Jump to content
In the Name of God بسم الله
  • entries
    30
  • comments
    131
  • views
    335,269

Did the Sahaba become Kafir?


هلك الناس أجمعون قلت: من في الشرق و من في الغرب؟ قال: فقال: إنها فتحت على الضلال

All the people were destroyed. I said: whomever was in the east and the west? he said: it (the whole earth) was opened up to misguidance

هلكوا إلا ثلاثة ثم لحق أبو ساسان و عمار و شتيرة و أبو عمرة فصاروا سبعة

All were destroyed except three - then they were joined by Abu Sasan, Ammar, Shatira and Abu Amra, so they became seven [Ja`far al-Sadiq]

 

Did the Sahaba Apostatize?

There are narrations which indicate that all the companions were destroyed except three, these were then joined by four others, so they became seven who were saved. However, most of the scholars have understood this Halak [destruction] to be that of Dhalal [misguidance] i.e. perished in Salvific terms, not Kufr [disbelief] - which is the opposite of Islam.

 

Who are the three?

They are the pillars of the Madhhab. They are explicitly named in some of the narrations below:

أبي بصير قال: قلت لأبي عبد الله عليه السلام: ارتد الناس إلا ثلاثة: أبو ذر، و سلمان، و المقداد؟ قال: فقال أبو عبد الله عليه السلام: فأين أبو ساسان، و أبو عمرة الأنصاري؟

[al-Kashshi] Abi Basir said: I said to Abi Abdillah عليه السلام: all the people turned back except for three - Abu Dhar, Salman and Miqdad? Abu Abdillah عليه السلام said: so where is Abu Sasan and Abu Amra al-Ansari?!

أبي بكر الحضرمى قال: قال أبو جعفر عليه السلام: ارتد الناس إلاثلاثة نفر سلمان وأبو ذر والمقداد. قال: قلت: فعمّار؟ قال عليه السلام: قد كان جاض جيضة ثم رجع ... ثم أناب الناس بعد فكان أول من أناب أبو ساسان الانصاري وأبوعمرة وشتيرة وكانوا سبعة فلم يكن يعرف حق أمير المؤمنين عليه السلام إلاّ هؤلاء السبعة

[al-Kashshi] Abi Bakr al-Hadhrami said: Abu Ja`far عليه السلام said: the people turned back except three individuals - Salman, Abu Dhar and Miqdad, I said: what about Ammar? He عليه السلام said: he wobbled a bit then he returned [to the truth] … then the people repented after that, so the first ones to return [to the truth] were Abu Sasan al-Ansari, Abu Amra, Shatira, and they became seven, none recognized the right of the commander of the faithful عليه السلام except these seven.

  • 'then the people repented after that, so the first ones ...' This shows that it was not just these seven, rather, these were the foremost of them.

علي بن أبي طالب عليهم السلام قال: خلقت الارض لبسبعة بهم ترزقون وبهم تنصرون وبهم تمطرون منهم سلمان الفارسي والمقداد وأبو ذر وعّمار وحذيفة رحمة اللّه عليهم. وكان علي عليه السلام يقول: وأنا إمامهم وهم الذين صلوا على فاطمة صلوات الله عليها

[al-Ikhtisas] Ali b. Abi Talib عليه السلام said: the earth was created for seven, because of them you are given sustenance, and because of them you are assisted, and because of them is rain made to fall on you, among them are Salman al-Farsi and al-Miqdad and Abu Dhar and Ammar and Hudhayfa - may Allah have mercy on them. Ali عليه السلام used to say: and I am their Imam, and they are the ones who prayed [Salat al-Mayyit] upon Fatima صلوات الله عليها            

 

The Three had a higher status than the Four

حمران قال: قلت لأبي جعفر عليه السلام: ما أقلنا لو اجتمعنا على شاة ما أفنيناها قال: فقال: ألا أخبرك بأعجب من ذلك قال: فقلت: بلى قال: المهاجرون و الأنصار ذهبوا إلا (و أشار بيده) ثلاثة

[al-Kashshi] Humran said: I said to Abi Ja’far عليه السلام - how few we (the Shias) are! if we gather to eat a sheep we will not be able to finish it, he (Humran) said: so he عليه السلام said: should I not inform you of something even more bewildering? he (Humran) said: I said: yes (do so), he said: the Muhajirun and the Ansar all diverted (i.e. went astray) except for - and he gestured with his hand - three.

In al-Kulayni’s variant the narration continues:

قال حمران: فقلت: جعلت فداك ما حال عمار؟ قال: رحم الله عمارا أبا اليقظان بايع وقتل شهيدا، فقلت في نفسي: ما شئ أفضل من الشهادة فنظر إلي فقال: لعلك ترى أنه مثل الثلاثة أيهات أيهات

Humran said: may I be made your ransom - what is the status of Ammar? He said: may Allah have mercy on Ammar Aba al-Yaqdhan, he pledged allegiance and died a martyr, I said in my heart: what thing is better than martyrdom, so he [the Imam] looked at me and said: perhaps you think that he [Ammar] is like the three [in status], how far! how far! [from truth that opinion is]. 

 

Does this mean all others became apostates?

The crux is the meaning of Ridda (ردّة) in these narrations. Whether it is to be understood in a linguistic sense or the technical sense of apostasy. If the latter is taken then it means all the Sahaba became Kafir [out of Islam] for not sticking to Ali.

Irtidad in the linguistic sense refers to ‘turning back from something’. It has been used with this meaning in a number of verses such as:

فَلَمَّا أَن جَاء الْبَشِيرُ أَلْقَاهُ عَلَى وَجْهِهِ فَارْتَدَّ بَصِيرًا قَالَ أَلَمْ أَقُل لَّكُمْ إِنِّي أَعْلَمُ مِنَ اللّهِ مَا لاَ تَعْلَمُونَ

(i) So when the caravan herald [fore-runner] came he threw it on his face so he returned to seeing, he said: did I not say to you that I know from Allah what ye do not (12:96)

قَالَ الَّذِي عِندَهُ عِلْمٌ مِّنَ الْكِتَابِ أَنَا آتِيكَ بِهِ قَبْلَ أَن يَرْتَدَّ إِلَيْكَ طَرْفُكَ

(ii) The one who had knowledge of a part of the Book said: I will bring it to you before your glance returns back to you [i.e. you blink and open your eyes again] (27:40)

مُهْطِعِينَ مُقْنِعِي رُءُوسِهِمْ لاَ يَرْتَدُّ إِلَيْهِمْ طَرْفُهُمْ وَأَفْئِدَتُهُمْ هَوَاء

(iii) Racing ahead, their heads bowed down, their glances not returning back to them [i.e. unblinking] and their hearts void (14:43)

Whenever Irtidad from the Diin - ‘turning back’ from the Diin i.e. apostasy in the technical sense is meant, the Qur`an qualifies it by explicitly mentioning Diin.

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُواْ مَن يَرْتَدَّ مِنكُمْ عَن دِينِهِ فَسَوْفَ يَأْتِي اللّهُ بِقَوْمٍ يُحِبُّهُمْ وَيُحِبُّونَهُ

(i) O you who believe, whoever turns back from his Diin from among you then Allah will bring about a people whom He loves and they love Him (5:54)

وَمَن يَرْتَدِدْ مِنكُمْ عَن دِينِهِ فَيَمُتْ وَهُوَ كَافِرٌ فَأُوْلَئِكَ حَبِطَتْ أَعْمَالُهُمْ فِي الدُّنْيَا وَالآخِرَةِ

(ii) And whoever among you turns back on his Diin and dies whilst being a Kafir then those are they whose deeds have been nullified in the world and the hereafter (2:217)

It is clear that the narrations about the Irtidad of the Sahaba are not qualified by Diin. To understand that meaning from it would require further proof.

 

The Chosen Interpretation

The Irtidad in the narrations should be understood [in light of other narrations] as people turning away, after the messenger of Allah صلى الله عليه وآله, from what they had made incumbent on themselves in his صلى الله عليه وآله lifetime, when they gave the Bay`a to Ali b. Abi Talib as the leader of the believers i.e. Irtidad from Wilaya not apostasy from Islam. 

Instead, they decided to give the Bay`a to someone else because of expediency and other reasons. This was a betrayal of epic proportions that opened up the door of misguidance and innovation in the Diin, however, they had not exited the apparent Islam, nor were all on the same level of liability for this.

