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History of the Turban


Origin of the Turban
The first person who wore a turban was Prophet Adam (عليه السلام) after he was expelled from Paradise [1]. A tradition states that the angel Gabriel descended from heaven and dressed him in an amaama (turban). This became a substitute for the crown that he had reportedly worn in Paradise [2]. In the hadith literature, the turban is also projected as a headgear of the angels. Imam Ali b. Abi Talib (عليه السلام) narrates that the Holy Prophet (s) once bound a turban on his head, allowing the ends to hang down in front and behind and said, "The crowns of the angels are thus. [3]" When the Prophet ascended to heaven he saw that the majority of the angels were wearing turbans [4]. The angels sent to assist the Muslims at the Battle of Badr are also recorded to have worn turbans, some yellow and others white [5].

Sheikh Kulayni, in Al Kafi, narrates several traditions which state that Allah (سُبْحَانَهُ وَ تَعَالَى) had sent four angels to destroy the community of Prophet Lut (عليه السلام). When they passed by Prophet Abraham (عليه السلام) he did not recognize them as they wore turbans. It was only when Gabriel removed his turban that Prophet Abraham (عليه السلام) recognized him [6]. Sheikh Kulayni cites another hadith stating that besides the angels, jinns also wore turbans [7]. Other reports indicate that even Satan wore a turban when he came down from heaven [13]. Reports such as these depict the turban as an angelic dress and enhance its importance.

Merits of wearing a Turban
There are many traditions reported from the Holy Prophet (s) regarding the merits of wearing a turban. He (s) is reported to have said that the "turban is the crown of Arabs [14]. Imam Musa al-Kazim (عليه السلام), reportedly stated that the Holy Prophet (s) called the turban "the authority of Allah" [15]. Other traditions state that it is Allah's dominion (sultan) [16]. Due to the proliferation of hadith about the turbans, the Holy Prophet (s) was known as "sahib ul-amaama" (the wearer of the turban).

Both Shia and Sunni texts cite various hadith regarding the significance of wearing a turban at all times. According to a hadith, wearing a turban brings a person closer to Allah (سُبْحَانَهُ وَ تَعَالَى) since it is a sign of angels [20]. The only time it is forbidden is when a person is in a state of ihram during the pilgrimage. Even in that state, Ima Ja'far al-Sadiq (عليه السلام) states that the pilgrim can tie the amaama around his stomach [21]. Traditions such as these underscore the importance of the turban; they also amplify the status of those who wear it and differentiate them from non-believers.

Besides the traditions enunciating the merits of wearing a turban, the headgear symbolized, among other things, authority, power, dignity, and respect. When the Arabs wanted to treat someone with respect they adorned him with a turban; preferably with their own turban. In contrast, the removal of a man's turban in public by an authoritative figure was a form of public humiliation and punishment. The turban was so important that people sometimes swore oaths on their turbans [26].

Burial with a Turban
The practice of being buried with a turban can be traced to the times of the Imams (عليه السلام) even though the traditions clearly enunciate that the amaama is not a part of the shroud (kafan) hence it is not obligatory to bury a person with it [94]. Before his death, Imam Muhammad al-Baqir (عليه السلام) made his last testimony to his son Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq (عليه السلام). He (عليه السلام) asked him to shroud him in the cloak in which he used to perform the Friday prayer, to put on him his turban, make his grave square, and raise it to the height of four fingers above the ground [95]. In another tradition, Imam Baqir (عليه السلام) commands Imam al-Sadiq (عليه السلام) to bury him with his own turban which he used during his life [96]. The eleventh Imam, al-Hasan al-Askari (عليه السلام) buried his father in the following manner: "I shrouded my father with two pieces of winter clothes that he had used as the clothes for Ihram […]. Also one of his shirts and the amaama that belonged to 'Ali b. al-Husayn and a gown that he had bought for forty dinars were used" [97]. However, a turban can only be buried with the corpse if a person had willed it before his death.

Color of the Turban
The Holy Prophet (s) and his companions wore different colors of turbans ranging from white, blue, black to even red [54]. He would sometimes wear a white-colored turban for which he was referred to as Sahab (cloud) [55]. The Holy Prophet (s) wore a yellow turban on the day of Badr [56]. A tradition states that he would sometimes dye his clothes, including the turban, in yellow [57]. The Imams also wore different colored turbans. For example, Imam Zayn al-'Abidin often wore a white turban. Other reports indicate that he would also wear a black turban [58]. When Asbagh b. Nubata went to see Imam Ali (عليه السلام) on his death bed, Imam Ali (عليه السلام) was wearing a yellow turban [59]. Al-Mufid notes that on the day of his coronation to succeed al-Ma'mun (d. 833), the eighth Imam al-Reza (عليه السلام) wore a white turban [60]. During his time, the 'Alids would wear green as that was their preferred color [61]. Al-Ma'mun changed the official color of the 'Abbasids to green after he appointed Imal al-Reza (عليه السلام) as his heir. After the death of Imam al-Reza (عليه السلام), al-Ma'mun changed it back to black [62]. 

Although the color of the turban is not stated, al-Majlisi states that when Imam Mahdi (ajtf), reappears he will wear the turban of the Prophet [63]. Significantly, although the traditions mention the different colored turbans the Imams used to wear, they do not state what color of turbans their followers should wear. Neither do they tell us what color they should not wear. Stated differently, the color of the turban is left to the followers of the Imams to decide. When did the Shia 'Alids start wearing black turbans to the exclusion of other colors?

Given that black was the official color of the Abbasids, where and when did the Shia practice of wearing black turbans by the descendants of the Prophet start from? Without quoting his source, Ibn Anbah claims that Syed Razi (d. 1016) was the first 'Alid to wear black. It was only after him, it is said, that black turbans became a prominent feature among sayyeds (those that claim to be the desendents of the Holy Prophet) and those from the tribe of Bani Hashim [64]. 

"White is the best color to wear; the next best color is yellow and then comes green. After that are pale red, purple, and brown. Dark red is considered an abominable (makruh) due, especially during prayer. One must avoid wearing it [dark red], and wearing black is loathsome for everything except for the turban, aba (inner robe), and high boots. However, if the turban and aba are not black, it is better [65]. Significantly, in the chapter dedicated to the wearing of turbans, one would have expected Majlisi to discuss the various colors of the turban that should be worn. The fact that he does not mention anything suggests that in his period, the color of the turban was not significant. 

