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Mufadhal b. Umar: Sinner or Saint?

Islamic Salvation

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اكتب وبث علمك في إخوانك، فإن مت فأورث كتبك بنيك

Write down and spread your knowledge among your brothers. And if you are about to die then will your books to your children [What the Imam al-Sadiq is supposed to have said to al-Mufadhal]

 

فلما انصرفت إلى الكوفة أقبلت علي الشيعة فمزقوني كل ممزق، يأكلون لحمي ويشتمون عرضي، حتى أن بعضهم استقبلني فوثب في وجهي، وبعضهم قعد لي في سكك الكوفة يريد ضربي، ورموني بكل بهتان

When I reached Kufa and met the Shia, they tore me to shreds, eating my flesh and disparaging my honour, such that one of them faced me and punched me in the face, and one of them lay in ambush for me in the markets of Kufa wishing to beat me up, and they made false accusations against me [Mufadhal in his Last Will and Testimony]

 

ما يقولون في المفضل بن عمر؟ قلت: يقولون فيه: هيئة يهوديا أو نصرانيا

What do they say about al-Mufadhal b. Umar? They say: He has the appearance and manner of a Jew or a Christian [The General Populace of Kufa was not impressed by Mufadhal]

 

Who was He?

Abu Abdallah Mufadhal b. Umar al-Ju’fi (d. before 179), a money-changer by profession, was a Kufan companion of the two Imams, al-Sadiq and al-Kadhim. He was charged with performing certain tasks for them.

al-Tusi sees no problem in him. He includes him among the praiseworthy ‘intimate ones’ and ‘managers of the Imam’s affairs’ citing the following report as evidence:

علي بن محمد، قال: حدثني سلمة بن الخطاب، عن علي بن حسان، عن موسى بن بكير قال: كنت في خدمة أبي الحسن عليه السلام ولم أكن أرى شيئا يصل إلى إلا من ناحية المفضل بن عمر، ولربما رأيت الرجل يجئ بالشئ فلا يقبله منه ويقول: أوصله إلى المفضل

Ali b. Muhammad – Salama b. al-Khattab – Ali b. Hassan – Musa b. Bukayr: I was in the service of Abi al-Hasan  عليه السلام. Nothing [of the monetary dues] used to reach him [from any other route] except through Mufadhal b. Umar. I would sometimes see a man bringing something to the Imam directly and he [the Imam] would refuse to accept it and say: take it to Mufadhal.   

That he was an important figure who exerted considerable influence on the Shi’ite community is undeniable. This can be glimpsed from the number of narrations under his name and the books attributed to him. 

 

A Controversial Narrator

However, there is a controversy about his status. A controversy which probably began in his own lifetime. Some saw him as the bearer of the ‘secrets’ of the Imams who was understandably misunderstood by the laymen who could not bear them, while others saw him as a crypto-syncretist who distorted the teachings of the Imam.

There exists both praise and censure of him attributed to the Imams. Most of the narrations which extol him are narrated by the Ghulat who glorify him as one of their pillars.

The books ascribed to him include partially surviving esoteric manuals like Kitab al-Sirat (‘The Book of the Way’) and Kitab al-Haft wa al-Azilla (‘The Book of the Seven and the Phantoms’) among others. These are treasured by contemporary Nusayri-Alawis but would be considered heretical in the Twelver Madhhab. It is unclear whether this attribution is historical or merely based on the communal memory of his significance for their teachings. Modern academic research sees these books as consisting of many layers, with unidentified authors adding material to the oldest core.

al-Ayyashi encountered some of this suspect literature as he retells below:

 وأمّا أبو يعقوب إسحاق بن محمد البصري، فإنّه كان غالياً، وسرت إليه إلى بغداد لاكتب عنه وسألته كتاباً أنسخه، فأخرج إليّ من أحاديث المفضّل بن عمر في التفويض ، فلم أرغب فيه فأخرج إليّ من أحاديث مشيخته من الثقات

As for Abu Ya’qub Ishaq b. Muhammad al-Basri then he was a Ghali. I went to him in Baghdad to write from him. I asked him a book to copy so he took out for me a collection of narrations from Mufadhal b. Umar regarding Tafwidh [that the ‘Aimma are independent beings who run the world after its initial creation] but I did not express any interest in that, then he produced narrations relayed by the trustworthy ones among his teachers …

Traditionalist scholars like al-Najashi and Ibn al-Ghadhairi had a negative assessment of him for this very reason. They went through the works ascribed to him and found them to be unpalatable.