This interpretation is aided by the following texts:

أبي جعفر عليه السلام قال: كان الناس أهل ردة بعد النبي صلى الله عليه وآله إلا ثلاثة. فقلت: ومن الثلاثة؟ فقال: المقداد بن الأسود، وأبو ذر الغفاري، وسلمان الفارسي، رحمة الله وبركاته عليهم، ثم عرَف أناسٌ بعدَ يسير. وقال: هؤلاء الذين دارت عليهم الرحا وأبوا أن يبايعوا، حتى جاؤوا بأمير المؤمنين مكرَهاً فبايع، وذلك قوله تعالى: وَمَا مُحَمَّدٌ إِلاَّ رَسُولٌ قَدْ خَلَتْ مِن قَبْلِهِ الرُّسُلُ أَفَإِن مَّاتَ أَوْ قُتِلَ انقَلَبْتُمْ عَلَى أَعْقَابِكُمْ وَمَن يَنقَلِبْ عَلَىَ عَقِبَيْهِ فَلَن يَضُرَّ اللّهَ شَيْئًا وَسَيَجْزِي اللّهُ الشَّاكِرِينَ

(i) [al-Kafi] Abi Ja`far عليه السلام said: the people were the people of Ridda after the prophet صلى الله عليه وآله except three. I said: who are the three? He said: al-Miqdad b. al-Aswad, Abu Dhar al-Ghiffari and Salman al-Farsi, may Allah’s mercy and blessings be upon them, then the people came to know after a while [the truth], these [three] are those around whom the banner revolved and they refused to give Bay`a [to Abu Bakr], until when they brought the commander of the faithful عليه السلام by coercion and he gave the pledge of allegiance, and that is His words the Elevated - “Muhammad is not but a messenger, messengers have come and gone before him, if he dies or is killed, will you turn back on your heels, and whoever turns back on his heels then he will not harm Allah a thing and Allah will recompense those who are grateful” (3:144).

  • The narration indicates that the uniqueness of the three was that they did not give the Bay`a to the usurper because of knowing the true status of Ali, it was only when Ali was forced to give the Bay`a, and he did [for the Masliha which Allah willed], that the three also agreed to do it.
  • The meaning of 'then the people came to know after a while ...' is that some people recognized their fault, and acknowledged that the commander of the faithful was the most rightful person to assume leadership.

That all the others apart from the three were paralyzed by fear is shown in the narration below:

أبي جعفر عليه السلام قال: جاء المهاجرون والأنصار وغيرهم بعد ذلك إلى علي عليه السلام فقالوا له: أنت والله أمير المؤمنين وأنت والله أحق الناس وأولاهم بالنبي عليه السلام هلم يدك نبايعك فوالله لنموتن قدامك! فقال علي عليه السلام: ان كنتم صادقين فاغدوا غدا علي محلقين فحلق علي عليه السلام وحلق سلمان وحلق مقداد وحلق أبو ذر ولم يحلق غيرهم؛ ثم انصرفوا فجاؤوا مرة أخرى بعد ذلك، فقالوا له أنت والله أمير المؤمنين وأنت أحق الناس وأولاهم بالنبي عليه السلام عليه السلام هلم يدك نبايعك فحلفوا فقال: إن كنتم صادقين فاغدوا علي محلقين فما حلق إلا هؤلاء الثلاثة قلت: فما كان فيهم عمار؟ فقال: لا؛ قلت: فعمار من أهل الردة؟ فقال: إنّ عمارا قد قاتل مع علي عليه السلام بعد ذلك

(ii) [al-Kashshi] Abi Ja`far عليه السلام said: the Muhajirun and Ansar and others came after that [the coup at Saqifa] to Ali عليه السلام and said to him: you are by Allah the commander of the faithful, and you are by Allah the most rightful person and closest to the prophet, put forth your hand so that we can pledge allegiance to you, for by Allah we are going to die in front of you [in your defense], Ali said: if you are truthful then come to me tomorrow having shaved your head [which would visually identify the ‘rebels’ to the authorities], so Ali shaved, so did Salman, Miqdad and Abu Dhar, and no one else did, then they came a second time after the first and said: you are by Allah the most rightful person and closest to the prophet, put forth your hand so that we can pledge allegiance to you, and they swore an oath, he said: come to me tomorrow having shaved your head if you are truthful, so no one shaved except three. I said: Ammar was not among them? He said: No, I said: Ammar is from the people of Ridda? He said: Ammar fought together with Ali after that.

  • This reaffirms that the uniqueness of the three is related to them not giving in and remaining with Ali to the end as far as his right is concerned. Note also how Ammar is not included among the Ahl al-Ridda, even in a historical sense, because of his later support for Ali.

In fact, one of the reasons behind Ali accepting to give Bay`a after his show of dissent was so that the masses do not renounce the faith totally. Recall that the Islamic polity was still unstable and there were a lot of Arab tribes whose allegiance had been personally to the prophet and not the Diin per se, the Jahiliyya was not far from their psyche.

أبي جعفر عليه السلام قال: إن الناس لما صنعوا ما صنعوا إذ بايعوا أبا بكر لم يمنع أمير المؤمنين عليه السلام من أن يدعو إلى نفسه إلا نظرا للناس و تخوفا عليهم أن يرتدوا عن الاسلام فيعبدوا الاوثان ولا يشهدوا أن لا إله إلا الله وأن محمدا رسول الله صلى الله عليه وآله وكان الاحب إليه أن يقرهم على ما صنعوا من أن يرتدوا عن جميع الاسلام وإنما هلك الذين ركبوا ما ركبوا فأما من لم يصنع ذلك ودخل فيما دخل فيه الناس على غير علم ولا عداوة لامير المؤمنين عليه السلام فإن ذلك لا يكفره ولا يخرجه من الاسلام ولذلك كتم علي عليه السلام أمره وبايع مكرها حيث لم يجد أعوانا

(iii) [al-Kafi] Abu Ja'farعليه السلام  said: When the people did what they did - when they gave allegiance to Abu Bakr, nothing prevented the commander of the faithful عليه السلام from calling to himself (i.e. gather support to rival them publicly) except his fear for the people - that they would apostate from Islam, and begin worshiping the idols anew, and reject witnessing that there is no God but Allah, and that Muhammad is his messenger; and it was more beloved to him to acquiesce to what they had done rather than them apostatizing from the whole of Islam. Verily, those who clambered upon this (opposing Ali for rulership) have been destroyed. As for the one who did not contribute anything to that (opposing Ali for rulership) and entered into what the people entered into without knowledge (about his status) nor enmity towards him then this act of his does not make him a disbeliever, and it does not remove him from Islam, and this is why Ali kept quiet about his matter (status), and gave allegiance while displeased, when he could not find any supporters.

  • The narration makes it clear that had the Imam fought for his leadership i.e. a civil war it would cause irreparable damage, this is because of the tenuous position that Islam had, even the outward Islam (the Islam of the Shahadatyn) would have been wiped out. There were a lot of external and internal enemies waiting for this infighting to make sure that the whole foundation of Islam crumbles.

 

Conclusion

The Umma became, for the most part, misguided after their prophet. This is something that had also happened to the communities of past prophets. But this misguidance should not be understood to have taken all of them out of Islam as a whole, rather, by ignoring a central commandment of the prophet they have done a great sin which struck a blow to the pristine Islam.

Furthermore, the protagonists differ relative to their role in the fiasco. Some were quite unaware of the whole thing and lacked full knowledge of the Haqq of Ali and his Ma`rifa, this could be because they were blind to the order of the prophet (total ignorance); had some doubts; did not have the ability to influence the outcome because of some constraints [swept away by the wave of events]; or because they showed cowardice and faltered in coming to Ali’s aid. Others later acknowledged their mistake and made up for it in the following years. All these in their different categories can be said to be the majority. Their fate in the next world of “realities” is left to Allah

On the other hand, there were those who administered the whole thing. They had full knowledge of what the prophet had ordered them and what the divine commandment required them to do. They also knew the position of Ali. Despite this, they fought against this explicitly. These are those who should be treated as apparent Muslims in the daily life in this world [according to most scholars]. This is, after all, how Ali himself treated them, praying in their mosques, visiting them in sickness, helping them out when they faced challenges, eating with them etc. part of which is Taqiyya and safeguarding the greater principles of Islam, but they are undoubtedly people of the fire in the next world.

Note that this interpretation is dependent on the position of differentiating between the Dharuriyat of the Diin and that of the Madhhab and considering the Shahdatayn alone to be enough in making someone a Muslim [unless taken out for some other reason]. Whilst this is a popular position among scholars today, it has had its detractors among the scholars of the past, one of them being someone like Shaykh Yusuf al-Bahrani, who considered the rejectors of the Wilaya as Kafirs with the fullest implication this has [even in this world].  

55 Comments


Recommended Comments



  • Veteran Member
Islamic Salvation

Posted (edited)

1 hour ago, E.L King said:

So basically it was kufr which opposes iman and not kufr which opposes Islam? 

One way of putting it is that Iman is Naqis [deficient]. The other is that one is Kafir in Akhera. Both have been used by scholars who adopt this position. We are to treat them as Muslims on the apparent in our dealings with them.  

Other scholars did not see this nuance, someone like Yusuf al-Bahrani says:

إنك قد عرفت أن المخالف كافر لاحظ له في الاسلام بوجه من الوجوه 

You have known that the Mukhalif is a Kafir, he has nothing to do with Islam [he has no portion in Islam], in any way whatsoever.

See his: Shihab al-Thaqib fi Ma`na al-Nasib

This is an extreme position that we reject for many reasons.

Edited by Islamic Salvation
  • Veteran Member
Ayuoobi

Posted

Brother are there any ahaadith specifying the position of Malik ibn al-Nuwayrah? He died (according to my understanding, I may be mistaken) for not only refusing to give the zakaat, but for his loyalty to Imam Ali (as). Is his status like the three, or the seven, or below that?

It seems odd to me that he would not be considered among the elite considering he gave blood; during the very early period where confusion was widespread among the people he had baseerah. 

  • Veteran Member
Ayuoobi

Posted

Also brother what about the womenfolk? Like Um Salamah.

Or the Banu Hashim in general.

