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A Guide to Sunni Trends


Qa'im

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The Sunni Muslim world, as I see it, is divided up into the following social categories. Below are the major trends that run through this segment of the Umma.

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Madhhabi Sunnis: Anyone belonging to the traditional Hanafi, Shafi`i, Maliki, and Hanbali schools, including both conservative and nominal Muslims. Madhhabi Sunnis usually express their religion through devoted worship, spirituality, and traditional law-abidance. Many sub-movements fit in this category, including most Sufis, the mystical Barelvi movement, the Deobandi movement, and those who are simply culturally Muslim. Madhhabi Sunnis are usually suspicious of Salafi, Shia, and modernist ideas and traditions, but still advocate for Muslim unity; agreeing to disagree with competing trends. Some nominal Madhhabis are influenced by Salafi revivalism and conservatism. Sufis in particular are often politically quietist and pacifistic, and have a balanced but positive view of classical Islamic civilizations.

Popular examples: Hamza Yusuf, Yahya Rhodus, Timothy Winters, Zaid Shakir, Umar Abd-Allah, Shabir Ally, Usama Canon, Suhaib Webb, Faraz Rabbani, Amjad Tarsin.

Salafis: Those who try to pursue a literal interpretation of Sunni Islam based on its most established primary hadith sources. Salafis are suspicious of secondary sources, philosophy, mysticism, traditional Sunni schools, saint-reverence, forms of religious expressions that are not explicitly supported by "sahih" Sunni hadiths, and other sects and religions. Salafis usually express their religion through theological discourse, worship, strict adherence to early practices (including having a "Muslim appearance"), and clamping down on "innovations" in Islamic practice (i.e. anything in a hadith they consider "weak", or not found in their most literal interpretations). Salafis have three noticeable sub-movements: (1) the Wahabis, who follow the Najdi Saudi theologians; (2) apolitical non-Wahabi Salafis, who follow non-Najdi figures, are focused mostly on theology and law, and are critical of Saudi Arabia's royal family and state-sponsored scholars, and (3) Militant Salafis, who seek to revive the Caliphate, establish puritan Islamic states, resist Western imperialism, and punish deviant and nominal Muslims. Salafis are very critical of Sufis and Shias, and often push for the destruction of their relics.

Popular examples: Bilal Philips, Abu Khadeejah, Yasir Qadhi, Abdur Raheem Green, Zakir Naik, Feiz Mohammed, Abu Musab Wajdi Akkari, Abu Isa Niamatullah.

Liberal Reformists: This includes Quranists and other reformists, who have a modernist humanist worldview, and see many Islamic laws and practices as outdated or obsolete. Liberal Reformists are focused on social justice and ethical principles inspired by the Quran. They are skeptical of hadith literature, Islamic scholarship, mysticism, sectarianism, and some jurisprudence. Liberal Reformists are especially critical of traditional penalties (hudud), extremism, radicalization, and laws related to gender and sexuality. The Quran is viewed as a flexible, progressive document that mostly lacks the rigidity of Islamic laws.

Popular examples: Mona Eltahawy, Irshad Manji, Maajid Nawaz, Tarek Fatah, Amina Wadud, Asra Nomani, Michael Muhammad Knight, Khalid Abou El Fadl

Muslim Brotherhood Types: They are often unaffiliated with the actual MB, but hold the same pragmatist and anti-imperialist sentiments. They are a middle-upper class educated movement that focuses on social conservatism, harmonizing modernism and traditionalism, international politics, and social justice. The MB types believe in family values, scientific/technological progress and development, and quasi-Marxist-Leninist domestic and international policies (big welfare governments and anti-Western imperialism). They are critical of Salafi puritanism, Sufi mysticism, and Shia Iran's encroachment of the Arab world. The MB types often admire the Turkish, Tunisian, and Malaysian Islamic models, which are pluralistic yet respect Islamic tradition. They are often nostalgic of Islamic civilization's golden age.

Popular examples: Tariq Ramadan, Jamal Badawi, Dalia Mogahed, Anas al-Tikriti, Jonathan Brown

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Most Sunni Muslims are not very conscious of these divisions. They usually don't identify themselves with one of these labels, and all 4 trends coexist in most Sunni nations and communities. The trends also have some overlaps, and there are people that are a blend of multiple trends. Sunni scholars are more aware of the red lines due to their epistemological significance. But many Sunnis are subject to the influence of Gulf petrodollars, and therefore will take on some Salafi cliches without noticing it (or just seeing it as becoming "more religious"). I call this "Casual Salafism" - speakers like Nouman Ali Khan, Yusuf Estes, Ismail Menk, or Omar Suleiman, who are more laid-back and popular with the youth, but still have a Salafi epistemology and Salafi influences in their material.