Ibn al-Ghadhairi is scathing when he says:

خطابي، وقد زيد عليه شئ كثير، وحمل الغلاة في حديثه حملا عظيما

‘A Khattabi. A lot of fabricated material has been attributed to him. The Ghulat have launched a full-scale attack on his narrations (i.e. they have invaded his original corpus infiltrating it with their own ideas)’

al-Najashi warns:

وقد ذكرت له مصنفات لا يعول عليها، وإنما ذكرنا للشرط الذي قدمناه

‘A number of books are listed as authored by him but they are not to be depended upon. I only include their names because of the condition which we have mentioned before [i.e. to list the titles of all Shi’i authors]’

Even if he is not responsible for what circulates under his name, the fact that the Ghulat considered him one of their own should be reason enough for caution. Anonymous writers are  known to have penned material using his name seeking to enhance the authority of their works. It is an arduous task to sift the historical from the forged.

 

A Khattabi?

What can be asserted without doubt is that the historical Mufadhal was at one point in time connected to Abu al-Khattab and the Khatabiyya [there is even a splinter-sect of the Khatabiyya which was named after Mufadhal i.e. the Mufadhaliyya]. They are accused of deifying al-Sadiq in some way and of believing in continuation of prophecy. We have some narrations which indicate Mufadhal’s links with such beliefs:   

حدثني الحسين بن الحسن بن بندار القمي، قال حدثني سعد بن عبد الله بن أبي خلف القمي، قال حدثني محمد بن الحسين بن أبي الخطاب و الحسن بن موسى، عن صفوان بن يحيى، عن عبد الله بن مسكان قال: دخل حجر بن زائدة و عامر بن جذاعة الأزدي على أبي عبد الله عليه السلام فقالا: جعلنا فداك، إن المفضل بن عمر يقول إنكم تقدرون أرزاق العباد ...

al-Husayn b. al-Hasan b. Bundar al-Qummi – Sa’d b. Abdallah b. Abi Khalaf al-Qummi – Muhammad b. al-Husayn b. Abi al-Khattab and al-Hasan b. Musa from Safwan b. Yahya from Abdallah b. Muskan who said: Hujr b. Zaida and A’mir b. Judha’a al-Azdi entered upon Abi Abdillah عليه السلام and said to him: May we be made your ransom, Mufadhal b. Umar says that you are the ones who allot the Rizq of the slaves …

علي بن محمد، عن صالح بن أبي حماد، عن محمد بن أورمة، عن ابن سنان، عن المفضل بن عمر قال: كنت أنا والقاسم شريكي ونجم بن حطيم وصالح بن سهل بالمدينة فتناظرنا في الربوبية، قال: فقال بعضنا لبعض: ما تصنعون بهذا نحن بالقرب منه وليس منا في تقية قوموا بنا إليه، قال: فقمنا فوالله ما بلغنا الباب إلا وقد خرج علينا بلا حذاء ولا رداء قد قام كل شعرة من رأسه منه وهو يقول: لا لا يا مفضل ويا قاسم ويا نجم، لا لا بل عباد مكرمون لا يسبقونه بالقول وهم بأمره يعملون