  • Advanced Member
haidermpr

Posted

Umme Salma was steadfast on her Imaan. And as such these traditions talk about men folk and not women. Bani Hashim are also not included in these narratives. Read these narratives with special reference to Last Wish/Will of Prophet saww where he asked Hazrat Ali as to fight for his rights of caliphate if ansaar support him.

Ref. Sulaym bin Qais Hilali

guest051217

Posted (edited)

What about the following:

1. Bilal [ra]

2. Jabir ibn Abdillah al Ansari [ra]

3. Ibn Abbas [ra]

We even find in narrations Az Zubayr was one of the ones to stand by Ali a.s, but then later diverge.

4.Ubay ibn K'ab [ra]

5. Abdullah ibn Masu'd [ra] [i know this is a little bit of a khilaf issue]

6. Umar ibn abi salama [ra]

7. What of Abu Dujana [ra] , a man who even when death faced him stood by the Prophet [saw] ?

This is what the Prophet called out: "I am Muhammed and i am the Messenger of Allah, i am not killed, and i have not died" [words of the prophet from Al Kafi Volume 8] [Reliable hadith]

When the Prophet looked to Abu Dujanah [who was among the few who stayed with the Prophet he said: "O Abu Dujanah,you can also go; you have my permission to suspend your pledge of allegiance" [words of the prophet from Al Kafi Volume 8] [Reliable hadith same as above]

Now, have a look at the faith and Eman of Abu Dujanah [Radiyallahu Anhu! These words might make you shed a tear, and if not, evoke some reaction in your heart:]

"He[Abu Dujanah] turned around and sat before the Holy Prophet [saw] wept, and said: "No by Allah!", he raised his head to the sky and said: "No by Allah, i will not suspend my pledge of allegiance with you. I have pledged allegiance with you, then to whom can i return? Must i return to my wife who will die or the children who will also die or to the house that will be destroyed, or the asset that will vanish and the time of death that is approaching?' He kept fighting until his wounds made him to feel heavy when he and Ali were shielding him [The Holy Prophet.] [ from Al Kafi Volume 8] [Reliable hadith same as above]

 

If i understood this correctly, seven are the foremost, three are above the later four, but there are many others too?

Could it be possible that many feared not giving Bayah? After all, violence was used against those who rejected Abu Bakr. Perhaps some were bewildered and did not know what to do and gave Bayah out of taqqiyah but in their hearts wished they could give it to Ali a.s but know it was just not practical ?

Edited by QuranandAhlulbayt
  • Veteran Member
Islamic Salvation

Posted

9 hours ago, QuranandAhlulbayt said:

What about the following:

Jabir ibn Abdillah al Ansari [ra]

 

[1/135] الكافي: علي بن إبراهيم، عن أبيه، عن ابن أبي نجران، عن عاصم بن حميد، عن محمد بن مسلم، عن أبي جعفر عليه السلام قال: حدثني جابر عن رسول الله صلى الله عليه وآله ولم يكذب جابر ...
 
[1/135] al-Kafi: Ali b. Ibrahim from his father from Ibn Abi Najran from A`sim b. Humayd from Muhammad b. Muslim from Abi Ja`far عليه السلام who said: Jabir [b. Abdallah] narrated to me from the messenger of Allah صلى الله عليه وآله - and Jabir did not lie - …

https://sites.google.com/site/mujamalahadith/vol1/book-of-narrators/jabir-b-abdallah-al-ansari-and-jabir-b-yazid-al-jufi

These are some of the narrations about Jabir in our books.

https://sites.google.com/site/rijalalkashi/vol1/jabir-b-abdallah-al-ansari

I will post more about the others as their entries come up in Mu`jam or al-Kashshi.

9 hours ago, QuranandAhlulbayt said:

If i understood this correctly, seven are the foremost, three are above the later four, but there are many others too?

Correct.

9 hours ago, QuranandAhlulbayt said:

Could it be possible that many feared not giving Bayah? After all, violence was used against those who rejected Abu Bakr. Perhaps some were bewildered and did not know what to do and gave Bayah out of taqqiyah but in their hearts wished they could give it to Ali a.s but know it was just not practical ?

Furthermore, the protagonists differ relative to their role in the fiasco. Some were quite unaware of the whole thing and lacked full knowledge of the Haqq of Ali and his Ma`rifa, this could be because they were blind to the order of the prophet (total ignorance); had some doubts; did not have the ability to influence the outcome because of some constraints [swept away by the wave of events]; or because they showed cowardice and faltered in coming to Ali’s aid. Others later acknowledged their mistake and made up for it in the following years. All these in their different categories can be said to be the majority. Their fate in the next world of “realities” is left to Allah.

  • Veteran Member
Islamic Salvation

Posted

On 4/19/2017 at 0:38 AM, QuranandAhlulbayt said:

5. Abdullah ibn Masu'd [ra] [i know this is a little bit of a khilaf issue]

Indeed.

[78] و سئل عن ابن مسعود و حذيفة فقال: لم يكن حذيفة مثل ابن مسعود لأن حذيفة كان ركنا و ابن مسعود خلط و والى القوم و مال معهم و قال بهم
 
[78] And he [Ibn Fadhal] was asked about Ibn Mas`ud and Hudhayfa - so he said: Hudhayfa was not like [of the same status as] Ibn Mas`ud because Hudhayfa was a pillar [of support to Ali and rejecting the Khulafa] while Ibn Mas`ud became confused and accepted the group’s authority and inclined with them and professed them [as superior].  
 
On 4/19/2017 at 0:38 AM, QuranandAhlulbayt said:

If i understood this correctly, seven are the foremost, three are above the later four, but there are many others too?

 
و قال أيضا: إن من السابقين الذين رجعوا إلى أمير المؤمنين عليه السلام: أبو الهيثم بن التيهان و أبو أيوب و خزيمة بن ثابت و جابر بن عبد الله و زيد بن أرقم و أبو سعيد الخدري و سهل بن حنيف و البراء بن مالك و عثمان بن حنيف و عبادة بن الصامت ثم ممن دونهم قيس بن سعد بن عبادة و عدي بن حاتم و عمرو بن الحمق و عمران بن الحصين و بريدة الأسلمي و بشر كثير
 
He [al-Fadhl] also said: from among the fore-runners who returned back to the commander of the faithful عليه السلام were: Abu al-Haytham b. Tahiyyan, Abu Ayyub (al-Ansari), Khuzayma b. Thabit, Jabir b. Abdallah, Zayd b. Arqam, Abu Said al-Khudri, Sahl b. Hunayf, al-Bara` b. Malik, Uthman b. Hunayf and Ubada b. al-Samit - then those who were lesser than them - Qays b. Sa'd b. Ubada, Adi b. Hatim, Amr b. al-Hamiq, Imran b. al-Hussayn, Burayda al-Aslami and a large number of men besides.
 
  • Veteran Member
Islamic Salvation

Posted

12 hours ago, Shaykh Patience101 said:

@Islamic Salvation

Hate to keep pestering you brother, but what about Abu Ayyub al-Ansari? If I recall correctly, he initially refused to give bayah to Abu Bakr, but there is the issue of him fighting under a Muslim army commanded by Yazid at Constantinople.

I noticed the section under his name on https://sites.google.com/site/rijalalkashi/vol1/abu-ayyub-al-ansari is empty.

This is how al-Fadhl explains the point you raise. 

[77] و سئل الفضل بن شاذان عن أبي أيوب خالد بن زيد الأنصاري و قتاله مع معاوية المشركين فقال: كان ذلك منه قلة فقه و غفلة، ظن أنه أنما يعمل عملا لنفسه يقوى به الإسلام و يوهي به الشرك و ليس عليه من معاوية شي‏ء كان معه أو لم يكن
 
[77] al-Fadhl b. Shadhan was asked about Abi Ayyub Khalid b. Zayd al-Ansari and his fighting together with Mua`wiya against the polytheists - he said: that was a lapse of understanding from him and an oversight, he thought that he was performing an act for its own sake, by which he would strengthen Islam and efface polytheism, and that he would suffer no consequences by way of Mua`wiya - whether he was there [present with him] or not [since it had nothing to do with him].
 
  • Advanced Member
YAli

Posted

On 19/04/2017 at 7:54 PM, Shaykh Patience101 said:

@Islamic Salvation

Hate to keep pestering you brother, but what about Abu Ayyub al-Ansari? If I recall correctly, he initially refused to give bayah to Abu Bakr, but there is the issue of him fighting under a Muslim army commanded by Yazid at Constantinople.

I noticed the section under his name on https://sites.google.com/site/rijalalkashi/vol1/abu-ayyub-al-ansari is empty.

Salam brother, that's interesting, do we have sources that narrate he refused to give bayah to Abu Bakr. Thanks 

  • Advanced Member
wmehar2

Posted

On 4/19/2017 at 3:44 AM, Islamic Salvation said:
 
[79] Abu Abdallah Muhammad b. Ibrahim said: narrated to me Ali b. Muhammad b. Yazid al-Qummi saying: narrated to me Abdallah b. Muhammad b. Isa from Ibn Abi Umayr from Hisham b. Salim from Abi Abdillah عليه السلام who said: Bilal was a righteous slave while Suhayb was an evil slave - crying over Umar (i.e. after the latter was assassinated).
 
