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Riba and economic inequality

Haji 2003

Entry posted by Haji 2003 in Economics

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Summary

For Muslims, the questions around Riba are focused at the level of the individual because we want to know what we can and cannot do. This post looks at the broader societal issue. The conclusion is that riba and the business of lending can increase economic inequality between different segments in society.

Assuming an Islamic state has an overriding need to address economic inequality - it cannot accede to the provision of credit in a manner that we are used to in the West.

What is interest?

This may seem obvious. but it's worth exploring since the result can generate new insights.

  • Interest is a price charged by a lender to compensate them for not having the use of the money that they are lending.
  • Interest can also be compensation for the fact that the money they have lent will be worth less in the future than today because of inflation
  • Interest can also reflect a premium charged by the lender in order to account for the fact that some borrowers will not pay them back. The interest charged to the individual borrowers can vary because they vary in terms of their risk to the lender. Less risky borrowers are charged less and riskier ones are charged more.

The last point is not immediately obvious to everyone it is important however and we shall come back to it.

Access to credit

In a free market, there are all sorts of lenders (e.g. seeking different levels of return and willing to take different levels of risk) and all sorts of borrowers (e.g. those with good 'credit scores vs. those with poor ones). Those with a good credit record can borrow more and more cheaply than those with a poor record. This may be because those with a good record have a history of making repayments on time and so on. And this is where we have our first macroeconomic effect.

People who are poor and find it difficult to buy food and pay rent will invariably find it hard to keep up with their debt payments and if they don't pay their creditors on time, they will have a bad credit record. As a result, either they will not have access to credit at all or if they do, they will have to pay a higher price for it (a higher level of interest). This sounds crazy, but it is true. Credit is one product where the poor will generally pay more than the rich and it is certainly a product where those who need it to survive (rather than buying luxury goods) may not have access to it at all.

Therefore in a society where there is credit, there are two mechanisms by which social inequality is increased, lack of credit to the poor and expensive credit where it is available. There is a third mechanism by which inequality is increased. If rich people have access to credit and the poor do not, the rich may bid up the prices of assets so that they become even more unaffordable to the poor. A real-life example of this is the UK property market, at the time of writing this post. Many young people are 'priced out' of the UK housing market because people with access to credit (e.g. investors) have bid up the prices of property.

Materialism and credit

A further reason why inequality is increased is that people are encouraged (as consumers) to buy things today and pay for them tomorrow. Over the period they borrow money, they pay interest. The assumption here is that the 'joy' they get for the chance to consume something earlier than they otherwise would have done compensates for the reduced consumption that they will have in the future. They will have reduced consumption because in the future their income will be paying interest for their previous consumption. 

There is an important principle here. Such an approach to materialism has the following implications. This is a single-period gain. Because the only way you can keep doing it is to keep building up your debts! And at some point in the future, either you go bankrupt or the lender loses their capital or taxpayers' money is used to bail out both you and the lender. A materialist culture, therefore, combined with a system that makes credit easily available, rewards those people who have capital for pandering to the materialistic needs of the consumers but not much else.

No easy solutions

It would, however be naive to believe that the solution should be that lenders make credit available to all and at e.g. similar rates of interest. As we saw above interest performs a number of functions and one of these is to compensate lenders for risk. If lenders are forced to lend to the poor and at interest rates lower than they would normally offer, this may lead to losses for them.

There is another reason why there are no easy solutions. If someone has poor financial circumstances, then offering them more credit and associated interest payments could add to their problems rather than improve them. Credit unions, which do not seek to make a profit and are run for the benefit of their members offer a partial but not a complete solution.

Involvement of the State

If the market is unable to lend without increasing inequality then we must consider the role of the State, the criteria it uses to make loans and how it manages demand if interest is not a pricing mechanism that it wishes to use. This may seem radical and an intervention that is far too statist and dirigiste some might even describe it as socialist or even communist.

To put the above into context it's worth considering the role of the State when it comes to regulation of finance. It is notable that Martin Wolff a columnist writing in the Financial Times (the UK financial industry's newspaper) says:

Quote

This is how, crisis by crisis, we have created a banking sector that is in theory private, but in practice a ward of the state. 

https://www.ft.com/content/09bfbb8d-22f5-4c70-9d85-2df7ed5c516e

He arrives at this conclusion via an analysis of financial crises and not via the lens of inequality that I have used.

