﴾اللَّهُ يَجْتَبِي إِلَيْهِ مَن يَشَاءُ وَيَهْدِي إِلَيْهِ مَن يُنِيبُ﴿
Allah selects for Himself whom He wills and guides to Himself him who returns.
(Surah al-Shura: 13)
 
﴾وَنَزَّلْنَا عَلَيْكَ الْكِتَابَ تِبْيَانًا لِكُلِّ شَيْءٍ﴿
And We have sent down to you the Book as a clarification of everything.
(Surah al-Nahl: 89)
 
﴾وَمَا فَرَّطْنَا فِي الْكِتَابِ مِن شَيْءٍ﴿
We have neglected nothing in the Book.
(Surah Al-An'am:38)
 
[Note: The narrations discussed in this essay concern the rise of the Mahdi before he receives the bay'ah in Makkah beside the Ka'bah, not the events that follow.]
 
When Prophecies Become Myths:
★Are We Expecting the Wrong Kind of Reappearance?
One of the greatest obstacles to recognizing the fulfillment of prophecy is not disbelief—it is imagination. Throughout history, believers have often transformed prophetic traditions into elaborate mythologies, expecting every sign to unfold in an overtly supernatural, cinematic fashion. Anything that appears too historical, too political, or too human is dismissed as ordinary and therefore unworthy of prophetic significance.
Ironically, the Imams themselves warned against precisely this mentality.
Abu 'Ubaidah al-Hadhdha' narrated that he asked Imam Muhammad al-Baqir (عليه السلام) about the matter of al-Qa'im. The Imam replied:
"Because you expect that it comes to you in a certain way, do not deny it if it happens in another way."
(Bihar al-Anwar, vol. 52, p. 268, hadith 157)
This narration is remarkably profound. It suggests that preconceived notions can become a veil. If people insist that every prophecy must unfold exactly as they have imagined, they may end up denying its fulfillment when it occurs in a different—but no less authentic—manner.
Many Shi'as have unknowingly constructed a mythical image of the End Times. They expect unmistakable miracles at every stage, while overlooking that divine plans often unfold through ordinary historical events, wars, leaders, and political developments that only reveal their prophetic significance in retrospect.
 

 
★One striking example concerns the traditions about the Khorasani Hashimi leader.
The narrations describe a Hashimi (Sayyid/Husayni) leader from Khurasan associated with the black ensigns, possessing a mole or defect on his right hand, and exhibiting such unwavering resolve that even mountains could not subdue him. The Prophet (صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم) is reported to have instructed believers to support this movement "even if by crawling over ice" because of the Mahdi's presence in its ranks.
Many have interpreted these descriptions as corresponding to the Islamic Revolution of Iran and its leadership. The black ensigns emerging from Khurasan, the leadership of Imam Khomeini, followed by Imam Ali Khamenei—a Sayyid with an impairment affecting his right hand (also marked with a mole)—appear, to many observers, to form a remarkably coherent picture. Yet because many expected a far more mythical unfolding, these correspondences have often been dismissed without serious consideration.
The same pattern appears in traditions describing a prolonged conflict between this Hashimi Khorasani leader and an Iraqi Sufyani. The descriptions of a fierce and lengthy war between an eastern Hashimi and an Iraqi ruler have been seen by some researchers as closely resembling the Iran-Iraq War under Saddam Hussein (when a young Imam Ali Khamenei was the President of Iran). Even more intriguingly, certain reports indicate that the Mahdi is among the forces of the Hashimi during that struggle, suggesting his presence before his public appearance rather than only after it.
 

★Another example is of the traditions concerning Shu'ayb ibn Salih, the commander of the Khorasani vanguard.
Starting his career as a young military commander with a short beard, he later goes on to lead the advance forces of the Khorasani based in Rey (Tehran), on a hidden route toward Bayt al-Maqdis—a description strikingly reminiscent of the Axis of Resistance's gradual military buildup toward Jerusalem rather than an open conventional march.
Even his name invites reflection. Shu'ayb ("one who scatters/disperses") mirrors Qasem ("the disperser/distributor"), while Ibn Salih ("son of the righteous/good") corresponds to Soleimani's patronymic, Ibn Hasan (Hasan meaning good or beautiful). Thus, Shu'ayb ibn Salih parallels Qasem ibn Hasan Soleimani—the martyred leader of the IRGC's elite al-Quds Force—with surprising precision.
Traditions note he is a non-Arab ally of the Tamimis, reflecting Iran's close integration with Iraqi Shi'a militias. A prophecy states that leadership of the Khorasani movement passes to the Mahdi 72 months after Shu'ayb's campaigns end. Following Soleimani's assassination in January 2020, this 72-month window converges precisely on 2026—aligning with various other prophetic timelines.
 