 

ختص: كان بلال مؤذن رسول الله صلى الله عليه وآله، فلما قبض رسول الله صلى الله عليه وآله لزم بيته ولم يؤذن لاحد من الخلفاء وقال فيه أبوعبدالله جعفر بن محمد عليه السلام: رحم الله بلالا فإنه كان يحبنا أهل البيت، ولعن الله صهيبا فإنه كان يعادينا

al-Ikhtisas: Bilal was the Mua`dhin of the messenger of Allah صلى الله عليه وآله, so when the messenger of Allah صلى الله عليه وآله died, he [Bilal] remained in his house, and he did not give the Adhan for any one of the Khulafa, Abu Abdillah Ja`far b. Muhammad عليه السلام said about him: may Allah have mercy on Bilal, for he used to love us the Ahl al-Bayt, may Allah curse Suhayb for he used to have enmity with us.

يه: عن أبي بصير عن أحدهما عليهما السلام أنه قال : إن بلالا كان عبدا صالحا، فقال: لا اؤذن لاحد بعد رسول الله صلى الله عليه وآله، فترك يومئذ حي على خير العمل

al-Faqih: From Abi Basir from one of them عليهما السلام that he said: Bilal was a righteous slave, he said: I will not give the Adhan for anyone after the messenger of Allah صلى الله عليه وآله so 'Hayya ala Khayril Amal' was abandoned from that day.

يب: محمد بن علي بن محبوب، عن معاوية بن حكيم، عن سليمان بن جعفر، عن أبيه قال : دخل رجل من أهل الشام على أبي عبدالله عليه السلام فقال له: إن أول من سبق إلى الجنة بلال، قال: ولم؟ قال : لانه أول من أذن

Tahdhib al-Ahkam: Muhammad b. Ali b. Mahbub from Mu`awiya b. Hukaym from Sulayman b. Ja`far from his father who said: a man from the people of Sham entered to meet Abi Abdillah عليه السلام so he said to him: the first one to proceed to Janna will be Bilal, he said: why is that? he said: because he was the first to give the Adhan.

NOTE: al-Majlisi says that it could be the Imam who says this about Bilal, as is more likely, but there is an option that it is the Shami who said this, and the Imam responded - 'why do you say that?' [as a form of objecting to it] and the Shami answered, and the Imam remained silent because of Taqiyya. 

Also, Bilal being the first to proceed to Janna is not absolute, but could be relative to other Mu`adhins, or his class of the Sahaba who are not Ahl al-Bayt.

Salaam,

Here's a bit of other side perspective:

Sahih Bukhari Hadith Vol.2, Hadith. 375,
Narrated by Abdullah bin Ubaidullah bin Abi Mulaika
One of the daughters of 'Uthman died at Mecca. We went to attend her funeral
procession. Ibn 'Umar and Ibn Abbas were also present. I sat in between them (or
said, I sat beside one of them. Then a man came and sat beside me.) 'Abdullah
bin 'Umar said to 'Amr bin 'Uthman, "Will you not prohibit crying as Allah's
Apostle has said, 'The dead person is tortured by the crying of his relatives?"
Ibn Abbas said, "Umar used to say so." Then he added narrating, "I accompanied
Umar on a journey from Mecca till we reached Al-Baida. There he saw some
travelers in the shade of a Samura (A kind of forest tree). He said (to me), 'Go
and see who those travelers are.' So I went and saw that one of them was Suhaib.
I told this to 'Umar who then asked me to call him. So I went back to Suhaib and
said to him, 'Depart and follow the chief of the faithful believers.' Later,
when 'Umar was stabbed, Suhaib came in weeping and saying, 'O my brother, O my
friend!' (on this 'Umar said to him, 'O Suhaib! Are you weeping for me while the
Prophet said, "The dead person is punished by some of the weeping of his
relatives?" ' Ibn Abbas added, "When 'Umar died I told all this to 'Aisha and
she said, 'May Allah be merciful to Umar. By Allah, Allah's Apostle did not say
that a believer is punished by the weeping of his relatives. But he said, Allah
increases the punishment of a non-believer because of the weeping of his
relatives." 'Aisha further added, "The Quran is sufficient for you (to clear up
this point) as Allah has stated: 'No burdened soul will bear another's burden.'
" (35.18). Ibn Abbas then said, "Only Allah makes one laugh or cry." Ibn Umar
did not say anything after that.

  • Advanced Member
wmehar2

Posted (edited)

On 4/19/2017 at 3:44 AM, Islamic Salvation said:

[79] Abu Abdallah Muhammad b. Ibrahim said: narrated to me Ali b. Muhammad b. Yazid al-Qummi saying: narrated to me Abdallah b. Muhammad b. Isa from Ibn Abi Umayr from Hisham b. Salim from Abi Abdillah عليه السلام who said: Bilal was a righteous slave while Suhayb was an evil slave - crying over Umar (i.e. after the latter was assassinated).

Is this reference to Suhayb bin Sinan/ aka Suhayb Ar Rumi RA?  Or a different Suhayb?

I'd be surprised, considering Suhayb Ar Rumi/bin Sinan was close companions of Bilal ibn Rabah RA and Salman e Farsi RA.  As non-Arab Sahaba, they frequently spent much of their time together.

Also, from tafsir, a Quran verse was reveled upon Suhayb's arrival to Medina after being held back by the Qu'raish... he had to give up all of his wealth that he acquired after arriving as a runaway slave of the Byzantine Empire to escape Mecca to Medina after the Hijrah.

"Thereupon, the glorious verse was revealed: ‘And of mankind is he who sell himself, seeking the pleasure of Allah And Allah is full of kindness to (His) slaves’ (Quran 2:201). "

In fact, he's also fought in every battle alongside the Prophet SAW, and never ran from any nor left his side.

Also, Suhayb lived out the rest of his life till old age, spreading for Da'wah until he died (In response to the OP's post). 

These were taken from WikiShia:

He and Imam Ali were the last of Immigrants who joined the Prophet (s) in the first half of Rabi' I.

Some have related the revelation of verse 207 of the sura al-Baqara to him. However, it is famous that it has been revealed about the role of Imam Ali  at Laylat al-Mabit.

Suhayb participated in the battles of Badr, Uhud, Khandaq and other battles of the Prophet (s). About him, the noble Prophet (s) said, "the leaders are four people; I am the leader of Arabs, Suhayb is the leader of Romans, Salman is the leader of Persians and Bilal is the leader of Habesha."

Edited by wmehar2
  • Advanced Member
wmehar2

Posted

1 hour ago, wmehar2 said:

Also, Suhayb lived out the rest of his life till old age, spreading for Da'wah until he died (In response to the OP's post). 

To Elaborate further,

Suhayb spent any and all his wealth to the poor and community, even after the Prophet SAW died, and continued to spend his stipends for the needy and did not partake in corrupt Ummayyad wealth schemes.

This reeks of guilt by association, in a false accusation of a legitimate believing Sahaba  of being evil, all because he was cried over Umar's death and lead prayers after his death temporarily.  That's unfortunately not an academic/scholarly line of thought at all, and most importantly  it's not an Islamic line of logic.

Suhayb in his character was a Greek-Speaking Arab who was kidnapped from a wealthy family and brought up as a slave in Byzantine society, unlike Salman he had no knowledge of the Bible,, Hebrew and other Aristocratic attributes... instead Suhyab only learned directly from the Prophet's SAW Sermons.  His Arabic was harsh/heavy and himself had a difficult time re-learning it.

Contextually, Suhayb was a close companion but never could be in an inner circle of influence that was Umar, Uthman, and the rest of the "higher social ranked" Sahaba.  Instead he chose to act simply and directly in what he perceived was the direct way to please Allah SWT, e.g.(Hadith where he gave food after being questioned by 'Umar why he starved himself, that the Prophet SAW told him the best of people were those who gave food and charity). 

He was innocent to a fault, and perhaps ignorant.  Assuming Shia rhetoric of 'Umar and Abu Bakr is true of their plot to Usurp the Khilafah,  Suhayb was ignorantly in no place to understand with his lacking Arabic speech and distance from that social status (since he was a slave and not Quraish), the ramifications that 'Umar could have been an evil man and he was crying over an evil guy.

He seemed to be a goof ball as well, and is cited for making the Prophet SAW laugh on many occasions, and would never do it at any one else's expense.

Shame on the people who ascribe lies and false sayings to the Imams, AS on them all.

I've read deeply into the sources in al Kafi, and Yasser Habibs hate rhetoric and I find not a single ounce of legitimate nor logical premises of which to condemn/accuse Suhayb by direct actions, words, or speech.

Nearly all sources, even Shia indicate Suhayb as a righteous companion and follower of the Prophet SAW.

  • Veteran Member
Islamic Salvation

Posted (edited)

Sometimes the question is asked - who is greater Salman, Miqdad or Abu Dhar?

The narration below goes some way in attempting to answer, though it is not free of some weakness in the chain. It should also be noted that it is limited to how they reacted in response to the order of Ali in the face of the usurping of his right and does not speak of their overall merit.

Furthermore, they did not in fact sin in the conventional sense of the word, what two of them did might be called lapses which arose because of the righteous anger against the injustice done to Ali.

Despite this, what was required in the face of this unimaginable betrayal was to submit totally to the unknown wisdom behind divine providence.