Safavids and the rise of the Black Turban
The significance attached to the black turban probably increased during the Safavid period when turbans became important to identify a person's socio-political affiliations. Given the Holy Prophet's (s) penchant to the color black, descendants of the Prophet gradually came to favor wearing black turbans. It is within this context that we can discern why the sayyeds became especially fond of black.

When the Safavids came to power in Iran in 1501 they adopted Shiasm as the state religion. They resorted to different ways to promote their new faith. They popularized Shiasm by encouraging the public cursing of the first three caliphs, enacting public mourning ceremonies to mark the martyrdom of Imam Husayn (عليه السلام) and by pronouncing the name of 'Ali in the adhan (call to prayer) [70]. The political ideology of the Safavids was demonstrated in the headgear of its rulers. They used the turban to enunciate their dissociation from the Sunni Ottomans and to proclaim their religious affiliation.

Apart from political affiliation, the color of the turban was used to demarcate different religious groups and social rankings. In Safavid culture, white was the dominant color of the turbans. It is within this context that we may be able to surmise the exclusive use of black turbans by sayyeds [75]. As mentioned earlier, since the time of the Holy Prophet (s), black symbolized power and authority. Amidst the plethora of different colored and types of turbans, in order to enhance their unique status and authority in society, the sayyeds adopted the black turban as their official emblem. Although it is not possible to know exactly when the black turban became an exclusively sayyed insignia, the importance given to sayyeds, especially in the Safavid era, suggests that it probably started in this period. To understand why the sayyeds chose a specific color that differentiated them from the masses, it is important to comprehend the importance given to the descendants of the Prophet in Muslim societies.

Sayyeds and religious authority in Shia Islam
The social and financial advantages that accrue from being recognized a sayyed can be corroborated from the fact that throughout history there have been many false claimants to Prophetic descent. In fact people devised ingenious ways to fabricate their genealogy. People falsely claimed descent from extinct Prophetic lines in places such as Egypt, Rayy, Hamadan, Khurasan and Kufa [87]. The fact that special punishments had to be invented to expose false claimants (including having their heads shaven and/or being exiled) further demonstrates the extent of fabricated genealogies [88]. Due to the forgeries, an official system of monitoring of genealogies had to be established in many cities [89]. Various groups, agnate descendants claimed to be sayyeds. The descendants of Imam Ali's (عليه السلام) father Abu Talib through his other sons Ja'far and Aqil claimed to be sayyeds through Hashimi descent. Some have claimed that even Zaynabis, the descendants of Zaynab (sa), daughter of Imam Ali (عليه السلام) and Bibi Fatima (sa), should also be considered as sayyeds [90]. 

In the Shia religion khums is payable on savings, not just on war booty. This means that the share payable to sayyeds was enormous, fifty percent of the khums payable, a sum that not only encouraged people to proclaim their lineage but also enticed some to fabricate their genealogy. Sayyeds are also believed to have inherited the baraka (blessings) of the Prophet. These sacred personages may transmit baraka to the masses, either during their lifetime or after their deaths. Due to the principle of Prophetic lineage, it is also believed that children of holy men become contemporary recipients of the baraka that is transmitted by the saint. The emphasis on honoring the descendants of the Prophet precipitated the cult of the shrines of sayyeds, or imamzadeh as they came to be called. Especially in Safavid Iran, the tombs of many sayyeds became a focus of pilgrimage, a phenomenon widely prevalent in many parts of the Shia world today. It should be remembered that when they came to power, the Safavids claimed Prophetic genealogy. They reportedly forged descent from Imam Musa al-Kazim [91]. This empowered the kings to invoke their noble ancestors in the legitimization of their rule. As Arjomand says, "The rulers possessed great charisma of lineage as descendants of the Imams, and even claimed an attribute of the Imams: infallibility or sinlessness [92]. The devotional attachment to the Imams and their descendants helped the Safavids enhance their own stature as the progeny of these noble figures. The claim to 'Alid descent also helped them win wider acceptance among the masses.

Since the Safavids claimed prophetic descent, the sayyeds enjoyed great respect and prestige under their rule. In all probability, the social prestige combined with the financial benefits that accrued to sayyeds led to their public proclamation as the descendants of the Prophet. As previously mentioned, white was the dominant color of the majority of turbans in that period. The sayyeds had to differentiate themselves from the laity by deploying a color that was not in common usage, and, as descendants of the Prophet, a color that could be closely linked to him. In the Islamic world, sayyeds generally wore green turbans. For example, when Mustafa Celebi wore a green turban in Turkey in 1632, people raised questions whether he was a real sayyed. He claimed sayyed descent from his mother's side. The right to wear a green turban was accorded only to those whose father was a sayyed [93].

The Safavids sought a distinctive stratification of the Shia community into believers and sayyeds. It was through Prophetic descent that they sought to legitimize their privileges and superior status. The best way that a person could publicly proclaim himself to be a sayyed and differentiate himself from a non-sayyed was either by adopting the title sayyed or by donning a black turban. Undoubtedly, the turban was the more powerful tool since it conveyed one's nobility without having to verbalize it. It should be remembered that during the Safavid period, the wearing of turbans was not restricted to scholars. On the contrary, the masses wore turbans since these were popular costumes. Thus, the black turban became an important tool of identifying and signifying a sayyed, bestowing him, thereby, the respect, honor, and financial rewards that was due to him. Although a national costume, the westernization policies of Reza Shah in the 1930s forced most Iranians to abandon their traditional headgear in favor of western clothing. Only scholars were exempt from this proscription. With time, the turban became what it is today: a headgear worn primarily by scholars to distinguish them from the rest of society. Within the scholarly elite, color was used to mark Prophetic genealogy. The turban was used not only to differentiate between Muslims and non-Muslims but also between Muslims themselves. The reason for this genealogical distinction was both social status and financial benefits.

It is not possible to know exactly when the sayyeds chose to wear black turbans. Majlisi, who died in 1699, does not cite any special merit for wearing a black turban; in fact, he discourages it. It is possible that sayyeds started wearing black turbans after his time or during the Qajar period. Why did the sayyeds choose to wear black turbans? It has to be remembered that when the Safavids came to power, they encouraged the public expression and enactment of various forms mourning rituals for the family of the Prophet in general and for Husayn in particular. These rituals ranged from passion plays to flagellations and self-immolation. It is possible that the sayyeds decided around this time to wear black as it was the color of mourning. They wished to proclaim that they were the descendants of the family that was being publicly mourned and venerated. Another possible reason why the sayyeds switched to black turbans was because, as previously discussed, the Holy Prophet (s) himself had worn a black turban on various important occasions. Gabriel had donned him with a black turban; the Holy Prophet (s) also wore black when he was delivering sermons and when he conquered Mecca. He had put a black turban on'Ali before sending him to fight. Another possible reason for switching from green to black was because of sectarianism. With the increased sectarian tensions with the Ottoman Sunnis and the public cursing of the first three caliphs under the Safavids, it is possible that the Shia sayyeds wanted to differentiate themselves from Sunni sayyeds who wore green turbans.