Being conscious of these trends will allow us to better understand whom we can work with and whom we should best avoid.

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  • Advanced Member

amazing post.

I know many Muslims and families in the west, here in Canada that are not very religious. They barely care about Islam and are engulfed in the western world, yet still identify is Muslims (though they like to keep that a secret most of the time). They know that the quran is good to read, they know about hajj (but really count care less about actually doing it), they don't pray, they know about Ramadhan and like to celebrate eid. They have memorized many of the popular hadith (like the one about quran and Sunna, the one about backbiting,) and don't really care about learning more. Lastly they know the stories of the prophets and know which religion sprouted from each. And that's about it when it comes to religion.

What would this category be? The wont be liberal reformists, they don't care enough about what they call "religion" to want to reform anything. All thoughts are appreciated.

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  • Advanced Member

cool, but that should also be on your list, tend or not because it seems to be the most common type of Muslim, especially in the west, trend or not. I hope this post will have a sequel where we can discuss how to deal with all these types. Thanks, and God Bless

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I did not include them, because the characteristics of these people are fluid, random, varied, and not based on any epistemological framework. They are like foam in the ocean - there is much of it, but it has no shape, no weight, no affect, and it is taken anywhere the current goes. The dominant social trend in the Western world is secular humanism, which is the foundation of our media, economy, policies, and culture. Nominal Muslims who do not care about religion are subject to any influence and are apathetic to having a consistent methodology. They'll take whatever bits of existing trends they want and put it together, even if it makes little sense.

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  • Advanced Member

I find non religious Sunnis a harder case than atheists.

Because they have already made the logical choice (tawhid and nabuwah), which makes it near impossible to help them be more religious (pray 5 times a day, sin les, break less major rules) in a non extremist way.

Edited by Shabbar_Abidi
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2 hours ago, Shabbar_Abidi said:

but even sheep need a proper Shepard, without one they are left to the wolves. What do you think this Shepard should be? How should we guide nominal Sunnis away from the wolves?

The shepherd of course is Imam Ibn al-Hasan (as), but the people are distracted by wolves in sheep's clothing. To win them over, they must either be initiated (made to care about their fate, pushed to actively seek knowledge, experience a traumatic event), or re-educated (through schooling, movies, books, art, poetry, speeches, journalism, da`wa, family, and jobs). At the moment, the dominant system has control over most modes of education, and so even getting the attention of a nominal Muslim is difficult. But, everyone has an interest, a problem they are seeking answers for, or an issue they care deeply about, and you must be able to assess the situation of each individual, see what it is they need, and provide a solution that they will accept.

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11 hours ago, Bint Abbas said:

Tariq Ramadan a brotherhood type? Yeah ok

Well yeah. His grandfather founded the Muslim Brotherhood, and while he does not fully endorse the party, he routinely criticizes Sisi and other Arab military dictators and secularists. He has boycotted conferences that were not tough on U.S foreign policy ("imperialism"), Israel, and Arab dictators. He's a prof, a modernist, sports a light beard and a suit, and yet he is a conservative and does not call for gross Islamic reform. He defends traditional Islam, believes in revolution, and is against literalist or archaic interpretations. He is basically your textbook MB type.

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7 minutes ago, Qa'im said:

Well yeah. His grandfather founded the Muslim Brotherhood, and while he does not fully endorse the party, he routinely criticizes Sisi and other Arab military dictators and secularists. He has boycotted conferences that were not tough on U.S foreign policy ("imperialism"), Israel, and Arab dictators. He's a prof, a modernist, sports a light beard and a suit, and yet he is a conservative and does not call for gross Islamic reform. He defends traditional Islam, believes in revolution, and is against literalist or archaic interpretations. He is basically your textbook MB type.

Tariq Ramadan has written a dozen books calling for gross Islamic reform, one of them is even entitled 'Radical Reform'. The reason he opposes Sisi is because he is pro-democracy and Sisi took over via a military coup. In short, opposing Sisi does not equate to being an Ikhwani.