It's worth examining some of the points that Wolff makes, they are widely considered to be true:

Quote

The failure of Silicon Valley Bank shows there are holes in the US regulatory dike. That is no accident. It is what lobbyists called for: get rid of onerous regulations, they cried, and we will deliver miracles of growth.

This is a perennial issue, high levels of regulation stymie the returns that the financial sector can make and there is subsequently a call from economic liberals to remove the 'shackles', a new problem then arises, bailouts are needed and accompanied by new regulation.

Quote

Those who fail to escape in time will scream for a bailout ... few people are capitalists when threatened by losing money they regarded as safe and nobody is better than a capitalist at explaining how essential their wealth is to the health of the economy. 

the latter being justification for a bailout.

So state intervention in the financial markets is not an anomaly in a wholly capitalistic system. At the moment such intervention is justified given the damage that a bank run would cause for the whole economy.

It's not outrageous therefore that if the welfare of the poor is considered to be important, the availability of credit for them and the terms of such finance should be of concern to policy-makers. 

Practicalities of intervention

One way of arriving at a solution is to consider why people need loans in the first place.

  1. It is clear that sometimes people need to borrow money to increase their earning power. Loans for such purposes are obviously a 'good thing'. This is one end of a spectrum and the State should intervene to provide such loans at 0% interest, thus making them completely halal. However, an effect of such intervention could be to encourage training providers to raise prices, so where government is effectively subsidising a sector it may also need to intervene in terms of the prices it is willing to pay. The same applies to goods such as medical services.
  2. Buying a car. Now we are moving along the spectrum, is the car for enjoyment or for work? And if it is for work, how blingy or spartan is it? The latter could attract state funding, but the former is less likely to do so. For enjoyment, people should be educated to understand that there is no alternative to saving up.

And what about those who have capital?

My understanding is that having capital is not a problem in Islam. Lending it for interest is a problem. But that is not the only productive use that capitalists have for their capital. They can own shares in enterprises and receive dividends for their risk capital i.e. the profit or dividends they make depends on the risk that they take. Such risk-taking can be inherently more productive than lending capital for interest. It can be applied to the development of new technologies and industries - rather than pandering to the materialist interests of consumers or indeed increasing such materialistic interests.

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Haji 2003

Haji 2003 15,705

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I asked chatgpt: Does the availability of credit increase economic inequality in society?

The answer was quite similar to what I have posted above and there are points that I did not cover.

Screenshot 2023-03-21 at 11.46.41.png

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Haji 2003

Haji 2003 15,705

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How credit card debt has become a burden for Americans — and Joe Biden

 

Some interesting comments from readers after the above article in the Financial Times.

 

Quote

US credit card companies are far more predatory than counterparts in other parts of the world, and as others have noted, they are baked into a system that requires people to have a good credit score for all sorts of other transactions. I found it difficult to rent an apartment when I moved to the US for work, even though I was earning a 6 figure salary, because I didn't have a local credit score. Even now, my credit score is lower than many people earning much less because I haven't had the need for personal or car loans. It is a crazy system. But it has to be said that this is in large part a problem of financial illiteracy, poor resource management, and consumption addiction. The average American (or frankly the average global citizen) has very little idea how much money they lose long term on interest and makes short sighted decisions on impulse purchases. Want to avoid fees and interest? Don't take on credit you can't afford. Pay off your credit card each month. Even better, just buy less stuff. I grew up poor. I know what it is like. I see people piling crap into carts at Walmart and putting it on credit cards. It is patronizing to just say people are going into debt for necessities. Many are not.

https://www.ft.com/content/34c57911-dcda-4c29-b75d-bef830608a5a

 

Here's another good one, in the sense that it chimes with my views.