The form (style) of a Turban and how to wear it
The turban, its color, form and size impacted one's social and financial standing. The method of wearing the turban is also important. The Holy Prophet (s) is reported to have left the "tail" ('adhaba) of his turban hanging between his shoulder blades. This practice was imitated by the companions, and became a part of the Prophetic sunna [98]. According to the Holy Prophet's (s) companion Abd al-Rahman b. Awf (d. 653): "The Apostle of Allah (peace be upon him) put a turban on me and let the ends hang in front of him and behind me [99]. The letting down of the 'adhaba was included in the Prophetic injunction on wearing the amaama.

Besides letting the fringe down, some traditions also required the tying of the turban under the chin. Sunni scholars are divided on this practice. Jurists like Malik b. Anas favored this mode of dressing but the Shafi'is did not consider the fastening of the amaama under the chin as sunna [100]. This practice was also used as a mark of differentiation from non-Muslims who wore turbans. Hence, it was not only wearing the turban that was important, the method of wearing it was also significant. According to some traditions, the Holy Prophet (s) said: "Disagree with the Jews and do not wear turbans that are not fastened under the chin, or with their fringes not let down, as this method of wearing the turban is the fashion of the Jews [101].

Importance of Tahannuk
Within the Shia school, both the 'adhaba and the fastening the under the chin (called the tahannuk) were important in identifying true believers. Sheikh Kulayni narrates in Al Kafi, that <strong>al-Tabiqiyah (a layered turban without tahannak is the turban of Iblees</strong> [102]. Al-Saduq cites a tradition from the Holy Prophet (s) stating that the difference between a Muslim and a polytheist is the hanging down (talahi) of the amaama [103]. This was a Prophetic practise that was replicated by the Imams. When the eighth Imam Ali al-Reza went out in public for his coronation, he hung one part of the turban on his breast and the other between his shoulders [104]. <strong>The Imams also urged their followers to observe the custom of fastening the turban under their chin since this was also considered a mark of a true believer.</strong> The Holy Prophet (s) is reported to have stated: "The distinction between the Muslims and the unbelievers is the fastening of the turbans under their chin [105]. The Shia emphasized the tahannuk even more than the Sunnis did. So important was this practice that disregarding it could lead to incurable ailments. A tradition from al-Sadiq states: "He who wore the amaama and did not fasten it under his chin, let him not blame anyone except himself if he is inflicted with a disease for which there is no remedy [106]. In another tradition, the same Imam is reported to have guaranteed one who travels while observing the tahannuk that he will return home safely [107]. At one point in history, within the Shia circles it was considered detestable to wear the amaama without tying it under the chin [108].

When he discusses the question of how to wear a turban, Majlisi states in Chapter 7 entitled dar bayan-e bastan-e ammameh (on how to wrap the amaama): "To wear an ammameh is a tradition and to wrap it under the chin is also a tradition. Wearing the amaama with one end thrown at the back and one end kept loose in the front is also the tradition of the sadat (I.e. sayyeds)...to wrap an ammameh while in a standing position is also a tradition. According to the Holy Prophet (s), ammameh is the crown of the Arabs. When a man stops wearing his turban Allah (سُبْحَانَهُ وَ تَعَالَى) will stop honoring him. Imam Reza (عليه السلام) said that the Holy Prophet (s) wrapped his turban with the ends, one in the front and one at the back and Jibrail (Gabriel) did the same.109 Most Shia scholars have recommended that the tahannuk be practiced at all times. The medieval jurist Allama Hilli (d. 1325) states: The tahannuk is recommended by the words of Imam al-Sadiq, "Whoever wears the turban and does not put the tahannuk an ailment has struck him for which there is no cure. Thus, he should blame nobody but himself [110]". Hilli further states: it is abominable to pray in black clothes [...] and to abandon the tahannuk [111]". He concludes by stating, "It appears from these narrations that the tahannuk is recommended at all times, whether one is praying or not [112]". Hilli's ruling is shared by scholars like Muhammad Jamal al-din al-Makki al-Amili (also known as Shahid al-Awwal - d. 1385) who states in his Lum'a Dimishqiyya, "It is makruh to abandon the tahannuk at any time [113]". Baha' al‐Din Muhammad b. Husayn al‐'Amili (also known as Shaykh Baha'I - d. 1621) further emphasizes the point stating that "the tahannuk is recommended for anyone who wears the turban -whether he is praying or not. There is nothing in the traditions to suggest that it is recommended only during prayers [114]. Other scholars like Ja'far Kashif al-Ghita (d. 1812) go even further, quoting al-Saduq (d. 991) as saying: "I heard our teachers say that it is not permitted for one who wears a turban to pray unless if he observes the tahannuk [115]. Although Shia traditions greatly emphasize the tahannuk it is not practiced by most contemporary scholars. In explaining this, the commentator of Majlisi's Hilya al-Muttaqin states that in the past, the tahannuk was observed at all times. However, this is no longer a common practice.

Tahannuk Ignored by the Usuli Shias
Despite the numerous traditions on the merits and virtues of observing the tahannuk and the negative ramifications for ignoring it, most Shia scholars who wear turbans do not observe it. In all probability, this is because, in the past, tahannuk was performed by the Akhbaris, the dominant school in the medieval ages. Most contemporary scholars are Usulis who consider the Akhbaris as literalists and their nemesis. They have thus labeled the tahannuk as a sign of Akhbarism [116]. Whereas medieval scholars emphasized the importance of observing the tahannuk, later scholars like Fayd al-Kashani (d. 1680) claimed that the changing milieu and custom had dictated that the tahannuk be avoided in public. He states that, in his time, the tahannuk had become an abandoned sunna because it had become a mode of dressing that attracts attention (libas shuhra) and could be an object of derision, which is prohibited. Hence, he argues, it is not necessary to observe it [117]. With time, the tahannuk became symbolic of the ideological battle between the two schools within Shiasm. An act that was highly emphasized by the Imams (عليه السلام) was abandoned by the very scholars who claimed to transmit their teachings. This is further proof of how the turban and the method of wearing it has been used as a tool of differentiation not only between Muslims and non-Muslims but also within the Shia community itself.