Edited by Pro-Alid
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5 minutes ago, Qa'im said:

Well yeah. His grandfather founded the Muslim Brotherhood, and while he does not fully endorse the party, he routinely criticizes Sisi and other Arab military dictators and secularists. He has boycotted conferences that were not tough on U.S foreign policy ("imperialism"), Israel, and Arab dictators. He's a prof, a modernist, sports a light beard and a suit, and yet he is a conservative and does not call for gross Islamic reform. He defends traditional Islam, believes in revolution, and is against literalist or archaic interpretations. He is basically your textbook MB type.

Lol. So he is a ikhwani because his grandfather is Hasan al banna? He critizes Sisi because he threw away democracy nothing to do with ikhwan. Being Pro-Palestine, a modernist and a beard makes you a ikhwani? Really?? Tariq calls for reform constantly. As for Jonathan Brown being an ikhwani i dont even want to start on that.

Edited by Bint Abbas
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1 minute ago, Bint Abbas said:

Lol. So he is a ikhwani because his grandfather is Hasan al banna? He critizes Sisi because he threw away democracy nothing to do with ikhwan. Being Pro-Palestine, a modernist and a beard makes you a ikhwani? Really?? Tariq calls for reform constantly. As for Jonathan Brown being an ikhwani i dont even want to start on that.

I'm not sure what you define as ikhwani, but as someone who grew up surrounded by MB-types and members of the party, I wouldn't put Tariq Ramadan in the same category as people like Maajid Nawaz or Irshad Manji. He does not call for gross reform of Islam, he calls for what he says is "renovation" and modernization. That's typical of this trend. He defends conservatism and traditionalism from radical reformists ilk, but is not a strict traditionalist himself. Yes, he is not a Salafi or a Madhhabi. He had spoken up about citizenship and hudud in Islam - you can see his lecture here on "Rethinking Islamic Reform".


As for Jonathan Brown, he too fits in this category. If it's the name of this "category" that bothers you, then you can rename it to "conservative modernist anti-imperialist upper middle class university-educated Islamist who is not Salafist or Sufi, who is critical of militant secularism on one hand, but also literalist jihadism and Saudi on the other hand". But that's redundant. There are many Sunnis in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and elsewhere who fall under this category, who revile sell-outs and liberals like Nawaz and Knight, but also dislike Saudi and Iran. They're pro-AKP, pro-MB (but sometimes critical of it), pro-Nahda, pro-Qatar ($$$), and can appreciate the Malaysian model, and hold negativity towards the U.S, Israel, Saudi, and Russia.

Like all of the trends above, there are some parallels and some mixes. However, the "liberal reformists" I had in mind are those who hold unorthodox views on hijab, gender, gay marriage, and culture. Yes Ramadan called to uplift all forms of capital punishment, but in his own words, he does not see capital punishment as intrinsically inhumane, and he would support its return in his ideal Islamic state.

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30 minutes ago, Qa'im said:

I'm not sure what you define as ikhwani, but as someone who grew up surrounded by MB-types and members of the party, I wouldn't put Tariq Ramadan in the same category as people like Maajid Nawaz or Irshad Manji. He does not call for gross reform of Islam, he calls for what he says is "renovation" and modernization. That's typical of this trend. He defends conservatism and traditionalism from radical reformists ilk, but is not a strict traditionalist himself. Yes, he is not a Salafi or a Madhhabi. He had spoken up about citizenship and hudud in Islam - you can see his lecture here on "Rethinking Islamic Reform".


As for Jonathan Brown, he too fits in this category. If it's the name of this "category" that bothers you, then you can rename it to "conservative modernist anti-imperialist upper middle class university-educated Islamist who is not Salafist or Sufi, who is critical of militant secularism on one hand, but also literalist jihadism and Saudi on the other hand". But that's redundant. There are many Sunnis in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and elsewhere who fall under this category, who revile sell-outs and liberals like Nawaz and Knight, but also dislike Saudi and Iran. They're pro-AKP, pro-MB (but sometimes critical of it), pro-Nahda, pro-Qatar ($$$), and can appreciate the Malaysian model, and hold negativity towards the U.S, Israel, Saudi, and Russia.

Like all of the trends above, there are some parallels and some mixes. However, the "liberal reformists" I had in mind are those who hold unorthodox views on hijab, gender, gay marriage, and culture. Yes Ramadan called to uplift all forms of capital punishment, but in his own words, he does not see capital punishment as intrinsically inhumane, and he would support its return in his ideal Islamic state.