A report from Imam Ali (عليه السلام) recorded by Nu'aym ibn Hammad states:
"And before him (the Mahdi), a man from his (the Mahdi's) household will rise with the people of the East, carrying the sword upon his shoulder for eight months. He will kill and maim heading towards Bayt al-Maqdis (Jerusalem), but he will not reach it before he dies."
The period between the June 2025 Iran-Israel War (The Twelve-Day War) and the February 2026 martyrdom of Imam Ali Khamenei is a little over eight months.
 
(Above-mentioned prophecies about the Khorasani movement—Kitab al-Fitan Dar al-Fikr Print pp. 188-192, 216, 229, 230)
 
It becomes even more intriguing when viewed alongside a poem reportedly written in 2005 by the Shi'i mystic Hasan Zadeh Amuli, as later recited by his student Ismail Mansuri. The poem reportedly foretells that Imam Ali Khamenei would be martyred in a Zionist bombing approximately twenty years later, adding:
"Yet his blood will be a glad tiding of the Reappearance of the Mahdi, a presence within presence within presence. He will lift the veil from the face of the Mahdi."
Whether one accepts this interpretation or not, it illustrates how major historical developments may serve not as the appearance itself, but as the unveiling of its reality.
 

 
★The Mahdi is Dhu l-Ismayn—Bearer of Two Names.
An extremely crucial aspect concerns the traditions stating that the Mahdi possesses two names. According to certain Imami narrations, one is the name by which he first appeared in this world—Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Askari—while another is the name associated with his reappearance, a name that the Imams deliberately concealed for his protection and forbade those believers who would recognize him from mentioning it explicitly and publicly in reference to the Mahdi, before he himself reveals his identity. Such narrations suggest that even something as fundamental as the Imam's public identity may not unfold in the simplistic manner many imagine.
In Imami hadiths, the Mahdi's (عليه السلام) Occultation is likened to Joseph's (عليه السلام) occultation. Even after Joseph (عليه السلام) became the ruler of Egypt, neither the Egyptians nor his own brothers recognized his true identity.
 

 
★The discussion also extends to al-Nafs al-Zakiyyah (the Pure Soul).
A prophecy in Musannaf Ibn Abi Shaybah (15/199) states that the Mahdi will not rise until the Pure Soul is killed, after which people will rage at his killers and rally around the Mahdi.

[Interpretive Note: The Imams indicated that some prophecies originate from truthful dreams or visions and may therefore require interpretation e.g. they explained that a prophecy about a person may be fulfilled through his son or grandson (common in dreams). Likewise, Haram in a dream-based prophecy may not always mean Mecca alone; it may also refer to the foremost state governed by an Islamic system, as illustrated by Qasem Soleimani's description of Iran as a haram.]
It is narrated from the Commander of the Faithful, Ali (عليه السلام):
"Await the Faraj (relief/appearance of the Mahdi) through three signs."
It was said, "O Commander of the Faithful, what are they?"
He (عليه السلام) replied:
“The disagreement of the people of Sham [Syria] among themselves (1), the black banners from Khorasan [Iran] (2), and the great terror (or outcry) in the month of Ramadan (3).”
 
[Al-Kurani, Sheikh Ali, Dictionary of the Hadiths of Imam Al-Mahdi (may God hasten his appearance), Vol. 5, p. 238]
 
➡️ (1) The Syrian Civil War, (2) the Shia Iran-led Axis of Resistance and (3) the 2026 Ramadan War that began with the tragic martyrdom of Imam Ali Khamenei.
 

 
★The chronology proposed continues with celestial signs.
A narration recorded by al-Daraqutni speaks of a solar eclipse at the beginning of Ramadan and a lunar eclipse on the fifteenth night of Ramadan before the rise of the Mahdi. These have been compared with the annular solar eclipse of 17 February 2026 and the total lunar eclipse of 3 March 2026.

Similarly, al-Nu'mani records the narration:
"If you see a pillar of fire from the East in the midst of Ramadan, then it will be shortly before the appearance of al-Qa'im."
It has been associated with the massive pillar of fire produced after attacks on Iranian oil facilities during Ramadan 2026 (17th of the holy month).
 