Conclusion
Although a pre-Islamic costume, the turban was endorsed by Islam which subsequently became an important component of Islamic clothing.  Shia traditions on the turban are replicated in Sunni hadith literature which also sees the turban as the crown of Arabs. Within the Shia tradition, the importance of the turban was further highlighted by reports which recommended that turbans accompany the dead to their graves. Clearly, the attachment to the turban was so deep that it accompanied the wearer to the hereafter. 

Subsequently, the turban started to perform various functions in society; one of them was to differentiate Muslims from others. The turban (through its color) was also used in the Safavid era as a tool for social stratification. In order to enhance the status of the sayyeds in Safavid Shiasm, black turbans were reserved exclusively for the sayyeds. White turbans were used for non-sayyeds since this was the norm in much of Safavid society. The differentiation between black and white turbans was thus a historical construct, based on social and financial rather than religious considerations. Wearing a black turban for sayyeds became a customary rather than religious requirement. 

Also published on blog: https://ahlulbaytmission.org/2019/07/28/history-of-the-turban/

References
This article is based on the paper: Black or White: Turbanization of Islam By Liyakat Takim

[1] M. J. Kister, "The Crowns of This Community...: Some Notes on the Turban in the Muslim Tradition," in Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam, 24 (2000): 230.
[2] Hamid Algar, Amama, http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/amama-or-ammamaarabic-emama-the-turban.
[3] Mottaqi Hindi, Kanz al-'Ummal, ed. M.'Abd-al-Mu'id Khan (Hyderabad: Deccan, 1973), 10/45.
[4] M. J. Kister, "The Crowns of This Community," 243.
[5] Algar, "Amama." Traditions on the color of the turbans worn by the angels. 
[6] Al-Kulayni, Al-Kafi fi 'Ilm al-Din (Dar al-Kutub al-Islamiyya, Tehran, 1986), 5/546.
[7] Kulayni narrates that: "Ahmad b. Idris and Muhammad b. Yahya narrated from alHasan b. 'Ali al-Kufi from ibn al-Faddal from a group of our people from Sa'd al-Askaf who said: "Once I asked permission to meet Abu Ja'far (Muhammad alBaqir). I found saddles of camels lined up in front of the door and I heard very loud noises coming from inside. Then a people came out with turbans like those of Indian gypsies. I asked Abu Ja'far about them and said, "May Allah take my soul be in service for your cause. Today it took a long time to receive permission to meet you. I saw a people coming out with turbans whom I could not recognize." He said, "Do you know, O Sa'd, who they are?" I said, "No, I do not know." The Imam said, "They were your brethren in religion from the Jinns. They come to us for religious instructions, to learn the lawful and unlawful matters and the principles of their religion." Kulayni, Kitab al-Kafi, 1/394-5; Muhammad b. al-Hasan al-Saffar, Basa'ir al-Darajat fi Fada'il Al Muhammad (Qom: Maktabat Ayat Allah al-Mar'ashi, 1983), 1/97, hadith # 18; 1/100, hadith #10.
[13] M. J. Kister, "The Crowns of This Community," 227.
[14] Ibn Hajr al-Asqalani, Fada'il al-Qur'an al-Karim, (Beirut: 1986), 144.
[15] Muhammad ibn Ya'qub al-Kulayni al-Razi, Kitab al-Kafi, translated into English by Muhammad Sarwar, vol. 1-8 (n.p., the Islamic Seminary, n.d.), 453; H 827, Ch. 72, h 14.
[16] Muhammad al-Baqir Majlisi, Bihar al-Anwar: al-Jami'a Lidurari Akhbar alA'imma al-Athar, 110 vols (Beirut: Dar al-Ihya al-Turath al-'Arabi, 1983), 48/310; 50/26. Kulayni, al-Kafi, 2/82.
[17] Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, Al-Musnadu Al-Sahihu bi Naklil Adli known as Sahih Muslim, Converted by Bill McLean, http://www.mclean.faithweb.com. last accessed 6 August 2015, 167-168.
[18] M. J. Kister, "The Crowns of This Community," 242-3.
[19] On wearing a turban especially in salat, see Majlisi, Bihar al-Anwar, 80/193. In another tradition, al-Sadiq says "one who offers the prayers on the days of the two eids must wear an amaama. See Muhammad b. al-Hasan al
[20] Muhammad Fahad Badri, Al-Imama (Baghdad: Government Publication, 1968), 10.
[21] al-'Amili, Wasa'il al-Shi'a, 12/533.
[22] Kulayni, al-Kafi, 3/145.
[23] Al-'Amili, Wasail, 1/455.
[24] In Shiasm, the maraji' are the sources of reference for ordinary believers on issues pertaining to Islamic law.
[25] Email communication July 2015.
[26] Shelagh Weir, Palestinian Costumes (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989), 6.
[27] See al-'Amili, Wasa'il, 5/57; al-Majlisi, Bihar, 80/199.
[28] Al-Mufid, al-Amali (Qom: International Congress of Millennium of Shaykh Mufid, 1992), 318.
[29] Al-Mufid, Kitab al-Irshad, trans I. Howard (London: Balagha & Muhammadi Trust, 1981), 67.
[30] M. J. Kister, "The Crowns of This Community," 233.
[31] John Alden Williams, Themes of Islamic Civilization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 159-60.
[32] Bernard Lewis, The Jews of Islam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 15.
[33] For other restrictions and acts of humiliation inflicted on the dhimmis see, Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), 197-98.
[34] Abu Dawud, Sunan, Book 32: hadith 4067; Hafidh al-Tirmidhi, Jami'I, https://islamfuture.wordpress.com/2013/06/22/jami-at-tirmidhi-6-vol-set/, vol. 3, chapter 42, hadith 1784.
[35] M. J. Kister, "The Crowns of This Community," 225.
[36] Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Ahkam ahl al-Dhimma (Damascus: 1961), 2/742-44.
[37] Ibid., 2/739-40.
[38] Muslim, Sahih, The Book of Pilgrimage (Kitab Al-Hajj), Book 7, Hadith 3146; 3148; Tirmidhi, Jami', vol.3, chapter 11; hadith 1735.
[39] al-'Amili, Wasa'il al-Shi'a, 5/57.
[40] Bukhari, Sahih, Penalty of Hunting while on Pilgrimage Book 3: Volume 29 Hadith 72; Book 5; Volume 59, Hadith 582: Book 7; Volume 72, Hadith 699; Malik b. Anas, al-Muwatta', K. al-Hajj: Book 20: Hadith 20.76.256.
[41] Muslim, Sahih, The Book of Pilgrimage, Book 7, Hadith 3149.
[42] M. J. Kister, "The Crowns of This Community," 237.
[43] Majlisi, Bihar al-Anwar, 16/250.
[44] Ibid., 41/77.
[45] M. J. Kister, "The Crowns of This Community," 221, fn. 16.
[46] Ibid., 233.
[47] See the example cited of Abu Nadra in Muhammad b. Sa'd, Tabaqat al-Kubra. 9 vols. (Beirut Dar Sadir, n.d.), 7/208.
[48] Ibn Dawud, Sunan, Kitab al-Libas, Book 32, Hadith #4027.
[49] Kulayni, al-Kafi, 3/403; Muhammad b. 'Ali b. al-Husayn al-Saduq, Man La Yahduru'l Faqih (Qom: Jamia Mudarrisin Islamic Publications office, 1992), 1/251. al-'Amili, Wasa'il al-Shi'a, 4/382, 4/387.
[50] Nazemian Fard, Vakavi-e Karbord-e Rang-e Siah dar Mian-e Abbasian, 2, 7, (2011): 147-148.
[51] Teresa Bernheimer, The 'Alids: the First Family of Islam 750-1200 (Edinburgh: Edinburg University Press, 2014), 43.
[52] See the example of Qasim b. 'Abdullah cited by Bernheimer, The 'Alids, 70.
[53] al-'Amili, Wasa'il al-Shi'a, 4/385.