[24] علي بن الحكم، عن سيف بن عميرة عن أبي بكر الحضرمي قال: قال أبو جعفر عليه السلام: ارتد الناس إلا ثلاثة نفر سلمان و أبو ذر و المقداد قال: قلت: فعمار؟ قال: قد كان جاض جيضة ثم رجع، ثم قال: إن أردت الذي لم يشك و لم يدخله شي‏ء فالمقداد، فأما سلمان فإنه عرض في قلبه عارض أن عند أمير المؤمنين عليه السلام اسم الله الأعظم لو تكلم به لأخذتهم الأرض و هو هكذا فلبب و وجئت عنقه حتى تركت كالسلقة فمر به أمير المؤمنين عليه السلام فقال له: يا أبا عبد الله هذا من ذاك بايع فبايع و أما أبو ذر فأمره أمير المؤمنين عليه السلام بالسكوت و لم يكن يأخذه في الله لومة لائم فأبى إلا أن يتكلم فمر به عثمان فأمر به، ثم أناب الناس بعد فكان أول من أناب أبو ساسان الأنصاري و أبو عمرة و شتيرة و كانوا سبعة، فلم يكن يعرف حق أمير المؤمنين عليه السلام إلا هؤلاء السبعة

[24] Ali b. al-Hakam from Sayf b. Umayra from Abi Bakr al-Hadhrami who said: Abu Ja`far عليه السلام said: the people turned back except three individuals - Salman, Abu Dhar and Miqdad, I said: what about Ammar? He عليه السلام said: he wobbled a bit then he returned [to the truth], if you want the one who did not waver and nothing of doubt entered him then it was al-Miqdad, as for Salman then it came to his heart a thought that the commander of the faithful عليه السلام knew the greatest name of God which if he were to intone - the earth would swallow them up, and it is indeed so [it is true], because of this he was pulled by the scruff of his neck and it was stricken until it left a swollen lump [cyst], the commander of the faithful عليه السلام passed by him and said: O Aba Abdillah this [i.e. suffering] is because of that [the thought you had] - so give the pledge of allegiance, as for Abu Dhar then the commander of the faithful عليه السلام had ordered him to remain silent, but he was not one to be affected by the blame of the blamer in regards his duty to Allah, he did not desist until he talked, so Uthman b. Affan passed by him and ordered that he be disposed of [and he was banished], then the people repented after that, so the first ones to return [to the truth] were Abu Sasan al-Ansari, Abu Amra, Shatira, and they became seven, none recognized the right of the commander of the faithful عليه السلام except these seven. 

NOTES:

al-Miqdad obeyed the order of accepting Ali's decision to give the Bay`a unquestioningly, Salman harboured the thought that Ali should use the Greatest Name of God to overpower his enemies once and for all [without being patient about the divine decree], while Abu Dhar was too scrupulous about the truth to remain quiet and had to publicly condemn the usurpers.

Edited by Islamic Salvation
Sumerian

Posted (edited)

Quote

 [al-Kafi] Abu Ja'farعليه السلام  said: When the people did what they did - when they gave allegiance to Abu Bakr, nothing prevented the commander of the faithful عليه السلام from calling to himself (i.e. gather support to rival them publicly) except his fear for the people - that they would apostate from Islam, and begin worshiping the idols anew, and reject witnessing that there is no God but Allah, and that Muhammad is his messenger; and it was more beloved to him to acquiesce to what they had done rather than them apostatizing from the whole of Islam. Verily, those who clambered upon this (opposing Ali for rulership) have been destroyed. As for the one who did not contribute anything to that (opposing Ali for rulership) and entered into what the people entered into without knowledge (about his status) nor enmity towards him then this act of his does not make him a disbeliever, and it does not remove him from Islam, and this is why Ali kept quiet about his matter (status), and gave allegiance while displeased, when he could not find any supporters.

Al-Salamu Alaykum brother @Islamic Salvation. I have a question, this explains why Imam Ali (AS) chose not to rise, but how does that fit in with Imam Al-Husayn's (AS) revolution against Yazid Al-Khabeeth (LA)? Does this mean the people were already murtadeen when Yazid (LA) became the [false] Khalifa?

Edited by E.L King
  • Moderators
Abu Nur

Posted (edited)

I just recently observed the enemy of Ahlulbait (as) quoted one of these hadiths and made people think that Shias believe that most of the sahaba became kafir. Of course these kind of people never read the rest of the hadiths nor they try to understand the full meaning of the hadith, rather they just want to show that in the Shi'a authentic hadiths we find these kind of beliefs to make us look like kafirs.

Edited by Dhulfikar
  • Veteran Member
baqar

Posted

On 30/04/2017 at 4:46 AM, Islamic Salvation said:

al-Miqdad obeyed the order of accepting Ali's decision to give the Bay`a unquestioningly, Salman harboured the thought that Ali should use the Greatest Name of God to overpower his enemies once and for all [without being patient about the divine decree], while Abu Dhar was too scrupulous about the truth to remain quiet and had to publicly condemn the usurpers.

Brother, what is the source of this hadith?

I doubt the negative connotations for Salman because Salman is the ONLY companion about whom the Prophet said that he is from my Ahlul Bayt. 

As for what the hadith says about Abu Zar Ghaffari, I do not see anything negative in it.   

  • Veteran Member
Panzerwaffe

Posted

On 4/18/2017 at 4:38 PM, guest051217 said:

What about the following:

1. Bilal [ra]

2. Jabir ibn Abdillah al Ansari [ra]

3. Ibn Abbas [ra]

We even find in narrations Az Zubayr was one of the ones to stand by Ali a.s, but then later diverge.

4.Ubay ibn K'ab [ra]

5. Abdullah ibn Masu'd [ra] [i know this is a little bit of a khilaf issue]

6. Umar ibn abi salama [ra]

7. What of Abu Dujana [ra] , a man who even when death faced him stood by the Prophet [saw] ?

This is what the Prophet called out: "I am Muhammed and i am the Messenger of Allah, i am not killed, and i have not died" [words of the prophet from Al Kafi Volume 8] [Reliable hadith]

When the Prophet looked to Abu Dujanah [who was among the few who stayed with the Prophet he said: "O Abu Dujanah,you can also go; you have my permission to suspend your pledge of allegiance" [words of the prophet from Al Kafi Volume 8] [Reliable hadith same as above]

Now, have a look at the faith and Eman of Abu Dujanah [Radiyallahu Anhu! These words might make you shed a tear, and if not, evoke some reaction in your heart:]

"He[Abu Dujanah] turned around and sat before the Holy Prophet [saw] wept, and said: "No by Allah!", he raised his head to the sky and said: "No by Allah, i will not suspend my pledge of allegiance with you. I have pledged allegiance with you, then to whom can i return? Must i return to my wife who will die or the children who will also die or to the house that will be destroyed, or the asset that will vanish and the time of death that is approaching?' He kept fighting until his wounds made him to feel heavy when he and Ali were shielding him [The Holy Prophet.] [ from Al Kafi Volume 8] [Reliable hadith same as above]

 

If i understood this correctly, seven are the foremost, three are above the later four, but there are many others too?

Could it be possible that many feared not giving Bayah? After all, violence was used against those who rejected Abu Bakr. Perhaps some were bewildered and did not know what to do and gave Bayah out of taqqiyah but in their hearts wished they could give it to Ali a.s but know it was just not practical ?

Umar b abi salma is mentioned fondly in nah jul balagah and kitab sulaym b qays he attened jamal and later goverened Bahrain for Ali

  • Veteran Member
Panzerwaffe

Posted

On 4/20/2017 at 2:33 AM, Islamic Salvation said:

This is how al-Fadhl explains the point you raise. 

[77] و سئل الفضل بن شاذان عن أبي أيوب خالد بن زيد الأنصاري و قتاله مع معاوية المشركين فقال: كان ذلك منه قلة فقه و غفلة، ظن أنه أنما يعمل عملا لنفسه يقوى به الإسلام و يوهي به الشرك و ليس عليه من معاوية شي‏ء كان معه أو لم يكن
 
[77] al-Fadhl b. Shadhan was asked about Abi Ayyub Khalid b. Zayd al-Ansari and his fighting together with Mua`wiya against the polytheists - he said: that was a lapse of understanding from him and an oversight, he thought that he was performing an act for its own sake, by which he would strengthen Islam and efface polytheism, and that he would suffer no consequences by way of Mua`wiya - whether he was there [present with him] or not [since it had nothing to do with him].
 

Also abu ayyub was governer of medina and general at nahrawan for Ali when he was able to convince a lot of khawarij to return back to Ali

He also was a vocal critic of uthman as well

If abu ayyub was traitor to Alid cause he would have collaborated with bishr b abi artat when he raided medina but abu ayyub left and joined Ali in kufa

  • Veteran Member
Islamic Salvation

Posted

On 4/19/2017 at 0:38 AM, guest051217 said:

What of Abu Dujana [ra] , a man who even when death faced him stood by the Prophet [saw] ?