 
★The prophesied heavenly call (Nidāʾ al-Samāʾ) on the night of the 23rd of Ramadan falling on the eve of Friday—in which the Mahdi's second name and his father's name would be announced (hinting at Raj'ah), identifying the Mahdi as the leader and proclaiming that the Shia of Ali will ultimately prevail—was to be heard by everyone in their own language, to the extent that even women in seclusion inside their homes would hear it. Likewise, the pro-Umayyad satanic counter-call, prophesied to occur at the end of that same day in opposition to the heavenly proclamation, has also taken place.

These signs, too, were fulfilled during the same Ramadan. However, due to the sensitivity of the matter, and because people are still largely unprepared to accept it and lack the necessary scholarly maturity to evaluate it properly, it is not being discussed here.
 

 
★Six days or months or years in concealment 
Al-Asbagh ibn Nubatah reported: Imam Ali (عليه السلام) said, “I thought about a lineal descendant of mine, the eleventh of my sons (in line of succession). He will be the Mahdi who will fill the earth with justice and fairness after its being filled with suffering and injustice. He will disappear from the public sight and in confusing conditions. Certain people will deviate and others find the path of guidance.”
I then asked, “O Amir al-Mu’minin (عليه السلام), how long will be the duration of confusion and the disappearance?” He said, “Six days or six months or six years.”
I said, “Will this indeed come to pass?”
He said, “Yes, as surely as his being created. But how can you comprehend this matter, O Asbagh? Those are the best of this community, together with the best of the righteous ones from this Bloodline (ʿItrah).”
I said, “Then what will happen after that?”
He replied, “Then Allah will do whatever He wills. Indeed, He has new manifestations of His decree (badāʾ), wills, purposes, and endings.”.
[Al-Kafi Book 4, Chapter 80, The Issue of Disappearance (of the twelfth Imam ((عليه السلام)) from Public Sight) Hadith #7]
 

 
★The warning of Imam al-Baqir (عليه السلام) 
 remains as relevant today as ever. The greatest danger is not merely rejecting the Imam (عليه السلام) when he appears, but rejecting the very manner in which Allah chooses to fulfill His promises. A biblical parallel and an earlier precedent for ghaybah-then-zuhoor is Elias (عليه السلام), who was taken away and whose return was long awaited before the Messiah. Yet he came through rebirth as Zechariah's son (himself initially unaware) John (عليه السلام) the Baptist (the Qur'an's uniquely named "Yahya"—he lives on! Who?), preparing the way for Christ (عليه السلام). Jesus (عليه السلام) later told his disciples that Elias (عليه السلام) had indeed come and that John (عليه السلام) was he—showing how divine fulfillment can differ from human expectations.
Perhaps the real test of the believers is not whether they know the narrations, but whether they can recognize their fulfillment when it unfolds through the ordinary language of history rather than the extraordinary language of fantasy.
If the signs do indeed arrive differently from what we had imagined, may we remember the Imam's timeless counsel:
                              ﴿★★★★★★★﴾
"Because you expect that it comes to you in a certain way, do not deny it if it happens in another way."
                                    ﴿★★★★★★★﴾

Salam Alaikum wr wb everyone,
It’s been a few years.. and I pray InshAllah you’ve all been well.
There’s an issue that’s been on my mind for a while now, and I find it pertinent to share, in this current geopolitical climate; where the line had been distinctly drawn in the sand since the Gaza Genocide which we all witnessed live on our screens.
This also particularly relates to ShiaChat, and some of the discussions that were held in the days I’d been active, years ago.
There were a lot of discussions happening back then around Iran, WF, Shia leadership/representation, demonstrations in Iraq etc
To cut to the chase,
With the exception of Palestine, and Iran’s support for it, I personally didn’t have the best of views on Iran back then, as some might recall recall.
And whilst we’re all entitled to our opinions and can change our minds or positions to varying degrees, on matters large or small, without the need to vocalise it; but because I was previously very vocal here with my question marks over certain aspects of Iranian policies and conduct, I believe it's very important to be Just, and fair by putting my hand up to say, for the record:
Iran isn’t a perfect country, far from it.
But Iran is the ONLY country and government standing in the face of the baby killing Genocidal Zionists and their supporters. 
Iran is the only country that continuously helped the Palestinians & Lebanese in their legitimate struggle against the barbaric Zionist occupation from the outset of the Islamic Revolution.
This unwavering stand against the most wicked mass murderers of our time, on its own, is enough of an indication to us that any, and all attempts to demonise Iran in this climate is certainly propaganda and Hasbara.
Iran in its recent face-off with the baby killing Zionists & the Imperial US bullies wasn’t only rightfully defending itself against an illegal war of aggression; Iran is the only man standing and is defending us all from the servitude and dark future that awaits us, should the Zionists and the US bullies get their way. 
Iran is standing up for humanity.
I ask Allah Ta’ala to protect Iran by the love and blessings of the Guarantor Imam الإمام الضامن, Ali Bin Musa Al Ridha and his blessed sister, Fatima Al M’asooma; and I ask Allah Ta’ala to forgive me for any wrong I had assumed of Iran. 
 
