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Celebrating 9th Rabi’ al-Awwal – What For?

Ibn al-Hussain

Entry posted by Ibn al-Hussain

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In many Shi'i communities, it is the 9th of Rabi' al-Awwal that marks the end of the two-month mourning period that begins with the first of Muharram. The day is celebrated in most communities, for different reasons, and is referred to by a few names, such as Eid al-Zahra, Farhat al-Zahra, Eid-e Shuja, Taj Poshi-e Imam, Yawm Raf' ul-Qalam, Umar Kushshun etc. The significance of the day is due to four different reasons, all of which have been attributed to it:

  • 'Umar ibn al-Khattab (the 2nd caliph) was killed on this day
  • The angels lift their pens up for the Shi'as and they do not record anything (i.e. one can commit sins and not be held accountable for them)
  • The transfer of the Imamate from Imam Hasan al-'Askari to his son, Imam al-Mahdi
  • Mukhtar killed 'Umar ibn Sa'd which resulted in the happiness of Imam Sajjad and the women of Bani Hashim

 

Some communities may celebrate the day for some of the reasons, while some misinformed ones may celebrate the day for all four reasons - particular the first two reasons. In this post, I will simply be looking at the historical validity of all four of these reasons.

The killing of 'Umar and the Lifting of the Pens

The killing of 'Umar and as well as the angels lifting up their pens, have both been mentioned in one narration that has been recorded in the works of some mainstream Shi'i scholars. The narration speaks of two individuals (who are completely unknown and no information regarding them exists in biographical works and history books) disputing over 'Umar ibn al-Khattab (or in some books it says Abu al-Khattab Muhammad bin Abi Zaynab the founder of the extremist Khattabiyah sect). They make their way to Ahmad bin Ishaq, a companion of Imam al-'Askari, in the city of Qum while their visitation coincided with the 9th of Rabi' al-Awwal. His female slave opens the door and informs them that Ahmad is celebrating the day as a day of 'Eid and that he informed her of the words of Imam al-'Askari considering this day to be the best of 'Eids according to the Ahl ul-Bayt.

When they eventually meet Ahmad, they notice he has bathed specifically for this day and he begins to narrate a lengthy tradition from Imam al-'Askari.  He describes his meeting with the Imam during one of the years, which also happened to coincide with the 9th of Rabi' al-Awwal, and noticed that the Imam had informed those who were at his house to perfume themselves and wear new clothes. He questions the Imam about this, and the Imam begins to narrate a story from the time of the Prophet, which speaks of Hudhayfa ibn al-Yaman meeting the Prophet and Imam Ali on a similar date while they were partaking in a meal with smiles on their faces, congratulating each other for the blessings of this day. Hudhayfa asks for the reason, and the Prophet informs him that this is the day on which Allah (swt) destroyed their enemies. The Prophet begins to inform Hudhayfa about the blessings that Allah (swt) has bestowed upon this day, and while relaying this, he mentions that Allah has also ordered the angels to lift their pens on the onset of this day, and to not record any sins of the Shi'as in honour of the Prophet and his successor.

Then the narrative changes to Hudhayfa, who says that he witnessed what the hypocrites did after the demise of the Prophet and when the second caliph died - on the 9th of Rabi' al-Awwal - he visited Imam Ali to congratulate him. The Imam reminds him of the time when he visited them on a similar date and they were celebrating. He says that the celebration was to do with Allah (swt) foretelling them about this day. The Imam proceeds to give about seventy names for this day, such as The Second Ghadeer, The Great Eid of Allah, The Day of Charity etc.

The narrative changes back to the two individuals who say that after having heard Ahmad narrate this report, they kissed his forehead and thanked Allah for having learned the virtues of this blessed day before dying.

Before going any further, since I will be mentioning certain authors and their books, it is befitting for the readers to be aware of the chronological order by year of when these individuals lived.