[1/-] Ilal al-Sharai: Ahmad b. Ziyad b. Ja`far al-Hamdani from Ali b. Ibrahim b. Hashim from his father from Ahmad b. Muhammad b. Abi Nasr al-Bazanti and Muhammad b. Abi Umayr from Aban b. Uthman from Abi Abdillah عليه السلام who said:

All the companions of the messenger of Allah ran away on the day of Uhud - no one was left among them except Ali b. Abi Talib عليه السلام and Abu Dujana Simak b. Kharasha. The prophet صلى الله عليه وآله said to him: O Aba Dujana - don’t you see your people? he said: I do, he said: join up with them, he said: this is not what I gave my pledge of allegiance to Allah and His messenger for! he said: you are released [from your pledge], he said: by Allah the Quraysh will never get the opportunity to say that I abandoned you and ran away until I taste what you taste! Then the prophet صلى الله عليه وآله prayed for a good recompense for him.

Whenever a group used to attack the messenger of Allah - Ali عليه السلام would face them and repel them until he had killed a large number of them and injured others. He continued this way until his sword broke so he came to the prophet صلى الله عليه وآله and said: O messenger of Allah – a man can only fight with his weapon but my sword has broken! So he (the prophet) gave him his sword Dhu al-Fiqar and he (Ali) kept on defending the prophet using it until marks [wound traces] were inflicted on him and he became unrecognizable [because of a multitude of injuries]. Jibril descended and said: O Muhammad this is an incomparable support from Ali to you! so the prophet said: he is from me and I am from him, Jibril said: and I am from you both, and they heard a voice from heaven saying: there is no sword but Dhu al-Fiqar and the there is no young champion except Ali.

https://sites.google.com/site/mujamalahadith/vol1/book-of-narrators/simak-b-kharasha

Don'tMakeAس

Posted

14 minutes ago, Islamic Salvation said:

there is no sword but Dhu al-Fiqar and the there is no young champion except Ali

I have always heard it said that this phrase is not from our saheeh ahadith. Perhaps I've been incorrectly informed.


Join the conversation

You are posting as a guest. If you have an account, sign in now to post with your account.
Note: Your post will require moderator approval before it will be visible.

Guest
Add a comment...

×   Pasted as rich text.   Paste as plain text instead

  Only 75 emoji are allowed.

×   Your link has been automatically embedded.   Display as a link instead

×   Your previous content has been restored.   Clear editor

×   You cannot paste images directly. Upload or insert images from URL.

  • Latest Blog Entries

         0 comments
      https://youtube.com/shorts/-nD2xbrbvl4?si=sOv3sq_lMe4dfIXK
       
      "The Myth of the Unicorn"
      Co-written with Solmaz Rezayi.
       
      In a corner of the boundless sky, a lightless star beckons you to take a step forward and make a difference for the planet and its inhabitants, to wipe away the ugliness from the earth and sprinkle beauty upon it.
      For countless years, through the ages and beyond, the lightless stars have patiently awaited the moment when humanity will finally embrace a path of pure goodness. In that moment, when all the stars shine brightly, and the heavens are aglow, our hearts and minds will finally grasp the profound truths that have long eluded us.
      Would you be so kind as to lend a helping hand and flip the switch on these lights?
       
         0 comments
      The Developmental Cost of Fragmentation: How the Post-Ottoman Settlement Deprived the Arab World of Its Industrial Core
      The post-Ottoman settlement of the Middle East produced a structural distortion whose consequences are still compounding a century later: it separated the Arab world's largest population centre from its most significant resource base, preventing the emergence of indigenous Arab industrial and technological capacity.
      This was not accidental. When Muhammad Ali's Egypt attempted to extend control over the Arabian peninsula in the 1810s–1830s, European powers intervened to roll it back. The post-First World War order institutionalised this logic, establishing small, dependent sheikhdoms over the Gulf's energy reserves while leaving Egypt — then, as now, the Arab world's demographic and cultural centre of gravity — without the resource base to develop at scale. British imperial interests were better served by client micro-states controlling energy chokepoints than by a regional power capable of independent action.
      The consequences are visible in a paradox that defines the contemporary Arab world. The Gulf states, controlling vast hydrocarbon wealth, lack the population to staff their own economies. They import millions of workers — engineers, doctors, educators, project managers — from South and Southeast Asia and from poorer Arab states, including Egypt itself. Meanwhile, Egypt's 100 million people, many inadequately educated and underemployed, export their labour on terms set by host states that offer no permanent residency, limited rights, and minimal knowledge transfer. The value generated accrues to Gulf sovereign wealth funds; what returns to Egypt comes freighted with political obligation. The 2024 Ras El-Hekma deal — in which Egypt transferred 170 million square metres of Mediterranean coastline to Abu Dhabi's ADQ in exchange for debt relief — exemplifies the dynamic: sovereign territory exchanged for short-term fiscal survival.
      Iran provides the most instructive counterfactual. With a population comparable to Egypt's and significant hydrocarbon resources, Iran was forced by decades of sanctions into developing indigenous industrial capacity — steel production, petrochemical management, pharmaceutical manufacturing, and a defence industry that, whatever one's view of the regime, has demonstrably sustained operations against a US–Israeli military campaign for nearly two months. No Arab state possesses comparable self-sufficiency. The Gulf states, for all their wealth, cannot defend their own airports, as the 2026 conflict has brutally demonstrated. Iran's capacity was built under conditions of extreme adversity. The question this raises is uncomfortable: what might a state with Egypt's demographic scale and the Gulf's resource base have achieved under a developmental nationalist programme of the kind Nasser pursued — but with adequate capital behind it?
      The answer points toward the deepest cost of fragmentation: not merely Egyptian impoverishment, but the absence of an Arab developmental core. The Gulf states are now spending billions on workforce nationalisation programmes — Saudisation, Emiratisation — to train citizen populations into roles that expatriates have filled for decades. They are attempting, expensively and artificially, to solve a problem that would not exist had demographic mass and resource base not been deliberately separated. The current arrangement serves a handful of ruling dynasties and their external patrons. It has not served the Arab world's 400 million people, who remain collectively without the indigenous industrial, technological, and military capacity that their resources and population could readily have sustained.
         0 comments
      What Held Iran Together? The Answer Western Strategists Don't Want to Hear
      When the US and Israel killed Iran's Supreme Leader and top military brass in a single night, the playbook said the regime should crumble. It didn't. The reason challenges a deep Western assumption about religion and war.
      A familiar playbook
      When the United States and Israel launched their attack on 28 February 2026, the strategic logic was well-worn: decapitate the leadership, destroy key military assets, and watch a hierarchical adversary lose coherence. Within hours, Supreme Leader Khamenei was dead, along with the defence minister, the IRGC commander, and dozens of senior officials. By any precedent from recent Middle Eastern conflicts, Iran should have fractured.
      It did not.
      Instead, thirty-one provincial Revolutionary Guard commands activated pre-delegated authority and sustained retaliatory operations across nine countries for nearly six weeks, culminating in an April ceasefire negotiated from a position of bruised but recognisable strength.
      Doctrine isn't enough
      The standard explanation centres on Iran's "mosaic defence" — a doctrine formally adopted around 2005 that restructured the Revolutionary Guards into semi-autonomous regional commands, designed to survive precisely the kind of decapitation strikes that destroyed Ba'athist Iraq in 2003 and Gaddafi's Libya in 2011.
      But doctrine alone does not explain why the system held. Organisational charts can prescribe decentralised authority; they cannot guarantee that dispersed commanders, operating under degraded communications and immense pressure, will continue pursuing coherent objectives rather than freelancing, surrendering, or simply going home.
      The operating system beneath the org chart
      What provided that guarantee was something Western strategic thinking habitually underestimates: a shared revolutionary theology that functions as an operating system for distributed decision-making.
      The IRGC is not merely a military organisation; it is an ideological one. Every officer is trained in the doctrine of velayat-e faqih — the guardianship of the Islamic jurist — which locates ultimate authority not in any individual leader but in a divinely mandated system of governance. When Khamenei died, the system's theological logic did not die with him. Mid-ranking commanders could act autonomously because they shared an internalised understanding of the revolution's purpose that required no phone call from Tehran to activate.
      Why Iraq and Libya shattered — and Iran didn't
      The contrast with the region's recent history is striking. Saddam Hussein's Iraq operated through concentric circles of personal loyalty — family, clan, Ba'ath Party, Republican Guard — each bound by patronage rather than conviction. Remove Saddam, and the entire structure lost its organising principle within weeks. Gaddafi's Libya was even more personalised: a deliberate strategy of institutional weakness designed to prevent rivals accumulating power, which meant that when NATO struck the centre, nothing held the periphery together.
      Iran's system inverts this logic. Its combination of ideological training, the Basij militia's integration into provincial commands, and a culture of sacrifice rooted in the Shia narratives of Karbala creates an organisation where shared belief substitutes for direct supervision.
      The uncomfortable lesson
      This is not to romanticise the outcome. Autonomous units struck Turkey and Oman apparently without authorisation — the predictable cost of trading control for resilience. But the broader lesson is uncomfortable for those who assume religious conviction is merely an obstacle to modern military effectiveness. In Iran's case, it was the precondition for a form of organisational resilience that four decades of secular authoritarian rule elsewhere in the Middle East never achieved.
      Six weeks of war may have revealed less about the limits of airpower than about the limits of assuming all hierarchies shatter the same way when their apex is removed.
       