وَفَوْقَ كُلِّ ذِي عِلْمٍ عَلِيمٌ
And above every man of knowledge is The All Knowing.
12.76

https://youtube.com/shorts/-nD2xbrbvl4?si=sOv3sq_lMe4dfIXK
 
"The Myth of the Unicorn"
Co-written with Solmaz Rezayi.
 
In a corner of the boundless sky, a lightless star beckons you to take a step forward and make a difference for the planet and its inhabitants, to wipe away the ugliness from the earth and sprinkle beauty upon it.
For countless years, through the ages and beyond, the lightless stars have patiently awaited the moment when humanity will finally embrace a path of pure goodness. In that moment, when all the stars shine brightly, and the heavens are aglow, our hearts and minds will finally grasp the profound truths that have long eluded us.
Would you be so kind as to lend a helping hand and flip the switch on these lights?
 

The Developmental Cost of Fragmentation: How the Post-Ottoman Settlement Deprived the Arab World of Its Industrial Core
The post-Ottoman settlement of the Middle East produced a structural distortion whose consequences are still compounding a century later: it separated the Arab world's largest population centre from its most significant resource base, preventing the emergence of indigenous Arab industrial and technological capacity.
This was not accidental. When Muhammad Ali's Egypt attempted to extend control over the Arabian peninsula in the 1810s–1830s, European powers intervened to roll it back. The post-First World War order institutionalised this logic, establishing small, dependent sheikhdoms over the Gulf's energy reserves while leaving Egypt — then, as now, the Arab world's demographic and cultural centre of gravity — without the resource base to develop at scale. British imperial interests were better served by client micro-states controlling energy chokepoints than by a regional power capable of independent action.
The consequences are visible in a paradox that defines the contemporary Arab world. The Gulf states, controlling vast hydrocarbon wealth, lack the population to staff their own economies. They import millions of workers — engineers, doctors, educators, project managers — from South and Southeast Asia and from poorer Arab states, including Egypt itself. Meanwhile, Egypt's 100 million people, many inadequately educated and underemployed, export their labour on terms set by host states that offer no permanent residency, limited rights, and minimal knowledge transfer. The value generated accrues to Gulf sovereign wealth funds; what returns to Egypt comes freighted with political obligation. The 2024 Ras El-Hekma deal — in which Egypt transferred 170 million square metres of Mediterranean coastline to Abu Dhabi's ADQ in exchange for debt relief — exemplifies the dynamic: sovereign territory exchanged for short-term fiscal survival.
Iran provides the most instructive counterfactual. With a population comparable to Egypt's and significant hydrocarbon resources, Iran was forced by decades of sanctions into developing indigenous industrial capacity — steel production, petrochemical management, pharmaceutical manufacturing, and a defence industry that, whatever one's view of the regime, has demonstrably sustained operations against a US–Israeli military campaign for nearly two months. No Arab state possesses comparable self-sufficiency. The Gulf states, for all their wealth, cannot defend their own airports, as the 2026 conflict has brutally demonstrated. Iran's capacity was built under conditions of extreme adversity. The question this raises is uncomfortable: what might a state with Egypt's demographic scale and the Gulf's resource base have achieved under a developmental nationalist programme of the kind Nasser pursued — but with adequate capital behind it?
The answer points toward the deepest cost of fragmentation: not merely Egyptian impoverishment, but the absence of an Arab developmental core. The Gulf states are now spending billions on workforce nationalisation programmes — Saudisation, Emiratisation — to train citizen populations into roles that expatriates have filled for decades. They are attempting, expensively and artificially, to solve a problem that would not exist had demographic mass and resource base not been deliberately separated. The current arrangement serves a handful of ruling dynasties and their external patrons. It has not served the Arab world's 400 million people, who remain collectively without the indigenous industrial, technological, and military capacity that their resources and population could readily have sustained.