 

Quote

This is pretty much the reaction of every non-American who visits America. People buy far more than they need, often on credit. I do believe credit (and credit cards) are a net economic and social benefit. But a large minority of Americans are simply not able to handle unlimited credit in their pocket and should be protected better. The US should really introduce rules to link credit limits better to income and wealth. Ireland has a €40 tax on every personal credit card - almost no one has two of them or more! It's a very neat policy

 

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      TLDR
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      Introduction
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      Hochschild, A. R. (2016). Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right. The New Press.
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      Introduction
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      The answer to the latter question is presented below.
      This issue is one of many that contrasts the social and economic implications of Islamic injunctions vs. those of other religions. In summary, the Islamic notion of dogs as religiously impure focuses Muslims' attention towards other humans for social and emotional support. I believe that is superior to a society that redirects such attention to animals. 
      @Northwest

      TLDR
      The proposition that an Islamic-oriented society—with religious reservations about dog ownership—places a greater emphasis on human-human relationships than dog-friendly societies finds support in cross-cultural consumer research and Islamic marketing scholarship. The religious designation of dogs as impure curtails intensive anthropomorphic tendencies, leading consumers in Islamic contexts to channel social and emotional resources primarily toward family, friends, and community members. Consequently, marketing strategies and consumer behaviors in these contexts underscore interpersonal bonds, charitable obligations, and group cohesion rather than pet-centric consumption.
      By contrast, in societies that celebrate and encourage dog ownership, anthropomorphism significantly shapes consumer behavior, often shifting a portion of emotional and financial resources to human-dog relationships. These differences highlight how deeply cultural and religious frameworks influence the scope and nature of anthropomorphism, delineating the ways consumers allocate their relational capital between human and non-human companions.
       

      1. Anthropomorphism and Relationship Substitution
      Pet Humanization in Secular or Dog-Friendly Societies
      In many societies that promote dog ownership, there is a pronounced tendency to anthropomorphize pets—assigning them human-like traits and emotions (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007; Journal of Consumer Research). Pet ownership often translates into emotional bonds that parallel, or sometimes even substitute for, human-human connections. For example, Belk (2013; Journal of Consumer Research) discusses how dogs are seen as “extensions of the self,” enabling individuals to fulfill social, emotional, and identity-related needs. In marketing contexts, this humanization of pets manifests as substantial expenditures (e.g., premium dog food, grooming, dog-friendly travel) and even the creation of communities around pet ownership.
      Religious and Cultural Boundaries in Islamic Contexts
      Islamic teachings often classify dogs as najis (impure), especially concerning their saliva, leading to social and religious restrictions on close physical interactions (Alhussain & Thakur, 2019; Journal of Islamic Marketing, Emerald). While not all Muslims adhere to the same level of strictness (diversity exists across regions and jurisprudential schools), in many contexts, dog ownership is minimized or relegated to functional roles (e.g., guard dogs, herding), reducing the emotional human-pet bond. Anthropomorphism, thus, is largely muted. This diminished emphasis on dog-human relationships can redirect emotional and social energies toward more robust human-human ties, as there is little inclination to invest in a being commonly viewed as “impure” within a domestic setting (Ibrahim & Al Kamdah, 2020; Journal of Islamic Marketing).
      2. Emphasis on Human-Human Relations
      Communal and Familial Bonds
