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Miraculousness of the Qurān (Part 5)


Miraculousness of the Qurān – Doctrine of al-Ṣarfah – A Historical Overview (Part 5)

Original source: http://www.iqraonline.net/miraculousness-of-the-quran-doctrine-of-al-ṣarfah-a-historical-overview-part-5/

 

From the beginning of revelation up until the end of the 2nd century, the issue of i’jāz (miraculousness) of the Qurān was not a widely discussed topic amongst Muslim scholars. The Muslims before that were in general amazed by the Qurān and the concepts it discussed and expounded on, to such an extent that there never seemed to be a need to get into formal discussions regarding what made it a miracle. Two possible reasons exist for this lack of attention towards this aspect of the Qurān:

1) The Muslims had known that the Qurān is from God without a doubt, thus they did not develop the need to get into questions regarding the precise nature of its text, its sentence structure, its prose and so on.

2) The Muslims considered the Qurān a sacred book, and so they did not put forth any personal opinions regarding it. This is similar to why companions and the tābi’ūn (the followers and contemporaries of the companions) did not engage in extensive exegesis of the Qurān.

Formal discussions on the miraculousness of the Qurān began between the end of the 2nd and the beginning of the 3rd century hijrī. The earliest group engaging in discussions of i’jāz were the Mu’tazalīs, and thus the earliest formal opinion regarding its miracle also happened to be the doctrine of al-Ṣarfah – proposed by Abū Isḥāq Ibrahīm al-Naẓẓām (d. 231 AH / 845 CE). This was around the same time when dispute over the created nature of Qurān was also taking place between different scholars. Three groups sprung into existence during this period:

1) Those who believed that the Qurān was not miraculous at all. Some proponents of this view were Ibn Rāwandī the philosopher and the Mu’tazalī scholar ‘Īsa b. Ṣabīḥ al-Muzdār

2) Most Mu’tazalīs became proponents of the doctrine of al-Ṣarfah

3) Theologians who believed the miracle to be in the text and very nature of the Qurān – not outside of it

In this post, we will go over the second opinion, although due to the extensive nature of the discussion, we can only explain it briefly.

Al-Ṣarfah

Al-Ṣarfah linguistically means to prevent, discourage, or divert. It has been used in Sūrah al-A’rāf as follows:

سَأَصْرِفُ عَنْ آيَاتِيَ الَّذِينَ يَتَكَبَّرُونَ فِي الْأَرْضِ

[7:146] I will turn away from My signs those who are arrogant upon the earth

However, in our technical discussion in the context of the miraculousness of the Qurān, it refers to the concept of God diverting the Arabs away from being able to produce anything like the Qurān. In other words, the Arabs could have brought something like the Qurān, but an external barrier prevented them from doing so.[1] Arabic was the language of the people of the time, they were well familiar with the way it was used and employed. The Qurān was revealed in Arabic making use of the same grammatical foundations popular amongst the Arabs, so then what was it that prevented them from bringing something like it? The doctrine formulated to respond to this question was al-Ṣarfah, but how exactly it worked had remained a matter of dispute.

Al-Amīr Yaḥya b. Ḥamzah al-‘Alawī al-Zaydī (d. 749 AH) in his work al-Ṭarāz says there are three possibilities[2] regarding what the proponents of al-Ṣarfah believed in:

1) God had removed all motivation from them to bring anything similar to the Qurān and to challenge it, despite the fact that reasons for why they should have been motivated to do so were present. These reasons range from the Qurān essentially making a mockery of them, exposing their inability to bring something like it, or even discussing their defeat and downfall in the face of Islam. They had every reason to feel motivated to bring something like the Qurān to combat it, but they did not seem to be interested in doing so.

2) They were motivated to bring something like the Qurān, but God had diverted their attention away from the knowledge by which they could have produced something like it. There are two further explanations al-Amīr Yaḥya expounds on as far as this opinion is concerned, but we will suffice with what we have summarized here.

3) They had the motivation and as well as the necessary knowledge to bring something like the Qurān, but God forcefully prevented them from being able to do so.