Defending traditionalism and speaking about Hudud does not make you an ikhwani lol. As for reform, have you ever read any of his books?  As for Brown he is not an ikhwani and far from being an islamist.

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I disagree with the label. I wouldnt place Majid or Mona as sunni at all. I am sure if you asked them they would not even see themselves as sunnis. I would put Tariq Ramadan with the likes of Hasan Farhan, Adnan Ibrahim and their likes as Modernist Reformer and not Ikhwanis.

As for Brown, just because someone has a picture of Erdogan and Morsi that does not mean he is an ikhwani. 

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On 08/08/2016 at 5:07 PM, Shabbar_Abidi said:

amazing post.

I know many Muslims and families in the west, here in Canada that are not very religious. They barely care about Islam and are engulfed in the western world, yet still identify is Muslims (though they like to keep that a secret most of the time). They know that the quran is good to read, they know about hajj (but really count care less about actually doing it), they don't pray, they know about Ramadhan and like to celebrate eid. They have memorized many of the popular hadith (like the one about quran and Sunna, the one about backbiting,) and don't really care about learning more. Lastly they know the stories of the prophets and know which religion sprouted from each. And that's about it when it comes to religion.

What would this category be? The wont be liberal reformists, they don't care enough about what they call "religion" to want to reform anything. All thoughts are appreciated.

@Qa'im @Tawheed313 and as well as Shabbir brother, what about the shias, where do they stand, are they also divided, is it few division not applying to all of ummah?and when speaking of sunnnis, where do the shias stand, are the shias( not the scholars or speakers mentioned above) but lay people themselves religious? this makes me think i did come across a similar type of argument nouman ali khan against yasi qadhi over one issue and the comments made me think. i felt i had glossed over being so impressed by traditional things such as spirtuality love and salat and their motivational speeches i could have avoided the trap of falling into such petty things.i  also remember when i used to largely follow sunni scholars no matter how much motivation i had there would be one thing i would come across and my mind wouldnt let it go and i would think about it over and over again. if i ad reached the same conclusions of realsing different areas of of sunni trends it would have confuzed me making me think which one is correct to follow. there are quite a number of sunni motivational pages.who do all of these sunni trendsetter appaarently think is right, all of them cant be, or what does sunni islam imply. how do we following the imams a.s. avoid getting into these trends? i have certain ideas, but if anymore can be shared thatd be great. i do agree reading that above has made me want to become shia all over again why because people are trying to speak what is correct position of where sunni islam should go and there are literally divided whos the correct one to follow, the Imams have more wisdom literally the Ahlulbayt pbut are one of the rope of Allah SWT.

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  • Advanced Member

Bismihi Ta'ala

This is quite an interesting breakdown. There is no single or 'correct' way to define trends, because there will always be overlaps and exceptions. However, I do think that Tariq Ramadan has Ikhwani tendencies (not necessarily contemporary Ikhwani, but more the 70s Ikhwanism from which some actually became Khomeinists, and in the process, Shi'a). 

It is true that opposing Sisi in itself does not make one an MB supporter, but if I recall correctly he has actually gone as far as suggesting that Sisi's regime is worse than Morsi's. His explanation behind Morsi's failures also seem to gloss over the treatment of minorities. Knowing how Tariq Ramadan would not usually overlook such a point, this showed some bias and was somewhat a red flag.

Either way, he has made considerable efforts in the French-speaking world to reconciliate Muslim and Western identities without compromising one or the other.

Regarding the third group 'liberal reformists' I wouldn't necessarily categorize them when discussing Sunni trends because I don't really see most of the individuals in that group as being associated to a particular sect. Indeed, some of them are from non-Sunni backgrounds.

Wallahu A'lam

 

 

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as i have asked earlier ,if someone can answer, what about the shias, where do they stand, are they also divided, is it few division not applying to all of ummah?and when speaking of sunnnis, where do the shias stand, are the shias( not the scholars or speakers mentioned above) but lay people themselves religious?  how do we following the imams a.s. avoid getting into these trends?

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  • Advanced Member

Assalamu alaykum, 

Dear brother Qa'im, I must really congratulate you on that information-rich, epistemologically sound masterpiece ! We hardly have such insightful works done nowadays. Keep up the good work !

I suggest (if it's not too much of a trouble) that you make a similar classificatory study on the contemporary trends within our own Twelver Shi'i (imami) school. Whilst I am aware of the risks involved in this undertaking, such a study would nevertheless be immensely useful.

Best wishes !!