What Held Iran Together? The Answer Western Strategists Don't Want to Hear
When the US and Israel killed Iran's Supreme Leader and top military brass in a single night, the playbook said the regime should crumble. It didn't. The reason challenges a deep Western assumption about religion and war.
A familiar playbook
When the United States and Israel launched their attack on 28 February 2026, the strategic logic was well-worn: decapitate the leadership, destroy key military assets, and watch a hierarchical adversary lose coherence. Within hours, Supreme Leader Khamenei was dead, along with the defence minister, the IRGC commander, and dozens of senior officials. By any precedent from recent Middle Eastern conflicts, Iran should have fractured.
It did not.
Instead, thirty-one provincial Revolutionary Guard commands activated pre-delegated authority and sustained retaliatory operations across nine countries for nearly six weeks, culminating in an April ceasefire negotiated from a position of bruised but recognisable strength.
Doctrine isn't enough
The standard explanation centres on Iran's "mosaic defence" — a doctrine formally adopted around 2005 that restructured the Revolutionary Guards into semi-autonomous regional commands, designed to survive precisely the kind of decapitation strikes that destroyed Ba'athist Iraq in 2003 and Gaddafi's Libya in 2011.
But doctrine alone does not explain why the system held. Organisational charts can prescribe decentralised authority; they cannot guarantee that dispersed commanders, operating under degraded communications and immense pressure, will continue pursuing coherent objectives rather than freelancing, surrendering, or simply going home.
The operating system beneath the org chart
What provided that guarantee was something Western strategic thinking habitually underestimates: a shared revolutionary theology that functions as an operating system for distributed decision-making.
The IRGC is not merely a military organisation; it is an ideological one. Every officer is trained in the doctrine of velayat-e faqih — the guardianship of the Islamic jurist — which locates ultimate authority not in any individual leader but in a divinely mandated system of governance. When Khamenei died, the system's theological logic did not die with him. Mid-ranking commanders could act autonomously because they shared an internalised understanding of the revolution's purpose that required no phone call from Tehran to activate.
Why Iraq and Libya shattered — and Iran didn't
The contrast with the region's recent history is striking. Saddam Hussein's Iraq operated through concentric circles of personal loyalty — family, clan, Ba'ath Party, Republican Guard — each bound by patronage rather than conviction. Remove Saddam, and the entire structure lost its organising principle within weeks. Gaddafi's Libya was even more personalised: a deliberate strategy of institutional weakness designed to prevent rivals accumulating power, which meant that when NATO struck the centre, nothing held the periphery together.
Iran's system inverts this logic. Its combination of ideological training, the Basij militia's integration into provincial commands, and a culture of sacrifice rooted in the Shia narratives of Karbala creates an organisation where shared belief substitutes for direct supervision.
The uncomfortable lesson
This is not to romanticise the outcome. Autonomous units struck Turkey and Oman apparently without authorisation — the predictable cost of trading control for resilience. But the broader lesson is uncomfortable for those who assume religious conviction is merely an obstacle to modern military effectiveness. In Iran's case, it was the precondition for a form of organisational resilience that four decades of secular authoritarian rule elsewhere in the Middle East never achieved.
Six weeks of war may have revealed less about the limits of airpower than about the limits of assuming all hierarchies shatter the same way when their apex is removed.
 

Introduction
I asked the reasoning version of ChatGPT the following two questions (in the quotation box).
The answer to the latter question is presented below.
This issue is one of many that contrasts the social and economic implications of Islamic injunctions vs. those of other religions. In summary, the Islamic notion of dogs as religiously impure focuses Muslims' attention towards other humans for social and emotional support. I believe that is superior to a society that redirects such attention to animals. 
@Northwest

TLDR
The proposition that an Islamic-oriented society—with religious reservations about dog ownership—places a greater emphasis on human-human relationships than dog-friendly societies finds support in cross-cultural consumer research and Islamic marketing scholarship. The religious designation of dogs as impure curtails intensive anthropomorphic tendencies, leading consumers in Islamic contexts to channel social and emotional resources primarily toward family, friends, and community members. Consequently, marketing strategies and consumer behaviors in these contexts underscore interpersonal bonds, charitable obligations, and group cohesion rather than pet-centric consumption.
By contrast, in societies that celebrate and encourage dog ownership, anthropomorphism significantly shapes consumer behavior, often shifting a portion of emotional and financial resources to human-dog relationships. These differences highlight how deeply cultural and religious frameworks influence the scope and nature of anthropomorphism, delineating the ways consumers allocate their relational capital between human and non-human companions.
 