Āyatullah Hādī Ma’rifat says that it seems it was the second opinion many proponents of al-Ṣarfah believed in and that this is particularly true for the Shī’ī scholar Sayyid al-Murtaḍa – who was a staunch proponent of this doctrine.[3] Āyatullah Hādī Ma’rifat backs this up by citing a number of scholars, including Ibn Maytham al-Baḥrānī[4] (d. 679 AH) and Sa’d al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī[5] (d. 793 AH).

A number of heavy-weights held the opinion of al-Ṣarfah, such as al-Naẓẓām, Abū Isḥāq al-Nuṣaybī, ‘Abbād b. Sulaymān, Hisham al-Qurṭūbī, Ibn Ḥazm al-Andalusī (d. 456 AH) – a Ẓāhirī scholar, Abū ‘Uthmān al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 255 AH) and others. However, for sake of conciseness, we will go over just three scholars.

Al-Naẓẓām

As mentioned earlier, al-Naẓẓām appears to be the earliest proponent of the view of al-Ṣarfah, though some have also made the claim that it was Wāṣil b. ‘Āṭā (d. 131 AH / 748 CE). In any case, as far as what al-Naẓẓam’s view regarding al-Ṣarfah was, we are not too sure because none of his works are extant today by which we can judge for ourselves, and so all we are left with are quotations from him or what later scholars understood from his words. Due to this, we find that some scholars have said he took on the first opinion regarding al-Ṣarfah, meaning God had simply removed any motivation from them to bring something similar to the Qurān[6], while others such as Ibn al-Zamlakānī (d. 651 AH) suggest[7] it was the second opinion, where God had removed their access to the knowledge by which they could have brought something similar to the Qurān. Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash’arī (d. 320 AH) in his Maqālāt al-Islāmiyīn[8] explicitly states that it was, in fact, the third opinion al-Naẓẓām was a proponent of.

In other words, all three opinions have been attributed to him. Some later scholars argue it was, in fact, the first opinion al-Naẓẓām ascribed to, especially when we see his student al-Jāḥiẓ alluding to it as well. Furthermore, some scholars have explained the difference between al-Naẓẓām’s version of al-Ṣarfah with that of Sayyid al-Murtaḍa’s, which once again leads us to believe that al-Naẓẓām ascribed to the first opinion, because it is widely accepted that al-Murtaḍa ascribed to the second view.

Ibn Sinān al-Khafājī

Amīr Abū Muḥammad ‘Abdullah b. Muḥammad b. Sinān al-Khafājī (d. 466 AH / 1074 CE) was an Imām Shī’ī scholar of the 5th century hijrī, who was eventually poisoned on the orders of the Amīr Maḥmūd b. Naṣr. In his Sirr al-Fiṣāḥa[9] he comes out as a strong proponent of al-Ṣarfah and even attempts to refute Abū al-Ḥasan al-Rummānī (d. 384 AH / 994 CE) who believed the miracle of the Qurān to be in its assonance and eloquence.

In his attack on al-Rummānī, Ibn Sinān says that if one contemplates even a little over the Qurān and the eloquent speech of the Arabs, they will realize that there is not much difference between the two. In fact, someone who is familiar with the grammatical and literary foundations by which it could be claimed that a certain speech was eloquent, they will find phrases and speech amongst the Arabs that highly resembled the Qurānic verses. He says that the miraculous aspect of the Qurān is in the fact that God prevented the Arabs from being able to bring something like it simply by restricting their access to the specific knowledge that would be required to do so.

Sayyid al-Murtaḍa

Given that Sayyid al-Murtaḍa (d. 436 AH) is one of the greatest Shī’ī Imāmi scholars to ever live, and due to his vast expertise in the various Islamic sciences as well as his unique views in matters of theology, jurisprudence, Qurānic exegesis, grammar and so on, it only makes sense to understand his view on this doctrine.