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Should add Yusuf Estes to Salafi Category. He defended the destruction of the Baqi and praises Abdullah ibn Abdul Wahab(la). 

 

 

Edited by Abu Hadi
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  • Advanced Member

Salam . 

I grew up in a Sunni Barelvi household in Pakistan. Having said that, I foubd this post to be very interesting, especially this being based on a Shia's observation. Overall, a decent summary. Kudos. 

 

Edited by saberrider
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      One way of arriving at a solution is to consider why people need loans in the first place.
      It is clear that sometimes people need to borrow money to increase their earning power. Loans for such purposes are obviously a 'good thing'. This is one end of a spectrum and the State should intervene to provide such loans at 0% interest, thus making them completely halal. However, an effect of such intervention could be to encourage training providers to raise prices, so where government is effectively subsidising a sector it may also need to intervene in terms of the prices it is willing to pay. The same applies to goods such as medical services. Buying a car. Now we are moving along the spectrum, is the car for enjoyment or for work? And if it is for work, how blingy or spartan is it? The latter could attract state funding, but the former is less likely to do so. For enjoyment, people should be educated to understand that there is no alternative to saving up. And what about those who have capital?
      My understanding is that having capital is not a problem in Islam. Lending it for interest is a problem. But that is not the only productive use that capitalists have for their capital. They can own shares in enterprises and receive dividends for their risk capital i.e. the profit or dividends they make depends on the risk that they take. Such risk-taking can be inherently more productive than lending capital for interest. It can be applied to the development of new technologies and industries - rather than pandering to the materialist interests of consumers or indeed increasing such materialistic interests.
         3 comments
      Summary
      Iran is often accused of sponsoring groups such as Hamas. But what form is any help likely to take? Some speculative answers in the absence of any tangible proof.
      Background
      A short period after the Iranian revolution in 1979, Saddam Hussain, the Iraqi President decided to invade the country. He was funded by the Saudis and Kuwaitis amongst others and supplied by various western countries. Iran was embargoed. So they had to develop their own capabilities both in terms of hardware and likely software (military tactics etc.).
      Later on Iran helped set up Hizbollah because the Shias of Lebanon were being trodden on by all the other communities of that country as well as the invading Israelis. Hezbollah proved to be instrumental in helping the Israelis leave.
      Fast forward many years and Iranian-backed militia defeated ISIS in Iraq, and Hezbollah helped do the same in Syria (worth noting that very useful experience was derided by some who felt they should stay within Lebanese borders). Throughout all of this, Iran and its allies have no doubt picked up quite a few experiences and ideas about what it takes to fight in urban settings.
      In contrast, all other Arab countries relied on foreign armies' training. How effective that has been can be seen from the experience of the Iraqi army vs ISIS and the Afghan army vs the Taliban.
      Since the Nakba the Palestinian resistance was never known for the sophistication of its urban guerrilla warfare.
      Hamas
      The current anti-Israeli insurgency seems to be based on a mixture of small arms, tunnels and tactics. Assuming that sophisticated arms can't be smuggled, I'd hazard that the most valuable support they have received has been 'soft'. Strategies and tactics and that sort of thing. Knowing how to work around informers, etc., would also likely be very useful.
      No doubt someone has also been advising them how small arms can be made in motorcycle workshops. The Omani forts of centuries past had various defence mechanisms. One of them was the liquid produced by pressed dates. Nourishment for peacetime but a weapon for sieges when it could be boiled and poured onto invaders' heads. The point is that dual-use technology has a rich heritage and is eminently useful for a Gazan economy under siege for years. 
      Again throwing resources at problems such as this needs a state actor.
      Conclusion
      In sum, the Muslim world likely now has its own West Point, albeit not located in a physical location and one that does not need powerpoint slides and manuals. But as I said at the very start all speculation on my part.
       
         1 comment
      Looks like I've been here a while ...
      Twenty years ago today! I think I joined up after returning from Hajj, I should have done it beforehand I guess. It's been fun in the main, but gotten quieter over the years. Still, it has also served as a diary and a place to keep thoughts and ideas. I can understand why some people leave after a while - it's often the same issues that keep cropping up. It helps to have as bad a memory as mine - so things seem newer than they really are.
      And what about the future? This site like the rest of the net was the result of some transformative changes in tech. I think we are about to go through another inflexion point with AI and things won't be quite the same again. Exciting and challenging times ahead and I think the possible source of new ethical and fiqhi questions, albeit variations on existing themes to some extent.
      If you are wondering what 'Stories for Sakina' is about - the posts on this blog also serve the dual purpose of being (my niece) Sakina's birthday cards.
      So, for this post, I thought I'd collect an eclectic mix of my posts over the last 20 years. Eclectic means they are a haphazard mix of different types of posts, witterings, jokes and attempts to be useful and even philosophical.
      Finally, some career advice
      I joined in 2004 and got made a Mod in 2008, and became an Admin sometime after 2020 I think. So for those of you at the start of your careers the takeaway is that you don't need to be good to get to the top, you just need to hang around.
       