1. Anthropomorphism and Relationship Substitution
Pet Humanization in Secular or Dog-Friendly Societies
In many societies that promote dog ownership, there is a pronounced tendency to anthropomorphize pets—assigning them human-like traits and emotions (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007; Journal of Consumer Research). Pet ownership often translates into emotional bonds that parallel, or sometimes even substitute for, human-human connections. For example, Belk (2013; Journal of Consumer Research) discusses how dogs are seen as “extensions of the self,” enabling individuals to fulfill social, emotional, and identity-related needs. In marketing contexts, this humanization of pets manifests as substantial expenditures (e.g., premium dog food, grooming, dog-friendly travel) and even the creation of communities around pet ownership.
Religious and Cultural Boundaries in Islamic Contexts
Islamic teachings often classify dogs as najis (impure), especially concerning their saliva, leading to social and religious restrictions on close physical interactions (Alhussain & Thakur, 2019; Journal of Islamic Marketing, Emerald). While not all Muslims adhere to the same level of strictness (diversity exists across regions and jurisprudential schools), in many contexts, dog ownership is minimized or relegated to functional roles (e.g., guard dogs, herding), reducing the emotional human-pet bond. Anthropomorphism, thus, is largely muted. This diminished emphasis on dog-human relationships can redirect emotional and social energies toward more robust human-human ties, as there is little inclination to invest in a being commonly viewed as “impure” within a domestic setting (Ibrahim & Al Kamdah, 2020; Journal of Islamic Marketing).
2. Emphasis on Human-Human Relations
Communal and Familial Bonds
Several studies on Muslim consumer behavior note a pronounced focus on family cohesion, kinship obligations, and community welfare (Wilson & Grant, 2013; Journal of Islamic Marketing; Emerald). This cultural emphasis is partly derived from key Islamic principles like ummah (community) and zakat (almsgiving). Since dogs are not typically incorporated as household companions, the emotional investment that might be directed toward pets is instead often channeled into human relationships—strengthening family ties, neighborhood communities, and broader social networks. Social gatherings, frequent family visits, and kin-based reciprocity form the core of daily life (Jafari & Goulding, 2008; Consumption, Markets & Culture, Taylor & Francis).
Social Interaction Rituals
Societies that discourage dog ownership frequently invest in elaborate human-centric rituals: communal prayers, frequent visits to relatives, large-scale cultural festivals such as Eid, and extended family gatherings (Essoo & Dibb, 2004; European Journal of Marketing). These rituals encourage sustained human-human interaction. By contrast, in dog-friendly contexts, social rituals often include pet-oriented activities—visits to dog parks, “puppy parties,” or dog adoption events—showcasing how some communal bonding can revolve around animals rather than solely around human interaction (Holbrook & Woodside, 2008; Journal of Business Research, Elsevier).
3. Consumer Behavior Implications
Expenditure Flows
Dog-Friendly Societies: A significant proportion of household expenditures—such as premium dog food, veterinary care, and leisure activities—can be allocated to pets (Hirschman, 1994; Journal of Consumer Research). Over time, this fosters an entire “pet economy,” often reinforced by emotional satisfaction drawn from anthropomorphized relationships with dogs.
Islamic-Oriented Societies: Due to religious constraints, there is limited demand for dog-centric products and services. Instead, expenditures that might have been channeled toward pet care could be redirected toward communal obligations (e.g., charitable giving, gifts to family, social events). The consumer culture thus prioritizes human welfare, strengthening what might be viewed as social capital within human networks (Jafari & Goulding, 2008; Consumption, Markets & Culture).
Marketplace Signaling and Sociocultural Values
Signaling Communal Responsibility: Consumers in Islamic contexts may signal piety and communal commitment through active participation in social events or charitable acts, reflecting a cultural script that values direct human welfare (Wilson & Grant, 2013; Journal of Islamic Marketing).
Signaling Affection for Pets: In Western or dog-friendly contexts, owning a pampered dog can signal care, empathy, and a nurturing personality, reinforcing a sense of belonging in communities of pet lovers (Belk, 1988; Journal of Consumer Research). Marketers leverage anthropomorphism in advertising, depicting dogs as “family members” to appeal to consumers’ emotional investment in pets (Waytz, Cacioppo, & Epley, 2010; Trends in Cognitive Sciences).
4. Societal and Cultural Outcomes
Stronger Intra-Human Bonds in Islamic Contexts
The proposition that Islamic-oriented societies have a stronger emphasis on human-human relationships can be understood through the lens of “resource allocation” in consumer behavior. With limited scope for dog-human emotional or social investment, individuals are more inclined to strengthen kin networks, community relations, and collective identity (Ibrahim & Al Kamdah, 2020). This focus on human-centered relationships is further reinforced by religious teachings promoting empathy, community service, and direct human engagement over companionship with creatures deemed ritually impure (Alhussain & Thakur, 2019).
Diverse Relationship Portfolios in Dog-Friendly Societies
In societies where dogs occupy central roles in households, individuals often have “relationship portfolios” that include significant non-human elements (Belk, 2013). Emotional fulfillment, social activities, and even identity expression can revolve around pet ownership, potentially substituting or complementing human-human connections. While this can enrich daily life for pet owners, critics argue it may diminish time and investment in broader community involvement (Holbrook & Woodside, 2008; Hirschman, 1994).
 