There is no dispute that Sayyid al-Murtaḍa was a proponent of al-Ṣarfah. From amongst al-Murtaḍa’s students, it appears Shaykh al-Ṭūṣi was a proponent of al-Ṣarfah initially, as it is apparent from his commentary on Sayyid al-Murtaḍa’s work Jumal al-‘Ilm wa al-‘Amal, but later retracts his view in his work al-Iqtiṣād bi-Taḥqīq Mabānī al-I’tiqād. His other student Abū al-Ṣalāḥ al-Ḥalabī (d. 447 AH) though, remained on the view of al-Ṣarfah and considered it one of the best explanations for what makes the Qurān miraculous.[10]

Most scholars believe Sayyid al-Murtaḍa was a proponent of the second version of al-Ṣarfah – meaning God had divinely prevented access to the knowledge required to bring something like the Qurān. Al-Qutub al-Rāwandī[11] – who was also a proponent of al-Ṣarfah – explains that Sayyid al-Murtaḍa believed that the miraculousness of the Qurān is in the fact that God has prohibited the Arabs from producing anything like it, by preventing them from acquiring the required knowledge to produce something like it. One of the main arguments put forth by him and as well as some other proponents for al-Ṣarfah is as follows:

If the eloquence of the Qurān was miraculous, then it would be necessary for it to have a significant difference from what was considered to be the most eloquent speech by an Arab – to such an extent that if these statements were to be placed together, one would not be confused as to which one is the Qurān and which one is the speech of an Arab. This is all the while we find numerous places where the speech of the Arabs resembles the Qurān very much. In fact, we find that there is hardly any difference between some of the shorter chapters of the Qurān and that which is considered the best of Arab poetry and speech. If this was not the case, there would be no need for us to refer to the strong Arab poets and eloquent speakers in order to understand the usage of some of the literary and grammatical devices employed in the Qurān itself.

If someone were to respond and say that the view of al-Ṣarfah is against the consensus of the Muslims, and in fact accepting this view leads us to say that the Qurān is not the miracle, rather the act of prevention is the miracle, then it should be known – the proponents will say – that this is not a topic in which you can cite consensus as evidence. Furthermore, the claim that there is a consensus on this matter is itself invalid, because the matter is a disputed one.

Secondly, the word miracle has a linguistic meaning and a colloquial meaning. Colloquially – which is what is relevant here and what people use to describe the Qurān – a miracle is something which implies that the person who has come forth with it is truthful in their claim, and the Qurān is a miracle in this sense even if we accept the view of al-Ṣarfah. If someone says the Qurān is not a miracle, what the laymen understand from that is that it is not evidence for the Prophethood of Muḥammad (p) and that people are able to produce something similar to it and then make the claim of Prophethood for themselves. No proponent of al-Ṣarfah says or implies such a thing through their doctrine.

Shaykh al-Ṭūṣi summarizes the refutations of Sayyid al-Murtaḍa and the proponents of al-Ṣarfah to some of the explanations given for what makes the Qurān a miracle. For example, those who believe the miracle of the Qurān is in its order and prose and that it is impossible for one to reproduce such order, prose and eloquence in their speech, then al-Murtaḍa’s rebuttal to them would be that the verses of the Qurān are merely a combination of letters and words, which every human is inherently capable of doing. If someone hasn’t been able to bring something like it so far, does not necessarily mean that the order itself is miraculous, but rather it implies that people do not have enough knowledge to do so. This is similar to a person listening to a poet, yet they are not able to produce what a poet produces, not because the poetry in it and of itself is impossible to produce, but because the listener has not acquired the preliminaries required to produce poetry like it.

For those who say that the miracle of the Qurān is in its reports regarding the unseen, then even though that is a miracle, but that is not what the Arabs were being challenged on. In fact, much of the Qurān is empty of any reports about the unseen.

As for those who say that the miracle of the Qurān is in the absence of any contradictions in it, then once again this is not inherently miraculous, but rather one of the merits of the Qurān. This is because many humans, especially those who have strong memories and are attentive, can produce speech that is not contradictory – and no one says such a case is a miracle.

While these are the arguments put forth by the proponents of this doctrine, it should be reiterated that none of them were suggesting that the Qurān is not highly eloquent and literary profound. Rather, their simple point was that it isn’t this aspect of the Qurān which makes it a miracle – it was something external to it.