Ali b. Muhammad – Salih b. Abi Hammad – Muhammad b. Awrama – Ibn Sinan – al-Mufadhal b. Umar who said:  I, al-Qasim al-Shariki, Najm b. Hutaym and Salih b. Sahl were in Madina when we disputed each other over the divinity [of the ‘Aimma]. He [Mufadhal] said: We said to each other - why are we speculating on this when we are nearby to him [the Imam] and he is not in Taqiyya with us [does not answer us in dissimulation], let’s go meet him. He [Mufadhal] said: We headed towards him - by Allah we had not reached the door before he came out bare-footed, without a cloak and all the hair on his head stood on end [in apprehension] saying: No - O Mufadhal, Qasim and Najm, No! “rather mere honored slaves, never preceding Him (Allah) in word, and they always follow His orders” (21:26-27)

حدثني حمدويه وإبراهيم ابنا نصير، قالا: حدثنا محمد بن عيسى، عن علي ابن الحكم، عن المفضل بن عمر أنه كان يبشر أبا الخطاب وفلان أنكما لمن المرسلين

Hamduwayh b. Nusayr and Ibrahim b. Nusayr – Muhammad b. Isa – Ali b. al-Hakam: That he [Mufadhal b. Umar] used to give glad tidings to Aba al-Khattab and one other saying: ‘verily you are messengers’

قال الكشى: وذكرت الطيارة الغالية في بعض كتبها عن المفضل: أنه قال لقد قتل مع أبي اسماعيل يعني أبا الخطاب سبعون نبيا ... وأن المفضل قال: أدخلنا على أبي عبد الله عليه‌ السلام ونحن اثنى عشر رجلا، قال: فجعل أبو عبد الله عليه‌ السلام يسلم على رجل رجل منا ويسمي كل رجل منا باسم نبي، وقال لبعضنا: السلام عليك يا نوح، وقال لبعضنا: السلام عليك يا ابراهيم، وكان آخر من سلم عليه وقال: السلام عليك يا يونس، ثم قال: لا تخاير بين الانبياء

al-Kashshi said: The Tayyara Ghulat say in one of their books that al-Mufadhal said: Seventy prophets were killed with Aba al-Khattab … Mufadhal is also supposed to have said: Twelve of us entered in to see Abi Abdillah عليه‌ السلام. He [the Imam] began greeting each one of us individually and calling each one of us by the name of a prophet, saying to one of us ‘peace be upon you O Noah’ to another ‘peace be upon you O Ibrahim’, he greeted the last one of us saying: ‘peace be upon you O Yunus’. Then he [the Imam] said: do not distinguish between the prophets! 

 

Mufadhal, The Khattabiyya and Ismail

The Khatabbiya seem to have taken Ismail the son of al-Sadiq as their figure-head and pinned their hopes on him as the next Imam. It is hard to discern from the meager sources available whether Ismail’s participation in this was of his own volition or not.

رجال الكشي: حمدويه بن نصير، عن يعقوب بن يزيد، عن ابن أبي عمير، عن هشام بن الحكم وحماد بن عثمان، عن إسماعيل بن جابر قال: قال أبو عبد الله: ايت المفضل قل له: يا كافر يا مشرك ما تريد إلى ابني تريد أن تقتله

Hamduwayh b. Nusayr – Ya’qub b. Yazid – Ibn Abi Umayr – Hisham b. al-Hakam and Hammad b. Uthman –  Ismail b. Jabir who said: Abu Abdillah عليه السلام said: Go to Mufadhal and say to him - O Kafir, O Mushrik, what do you want for my son Ismail? Do you want to kill him!?

The narration above has the Imam using very harsh language with Mufadhal in the context of the latter’s ‘grooming’ of Ismail which al-Sadiq felt was dangerous. 

On the other hand, there also exists a countervailing narration as below:


الكافي: محمد بن يحيى، عن أحمد بن محمد بن عيسى، عن علي بن الحكم، عن يونس بن يعقوب قال: أمرني أبو عبد الله عليه السلام أن آتي المفضل واعزيه باسماعيل وقال: اقرأ المفضل السلام وقل له: إنا قد اصبنا بإسماعيل فصبرنا، فاصبر كما صبرنا، إنا أردنا أمرا وأراد الله عزوجل أمرا، فسلمنا لامر الله عزوجل

Muhammad b. Yahya – Ahmad b. Muhammad b. Isa – Ali b. al-Hakam – Yunus b. Ya’qub who said: Abu Abdillah عليه السلام ordered me to go to Mufadhal and condole him for [the death of] Ismail. He [the Imam] said: Convey my greetings of peace to Mufadhal and say to him: We have been tried through Ismail and have remained patient, so be patient the way we have been patient. We wanted something but Allah Mighty and Majestic wanted something else so we have submitted to the command of Allah Mighty and Majestic.   