Key References
Alhussain, T., & Thakur, R. (2019). Religious beliefs and consumer behavior: A conceptual framework and research propositions. Journal of Islamic Marketing, 10(3), 948–962. [Emerald]
Belk, R. W. (1988). Possessions and the extended self. Journal of Consumer Research, 15(2), 139–168. [University of Chicago Press]
Belk, R. W. (2013). Extended self in a digital world. Journal of Consumer Research, 40(3), 477–500. [University of Chicago Press]
Epley, N., Waytz, A., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2007). On seeing human: A three-factor theory of anthropomorphism. Psychological Review, 114(4), 864–886. [APA; frequently cited in marketing and consumer research]
Essoo, N., & Dibb, S. (2004). Religious influences on shopping behaviour: An exploratory study. European Journal of Marketing, 38(5/6), 536–553. [Emerald]
Hirschman, E. C. (1994). Consumers and their animal companions. Journal of Consumer Research, 20(4), 616–631. [Oxford University Press for the Association for Consumer Research]
Holbrook, M. B., & Woodside, A. G. (2008). Animal companions, consumption experiences, and the marketing of pets: Transcending boundaries in the animal-human distinction. Journal of Business Research, 61(5), 377–381. [Elsevier]
Ibrahim, B., & Al Kamdah, A. (2020). Exploring the Islamic marketing ethics from macro and consumer behaviour perspectives. Journal of Islamic Marketing, 11(5), 1295–1312. [Emerald]
Jafari, A., & Goulding, C. (2008). “We are not terrorists!” UK-based Iranians, consumption practices and the ‘torn self.’ Consumption, Markets & Culture, 11(2), 73–91. [Taylor & Francis]
Wilson, J. A. J., & Grant, J. (2013). Islamic marketing – A challenger to the classical marketing canon? Journal of Islamic Marketing, 4(1), 7–21. [Emerald]
Waytz, A., Cacioppo, J. T., & Epley, N. (2010). Who sees human? The stability and importance of individual differences in anthropomorphism. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 5(3), 219–232. [SAGE, frequently cited in consumer research]
These references illustrate how socio-religious norms and cultural frameworks (particularly in Islamic contexts) shape the nature and direction of anthropomorphism and, consequently, influence where consumers channel their social and emotional investment—ultimately affirming the proposition that Islamic-oriented societies often place a stronger emphasis on human-human relations.

[amended 19 August 2023 to include references to the Irish potato famine and two Bengal famines]
 


 
Images taken at the Egyptian Museum, Tahrir Sq, Cairo. June 2024
Surah Yusuf
Prophet Yusuf (عليه السلام) advised Pharoah to hoard grains during the years of plenty. I think this episode is a noteworthy one because it shows how a State can intervene in the marketplace in order to improve the welfare of the wider population.
But as we shall see below, the government intervention that Prophet Yusuf (عليه السلام) instigated favoured some sections of the population over others - it was not neutral in terms of how it spread gains and losses across the population.
https://www.al-islam.org/sites/default/files/singles/633-yusuf.pdf
While there is other material in the Qur'an that deals with transactions within the marketplace between individual participants - this story stands out in terms of its focus on state intervention. 
I'll be coming back to this issue later - but I think it informs the discussions we have about Islam and contemporary socio-economic theories. In particular, I think it illustrates that Islam does see the State as an active market participant and that in an Islamic state, the role of government is not one that is hands-off or laissez-faire.
 