One Additional Argument

One additional argument that proponents of al-Ṣarfah will bring are the Qurānic codices of Ibn Mas’ūd and Ubay b. Ka’b.  What is famously agreed upon by the majority of Muslim scholars is that ‘Abdullah b. Mas’ūd did not have Sūrah al-Falaq and al-Nās in his Qurānic codex and in fact, he did not consider them part of the Qurān at all. On the contrary, it is also accepted that Ubay b. Ka’b had two extra chapters in his codex, namely Sūrah al-Ḥafd and al-Khala’. We will not be expanding on the historical discussion concerning these two codices of two of the most prominent companions of the Prophet (p) and scholars of the Qurān – those interested can look into it further, as much discussion exists regarding them. However, we can briefly explain how the proponents of al-Ṣarfah cited these two codices to defend their claim.

If the miracle of the Qurān was in its very nature, in its text, in the way its verses are organized and in its eloquence, then how was it possible for someone like ‘Abdullah b. Mas’ūd to not be able to acknowledge this for Sūrah al-Falaq and al-Nās, to the extent that he did not even consider them to be part of the Qurān. If the eloquence and prose of the Qurān were enough to establish its miraculous nature then we would not have seen Ibn Mas’ūd omit these chapters from his codex. On the contrary, if the eloquence and prose of the Qurān was enough to establish its miraculous nature, then Ubay b. Ka’b should have been able to ascertain that regarding al-Ḥafd and al-Khala’ and should have known that these two are not chapters of the Qurān.

If anyone is interested in reading a little more on the discussion concerning the codex of ‘Abdullah b. Mas’ud, please refer to the transcripts from lesson two and three of Shaykh Ḥaider Ḥobollah’s classes on Sūrah al-Falaq.

God willing, in the next post, we will summarize some of the critiques presented by scholars on the doctrine of al-Ṣarfah and why it has not remained a popular position.


[1] Al-Itqān fī ‘Ulūm al-Qurān, by Jalāl al-Dīn al-Ṣuyūṭī, vol. 4, pg. 7

[2] Al-Ṭarāz, by Al-Amīr Yaḥya b. Ḥamzah al-‘Alawī, vol. 3, pg. 391-392

[3] Al-Tamhīd, by Āyatullah Hādī Ma’rifat, vol. 4, pg. 140

[4] Qawā’id al-Marām, pg. 132

[5] Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid, vol. 2, pg. 184

[6] This is what Sayyid Shari al-Jurjāni (d. 816 AH) says in his Sharh al-Mawāqif, vol. 3, pg. 112

[7] Al-Burhān al-Kāshif ‘an I’jāz al-Qurān, pg. 53

[8] Maqālāt al-Islāmiyīn, vol. 1, pg. 296

[9] Sirr al-Fiṣāḥah, pg. 89-90

[10] In his work Taqrīb al-Ma’ārif, pg. 105-108

[11] In his al-Kharāij wa al-Jarā’ih, vol. 3, pg. 981-984

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      I gave ChatGPT the following prompt:
       
      The text below is provided by ChatGPT.
       