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         2 comments
      Why has the West seen falling living standards?
      Variations on this question are commonly asked on social media. The common theme is that living standards in the West used to be so good but what happened?
      Popular answers to the following tweet include:
      But they didn't have internet and dad worked 50-60 hours a week Our rulers sent jobs overseas Women thought it would be a good idea to work Bigger government Inflation I think the real answers are pretty straightforward, looking at the above in turn.
      I agree that the way you measure living standards is important. There has been tremendous economic growth since then. This family likely could not watch their choice of television programming as easily as today.  Whether or not jobs were sent overseas, they would invariably end up there. The US was a first mover in terms of development, there would come a point where it would be cheaper to make things overseas. Also other countries began to figure out e.g. how to make cars better and more efficiently than the US. This is an interesting one. The issue is why/how could one wage-earner keep a family whereas now it takes two. I'll have to come back to this later. This is in response to more social problems - which themselves are a function of greater levels of personal freedom This is also a factor and one that's likely outside the control of government. in the 1950s the US was the world's largest volume car producer (safe to guess), since then other countries have taken over, so there is now more competition for those resources hence inflation. Same applies to gas/petrol In summary there was no agenda to do down the Caucasian populations of the US and Europe. The rest of the world simply caught up. It may have taken longer than it did, but if you spread the good news of Capitalism to Russia, China and India, its going to happen. Since communism dampened demand for consumer goods in those countries it dimmed inflationary pressures for the rest of us.
         
         0 comments
      [I co-wrote this with chatgpt4]
       
      In a softly lit, high-ceilinged room, a group of civil servants gathered around a large oval table. The air was thick with tension, a palpable sense of unease hovering over them. At the head of the table, Marianne, the committee chair, cleared her throat. "The reality is unavoidable," she began, her voice steady yet tinged with concern. "With the rise of artificial intelligence, we're facing unprecedented job losses across multiple industries."
      Heads nodded in agreement, eyes reflecting the gravity of the situation. A murmur of assent rippled through the room as each member pondered the implications. "But what do we do with our people?" asked Thomas, a veteran member known for his pragmatism. "How do we find meaningful work for them?"
      The question hung in the air like a heavy cloud, challenging the collective wisdom of the room. Suggestions were made - some practical, others far-fetched. "We can't simply create jobs for the sake of it," Marianne pointed out. "It needs to be meaningful, something that adds value to society."
      As the discussion deepened, a pattern began to emerge. They spoke of community, of human connection, of the things that machines could never replicate. Slowly, an idea took shape, gaining clarity and momentum. "What if," ventured Sarah, a younger member with a thoughtful expression, "we focus on our future generations? What if we turn our attention to raising and nurturing our children?"
      The room fell silent, each person considering the proposal. "Investing in our children," mused Marianne. "Teaching, mentoring, spending quality time with them - these are tasks no AI can fulfill. They require empathy, understanding, and a human touch."
      Excitement bubbled up as they explored the idea further. They spoke of parents having more time with their kids, of communities coming together to support each other, of a society where the nurturing of young minds and hearts became a central goal.
      "We can create programs, offer training for these new roles," suggested Thomas, his voice now imbued with hope. "We can redefine work in terms of contributing to the growth and development of our children."
      As the meeting drew to a close, there was a sense of resolution, a feeling that they had stumbled upon a solution that could truly make a difference. "We will face challenges," Marianne concluded, "but in focusing on our children, we invest in a future where humanity and compassion are at the forefront. This is what we do."
      The committee members left the room with a newfound purpose, ready to face the challenges ahead. They had found their answer in the most fundamental aspect of human existence - the nurturing and upbringing of the next generation. In a world dominated by artificial intelligence, they had rediscovered the irreplaceable value of human connection and care.
         0 comments
      https://thecontentedself.wordpress.com/2023/12/10/apolitical-intellectuals/
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