a liability. Of course their are exceptions to the Hashmite Ummayad rivalry. One other such example is the friendship of Marwan and Imam Zain Ul abideen. It was Imam Zain who gave shelter to the family of Marwan while Ummayads were expelled from Mecca. Abdullah ibn Omar had refused to give them shelter. Later on it was Marwan who took Imam Zain Ul abideen to Muslim bin Uqbah to get a safety assurance for him. What can one make of all this mess? May be the only logical solution is to state that Islam has nothing to do with governance and is a personal religion. I don't see any coherent solution other than this to the bloody history of caliphate in Islam.
  15. I wish it was as simple as that. Abi Mikhnaf's account of Karbala is a very naturalistic explanation of all the events that to the massacre of Karbala. He gives an account of what happened immediately after the death of Mu'aviya till the massacre and its impacts shortly afterwards. We can not read intentions but we definitely can say something about them from the details provided by Abi mikhnaf and the collective circumstantial evidence. There are atleast 5 instances in which Al-Hussain agrees to stepping back from Karbala and avoid the conflict. The first is when he encounters Hur and his men near Karbala till Ibn Sa'ad has not arrived on the scene. He offers Hur that he would depart back. The second one is in his encounter with Ibn Sa'ad in which Al-Hussain proposes stepping back. The rest can be found in his sermons and interactions before the massacre began. His decision to step back , end up his journey to Kufa and get out of the situation at hand is very much naturalistic. He is a man who has been encircled by opponents who have a history of bloodshed and his father has been battling the same faction in the recent years. Hussain is seeing the impending doom and he is disillusioned with the Kufan support as well. He twice or may be thrice mentions to Ibn Sa'ad's Army that I did not come by myself , rather I was invited by you people. He even shows them the letters. This simply implies that he is trying to get out of the showdown scenario , to save himself and his family. In a meeting with Ibn Sa'ad , Al-Hussain proposes that we both should leave our men here and visit Yazid so that we can sought it out. When the news of this proposal and Ibn Sa'ad's soft corner for Al-Hussain reaches the court of Ibn Ziyad , Shimr there instigates Ibn Ziyad alluding to Ibn Sa'ad's soft corner for Al-Hussain and that's when Ibn Ziyad sends Shimr to the scene and he shatters the negotiations as he arrives. No one needs to read the mind of Al-Hussain but its crystal clear as to what's going on. This account is naturalistic and it makes sense. That's how humans operate. Now , interpolating "Hussain knew that he shall be killed in Karbala and he knowingly embarked on the journey for mass sacrifice" into this makes the whole scenario inexplicable , unnatural and contradictory. Its an extraordinary claim and it needs an extraordinary evidence to substantiate it.
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