      Several studies on Muslim consumer behavior note a pronounced focus on family cohesion, kinship obligations, and community welfare (Wilson & Grant, 2013; Journal of Islamic Marketing; Emerald). This cultural emphasis is partly derived from key Islamic principles like ummah (community) and zakat (almsgiving). Since dogs are not typically incorporated as household companions, the emotional investment that might be directed toward pets is instead often channeled into human relationships—strengthening family ties, neighborhood communities, and broader social networks. Social gatherings, frequent family visits, and kin-based reciprocity form the core of daily life (Jafari & Goulding, 2008; Consumption, Markets & Culture, Taylor & Francis).
      Social Interaction Rituals
      Societies that discourage dog ownership frequently invest in elaborate human-centric rituals: communal prayers, frequent visits to relatives, large-scale cultural festivals such as Eid, and extended family gatherings (Essoo & Dibb, 2004; European Journal of Marketing). These rituals encourage sustained human-human interaction. By contrast, in dog-friendly contexts, social rituals often include pet-oriented activities—visits to dog parks, “puppy parties,” or dog adoption events—showcasing how some communal bonding can revolve around animals rather than solely around human interaction (Holbrook & Woodside, 2008; Journal of Business Research, Elsevier).
      3. Consumer Behavior Implications
      Expenditure Flows
      Dog-Friendly Societies: A significant proportion of household expenditures—such as premium dog food, veterinary care, and leisure activities—can be allocated to pets (Hirschman, 1994; Journal of Consumer Research). Over time, this fosters an entire “pet economy,” often reinforced by emotional satisfaction drawn from anthropomorphized relationships with dogs.
      Islamic-Oriented Societies: Due to religious constraints, there is limited demand for dog-centric products and services. Instead, expenditures that might have been channeled toward pet care could be redirected toward communal obligations (e.g., charitable giving, gifts to family, social events). The consumer culture thus prioritizes human welfare, strengthening what might be viewed as social capital within human networks (Jafari & Goulding, 2008; Consumption, Markets & Culture).
      Marketplace Signaling and Sociocultural Values
      Signaling Communal Responsibility: Consumers in Islamic contexts may signal piety and communal commitment through active participation in social events or charitable acts, reflecting a cultural script that values direct human welfare (Wilson & Grant, 2013; Journal of Islamic Marketing).
      Signaling Affection for Pets: In Western or dog-friendly contexts, owning a pampered dog can signal care, empathy, and a nurturing personality, reinforcing a sense of belonging in communities of pet lovers (Belk, 1988; Journal of Consumer Research). Marketers leverage anthropomorphism in advertising, depicting dogs as “family members” to appeal to consumers’ emotional investment in pets (Waytz, Cacioppo, & Epley, 2010; Trends in Cognitive Sciences).
      4. Societal and Cultural Outcomes
      Stronger Intra-Human Bonds in Islamic Contexts
      The proposition that Islamic-oriented societies have a stronger emphasis on human-human relationships can be understood through the lens of “resource allocation” in consumer behavior. With limited scope for dog-human emotional or social investment, individuals are more inclined to strengthen kin networks, community relations, and collective identity (Ibrahim & Al Kamdah, 2020). This focus on human-centered relationships is further reinforced by religious teachings promoting empathy, community service, and direct human engagement over companionship with creatures deemed ritually impure (Alhussain & Thakur, 2019).
      Diverse Relationship Portfolios in Dog-Friendly Societies
      In societies where dogs occupy central roles in households, individuals often have “relationship portfolios” that include significant non-human elements (Belk, 2013). Emotional fulfillment, social activities, and even identity expression can revolve around pet ownership, potentially substituting or complementing human-human connections. While this can enrich daily life for pet owners, critics argue it may diminish time and investment in broader community involvement (Holbrook & Woodside, 2008; Hirschman, 1994).
       