What policy options did Prophet Yusuf (عليه السلام) have?
We should not take the story as presented 'for granted'. In reality, the Prophet (عليه السلام). had a range of choices open to him, and thinking those through helps us better understand the reasons for the policy he undertook and the reason why. 
No government interference
Let's start with the simplest and easiest option that Pharoah's government could have pursued once they knew that there would be seven years of plenty followed by seven years of famine (as predicted by the Pharoah's dream which was interpreted by Prophet Yusuf (عليه السلام).) .
Pharoah could have left the entire issue to the 'market'. During the years of plenty, the price of food would have fallen and people would have enjoyed a higher standard of living. For example, the lower grain prices could have led to people rearing more cattle and their diets would have improved with more meat.
However, during the years of famine, grain prices would have risen and those people who had accumulated assets in the years of plenty would be able to pay the higher prices in the famine years. Those who had not had such assets would have starved.
This assumes a fairly high level of self-discipline on the part of the population, but as Milton Friedman would say, the people would have been 'free to choose'. This is not a hypothetical option. The British lack of action to the Irish potato famine has been attributed to the British government's ideological adherence to a laissez-faire approach to macro-economics:
https://kenanfellows.org/kfp-cp-sites/cp01/cp01/sites/kfp-cp-sites.localhost.com.cp01/files/LP3_BBC Irish Famine Article for Lab.pdf
 
The Bengal famine is another one where government policy was different to the one Prophet Yusuf ((عليه السلام).) prescribed to Pharoah. In this instance, it was lack of government restriction over the action of privateers:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/29/winston-churchill-policies-contributed-to-1943-bengal-famine-study
 
Going back still further, the Great Bengal Famine of 1770 has been directly attributed to British government laissez-faire economic policy.
https://worldfinancialreview.com/the-political-economy-of-famines-during-the-british-rule-in-india-a-critical-analysis/
 
Light interference - provision of information
A common policy option nowadays, where people do not want direct government intervention is to recommend improving the provision of information to the population who will then be better able to make the correct decisions for themselves. The government could have mounted an information campaign during the years of plenty and told people to hoard food themselves, hoarding when there is no shortage is allowed in Islam.
However such attempts to influence awareness about the famine to come and changing peoples' attitudes so that they saved more than they were used to, would likely have run against increased social pressures on people to do the opposite. For example typically in societies as wealth increases there is social pressure to spend more, in this case, for example, have more lavish weddings.
Also providing information would have been a practical benefit for the better off e.g. those with storage capacity, but not so good for the poor (who would not have room to store grain, for example).
The government (using a bit more intervention) could have given tax breaks to people who owned granaries, to help the poor who needed such facilities. Again this solution would be to focus on market-based interventions and simply alter the working of the market using incentives. Current economic theory holds that people discount future risks very heavily i.e. they don't perceive them as much of a threat as they should. So, for example, just telling people they should save for a pension does not work. 
So we can likely predict that the solutions described above would not have worked had they tried them.
Heavy interference
This is what they actually did.
In times of plenty, Pharoah's government did not let prices fall as would have happened under free market conditions. They kept prices higher than they otherwise would have been because the government intervened and took excess stocks of grain out of circulation.
All people (rich and poor alike) had no option but to pay the usual higher prices - effectively, the government was taxing everyone, but this was not seen as a loss by anyone because the prices were no higher than usual.
The government stored the grain centrally and then they decided to release the grain according to their own policies.
Assumptions made by Prophet Yusuf's government
If you leave people to their own devices they may not make the best decisions (whether they are rich or poor), this could be due to: People do not have the resources to cater for future shocks (mainly the poor) People do not have the discipline to address future shocks (applies to both the rich and the poor) The government can make better decisions than individuals acting in their own self-interest because: The government can have access to more and better information than individuals do The government may not be as susceptible to a lack of self-discipline  
Conclusion
Of all the policy options open to Prophet Yusuf (عليه السلام) he advised Pharoah to pursue the most interventionist one. Some people may be tempted to call this socialist or communist, but I think those terms carry a lot of excess baggage, so I won't bring them into the discussion.
What I think can be safely inferred from his choice of policy is a fundamental principle that could inform economic policy in any Islamic state.
Facing an external shock to the Egyptian economy, he went for the option that would cause the least pain to the worst off in society. Other policy options would have caused more pain for the poorest but somewhat less for the better off.