[54] See the example cited of the famous companion Jabir b. 'Abd Allah al-Ansari seated in the mosque of Medina looking for al-Baqir while wearing a black turban. Muhammad b. Ya'qub al-Kulayni al-Razi, Kitab al-Kafi, trans. Muhammad Sarwar, vol. 1-8 (n.p., the Islamic Seminary, n.d.), H 1267, Ch. 118, h 2, p. 664.
[55] Abdul-Hussein Ahmad Amini Najafi, Al-Ghadir fil-Kitab wal-Sunnah wal-Adab, vol. 3/290-293. Stillman, "Libas," EI.
[56] 'Abd al-Rahman Jalal al-Din Suyuti, al-Durr al-Manthur fi tafsir bi'l ma'thur (Cairo, 1896), 2/70.
[57] Ibn Dawud Sunan, Book 32, hadith, 4053.
[58] al-'Amili, Wasa'il al-Shi'a, 5/57.
[59] Al-Mufid, al-Amali, 352.
[60] Al-Mufid, Kitab al-Irshad, trans. I. Howard (London: Balagha & Muhammadi Trust, 1981), 474. Kafi, 686, H 1234, Ch. 121, h 7.
[61] Even in Syria in the 1960s, among the Sunni community, the green turban was reserved for the descendants of the Prophet. See Thomas Pierret, Religion and State in Syria: The Sunni Ulama from Coup to Revolution (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013), 21.
[62] Muhammad b. Jarir al-Tabari, Ta'rikh al-Umam Wa'l-Muluk. 8 vols. (Beirut: Mu'assasa al-A'lami), 1983, 3/1013, 1037.
[63] Majlisi, Bihar, 52/302. Ibn Abu Zaynab, Kitab al-Ghayba, trans. Abdullah al-Shahin (Qom: Ansariyan, 2003), 439.
[64] http://www.erfan.ir/Arabic/article/view/78723.
[65] Muhammad al-Baqir al-Majlisi, Hilyat al-Muttaqin (Tehran: Yas Publication 1993), 5-6. The text is closely studied by Faegheh Shirazi in her article entitled "Manly Matters in Iran: From Beards to Turbans", In Critical Encounters, Essays in Persian Literature and Culture in Honor of Peter Chelkowski. Mohammed Mehdi Khorrami and M.R. Ghanoonparvar eds., (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publications, 2007), 146-166.
[66] al-Majlisi, Hilyat al-Muttaqin, 3.
[67] Ibid., 10.
[68] Ibid.
[69] Ibid.Sayyids and the Black Emblem
[70] Liyakat Takim, "From Bid'a to Sunna: The Wilaya of 'Ali in the Shia Adhan." Journal of the American Oriental Society 120, no. 2 (2000): 66-77.
[71] Yedidah Stillman, "Libas," 749.
[72] Cambridge History of Islam. Edited by Peter Holt, Ann Lambton, and Bernard Lewis. 2 vols. (Cambridge: l970), 1/396. 
[73] http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/safa_f/hd_safa_f.htm. See also http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/clothing-x
[74] Faegheh Shirazi-Mahajan, "The Semiotics of the Turban: the Safavid Era in Iran," in Journal of International Association of Costume, 9, 67-87 (1992):72.
[75] Pierret notes that the white turban in Syria was a symbol of religious knowledge, and is worn by religious scholars even today. Pierret, Religion and State in Syria, 9 – 10, 41.
[76] al-Mufid, Kitab al-Irshad, 296.
[77] Bosworth, "Sayyid," Encyclopedia of Islam, 9:115. See also Muhammad b. 'Ali b. al-Husayn al-Saduq, Risala al-I'tiqadat (A Shi'ite Creed), trans. A. Fyzee (Oxford: 1942), 108-9.
[78] Bernheimer, The 'Alids, 17.
[79] Bosworth, "Sayyid," Encyclopedia of Islam, 9/115. See also Liyakat Takim,
[80] Ruya Kilic, "The Reflection of Islamic Tradition on Ottoman Social Structure: The Sayyids and Sharifs" in Morimoto Kazuo ed., Sayyids and Sharifs in Muslim Societies: The Living Links to the Prophet (Routledge: New York, 2012), 123.
[81] Ibid., 132-133.
[82] Mercedes Garcia-Arenal, "Shurafa in the Last Years of al-Andalus and in the Morisco Period: Laylat al-Mawlid and Genealogies of the Prophet Muhammad," in Morimoto Kazuo ed., Sayyids and Sharifs, 162.
[83] Valerie Hoffman, "The Role of the Masharifu on the Swahili Coast in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries" in Morimoto Kazuo ed., Sayyids and Sharifs, 191.
[84] Arthur Buehler, "Trends of Ashrafization in India" in Morimoto Kazuo ed., Sayyids and Sharifs, 235.
[85] See Morimoto Kazuo, "How to Behave towards Sayyids and Sharifs: a TransSectarian Tradition of Dream Accounts, in Morimoto Kazuo ed., Sayyids and Sharifs, 22-25. Other stories talk of the inviolability of Sayyids, ibid.
[86] Abu al-Qasim al-Khu'I, Minhaj al-Salihin, 9th edition, 1:371.
[87] Bernheimer, The 'Alids, Ibid., 24 – 6.
[88] Ibid., 26 – 8.
[89] Arthur Buehler, "Trends of Ashrafization in India" in Morimoto Kazuo ed., Sayyids and Sharifs, 235.
[90] Teresa Bernheimer, Genealogy, Marriage, and the Drawing of Boundaries among the 'Alids (Eighth-Twelfth Centuries), in Morimoto Kazuo ed., Sayyids and Sharifs,83-85.
[91] This was reiterated under Shah Tahmasp. See Kathryn Babayan, "Sufis, Dervishes and Mulla: the Controversy over Spiritual and Temporal Dominion in Seventeenth-Century Iran" in Charles Melville ed., Safavid Persia (Tauris: London, 1996), 123. See also op. cit. page 135 fn. 26 for details of tampering with Safavid genealogy.
[92] Sa'id Amir Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam: Religion, Political Order and Societal Change in Shi'ite Iran from the Beginning to 1890 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1986), 211.
[93] Ruya Kilic, "The Reflection of Islamic Tradition" in Morimoto Kazuo ed., Sayyids and Sharifs, 130-131. In his descriptions of contemporary Ottoman society Nicolas de Nicolay (d. 1583) discusses the green turbans worn by the emirs (another title for the family of the Prophet).
[94] Kulayni, al-Kafi, 3/144. In another tradition, al-Sadiq states that my father told me to bury him with three items of clothing, but the amaama is not a part of the kafn. Kulayni, al-Kafi, 3/144. The donning of the amaama on a male corpse is considered a sunna. Majlisi, Bihar al-Anwar, 110/342.
[95] Al-Mufid, Kitab al-Irshad, 410; al-Kafi, 443; h. 797,ch. 70, #8.
[96] al-Kafi, 537.forty dinars were used".97 However, a turban can only be buried with the corpse if a person had willed it before his death.
[97] al-Kafi, 672.
[98] Tirmidhi, Jami', vol.3, Chapter 12, hadith 1736.
[99] Ibn Dawud, Sunan, Kitab al-Libas, Book 32: Hadith 4068.
[100] "M. J. Kister, The Crowns of This Community," 227-228.
[101] Ibid., 229.
[102] Al Kafi V6 Ch 15 - The book of outfits and beautification
[103] Al-Saduq, Man La Yahduru, 1/266 hadith # 821.
[104] Al-Mufid, Kitab al-Irshad, 474.
[105] Majlisi, Bihar al-Anwar, 83/194.
[106] Yusuf al-Bahrani, Hadaiq al-Nadhira (Najaf, 1379), 7/126. Majlisi, Bihar, 83/194. Ahmad b. Muhammad b. Khalid al-Barqi, Kitab al-Mahasin (Qom: Dar alKutub al-Islamiyya, 1951), 378.
[107] Al-Saduq, Man La Yahduru, 1/265.
[108] Majlisi, Bihar al-Anwar, 80/193. The tenth century jurist al-Saduq considered that one who wears an amaama has to observe tahannuk. Majlisi, Bihar al-Anwar, 80/193-4.
[109] Majlisi, Hilya, p.7.
[110] Hilli, Tadhkira al-Fuqaha' (Qom: Mu'assassa Al-Bayt, 1993), 2/451.
[111] Qawa'id al-Ahkam (Qom: Mu'assassa al-Tabi'a al-Jami'a, 1992), 1/257.
[112] Hilli, Muntaha al-Matlab, 4/251.
[113] Muhammad Jamal al-din al-Makki al-Amili, al-Lum'a al-Dimishqiyya (Qom: Manshurat Dar al-Fiqr, 1990), 2/62.
[114] Al-Amili, al-Habl al-Matin (Qom: Manshuurat Maktab al-Basirat, 1999), 187.
[115] Al-Ghita, Kashf al-Ghita' (Isfahan: Intisharat al-Mahdawi, 1999), 1/202.
[116] Observation of Ayatullah al-Sayyid Fadhil Milani.
[117] See al-Saduq, Man La Yahduru, 1/266 fn 2.