This one is much more warm. The Imam condoles Mufadhal on the occasion of Ismail’s death - the two must have been especially close - and commends him to be patient in emulation of the Imam’s own patience.   

How can we explain this difference in tone?

 

A Rapprochement?

It seems that one way to reconcile between them is to posit that Mufadhal had a period of estrangement from the Imam - because of his involvement with the Khattabis and their intentions for Ismail, however, he later repented from this and broke away with Abu al-Khattab, consequently the relation with the Imam improved.

Evidence for this can be found in the narration below:

جبرئيل بن أحمد قال: حدّثني محمّد بن عيسى، عن يونس، عن حماد بن عثمان قال: سمعت أبا عبداللّه عليه السلام يقول للمفضّل بن عمر الجعفي: يا كافر يا مشرك ما لك ولابني، يعني إسماعيل بن جعفر، وكان منقطعا إليه، يقول فيه مع الخطابية، ثم رجع بعد

Jibrail b. Ahmad – Muhammad b. Isa – Yunus – Hammad b. Uthman who said: I heard Aba Abdillah عليه السلام saying to al-Mufadhal b. Umar al-Ju’fi: O Kafir, O Mushrik, what do you have to do with my son - meaning Ismail b. Ja’far? - and he [Mufadhal] was loyal to him [Ismail], believing about him [that he is the Imam and much more] together with the Khatabiyya, then he returned afterwards.

That Mufadhal returned back to the truth after deviation can be proved also by the fact that he was not among those followers of Abu al-Khattab who died with their leader when they were attacked by the men of Isa b. Musa [the Abbasid governor of Kufa] after barricading themselves in the central mosque as part of an aborted revolt.

Another piece of evidence for this view is that Mufadhal seems to have a more cordial relation with al-Kadhim after the death of al-Sadiq [indeed there are no censures against him quoted from this Imam, which would tally with his reform in his later years]. 

محمد بن مسعود، قال: حدثني عبد الله بن خلف، قال: حدثنا علي بن حسان الواسطي، قال: حدثني موسى بن بكير قال: سمعت أبا الحسن يقول لما أتاه موت المفضل بن عمر، قال: رحمه الله، كان الوالد بعد الوالد، أما انه قد استراح

Muhammad b. Masud – Abdallah b. Khalaf – Ali b. Hassan al-Wasiti – Musa b. Bukayr who said: I heard Aba al-Hasan saying when he was informed of the death of al-Mufadhal b. Umar - May Allah have mercy on him, he was a father after the father [al-Sadiq i.e. a second father to him]. Verily he is now resting in peace.

 

Summary 

The case of al-Mufadhal is a complicated one. More needs to be done to collect all the relevant evidence and formulate a coherent position, if at all possible. This is obviously not the place for an in-depth study. Such research should also consider the provenance of famous books attributed to him like Tawhid al-Mufadhal, al-Ihlilaja etc. Having said all this, caution must be exercised as regards narrations attributed to him, specifically if the contents have to do with Imamology.