      The proposition that Islamic societies have been particularly successful in maintaining their cultural heritage since the 16th-century expansion of European power is complex and nuanced. While many Islamic societies have indeed preserved significant aspects of their cultural, religious, and linguistic traditions, the extent of this preservation varies across regions and historical contexts. To explore this proposition, consider the following key factors:
      1. Cultural Resilience in the Face of European Expansion
      Islamic societies, particularly those in the Ottoman Empire, Safavid Persia, and Mughal India, exhibited remarkable cultural resilience during and after the period of European imperial expansion. Unlike many indigenous cultures in the Americas, Africa, and parts of Asia, Islamic societies often retained their religious, legal, and linguistic frameworks despite external pressures.
      Key Examples:
      Ottoman Empire: The Ottomans maintained their Islamic legal and educational systems alongside modernizing reforms (e.g., the Tanzimat reforms) while resisting cultural assimilation. Safavid Persia (Iran): The Safavid dynasty entrenched Twelver Shi’ism, reinforcing a distinct cultural and religious identity that endures today. Mughal India: Mughal rulers preserved and promoted Islamic art and architecture, influencing the Indian subcontinent despite British colonial rule. Theoretical Support:
      Marshall Hodgson in The Venture of Islam (1974) argues that Islamic societies developed robust institutional and intellectual traditions that enabled them to integrate external influences while maintaining core cultural elements.
      2. The Role of Religion as a Cultural Anchor
      Islamic societies have often placed significant emphasis on religious education and practice, which provided a unifying cultural framework that resisted external cultural influences. The centrality of Islam in daily life—through Quranic education, mosques, and religious practices—contributed to this cultural persistence.
      Key Insight:
      Clifford Geertz’s study of Morocco and Indonesia in Islam Observed (1968) demonstrates how Islamic societies adapted to modernity while retaining religious and cultural traditions.
      3. Linguistic and Educational Continuity
      Unlike many indigenous languages that declined under European rule, Arabic, Persian, and Ottoman Turkish remained central to intellectual and cultural life in their respective regions. Islamic scholars preserved classical texts and continued producing scholarly works even during colonial rule.
      Contrast with Other Societies:
      In Latin America, many indigenous languages and cultural practices were systematically suppressed by European colonizers. In Africa, missionary-led education often replaced local languages with European ones. 4. Selective Adaptation and Cultural Synthesis
      Islamic societies did not resist external influences entirely; instead, they often selectively adopted technological, administrative, and intellectual practices from European powers while preserving core cultural and religious principles.
      Example:
      The Ottoman Empire modernized its military and bureaucracy but retained its Islamic legal structure (Sharia) alongside secular reforms. 5. Regional Variations and Exceptions
      The degree of cultural preservation varies significantly across the Islamic world. For instance:
      North Africa and the Middle East: Maintained strong Islamic and linguistic traditions despite French and British colonization. Central Asia: Soviet policies suppressed religious practices, weakening Islamic cultural heritage for much of the 20th century. Southeast Asia: Indonesian and Malaysian societies retained Islamic practices while integrating elements of European education systems. 6. Comparative Perspective
      When comparing Islamic societies with other non-European societies, such as Native American, Aboriginal Australian, or sub-Saharan African communities, the relative success in preserving cultural heritage becomes more apparent. Many of these societies experienced significant cultural loss due to direct European intervention, religious conversion, and the imposition of foreign educational systems.
      Scholarly Insight:
      Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978) highlights how Islamic societies were often misrepresented in Western discourse, yet this external pressure also galvanized internal cultural reaffirmation.
      Conclusion
      While Islamic societies have indeed shown notable success in preserving their cultural heritage, this success is not uniform across all regions. The resilience largely stems from the centrality of religion, the adaptability of cultural practices, and the selective adoption of external influences. However, regions like Central Asia illustrate how external forces can disrupt this continuity. Ultimately, the proposition holds considerable validity when compared to many other societies that experienced cultural erosion under European expansion.
         0 comments
      In 2010 we did a little project that involved analysing the content of Shiachat posts over the preceding few years to capture what people were saying about Music on Shiachat.
      The final report is attached.
      Music in Islam v.1.pdf
         10 comments
      [amended 19 August 2023 to include references to the Irish potato famine and two Bengal famines]
       


       
      Images taken at the Egyptian Museum, Tahrir Sq, Cairo. June 2024
      Surah Yusuf
      Prophet Yusuf (عليه السلام) advised Pharoah to hoard grains during the years of plenty. I think this episode is a noteworthy one because it shows how a State can intervene in the marketplace in order to improve the welfare of the wider population.
      But as we shall see below, the government intervention that Prophet Yusuf (عليه السلام) instigated favoured some sections of the population over others - it was not neutral in terms of how it spread gains and losses across the population.
      https://www.al-islam.org/sites/default/files/singles/633-yusuf.pdf
      While there is other material in the Qur'an that deals with transactions within the marketplace between individual participants - this story stands out in terms of its focus on state intervention. 
      I'll be coming back to this issue later - but I think it informs the discussions we have about Islam and contemporary socio-economic theories. In particular, I think it illustrates that Islam does see the State as an active market participant and that in an Islamic state, the role of government is not one that is hands-off or laissez-faire.
       