Also published on blog: https://ahlulbaytmission.org/2019/07/28/history-of-the-turban/

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      Introduction
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      Key References
      Alhussain, T., & Thakur, R. (2019). Religious beliefs and consumer behavior: A conceptual framework and research propositions. Journal of Islamic Marketing, 10(3), 948–962. [Emerald]
      Belk, R. W. (1988). Possessions and the extended self. Journal of Consumer Research, 15(2), 139–168. [University of Chicago Press]
      Belk, R. W. (2013). Extended self in a digital world. Journal of Consumer Research, 40(3), 477–500. [University of Chicago Press]
      Epley, N., Waytz, A., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2007). On seeing human: A three-factor theory of anthropomorphism. Psychological Review, 114(4), 864–886. [APA; frequently cited in marketing and consumer research]
      Essoo, N., & Dibb, S. (2004). Religious influences on shopping behaviour: An exploratory study. European Journal of Marketing, 38(5/6), 536–553. [Emerald]
      Hirschman, E. C. (1994). Consumers and their animal companions. Journal of Consumer Research, 20(4), 616–631. [Oxford University Press for the Association for Consumer Research]
      Holbrook, M. B., & Woodside, A. G. (2008). Animal companions, consumption experiences, and the marketing of pets: Transcending boundaries in the animal-human distinction. Journal of Business Research, 61(5), 377–381. [Elsevier]
      Ibrahim, B., & Al Kamdah, A. (2020). Exploring the Islamic marketing ethics from macro and consumer behaviour perspectives. Journal of Islamic Marketing, 11(5), 1295–1312. [Emerald]
      Jafari, A., & Goulding, C. (2008). “We are not terrorists!” UK-based Iranians, consumption practices and the ‘torn self.’ Consumption, Markets & Culture, 11(2), 73–91. [Taylor & Francis]
      Wilson, J. A. J., & Grant, J. (2013). Islamic marketing – A challenger to the classical marketing canon? Journal of Islamic Marketing, 4(1), 7–21. [Emerald]
      Waytz, A., Cacioppo, J. T., & Epley, N. (2010). Who sees human? The stability and importance of individual differences in anthropomorphism. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 5(3), 219–232. [SAGE, frequently cited in consumer research]
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         12 comments
      [amended 19 August 2023 to include references to the Irish potato famine and two Bengal famines]
       