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      2. Emphasis on Human-Human Relations
      Communal and Familial Bonds
      Several studies on Muslim consumer behavior note a pronounced focus on family cohesion, kinship obligations, and community welfare (Wilson & Grant, 2013; Journal of Islamic Marketing; Emerald). This cultural emphasis is partly derived from key Islamic principles like ummah (community) and zakat (almsgiving). Since dogs are not typically incorporated as household companions, the emotional investment that might be directed toward pets is instead often channeled into human relationships—strengthening family ties, neighborhood communities, and broader social networks. Social gatherings, frequent family visits, and kin-based reciprocity form the core of daily life (Jafari & Goulding, 2008; Consumption, Markets & Culture, Taylor & Francis).
      Social Interaction Rituals
      Societies that discourage dog ownership frequently invest in elaborate human-centric rituals: communal prayers, frequent visits to relatives, large-scale cultural festivals such as Eid, and extended family gatherings (Essoo & Dibb, 2004; European Journal of Marketing). These rituals encourage sustained human-human interaction. By contrast, in dog-friendly contexts, social rituals often include pet-oriented activities—visits to dog parks, “puppy parties,” or dog adoption events—showcasing how some communal bonding can revolve around animals rather than solely around human interaction (Holbrook & Woodside, 2008; Journal of Business Research, Elsevier).
      3. Consumer Behavior Implications
      Expenditure Flows
      Dog-Friendly Societies: A significant proportion of household expenditures—such as premium dog food, veterinary care, and leisure activities—can be allocated to pets (Hirschman, 1994; Journal of Consumer Research). Over time, this fosters an entire “pet economy,” often reinforced by emotional satisfaction drawn from anthropomorphized relationships with dogs.
      Islamic-Oriented Societies: Due to religious constraints, there is limited demand for dog-centric products and services. Instead, expenditures that might have been channeled toward pet care could be redirected toward communal obligations (e.g., charitable giving, gifts to family, social events). The consumer culture thus prioritizes human welfare, strengthening what might be viewed as social capital within human networks (Jafari & Goulding, 2008; Consumption, Markets & Culture).
      Marketplace Signaling and Sociocultural Values
      Signaling Communal Responsibility: Consumers in Islamic contexts may signal piety and communal commitment through active participation in social events or charitable acts, reflecting a cultural script that values direct human welfare (Wilson & Grant, 2013; Journal of Islamic Marketing).
      Signaling Affection for Pets: In Western or dog-friendly contexts, owning a pampered dog can signal care, empathy, and a nurturing personality, reinforcing a sense of belonging in communities of pet lovers (Belk, 1988; Journal of Consumer Research). Marketers leverage anthropomorphism in advertising, depicting dogs as “family members” to appeal to consumers’ emotional investment in pets (Waytz, Cacioppo, & Epley, 2010; Trends in Cognitive Sciences).
      4. Societal and Cultural Outcomes
      Stronger Intra-Human Bonds in Islamic Contexts
      The proposition that Islamic-oriented societies have a stronger emphasis on human-human relationships can be understood through the lens of “resource allocation” in consumer behavior. With limited scope for dog-human emotional or social investment, individuals are more inclined to strengthen kin networks, community relations, and collective identity (Ibrahim & Al Kamdah, 2020). This focus on human-centered relationships is further reinforced by religious teachings promoting empathy, community service, and direct human engagement over companionship with creatures deemed ritually impure (Alhussain & Thakur, 2019).
      Diverse Relationship Portfolios in Dog-Friendly Societies
      In societies where dogs occupy central roles in households, individuals often have “relationship portfolios” that include significant non-human elements (Belk, 2013). Emotional fulfillment, social activities, and even identity expression can revolve around pet ownership, potentially substituting or complementing human-human connections. While this can enrich daily life for pet owners, critics argue it may diminish time and investment in broader community involvement (Holbrook & Woodside, 2008; Hirschman, 1994).
       