      Key References
      Alhussain, T., & Thakur, R. (2019). Religious beliefs and consumer behavior: A conceptual framework and research propositions. Journal of Islamic Marketing, 10(3), 948–962. [Emerald]
      Belk, R. W. (1988). Possessions and the extended self. Journal of Consumer Research, 15(2), 139–168. [University of Chicago Press]
      Belk, R. W. (2013). Extended self in a digital world. Journal of Consumer Research, 40(3), 477–500. [University of Chicago Press]
      Epley, N., Waytz, A., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2007). On seeing human: A three-factor theory of anthropomorphism. Psychological Review, 114(4), 864–886. [APA; frequently cited in marketing and consumer research]
      Essoo, N., & Dibb, S. (2004). Religious influences on shopping behaviour: An exploratory study. European Journal of Marketing, 38(5/6), 536–553. [Emerald]
      Hirschman, E. C. (1994). Consumers and their animal companions. Journal of Consumer Research, 20(4), 616–631. [Oxford University Press for the Association for Consumer Research]
      Holbrook, M. B., & Woodside, A. G. (2008). Animal companions, consumption experiences, and the marketing of pets: Transcending boundaries in the animal-human distinction. Journal of Business Research, 61(5), 377–381. [Elsevier]
      Ibrahim, B., & Al Kamdah, A. (2020). Exploring the Islamic marketing ethics from macro and consumer behaviour perspectives. Journal of Islamic Marketing, 11(5), 1295–1312. [Emerald]
      Jafari, A., & Goulding, C. (2008). “We are not terrorists!” UK-based Iranians, consumption practices and the ‘torn self.’ Consumption, Markets & Culture, 11(2), 73–91. [Taylor & Francis]
      Wilson, J. A. J., & Grant, J. (2013). Islamic marketing – A challenger to the classical marketing canon? Journal of Islamic Marketing, 4(1), 7–21. [Emerald]
      Waytz, A., Cacioppo, J. T., & Epley, N. (2010). Who sees human? The stability and importance of individual differences in anthropomorphism. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 5(3), 219–232. [SAGE, frequently cited in consumer research]
      These references illustrate how socio-religious norms and cultural frameworks (particularly in Islamic contexts) shape the nature and direction of anthropomorphism and, consequently, influence where consumers channel their social and emotional investment—ultimately affirming the proposition that Islamic-oriented societies often place a stronger emphasis on human-human relations.
    • Haji 2003
      A counterpoint to the Great Replacement Theory
      By Haji 2003 in Contemporania
         8 comments
      [This post was initially published as 'A little conspiracy theory of mine' on Oct 25 2016. I've now retitled it and linked some of the text with the notion of the Great Replacement Theory.]
      Summary
      Britain, after the Second World War ostensibly recruited workers from various developing countries in order to fill skill shortages. However, around the same time, there was a concerted effort by Australia to recruit working-class Britons. A possible explanation to this anomalous situation is that there was a concerted policy by Britain and Australia to ensure that Australia remained white. This is one argument against the idea that inward migration into the West is somehow an attack on white people. The two examples of migration examined here represent the opposite.
      The Great Replacement Theory
      According to Prof Matthew Feldman there is a lite of versions of The Great Replacement Theory and a full-fat one and the latter holds that:
      https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/08/a-deadly-ideology-how-the-great-replacement-theory-went-mainstream
      In this post, I will argue that at least in terms of one example, this is indeed the case, but rather than representing some form of surrender on the part of the 'white race' as the far right claims the policy represents, it is actually the opposite.
      The Windrush Generation
      This is the narrative all Britons have been brought up with (the following is from the UK government's own website):
      http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/citizenship/brave_new_world/immigration.htm
      It sounds very multi-culti, liberal and nice. Britain needed labour, brown people needed jobs and everyone would get along swimmingly in post-war Britain. This was not illegal immigration, it was planned and made good economic sense.
      Here's some more justification from the British Library:
      http://www.bl.uk/learning/timeline/item107671.html
      To help immigration into the UK, the British Nationality Act of 1948 gave rights to all people from the commonwealth to settle in the country. West Indian immigration to the UK from the 1940's to the 1960s was about 170,000. In Britain, there was an increase of about 80,000 people originating from the Indian sub-continent from 1951 to 1961.
      So if there was such a shortage of labour in postwar Britain, surely the British government would have been aghast at the prospect of Britons leaving the UK? And trying to put a stop to it?
      Apparently not.
      The Assisted Passage Scheme from Britain to Australia
      Australia's 'Assisted Passage Migration Scheme' started in 1945 and involved 1 million people migrating from Britain to Australia.
      http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/7217889.stm
      The following paper adds some nuance to this:
      Yet despite the 'reluctance' we still get:
      Stephen Constantine (2003) British emigration to the empire- commonwealth since 1880: From overseas settlement to Diaspora?, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 31:2, 16-35, DOI: 10.1080/03086530310001705586
      From the same paper the following motivation, which refers to policies in the nineteenth century could perhaps explain the flow of people observed at the top of this post:
       