         4 comments
      Introduction
      I asked the reasoning version of ChatGPT the following two questions (in the quotation box).
      The answer to the latter question is presented below.
      This issue is one of many that contrasts the social and economic implications of Islamic injunctions vs. those of other religions. In summary, the Islamic notion of dogs as religiously impure focuses Muslims' attention towards other humans for social and emotional support. I believe that is superior to a society that redirects such attention to animals. 
      @Northwest

      TLDR
      The proposition that an Islamic-oriented society—with religious reservations about dog ownership—places a greater emphasis on human-human relationships than dog-friendly societies finds support in cross-cultural consumer research and Islamic marketing scholarship. The religious designation of dogs as impure curtails intensive anthropomorphic tendencies, leading consumers in Islamic contexts to channel social and emotional resources primarily toward family, friends, and community members. Consequently, marketing strategies and consumer behaviors in these contexts underscore interpersonal bonds, charitable obligations, and group cohesion rather than pet-centric consumption.
      By contrast, in societies that celebrate and encourage dog ownership, anthropomorphism significantly shapes consumer behavior, often shifting a portion of emotional and financial resources to human-dog relationships. These differences highlight how deeply cultural and religious frameworks influence the scope and nature of anthropomorphism, delineating the ways consumers allocate their relational capital between human and non-human companions.
       

      1. Anthropomorphism and Relationship Substitution
      Pet Humanization in Secular or Dog-Friendly Societies
      In many societies that promote dog ownership, there is a pronounced tendency to anthropomorphize pets—assigning them human-like traits and emotions (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007; Journal of Consumer Research). Pet ownership often translates into emotional bonds that parallel, or sometimes even substitute for, human-human connections. For example, Belk (2013; Journal of Consumer Research) discusses how dogs are seen as “extensions of the self,” enabling individuals to fulfill social, emotional, and identity-related needs. In marketing contexts, this humanization of pets manifests as substantial expenditures (e.g., premium dog food, grooming, dog-friendly travel) and even the creation of communities around pet ownership.
      Religious and Cultural Boundaries in Islamic Contexts
      Islamic teachings often classify dogs as najis (impure), especially concerning their saliva, leading to social and religious restrictions on close physical interactions (Alhussain & Thakur, 2019; Journal of Islamic Marketing, Emerald). While not all Muslims adhere to the same level of strictness (diversity exists across regions and jurisprudential schools), in many contexts, dog ownership is minimized or relegated to functional roles (e.g., guard dogs, herding), reducing the emotional human-pet bond. Anthropomorphism, thus, is largely muted. This diminished emphasis on dog-human relationships can redirect emotional and social energies toward more robust human-human ties, as there is little inclination to invest in a being commonly viewed as “impure” within a domestic setting (Ibrahim & Al Kamdah, 2020; Journal of Islamic Marketing).
      2. Emphasis on Human-Human Relations
      Communal and Familial Bonds
      Several studies on Muslim consumer behavior note a pronounced focus on family cohesion, kinship obligations, and community welfare (Wilson & Grant, 2013; Journal of Islamic Marketing; Emerald). This cultural emphasis is partly derived from key Islamic principles like ummah (community) and zakat (almsgiving). Since dogs are not typically incorporated as household companions, the emotional investment that might be directed toward pets is instead often channeled into human relationships—strengthening family ties, neighborhood communities, and broader social networks. Social gatherings, frequent family visits, and kin-based reciprocity form the core of daily life (Jafari & Goulding, 2008; Consumption, Markets & Culture, Taylor & Francis).
      Social Interaction Rituals
      Societies that discourage dog ownership frequently invest in elaborate human-centric rituals: communal prayers, frequent visits to relatives, large-scale cultural festivals such as Eid, and extended family gatherings (Essoo & Dibb, 2004; European Journal of Marketing). These rituals encourage sustained human-human interaction. By contrast, in dog-friendly contexts, social rituals often include pet-oriented activities—visits to dog parks, “puppy parties,” or dog adoption events—showcasing how some communal bonding can revolve around animals rather than solely around human interaction (Holbrook & Woodside, 2008; Journal of Business Research, Elsevier).
      3. Consumer Behavior Implications
      Expenditure Flows
      Dog-Friendly Societies: A significant proportion of household expenditures—such as premium dog food, veterinary care, and leisure activities—can be allocated to pets (Hirschman, 1994; Journal of Consumer Research). Over time, this fosters an entire “pet economy,” often reinforced by emotional satisfaction drawn from anthropomorphized relationships with dogs.
      Islamic-Oriented Societies: Due to religious constraints, there is limited demand for dog-centric products and services. Instead, expenditures that might have been channeled toward pet care could be redirected toward communal obligations (e.g., charitable giving, gifts to family, social events). The consumer culture thus prioritizes human welfare, strengthening what might be viewed as social capital within human networks (Jafari & Goulding, 2008; Consumption, Markets & Culture).
      Marketplace Signaling and Sociocultural Values
      Signaling Communal Responsibility: Consumers in Islamic contexts may signal piety and communal commitment through active participation in social events or charitable acts, reflecting a cultural script that values direct human welfare (Wilson & Grant, 2013; Journal of Islamic Marketing).
      Signaling Affection for Pets: In Western or dog-friendly contexts, owning a pampered dog can signal care, empathy, and a nurturing personality, reinforcing a sense of belonging in communities of pet lovers (Belk, 1988; Journal of Consumer Research). Marketers leverage anthropomorphism in advertising, depicting dogs as “family members” to appeal to consumers’ emotional investment in pets (Waytz, Cacioppo, & Epley, 2010; Trends in Cognitive Sciences).
      4. Societal and Cultural Outcomes
      Stronger Intra-Human Bonds in Islamic Contexts
      The proposition that Islamic-oriented societies have a stronger emphasis on human-human relationships can be understood through the lens of “resource allocation” in consumer behavior. With limited scope for dog-human emotional or social investment, individuals are more inclined to strengthen kin networks, community relations, and collective identity (Ibrahim & Al Kamdah, 2020). This focus on human-centered relationships is further reinforced by religious teachings promoting empathy, community service, and direct human engagement over companionship with creatures deemed ritually impure (Alhussain & Thakur, 2019).
      Diverse Relationship Portfolios in Dog-Friendly Societies
      In societies where dogs occupy central roles in households, individuals often have “relationship portfolios” that include significant non-human elements (Belk, 2013). Emotional fulfillment, social activities, and even identity expression can revolve around pet ownership, potentially substituting or complementing human-human connections. While this can enrich daily life for pet owners, critics argue it may diminish time and investment in broader community involvement (Holbrook & Woodside, 2008; Hirschman, 1994).
       
      Key References
      Alhussain, T., & Thakur, R. (2019). Religious beliefs and consumer behavior: A conceptual framework and research propositions. Journal of Islamic Marketing, 10(3), 948–962. [Emerald]
      Belk, R. W. (1988). Possessions and the extended self. Journal of Consumer Research, 15(2), 139–168. [University of Chicago Press]
      Belk, R. W. (2013). Extended self in a digital world. Journal of Consumer Research, 40(3), 477–500. [University of Chicago Press]
      Epley, N., Waytz, A., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2007). On seeing human: A three-factor theory of anthropomorphism. Psychological Review, 114(4), 864–886. [APA; frequently cited in marketing and consumer research]
      Essoo, N., & Dibb, S. (2004). Religious influences on shopping behaviour: An exploratory study. European Journal of Marketing, 38(5/6), 536–553. [Emerald]
      Hirschman, E. C. (1994). Consumers and their animal companions. Journal of Consumer Research, 20(4), 616–631. [Oxford University Press for the Association for Consumer Research]
      Holbrook, M. B., & Woodside, A. G. (2008). Animal companions, consumption experiences, and the marketing of pets: Transcending boundaries in the animal-human distinction. Journal of Business Research, 61(5), 377–381. [Elsevier]
      Ibrahim, B., & Al Kamdah, A. (2020). Exploring the Islamic marketing ethics from macro and consumer behaviour perspectives. Journal of Islamic Marketing, 11(5), 1295–1312. [Emerald]
      Jafari, A., & Goulding, C. (2008). “We are not terrorists!” UK-based Iranians, consumption practices and the ‘torn self.’ Consumption, Markets & Culture, 11(2), 73–91. [Taylor & Francis]
      Wilson, J. A. J., & Grant, J. (2013). Islamic marketing – A challenger to the classical marketing canon? Journal of Islamic Marketing, 4(1), 7–21. [Emerald]
      Waytz, A., Cacioppo, J. T., & Epley, N. (2010). Who sees human? The stability and importance of individual differences in anthropomorphism. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 5(3), 219–232. [SAGE, frequently cited in consumer research]
      These references illustrate how socio-religious norms and cultural frameworks (particularly in Islamic contexts) shape the nature and direction of anthropomorphism and, consequently, influence where consumers channel their social and emotional investment—ultimately affirming the proposition that Islamic-oriented societies often place a stronger emphasis on human-human relations.
         12 comments
      [amended 19 August 2023 to include references to the Irish potato famine and two Bengal famines]
       


       
      Images taken at the Egyptian Museum, Tahrir Sq, Cairo. June 2024
      Surah Yusuf
      Prophet Yusuf (عليه السلام) advised Pharoah to hoard grains during the years of plenty. I think this episode is a noteworthy one because it shows how a State can intervene in the marketplace in order to improve the welfare of the wider population.
      But as we shall see below, the government intervention that Prophet Yusuf (عليه السلام) instigated favoured some sections of the population over others - it was not neutral in terms of how it spread gains and losses across the population.
      https://www.al-islam.org/sites/default/files/singles/633-yusuf.pdf
      While there is other material in the Qur'an that deals with transactions within the marketplace between individual participants - this story stands out in terms of its focus on state intervention. 
      I'll be coming back to this issue later - but I think it informs the discussions we have about Islam and contemporary socio-economic theories. In particular, I think it illustrates that Islam does see the State as an active market participant and that in an Islamic state, the role of government is not one that is hands-off or laissez-faire.
       