  • Ahmad bin Ishaq al-Qummi: died 263 Hijri
  • Shaykh Saduq: 305 - 381 Hijri
  • Maymun ibn Qasim al-Tabarani (author of Majmu' al-A'yad): 350/358 - 426/427 Hijri
  • Hashim ibn Muhammad Ali (author of Misbah al-Anwar): Alive in 558 Hijri
  • Ali ibn Ta'us (author of Iqbal al-A'mal): 589 - 664 Hijri
  • Ali ibn Ali ibn Ta'us (author of Zawaid al-Fawaid): 647 - 711 Hijri
  • Shaykh Hasan ibn Sulayman (author of al-Mukhtasar): Possibly before 742 - till after 802 Hijri
  • Shaykh Hurr al-Amili (author of Ithbat al-Huda): 1033 - 1104 Hijri
  • Allamah Majlisi (author of Bihar al-Anwar): 1037 - 1110 Hijri
     

The earliest book of a mainstream Shi'a scholar, in which this specific narration appears in is Misbah al-Anwar by Shaykh Hashim ibn Muhammad (scholar from 6th century Hijri but the book may have been written in 7th century Hijri)[1]. Its chain of narration is as follow:

قال: أخبرنا أبو محمد الحسن بن محمّد القمّي بالكوفة، قال: حدثّنا أبو بكر محمد بن جعدويه القزويني، وكان شيخاً صالحاً زاهداً (سنّهُ إحدى واربعين وثلاثمائة) صاعداً الى الحج، قال: حدثني محمد بن علي القزويني، قال: حدثنا الحسن بن الحسن الخالدي بمشهد أبي الحسن الرضا عليه السلام قال: حدثنا محمد بن العلاء الهمداني الواسطي و يحيى بن محمد جريح البغدادي قالا :تنازعنا في أمر أبي الخطّاب محمد بن زينب الکوفي فاشتبه علينا أمره فقصدنا جميعاً أبا علي أحمد بن إسحاق بن سعد الأشعري القمّي صاحب أبي الحسن العسکري عليه السلام بمدينته بقم

Shaykh Hashim said: Abu Muhammad al-Hasan bin Muhammad al-Qummi narrated to me in Kufa saying: Abu Bakr Muhammad bin Ja'dawayh al-Qazwini - he was a righteous and ascetic scholar - narrated to me while on his way to Hajj (in the year 341 Hijri) saying: Muhammad bin Ali al-Qazwini narrated to me saying: Hasan bin al-Hasan al-Khalidi narrated to me in the shrine of Imam Ridha (as) saying: Muhammad bin al-'Ala al-Hamdani al-Wasiti and Yahya bin Muhammad Jarih al-Baghdadi both narrated to me saying: We were disputing regarding Abi al-Khattab Muhammad bin Zaynab al-Kufi, and his affair confused us. So we decided to go to Ahmad bin Ishaq bin Sa'ad al-Ash'ari al-Qummi the companion of Imam Hasan al-'Askari (as) in the city of Qom.

In this report, we see that the two main narrators (Muhammad bin al-'Ala al-Hamdani and Yahya bin Muhammad Jarih[2] al-Baghdadi) who are completely unknown, are reporting the tradition to yet another unknown person by the name of Hasan al-Khalidi. In this report it says explicitly that the two individuals were arguing over Abi al-Khattab - rather than 'Umar ibn al-Khattab. We also do not know much about the life of the author himself, besides what is available through this book of his.

The next book that the narration exists is in al-Mukhtasar[3] of Shaykh Hasan bin Sulayman. This report has slight differences in its text, and its chain of narrators is cut severely short, however the two main reporters are the same, namely Muhammad bin al-'Ala al-Hamdani and Yahya bin Jarih al-Baghdadi. The chain is as follow:

الشيخ الفاضل علي بن مظاهر الواسطي عن محمد بن العلا الهمداني الواسطي ويحيى بن جريح البغدادي

al-Shaykh al-Fadhil Ali bin Mazahir al-Wasiti from Muhammad bin al-'Ala al-Hamdani al-Wasiti and Yahya bin Muhammad bin Jarih al-Baghdadi.

Over here, they are narrating this report to a person by the name of Ali bin Mazahir al-Wasiti (another unknown person).