      Conclusion
      In sum, Britain was allowed to go a bit brown, because it was essential that Australia, Canada and other dominions remain essentially white. And this racist policy was maintained until the facts on the ground had been established. This point is one counter-arguments to the 'Great Replacement Theory' that has been espoused in some far-right circles in the West.
       
      https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/08/a-deadly-ideology-how-the-great-replacement-theory-went-mainstream
       
      So we have two migration stories. And the funny thing is that the first story is covered in the press, and you'll also find the second story given a lot of attention.
       
      But the two are never mentioned together.
       
      It's when you put, what are otherwise very positive stories together, that something far nastier emerges. Something which is within plain sight but unacknowledged.
       
      https://contemporaniablog.wordpress.com/2016/10/24/poms-and-windrush/
    • Haji 2003
      Religion and cultural resilience
      By Haji 2003 in Contemporania - AI enhanced
         0 comments
      I gave ChatGPT the following prompt:
       
      The text below is provided by ChatGPT.
       

      The proposition that Islamic societies have been particularly successful in maintaining their cultural heritage since the 16th-century expansion of European power is complex and nuanced. While many Islamic societies have indeed preserved significant aspects of their cultural, religious, and linguistic traditions, the extent of this preservation varies across regions and historical contexts. To explore this proposition, consider the following key factors:
      1. Cultural Resilience in the Face of European Expansion
      Islamic societies, particularly those in the Ottoman Empire, Safavid Persia, and Mughal India, exhibited remarkable cultural resilience during and after the period of European imperial expansion. Unlike many indigenous cultures in the Americas, Africa, and parts of Asia, Islamic societies often retained their religious, legal, and linguistic frameworks despite external pressures.
      Key Examples:
      Ottoman Empire: The Ottomans maintained their Islamic legal and educational systems alongside modernizing reforms (e.g., the Tanzimat reforms) while resisting cultural assimilation. Safavid Persia (Iran): The Safavid dynasty entrenched Twelver Shi’ism, reinforcing a distinct cultural and religious identity that endures today. Mughal India: Mughal rulers preserved and promoted Islamic art and architecture, influencing the Indian subcontinent despite British colonial rule. Theoretical Support:
      Marshall Hodgson in The Venture of Islam (1974) argues that Islamic societies developed robust institutional and intellectual traditions that enabled them to integrate external influences while maintaining core cultural elements.
      2. The Role of Religion as a Cultural Anchor
      Islamic societies have often placed significant emphasis on religious education and practice, which provided a unifying cultural framework that resisted external cultural influences. The centrality of Islam in daily life—through Quranic education, mosques, and religious practices—contributed to this cultural persistence.
      Key Insight:
      Clifford Geertz’s study of Morocco and Indonesia in Islam Observed (1968) demonstrates how Islamic societies adapted to modernity while retaining religious and cultural traditions.
      3. Linguistic and Educational Continuity
      Unlike many indigenous languages that declined under European rule, Arabic, Persian, and Ottoman Turkish remained central to intellectual and cultural life in their respective regions. Islamic scholars preserved classical texts and continued producing scholarly works even during colonial rule.
      Contrast with Other Societies:
      In Latin America, many indigenous languages and cultural practices were systematically suppressed by European colonizers. In Africa, missionary-led education often replaced local languages with European ones. 4. Selective Adaptation and Cultural Synthesis
      Islamic societies did not resist external influences entirely; instead, they often selectively adopted technological, administrative, and intellectual practices from European powers while preserving core cultural and religious principles.
      Example:
      The Ottoman Empire modernized its military and bureaucracy but retained its Islamic legal structure (Sharia) alongside secular reforms. 5. Regional Variations and Exceptions
      The degree of cultural preservation varies significantly across the Islamic world. For instance:
      North Africa and the Middle East: Maintained strong Islamic and linguistic traditions despite French and British colonization. Central Asia: Soviet policies suppressed religious practices, weakening Islamic cultural heritage for much of the 20th century. Southeast Asia: Indonesian and Malaysian societies retained Islamic practices while integrating elements of European education systems. 6. Comparative Perspective
      When comparing Islamic societies with other non-European societies, such as Native American, Aboriginal Australian, or sub-Saharan African communities, the relative success in preserving cultural heritage becomes more apparent. Many of these societies experienced significant cultural loss due to direct European intervention, religious conversion, and the imposition of foreign educational systems.
      Scholarly Insight:
      Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978) highlights how Islamic societies were often misrepresented in Western discourse, yet this external pressure also galvanized internal cultural reaffirmation.
      Conclusion
      While Islamic societies have indeed shown notable success in preserving their cultural heritage, this success is not uniform across all regions. The resilience largely stems from the centrality of religion, the adaptability of cultural practices, and the selective adoption of external influences. However, regions like Central Asia illustrate how external forces can disrupt this continuity. Ultimately, the proposition holds considerable validity when compared to many other societies that experienced cultural erosion under European expansion.

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