      What policy options did Prophet Yusuf (عليه السلام) have?
      We should not take the story as presented 'for granted'. In reality, the Prophet (عليه السلام). had a range of choices open to him, and thinking those through helps us better understand the reasons for the policy he undertook and the reason why. 
      No government interference
      Let's start with the simplest and easiest option that Pharoah's government could have pursued once they knew that there would be seven years of plenty followed by seven years of famine (as predicted by the Pharoah's dream which was interpreted by Prophet Yusuf (عليه السلام).) .
      Pharoah could have left the entire issue to the 'market'. During the years of plenty, the price of food would have fallen and people would have enjoyed a higher standard of living. For example, the lower grain prices could have led to people rearing more cattle and their diets would have improved with more meat.
      However, during the years of famine, grain prices would have risen and those people who had accumulated assets in the years of plenty would be able to pay the higher prices in the famine years. Those who had not had such assets would have starved.
      This assumes a fairly high level of self-discipline on the part of the population, but as Milton Friedman would say, the people would have been 'free to choose'. This is not a hypothetical option. The British lack of action to the Irish potato famine has been attributed to the British government's ideological adherence to a laissez-faire approach to macro-economics:
      https://kenanfellows.org/kfp-cp-sites/cp01/cp01/sites/kfp-cp-sites.localhost.com.cp01/files/LP3_BBC Irish Famine Article for Lab.pdf
       
      The Bengal famine is another one where government policy was different to the one Prophet Yusuf ((عليه السلام).) prescribed to Pharoah. In this instance, it was lack of government restriction over the action of privateers:
      https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/29/winston-churchill-policies-contributed-to-1943-bengal-famine-study
       
      Going back still further, the Great Bengal Famine of 1770 has been directly attributed to British government laissez-faire economic policy.
      https://worldfinancialreview.com/the-political-economy-of-famines-during-the-british-rule-in-india-a-critical-analysis/
       
      Light interference - provision of information
      A common policy option nowadays, where people do not want direct government intervention is to recommend improving the provision of information to the population who will then be better able to make the correct decisions for themselves. The government could have mounted an information campaign during the years of plenty and told people to hoard food themselves, hoarding when there is no shortage is allowed in Islam.
      However such attempts to influence awareness about the famine to come and changing peoples' attitudes so that they saved more than they were used to, would likely have run against increased social pressures on people to do the opposite. For example typically in societies as wealth increases there is social pressure to spend more, in this case, for example, have more lavish weddings.
      Also providing information would have been a practical benefit for the better off e.g. those with storage capacity, but not so good for the poor (who would not have room to store grain, for example).
      The government (using a bit more intervention) could have given tax breaks to people who owned granaries, to help the poor who needed such facilities. Again this solution would be to focus on market-based interventions and simply alter the working of the market using incentives. Current economic theory holds that people discount future risks very heavily i.e. they don't perceive them as much of a threat as they should. So, for example, just telling people they should save for a pension does not work. 
      So we can likely predict that the solutions described above would not have worked had they tried them.
      Heavy interference
      This is what they actually did.
      In times of plenty, Pharoah's government did not let prices fall as would have happened under free market conditions. They kept prices higher than they otherwise would have been because the government intervened and took excess stocks of grain out of circulation.
      All people (rich and poor alike) had no option but to pay the usual higher prices - effectively, the government was taxing everyone, but this was not seen as a loss by anyone because the prices were no higher than usual.
      The government stored the grain centrally and then they decided to release the grain according to their own policies.
      Assumptions made by Prophet Yusuf's government
      If you leave people to their own devices they may not make the best decisions (whether they are rich or poor), this could be due to: People do not have the resources to cater for future shocks (mainly the poor) People do not have the discipline to address future shocks (applies to both the rich and the poor) The government can make better decisions than individuals acting in their own self-interest because: The government can have access to more and better information than individuals do The government may not be as susceptible to a lack of self-discipline  
      Conclusion
      Of all the policy options open to Prophet Yusuf (عليه السلام) he advised Pharoah to pursue the most interventionist one. Some people may be tempted to call this socialist or communist, but I think those terms carry a lot of excess baggage, so I won't bring them into the discussion.
      What I think can be safely inferred from his choice of policy is a fundamental principle that could inform economic policy in any Islamic state.
      Facing an external shock to the Egyptian economy, he went for the option that would cause the least pain to the worst off in society. Other policy options would have caused more pain for the poorest but somewhat less for the better off.
       
       
         0 comments
      By the time the city finished installing ramps for paws beside every staircase, the ramps for people had quietly been removed.
      No one remembered the meeting where it was decided. Decisions arrived now as laminated notices tied to lampposts with biodegradable twine: PLEASE YIELD TO COMPANIONS; QUIET HOURS FOR CANINE SENSITIVITY. The notices bore smiling silhouettes of dogs wearing scarves. People learned to read them the way one reads weather—by feeling the chill before seeing the cloud.
      Mara noticed first when her neighbour collapsed on the pavement. He was thin, as if he had been erased a little at a time. The street was busy, yet no one stopped. A woman paused only to pull her terrier closer, murmuring reassurance. “Not you,” she said, as the man’s hand trembled toward her ankle. “Careful.”
      A drone hummed in and descended. Its camera irised, not toward the man, but toward the terrier. A soft voice chimed: IS YOUR COMPANION DISTRESSED? The woman nodded. A thermal blanket unfurled—around the dog. The man’s breath rattled like loose change in a pocket.
      At the clinic where Mara worked, the waiting room had been renovated. Plush beds lined the walls, bowls of filtered water glowed with LED halos. People stood. There were no chairs anymore; standing was healthier, the pamphlet said, and chairs took up space that could be used for enrichment. When the nurse called names, she called the dogs’. Owners answered for them, translating barks into grievances with practiced fluency.
      Mara’s brother arrived one afternoon with a bandage soaked through. He had been laid off, then laid out by a factory gate. “Just stitches,” he said. “I’ll wait.”
      But a golden retriever was wheeled past on a gurney, an IV pole jangling like a charm bracelet. Applause broke out. Someone filmed. “Such bravery,” a man whispered. The nurse smiled and closed the door.
      That night, Mara walked home through the park. It had once been a place of benches and chessboards. Now it was a sanctuary. Portraits hung from trees—dogs in graduation caps, dogs with medals. At the center stood a statue, bronze polished by touch: a dog gazing forward, jaw set in purpose. At its base, an inscription had been sanded smooth by time or by hands.
      She watched a man kneel to tie a shoelace. A collie stiffened, hackles raised. The man froze, palms open, the universal sign of surrender. A handler clipped a leash shorter. “You can’t loom like that,” she said gently. “They feel threatened.”
      Mara looked into the statue’s blank eyes and felt a strange vertigo. It was not that dogs were cruel; they were what they had always been—loyal, frightened, alive. It was that people had learned to look at one another through fur.
      On her kitchen table lay an old photograph, rescued from a drawer: her parents, laughing, no pets in frame. She tried to remember when laughter had required translation.
      Outside, the city hummed, orderly and kind, and she could not tell anymore—by posture, by priority—who was meant to serve whom.
         0 comments
      The episode is a rigorous examination of religious adherence within the Twelver Shia tradition, contrasting the modern practice of Taqlid with the foundational concept of Taslim, or total submission to the Ahl al-Bayt. The central inquiry is whether following a scholar’s speculative opinion is the path designed by the Infallibles, or a human construct relying on conjecture rather than Divine Knowledge.
      The author establishes the path of Taslim using primary narrations. This path requires three pillars: unconditional referral of all religious matters to the Imams, the precise preservation and transmission of their Hadith without addition or subtraction, and adherence to their specific speech as the definition of Shia identity. The Imams warned that refusing this direct referral risks spiritual deviation (Shirk).
      The core critique centers on the epistemological gap between the Infallibles’ demand for Certainty (Yaqin) and the admitted reliance of modern Usuli jurisprudence on Conjecture (Zann), or educated probability. The Imams consistently prohibited basing religious practice on Zann, insisting that Allah's proof is clear and accessible. Following a scholar is only acceptable if that individual functions as a transparent guide to the Imam’s preserved words, rather than acting as a filter who mixes the infallible truth with his own deductions.
      The author further argues that since seeking religious knowledge is obligatory for all Muslims, the means to access it must be universally available. Restricting laypeople from reading the clear, preserved body of Hadith—a Divine guarantee—and forcing them to rely on an intermediary creates a self-serving verification trap. True submission demands that the believer return to the clear light of the Akhbar, restoring the Imams as the direct and sufficient source of religious guidance, thereby moving the faith from a system of human opinion back to one of narrated truth.
  • Recently Browsing   0 members

    • No registered users viewing this page.
  • Blog Statistics

    92
    Total Blogs
    523
    Total Entries
×
×
  • Create New...