The next book in which this report appears is Zawaid al-Fawaid of Ali ibn Ali ibn Ta'us, which we know of through Allamah Majlisi's work Bihar al-Anwar. The chain of narrators is as follow:

رَوَى‏ ابْنُ‏ أَبِي‏ الْعَلَاءِ الْهَمْدَانِيُ‏ الْوَاسِطِيُ‏ وَ يَحْيَى بْنُ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ حُوَيْجٍ الْبَغْدَادِيُّ

Ibn Abi al-'Ala al-Hamdani al-Wasiti and Yahya bin Muhammad bin Huwayj al-Baghdadi narrate...

In Allamah Majlisi's work Zaad al-Ma'ad, he records this tradition from Zawaid al-Fawaid and quotes additional words from Ali ibn Ali ibn Ta'us himself:

The author of Zawaid al-Fawaid said: I copied this narration from the handwriting of Ali bin Muhammad Tayy (ra)[4], and I found in other books various reports that are in line with this tradition, and I have relied on them. It is appropriate for the Shi'a to honour this day and express delight and happiness.[5]

The narration with Ali bin Mazahir in its chain (as recorded in al-Mukhtsar) has been briefly referenced by Shaykh Hurr al-Amili in his book Ithbat al-Huda[6] as well, however note the significant difference between this chain and the other ones:

ithbat-al-huda.png.8fbc3fe48ff2f56afcd11

And some of our scholars narrate in a treatise regarding the killing of 'Umar, from Ali bin Mazahir al-Wasiti with a connected chain, from Muhammad bin Ali al-Hamdani from Hasan bin al-Husayn al-Samiri from Ahmad bin Ishaq al-Qummi from Imam Hasan al-'Askari.

In this chain, Yahya bin Muhammad is completely dropped and is replaced by another person by the name of Hasan al-Samiri (unknown). Two individuals are not reporting from Ahmad bin Ishaq in this chain, rather only one person (al-Samiri) is narrating from Ahmad bin Ishaq. Some have also mistakenly confused Ali bin Mazahir with Zayn ul-Din Ali bin 'Izz al-Din Hasan bin Mazahir al-Hilli (8th century Hijri scholar), a student of Muhammad bin Hasan al-Hilli (son of Allamah Hilli and famously known as Fakhr al-Muhaqqiqeen). There is no evidence to suggest that it was him.

Other than the chain of narrators present in Misbah al-Anwar, the rest of the books all possess broken chains with gaps of 300 years and more, between their authors and the time when Ahmad bin Ishaq was living.

There also exists a great amount of inconsistencies in these chains. For example at one point Ali bin Mazahir is narrating from Muhammad bin al-'Ala al-Hamdani al-Wasiti and Yahya bin Muhammad bin Jarih al-Baghdadi, who are in fact narrating the actual story of their visit to Ahmad bin Ishaq, whereas in Ithbat al-Huda, Ali bin Mazahir is narrating from Muhammad bin Ali al-Hamdani who then quotes from Hasan bin al-Husayn al-Samiri who narrates the tradition from Ahmad bin Ishaq. The names are not consistent and scriptural errors can also be witnessed, there is no mention of Yahya bin Muhammad in Shaykh Hurr al-Amili's work at all and rather Hasan al-Samiri - a completely different and unknown individual - is mentioned in the chain.

Since we have not been able to identify who these individuals are, and with a gap of a few centuries between the authors and the unknown narrators, there is really no way to claim that we have a good level of assurance that this narration is reliable or that the wordings that have been recorded were indeed the words of Imam al-'Askari, the Prophet, Imam Ali or any other individuals that have been referred to in the lengthy narration.