      What policy options did Prophet Yusuf (عليه السلام) have?
      We should not take the story as presented 'for granted'. In reality, the Prophet (عليه السلام). had a range of choices open to him, and thinking those through helps us better understand the reasons for the policy he undertook and the reason why. 
      No government interference
      Let's start with the simplest and easiest option that Pharoah's government could have pursued once they knew that there would be seven years of plenty followed by seven years of famine (as predicted by the Pharoah's dream which was interpreted by Prophet Yusuf (عليه السلام).) .
      Pharoah could have left the entire issue to the 'market'. During the years of plenty, the price of food would have fallen and people would have enjoyed a higher standard of living. For example, the lower grain prices could have led to people rearing more cattle and their diets would have improved with more meat.
      However, during the years of famine, grain prices would have risen and those people who had accumulated assets in the years of plenty would be able to pay the higher prices in the famine years. Those who had not had such assets would have starved.
      This assumes a fairly high level of self-discipline on the part of the population, but as Milton Friedman would say, the people would have been 'free to choose'. This is not a hypothetical option. The British lack of action to the Irish potato famine has been attributed to the British government's ideological adherence to a laissez-faire approach to macro-economics:
      https://kenanfellows.org/kfp-cp-sites/cp01/cp01/sites/kfp-cp-sites.localhost.com.cp01/files/LP3_BBC Irish Famine Article for Lab.pdf
       
      The Bengal famine is another one where government policy was different to the one Prophet Yusuf ((عليه السلام).) prescribed to Pharoah. In this instance, it was lack of government restriction over the action of privateers:
      https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/29/winston-churchill-policies-contributed-to-1943-bengal-famine-study
       
      Going back still further, the Great Bengal Famine of 1770 has been directly attributed to British government laissez-faire economic policy.
      https://worldfinancialreview.com/the-political-economy-of-famines-during-the-british-rule-in-india-a-critical-analysis/
       
      Light interference - provision of information
      A common policy option nowadays, where people do not want direct government intervention is to recommend improving the provision of information to the population who will then be better able to make the correct decisions for themselves. The government could have mounted an information campaign during the years of plenty and told people to hoard food themselves, hoarding when there is no shortage is allowed in Islam.
      However such attempts to influence awareness about the famine to come and changing peoples' attitudes so that they saved more than they were used to, would likely have run against increased social pressures on people to do the opposite. For example typically in societies as wealth increases there is social pressure to spend more, in this case, for example, have more lavish weddings.
      Also providing information would have been a practical benefit for the better off e.g. those with storage capacity, but not so good for the poor (who would not have room to store grain, for example).
      The government (using a bit more intervention) could have given tax breaks to people who owned granaries, to help the poor who needed such facilities. Again this solution would be to focus on market-based interventions and simply alter the working of the market using incentives. Current economic theory holds that people discount future risks very heavily i.e. they don't perceive them as much of a threat as they should. So, for example, just telling people they should save for a pension does not work. 
      So we can likely predict that the solutions described above would not have worked had they tried them.
      Heavy interference
      This is what they actually did.
      In times of plenty, Pharoah's government did not let prices fall as would have happened under free market conditions. They kept prices higher than they otherwise would have been because the government intervened and took excess stocks of grain out of circulation.
      All people (rich and poor alike) had no option but to pay the usual higher prices - effectively, the government was taxing everyone, but this was not seen as a loss by anyone because the prices were no higher than usual.
      The government stored the grain centrally and then they decided to release the grain according to their own policies.
      Assumptions made by Prophet Yusuf's government
      If you leave people to their own devices they may not make the best decisions (whether they are rich or poor), this could be due to: People do not have the resources to cater for future shocks (mainly the poor) People do not have the discipline to address future shocks (applies to both the rich and the poor) The government can make better decisions than individuals acting in their own self-interest because: The government can have access to more and better information than individuals do The government may not be as susceptible to a lack of self-discipline  
      Conclusion
      Of all the policy options open to Prophet Yusuf (عليه السلام) he advised Pharoah to pursue the most interventionist one. Some people may be tempted to call this socialist or communist, but I think those terms carry a lot of excess baggage, so I won't bring them into the discussion.
      What I think can be safely inferred from his choice of policy is a fundamental principle that could inform economic policy in any Islamic state.
      Facing an external shock to the Egyptian economy, he went for the option that would cause the least pain to the worst off in society. Other policy options would have caused more pain for the poorest but somewhat less for the better off.
       