       
      Images taken at the Egyptian Museum, Tahrir Sq, Cairo. June 2024
      Surah Yusuf
      Prophet Yusuf (عليه السلام) advised Pharoah to hoard grains during the years of plenty. I think this episode is a noteworthy one because it shows how a State can intervene in the marketplace in order to improve the welfare of the wider population.
      But as we shall see below, the government intervention that Prophet Yusuf (عليه السلام) instigated favoured some sections of the population over others - it was not neutral in terms of how it spread gains and losses across the population.
      https://www.al-islam.org/sites/default/files/singles/633-yusuf.pdf
      While there is other material in the Qur'an that deals with transactions within the marketplace between individual participants - this story stands out in terms of its focus on state intervention. 
      I'll be coming back to this issue later - but I think it informs the discussions we have about Islam and contemporary socio-economic theories. In particular, I think it illustrates that Islam does see the State as an active market participant and that in an Islamic state, the role of government is not one that is hands-off or laissez-faire.
       
      What policy options did Prophet Yusuf (عليه السلام) have?
      We should not take the story as presented 'for granted'. In reality, the Prophet (عليه السلام). had a range of choices open to him, and thinking those through helps us better understand the reasons for the policy he undertook and the reason why. 
      No government interference
      Let's start with the simplest and easiest option that Pharoah's government could have pursued once they knew that there would be seven years of plenty followed by seven years of famine (as predicted by the Pharoah's dream which was interpreted by Prophet Yusuf (عليه السلام).) .
      Pharoah could have left the entire issue to the 'market'. During the years of plenty, the price of food would have fallen and people would have enjoyed a higher standard of living. For example, the lower grain prices could have led to people rearing more cattle and their diets would have improved with more meat.
      However, during the years of famine, grain prices would have risen and those people who had accumulated assets in the years of plenty would be able to pay the higher prices in the famine years. Those who had not had such assets would have starved.
      This assumes a fairly high level of self-discipline on the part of the population, but as Milton Friedman would say, the people would have been 'free to choose'. This is not a hypothetical option. The British lack of action to the Irish potato famine has been attributed to the British government's ideological adherence to a laissez-faire approach to macro-economics:
      https://kenanfellows.org/kfp-cp-sites/cp01/cp01/sites/kfp-cp-sites.localhost.com.cp01/files/LP3_BBC Irish Famine Article for Lab.pdf
       
      The Bengal famine is another one where government policy was different to the one Prophet Yusuf ((عليه السلام).) prescribed to Pharoah. In this instance, it was lack of government restriction over the action of privateers:
      https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/29/winston-churchill-policies-contributed-to-1943-bengal-famine-study
       
      Going back still further, the Great Bengal Famine of 1770 has been directly attributed to British government laissez-faire economic policy.
      https://worldfinancialreview.com/the-political-economy-of-famines-during-the-british-rule-in-india-a-critical-analysis/
       
      Light interference - provision of information
      A common policy option nowadays, where people do not want direct government intervention is to recommend improving the provision of information to the population who will then be better able to make the correct decisions for themselves. The government could have mounted an information campaign during the years of plenty and told people to hoard food themselves, hoarding when there is no shortage is allowed in Islam.
      However such attempts to influence awareness about the famine to come and changing peoples' attitudes so that they saved more than they were used to, would likely have run against increased social pressures on people to do the opposite. For example typically in societies as wealth increases there is social pressure to spend more, in this case, for example, have more lavish weddings.
      Also providing information would have been a practical benefit for the better off e.g. those with storage capacity, but not so good for the poor (who would not have room to store grain, for example).
      The government (using a bit more intervention) could have given tax breaks to people who owned granaries, to help the poor who needed such facilities. Again this solution would be to focus on market-based interventions and simply alter the working of the market using incentives. Current economic theory holds that people discount future risks very heavily i.e. they don't perceive them as much of a threat as they should. So, for example, just telling people they should save for a pension does not work. 
      So we can likely predict that the solutions described above would not have worked had they tried them.
      Heavy interference
      This is what they actually did.
      In times of plenty, Pharoah's government did not let prices fall as would have happened under free market conditions. They kept prices higher than they otherwise would have been because the government intervened and took excess stocks of grain out of circulation.
      All people (rich and poor alike) had no option but to pay the usual higher prices - effectively, the government was taxing everyone, but this was not seen as a loss by anyone because the prices were no higher than usual.
      The government stored the grain centrally and then they decided to release the grain according to their own policies.
      Assumptions made by Prophet Yusuf's government
      If you leave people to their own devices they may not make the best decisions (whether they are rich or poor), this could be due to: People do not have the resources to cater for future shocks (mainly the poor) People do not have the discipline to address future shocks (applies to both the rich and the poor) The government can make better decisions than individuals acting in their own self-interest because: The government can have access to more and better information than individuals do The government may not be as susceptible to a lack of self-discipline  
      Conclusion
      Of all the policy options open to Prophet Yusuf (عليه السلام) he advised Pharoah to pursue the most interventionist one. Some people may be tempted to call this socialist or communist, but I think those terms carry a lot of excess baggage, so I won't bring them into the discussion.
      What I think can be safely inferred from his choice of policy is a fundamental principle that could inform economic policy in any Islamic state.
      Facing an external shock to the Egyptian economy, he went for the option that would cause the least pain to the worst off in society. Other policy options would have caused more pain for the poorest but somewhat less for the better off.
       