      Key References
      Alhussain, T., & Thakur, R. (2019). Religious beliefs and consumer behavior: A conceptual framework and research propositions. Journal of Islamic Marketing, 10(3), 948–962. [Emerald]
      Belk, R. W. (1988). Possessions and the extended self. Journal of Consumer Research, 15(2), 139–168. [University of Chicago Press]
      Belk, R. W. (2013). Extended self in a digital world. Journal of Consumer Research, 40(3), 477–500. [University of Chicago Press]
      Epley, N., Waytz, A., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2007). On seeing human: A three-factor theory of anthropomorphism. Psychological Review, 114(4), 864–886. [APA; frequently cited in marketing and consumer research]
      Essoo, N., & Dibb, S. (2004). Religious influences on shopping behaviour: An exploratory study. European Journal of Marketing, 38(5/6), 536–553. [Emerald]
      Hirschman, E. C. (1994). Consumers and their animal companions. Journal of Consumer Research, 20(4), 616–631. [Oxford University Press for the Association for Consumer Research]
      Holbrook, M. B., & Woodside, A. G. (2008). Animal companions, consumption experiences, and the marketing of pets: Transcending boundaries in the animal-human distinction. Journal of Business Research, 61(5), 377–381. [Elsevier]
      Ibrahim, B., & Al Kamdah, A. (2020). Exploring the Islamic marketing ethics from macro and consumer behaviour perspectives. Journal of Islamic Marketing, 11(5), 1295–1312. [Emerald]
      Jafari, A., & Goulding, C. (2008). “We are not terrorists!” UK-based Iranians, consumption practices and the ‘torn self.’ Consumption, Markets & Culture, 11(2), 73–91. [Taylor & Francis]
      Wilson, J. A. J., & Grant, J. (2013). Islamic marketing – A challenger to the classical marketing canon? Journal of Islamic Marketing, 4(1), 7–21. [Emerald]
      Waytz, A., Cacioppo, J. T., & Epley, N. (2010). Who sees human? The stability and importance of individual differences in anthropomorphism. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 5(3), 219–232. [SAGE, frequently cited in consumer research]
      These references illustrate how socio-religious norms and cultural frameworks (particularly in Islamic contexts) shape the nature and direction of anthropomorphism and, consequently, influence where consumers channel their social and emotional investment—ultimately affirming the proposition that Islamic-oriented societies often place a stronger emphasis on human-human relations.
    • Haji 2003
      Prophet Yusuf's (عليه السلام) policy options
      By Haji 2003 in Qur'an Semantic Field Analysis
         12 comments
      [amended 19 August 2023 to include references to the Irish potato famine and two Bengal famines]
       


       
      Images taken at the Egyptian Museum, Tahrir Sq, Cairo. June 2024
      Surah Yusuf
      Prophet Yusuf (عليه السلام) advised Pharoah to hoard grains during the years of plenty. I think this episode is a noteworthy one because it shows how a State can intervene in the marketplace in order to improve the welfare of the wider population.
      But as we shall see below, the government intervention that Prophet Yusuf (عليه السلام) instigated favoured some sections of the population over others - it was not neutral in terms of how it spread gains and losses across the population.
      https://www.al-islam.org/sites/default/files/singles/633-yusuf.pdf
      While there is other material in the Qur'an that deals with transactions within the marketplace between individual participants - this story stands out in terms of its focus on state intervention. 
      I'll be coming back to this issue later - but I think it informs the discussions we have about Islam and contemporary socio-economic theories. In particular, I think it illustrates that Islam does see the State as an active market participant and that in an Islamic state, the role of government is not one that is hands-off or laissez-faire.
       
      What policy options did Prophet Yusuf (عليه السلام) have?
      We should not take the story as presented 'for granted'. In reality, the Prophet (عليه السلام). had a range of choices open to him, and thinking those through helps us better understand the reasons for the policy he undertook and the reason why. 
      No government interference
      Let's start with the simplest and easiest option that Pharoah's government could have pursued once they knew that there would be seven years of plenty followed by seven years of famine (as predicted by the Pharoah's dream which was interpreted by Prophet Yusuf (عليه السلام).) .
      Pharoah could have left the entire issue to the 'market'. During the years of plenty, the price of food would have fallen and people would have enjoyed a higher standard of living. For example, the lower grain prices could have led to people rearing more cattle and their diets would have improved with more meat.
      However, during the years of famine, grain prices would have risen and those people who had accumulated assets in the years of plenty would be able to pay the higher prices in the famine years. Those who had not had such assets would have starved.
      This assumes a fairly high level of self-discipline on the part of the population, but as Milton Friedman would say, the people would have been 'free to choose'. This is not a hypothetical option. The British lack of action to the Irish potato famine has been attributed to the British government's ideological adherence to a laissez-faire approach to macro-economics:
      https://kenanfellows.org/kfp-cp-sites/cp01/cp01/sites/kfp-cp-sites.localhost.com.cp01/files/LP3_BBC Irish Famine Article for Lab.pdf
       