       
         0 comments
      Final part of my book, narrated by my dear friend, Mrs. Solmaz Rezayi
      Music: Below the Horizon by Guy Sweens
      Images created by ai bing image generator
         3 comments
      Gains and losses
      It's tempting to think of human experiences, in terms of gains or losses, especially those which involve dealing with other people and groups. Some exchanges lend themselves to this calculus e.g. trade or war. However, a focus on the material element of the equation can often ignore the intangible aspects of the encounter or the trade. The latter can often have longer-term and more profound consequences.
      For believers faced with what can seem to be a loss in the material world, it's worth reflecting on what has been gained in the spiritual world. At the moment, in the Middle East there is a dynamic movement of politics and people being played out. Certain groups are gaining power, others are losing. Some people are dying and others are killing them. It's easy to construct the balance sheet in terms of human casualties, square kilometres of land and who holds power.
      But this ignores the bigger picture.
      Spiritual vs. material
      What is also happening is the surfacing of opinions, standpoints and, most importantly, behaviours. In a world at equilibrium, peoples' discourse can often hide their true beliefs and they can avoid engaging in behaviours which make explicit where they stand. 
      However, standing as we are in a world where there is disequilibrium, where the stakes are high for a reconfiguration of the Middle East as the tectonic plates shift, so people become more willing to disclose who they really are. 
      This is a win for the believers. Tempted by the greed for gain, this is where Satan's mask drops, and reality becomes evident. People motivated primarily by gains in this world no longer hide where they really stand - they believe they can achieve far more by grabbing as much as they can possibly have.
      The speed with which events take place makes it impossible for aggressors to hide their tracks. More importantly they believe that they no longer need to do so because the victory is so overwhelming that they will never be brought to account.
      Understanding reality
      Knowing the objective reality of this world can often be quite difficult; it's usually shrouded by our limitations and weaknesses. Often, believers are tempted to ask God for 'signs' to substantiate their belief. We think how easy it must have been for the ancients who lived in a world of miracles to have belief.
      But the miracles are all around us.
      As Satan's mask drops, we can see the people who would typically protest about human rights as part of their overall 'belief system' but are utterly silent about genocide. We can see that people who were horrified by the death of a single Iranian woman are now completely silent about the deaths of thousands.
      And indeed, it's not just silence - there's active subterfuge on their part to protect the aggressor. We see evidence of social media algorithms being changed. We see evidence of the identify of the aggressor being hidden where typically it would not be. Journalists who held themselves to be paragons of integrity have been seen to be weak and supine. Newspapers that used to criticise other countries for censorship have been found to be self-censoring with abandon.
      It's now been left to ordinary people often those with no interest in that part of the world taking note of journalists who have been summarily removed simply for asking Israeli representatives the wrong questions. And just as technology has enabled aggressors to have superior weapons so we are able to better measure and compare the published narrative and have no doubt about what is happening.
      And that's just the media.
      As for political leaders, we can see the people who claim leadership of Muslims but who show none when world events demand it. We can see the leaders who not only fail to protect the oppressed but who take an active part in the oppression. Their followers are left having to make excuses or alternatively make up new ideologies to replace those found to be wanting.
      Crumbling in front of us is the whole edifice of human rights, feminism, democracy, freedom of the press, international system of crime and justice and all those other things that have been used to beat up Muslims for decades. Of course, there is nothing wrong with them per se - but it's now obvious that there was never any principle underpinning their use. They were only a weaponised tool whose promoters were kept on a tight leash and allowed to attack some countries while we now see them willingly held back from applying the same rules to others.
      Claims of a 'superior civilisation' (whose superiority above Islam we were told we should accept) are now an embarrassment except to those with no reason or shame. Its promoters have traded them for gains in this world and have given up whatever echoes they wished to leave for eternity. And even those gains will prove to be short lived. The moral high ground needs legitimacy which has now disappeared.
      Implications for us
      It's at times like this that we might be saddened by the loss of people and places. But at the same time, our faith should be reinvigorated by the knowledge that what others believe is false, whose hypocrisy is made manifest and most importantly, whose ethical and moral position is so weak that it requires extreme violence to uphold.
      Shias more than anyone know that gains and losses on the battlefield are not the end of the story.
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