       
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      By the time the city finished installing ramps for paws beside every staircase, the ramps for people had quietly been removed.
      No one remembered the meeting where it was decided. Decisions arrived now as laminated notices tied to lampposts with biodegradable twine: PLEASE YIELD TO COMPANIONS; QUIET HOURS FOR CANINE SENSITIVITY. The notices bore smiling silhouettes of dogs wearing scarves. People learned to read them the way one reads weather—by feeling the chill before seeing the cloud.
      Mara noticed first when her neighbour collapsed on the pavement. He was thin, as if he had been erased a little at a time. The street was busy, yet no one stopped. A woman paused only to pull her terrier closer, murmuring reassurance. “Not you,” she said, as the man’s hand trembled toward her ankle. “Careful.”
      A drone hummed in and descended. Its camera irised, not toward the man, but toward the terrier. A soft voice chimed: IS YOUR COMPANION DISTRESSED? The woman nodded. A thermal blanket unfurled—around the dog. The man’s breath rattled like loose change in a pocket.
      At the clinic where Mara worked, the waiting room had been renovated. Plush beds lined the walls, bowls of filtered water glowed with LED halos. People stood. There were no chairs anymore; standing was healthier, the pamphlet said, and chairs took up space that could be used for enrichment. When the nurse called names, she called the dogs’. Owners answered for them, translating barks into grievances with practiced fluency.
      Mara’s brother arrived one afternoon with a bandage soaked through. He had been laid off, then laid out by a factory gate. “Just stitches,” he said. “I’ll wait.”
      But a golden retriever was wheeled past on a gurney, an IV pole jangling like a charm bracelet. Applause broke out. Someone filmed. “Such bravery,” a man whispered. The nurse smiled and closed the door.
      That night, Mara walked home through the park. It had once been a place of benches and chessboards. Now it was a sanctuary. Portraits hung from trees—dogs in graduation caps, dogs with medals. At the center stood a statue, bronze polished by touch: a dog gazing forward, jaw set in purpose. At its base, an inscription had been sanded smooth by time or by hands.
      She watched a man kneel to tie a shoelace. A collie stiffened, hackles raised. The man froze, palms open, the universal sign of surrender. A handler clipped a leash shorter. “You can’t loom like that,” she said gently. “They feel threatened.”
      Mara looked into the statue’s blank eyes and felt a strange vertigo. It was not that dogs were cruel; they were what they had always been—loyal, frightened, alive. It was that people had learned to look at one another through fur.
      On her kitchen table lay an old photograph, rescued from a drawer: her parents, laughing, no pets in frame. She tried to remember when laughter had required translation.
      Outside, the city hummed, orderly and kind, and she could not tell anymore—by posture, by priority—who was meant to serve whom.
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      The episode is a rigorous examination of religious adherence within the Twelver Shia tradition, contrasting the modern practice of Taqlid with the foundational concept of Taslim, or total submission to the Ahl al-Bayt. The central inquiry is whether following a scholar’s speculative opinion is the path designed by the Infallibles, or a human construct relying on conjecture rather than Divine Knowledge.
      The author establishes the path of Taslim using primary narrations. This path requires three pillars: unconditional referral of all religious matters to the Imams, the precise preservation and transmission of their Hadith without addition or subtraction, and adherence to their specific speech as the definition of Shia identity. The Imams warned that refusing this direct referral risks spiritual deviation (Shirk).
      The core critique centers on the epistemological gap between the Infallibles’ demand for Certainty (Yaqin) and the admitted reliance of modern Usuli jurisprudence on Conjecture (Zann), or educated probability. The Imams consistently prohibited basing religious practice on Zann, insisting that Allah's proof is clear and accessible. Following a scholar is only acceptable if that individual functions as a transparent guide to the Imam’s preserved words, rather than acting as a filter who mixes the infallible truth with his own deductions.
      The author further argues that since seeking religious knowledge is obligatory for all Muslims, the means to access it must be universally available. Restricting laypeople from reading the clear, preserved body of Hadith—a Divine guarantee—and forcing them to rely on an intermediary creates a self-serving verification trap. True submission demands that the believer return to the clear light of the Akhbar, restoring the Imams as the direct and sufficient source of religious guidance, thereby moving the faith from a system of human opinion back to one of narrated truth.
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      Deepseek's analysis
      The prompt:
      Yes, that is a fair and insightful characterization. The difference in scope you've identified gets to the heart of how each text uses the Exodus story for its distinct theological purpose.
      Let's break down this distinction:
      The Quran: A Universal Monotheistic Message
      In the Quran, the conflict is fundamentally ideological, not ethnic or national. The message of Tawhid (absolute monotheism) is presented as universal truth, applicable to all parties.
      · For the Israelites: Moses is sent to liberate them and to call them back to the pure monotheism of their ancestor Abraham, from which they had strayed.
      · For the Egyptians, especially Pharaoh: The plagues are "signs" (آيَات) meant to invite Pharaoh and his people to recognize the one God. Their sin is not just oppression, but primarily polytheism and claiming divinity (shirk). Pharaoh's drowning-scene confession (10:90) underscores that the message was, in principle, for him too—though his acceptance came too late.
      · For the Reader: The story is a timeless lesson: the fate of those who reject God's messengers (like Pharaoh) versus those who believe, even if weak (like the Israelite believers and Pharaoh's own magicians who convert).
      Key Example: The Quranic Pharaoh is surrounded by some Egyptians who secretly believe (40:28-45), showing that the monotheistic message was intended for, and accepted by, some within Egyptian society.
      The Bible: A Particular Covenant with a Chosen People
      In the Biblical narrative, the focus is overwhelmingly on the election of Israel and the establishment of a unique covenant relationship.
      · For the Israelites: The Exodus is their foundational national liberation, leading directly to the covenant at Sinai. The laws and rituals (like Passover) are given specifically to them as a "kingdom of priests and a holy nation" (Exodus 19:6).
      · For the Egyptians: They serve as the instruments of God's judgment and the demonstration of His power. Pharaoh's heart is hardened so that God's glory and power might be shown (Exodus 9:16, Romans 9:17). While there is recognition of the "God of the Hebrews," there is no sustained call for the Egyptians as a people to convert to worshiping Yahweh. The focus is on their defeat, not their spiritual redemption.
      · Theological Goal: The story establishes Yahweh as the God who acts uniquely in history for His people, Israel. It's about identity, covenant, and law for a specific nation.
      Side-by-Side Comparison of the Audience

      Conclusion
      Your observation is precise. The Quran presents the Exodus as a paradigm of the universal prophetic struggle, where the message of One God is delivered to both the oppressed (Israelites) and the oppressor (Pharaoh and Egyptians), with eternal consequences for each based on belief.
      The Bible presents it as the formative, particularist history of Israel, where God acts decisively to create a covenant people, using the confrontation with Egypt to demonstrate His unique commitment to them.
      Thus, the Quranic account moralizes and universalizes the story, while the Biblical account historicizes and nationalizes it. This difference stems from the distinct contexts: the Quran establishing a universal faith for all nations, and the Torah establishing the identity of a specific nation.
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