      The Bengal famine is another one where government policy was different to the one Prophet Yusuf ((عليه السلام).) prescribed to Pharoah. In this instance, it was lack of government restriction over the action of privateers:
      https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/29/winston-churchill-policies-contributed-to-1943-bengal-famine-study
       
      Going back still further, the Great Bengal Famine of 1770 has been directly attributed to British government laissez-faire economic policy.
      https://worldfinancialreview.com/the-political-economy-of-famines-during-the-british-rule-in-india-a-critical-analysis/
       
      Light interference - provision of information
      A common policy option nowadays, where people do not want direct government intervention is to recommend improving the provision of information to the population who will then be better able to make the correct decisions for themselves. The government could have mounted an information campaign during the years of plenty and told people to hoard food themselves, hoarding when there is no shortage is allowed in Islam.
      However such attempts to influence awareness about the famine to come and changing peoples' attitudes so that they saved more than they were used to, would likely have run against increased social pressures on people to do the opposite. For example typically in societies as wealth increases there is social pressure to spend more, in this case, for example, have more lavish weddings.
      Also providing information would have been a practical benefit for the better off e.g. those with storage capacity, but not so good for the poor (who would not have room to store grain, for example).
      The government (using a bit more intervention) could have given tax breaks to people who owned granaries, to help the poor who needed such facilities. Again this solution would be to focus on market-based interventions and simply alter the working of the market using incentives. Current economic theory holds that people discount future risks very heavily i.e. they don't perceive them as much of a threat as they should. So, for example, just telling people they should save for a pension does not work. 
      So we can likely predict that the solutions described above would not have worked had they tried them.
      Heavy interference
      This is what they actually did.
      In times of plenty, Pharoah's government did not let prices fall as would have happened under free market conditions. They kept prices higher than they otherwise would have been because the government intervened and took excess stocks of grain out of circulation.
      All people (rich and poor alike) had no option but to pay the usual higher prices - effectively, the government was taxing everyone, but this was not seen as a loss by anyone because the prices were no higher than usual.
      The government stored the grain centrally and then they decided to release the grain according to their own policies.
      Assumptions made by Prophet Yusuf's government
      If you leave people to their own devices they may not make the best decisions (whether they are rich or poor), this could be due to: People do not have the resources to cater for future shocks (mainly the poor) People do not have the discipline to address future shocks (applies to both the rich and the poor) The government can make better decisions than individuals acting in their own self-interest because: The government can have access to more and better information than individuals do The government may not be as susceptible to a lack of self-discipline  
      Conclusion
      Of all the policy options open to Prophet Yusuf (عليه السلام) he advised Pharoah to pursue the most interventionist one. Some people may be tempted to call this socialist or communist, but I think those terms carry a lot of excess baggage, so I won't bring them into the discussion.
      What I think can be safely inferred from his choice of policy is a fundamental principle that could inform economic policy in any Islamic state.
      Facing an external shock to the Egyptian economy, he went for the option that would cause the least pain to the worst off in society. Other policy options would have caused more pain for the poorest but somewhat less for the better off.
       
       
    • Haji 2003
      Yield to companions
      By Haji 2003 in Stories for Sakina
         0 comments
      By the time the city finished installing ramps for paws beside every staircase, the ramps for people had quietly been removed.
      No one remembered the meeting where it was decided. Decisions arrived now as laminated notices tied to lampposts with biodegradable twine: PLEASE YIELD TO COMPANIONS; QUIET HOURS FOR CANINE SENSITIVITY. The notices bore smiling silhouettes of dogs wearing scarves. People learned to read them the way one reads weather—by feeling the chill before seeing the cloud.
      Mara noticed first when her neighbour collapsed on the pavement. He was thin, as if he had been erased a little at a time. The street was busy, yet no one stopped. A woman paused only to pull her terrier closer, murmuring reassurance. “Not you,” she said, as the man’s hand trembled toward her ankle. “Careful.”
      A drone hummed in and descended. Its camera irised, not toward the man, but toward the terrier. A soft voice chimed: IS YOUR COMPANION DISTRESSED? The woman nodded. A thermal blanket unfurled—around the dog. The man’s breath rattled like loose change in a pocket.
      At the clinic where Mara worked, the waiting room had been renovated. Plush beds lined the walls, bowls of filtered water glowed with LED halos. People stood. There were no chairs anymore; standing was healthier, the pamphlet said, and chairs took up space that could be used for enrichment. When the nurse called names, she called the dogs’. Owners answered for them, translating barks into grievances with practiced fluency.
      Mara’s brother arrived one afternoon with a bandage soaked through. He had been laid off, then laid out by a factory gate. “Just stitches,” he said. “I’ll wait.”
      But a golden retriever was wheeled past on a gurney, an IV pole jangling like a charm bracelet. Applause broke out. Someone filmed. “Such bravery,” a man whispered. The nurse smiled and closed the door.
      That night, Mara walked home through the park. It had once been a place of benches and chessboards. Now it was a sanctuary. Portraits hung from trees—dogs in graduation caps, dogs with medals. At the center stood a statue, bronze polished by touch: a dog gazing forward, jaw set in purpose. At its base, an inscription had been sanded smooth by time or by hands.
      She watched a man kneel to tie a shoelace. A collie stiffened, hackles raised. The man froze, palms open, the universal sign of surrender. A handler clipped a leash shorter. “You can’t loom like that,” she said gently. “They feel threatened.”
      Mara looked into the statue’s blank eyes and felt a strange vertigo. It was not that dogs were cruel; they were what they had always been—loyal, frightened, alive. It was that people had learned to look at one another through fur.
      On her kitchen table lay an old photograph, rescued from a drawer: her parents, laughing, no pets in frame. She tried to remember when laughter had required translation.
      Outside, the city hummed, orderly and kind, and she could not tell anymore—by posture, by priority—who was meant to serve whom.
    • shuaybi
      Beyond Taqlid: The Path Of Taslim
      By shuaybi in The Shuaybi Blog
         0 comments
      The episode is a rigorous examination of religious adherence within the Twelver Shia tradition, contrasting the modern practice of Taqlid with the foundational concept of Taslim, or total submission to the Ahl al-Bayt. The central inquiry is whether following a scholar’s speculative opinion is the path designed by the Infallibles, or a human construct relying on conjecture rather than Divine Knowledge.
      The author establishes the path of Taslim using primary narrations. This path requires three pillars: unconditional referral of all religious matters to the Imams, the precise preservation and transmission of their Hadith without addition or subtraction, and adherence to their specific speech as the definition of Shia identity. The Imams warned that refusing this direct referral risks spiritual deviation (Shirk).
      The core critique centers on the epistemological gap between the Infallibles’ demand for Certainty (Yaqin) and the admitted reliance of modern Usuli jurisprudence on Conjecture (Zann), or educated probability. The Imams consistently prohibited basing religious practice on Zann, insisting that Allah's proof is clear and accessible. Following a scholar is only acceptable if that individual functions as a transparent guide to the Imam’s preserved words, rather than acting as a filter who mixes the infallible truth with his own deductions.
      The author further argues that since seeking religious knowledge is obligatory for all Muslims, the means to access it must be universally available. Restricting laypeople from reading the clear, preserved body of Hadith—a Divine guarantee—and forcing them to rely on an intermediary creates a self-serving verification trap. True submission demands that the believer return to the clear light of the Akhbar, restoring the Imams as the direct and sufficient source of religious guidance, thereby moving the faith from a system of human opinion back to one of narrated truth.

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