The narration also appears with another chain in an 11th century Hijri work, Anwar al-Nu'maniyah[7] of Sayyid Nematullah Jazairi, with a slightly different rendition of the text and a different chain. The author is supposedly quoting from Abu Ja'far Muhammad bin Jarir al-Tabari:

Narrated to us al-Amin al-Sayyid Abu al-Mubarak Ahmad bin Muhammad bin Ardshir al-Dastani saying: Sayyid Abu al-Barakat bin Muhammad al-Jurjani narrated to us saying: Hibatullah al-Qummi (whose name was Yahya) narrated to us saying: Ahmad bin Ishaq bin Muhammad al-Baghdadi said: Narrated to us Hasan bin Hasan[8] al-Samiri who said: Myself and Yahya bin Ahmad bin Jarih al-Baghdadi decided to go to Ahmad bin Ishaq al-Qummi who was a companion of Imam Hasan al-'Askari in the city of Qom...

This chain when seen in light with the rest of the chains, once again has contradictions and inconsistencies. There are narrators that are both known and unknown (particularly the main narrators of the tradition) in this chain. In this narration, there is no mention of Muhammad bin al-'Ala who is one of the individuals who supposedly visits Ahmad bin Ishaq with Yahya.

One last book by a mainstream Shi'i scholar that I will be mentioning in which this report is mentioned in with a different chain is al-'Iqd al-Nadhid wa al-Durr al-Farid, of someone by the name of Muhammad bin al-Hasan al-Qummi. Once again, not much is known about the author except that he authored this book. The book was written after 7th century Hijri and the chain on page 60 is as follow:

الحديث السادس والأربعون: عن الحسن بن الحسين السامري قال: كنت أنا ويحيى بن أحمد بن جريح البغدادي

Hadith Forty-Six: From Hasan bin al-Husayn al-Samiri who said: Myself and Yahya bin Ahmad bin Jarih al-Baghdadi

This chain is once again broken and shows similar inconsistency. A chart depicting the chains from the 6 books mentioned is presented below so the readers can see the inconsistencies (please note that all the individuals are unknown except Ahmad bin Ishaq al-Qummi):

Hadith-Chains.jpg.99f883c41beece7088b5af

Before one can begin using a narration or a historical report, the most fundamental thing that needs to be attained, is a level of assurance that these words were essentially said. This is generally done either by looking at the chain of narrators and determining whether they were trustworthy individuals with good memories, or there exists sufficient contextual evidence, or redundancy in the same narration or its contents by multiple different individuals, to support the fact that these words were indeed said. With regards to this narration, after what we have witnessed, no reliable methodology will result in a level of assurance suggesting that this narration is reliable. In fact, the chains have major contradictions between each other whose result would be that the incident actually took place twice in exactly the same manner with different individuals. Names are dropped and added from book to book and even the names of the two main narrators who supposedly visit Ahmad bin Ishaq appear inconsistently. The hadith seems to have begun appearing in mainstream Shi'i works during the 6th century Hijri.

The Narration in an Earlier Work

This narration appears in one other book, earlier than any of the works mentioned above. It is a book authored by Abu Sa'eed Surur bin Qasim al-Tabarani (358 - 426 Hijri) by the name of Majmu' al-A'yad. The author was a Nusayri, and a lot has been written and researched[9] about him, however it is outside the scope of this article to get into it. It suffices to say that he possessed leadership of the Nusayri community after Muhammad bin Ali al-Jali and al-Khasibi and would not be considered a mainstream Shi'i scholar by any definition.

The chain of narrators in this book is as follow:

حدثنا محمد بن محمد بن العبّاس الخراساني قال أخبرنا أبو علي احمد بن اسماعيل السليماني قال حدثنا الحسين بن أحمد بن شيبان القزويني قال حدّثني أبو أحمد بن علي الکهجشي قال حدثنا محمد بن العلاء الهمداني الواسطي و يحيی بن محمد بن جدع البغدادي قالا تنازعنا في باب أبي الخطاب

Muhammad bin Muhammad bin al-Abbas al-Khorasani narrated to us saying: Abu Ali Ahmad bin Ismail al-Sulaymani narrated to us saying: Husayn bin Ahmad bin Shayban al-Qazwini narrated to us saying: Abu Ahmad bin Ali al-Kahjashi narrated to me saying: Muhammad bin al-'Ala al-Hamdani al-Wasiti and Yahya bin Muhammad bin Jad' al-Baghdadi narrated to me saying: There was a dispute between us regarding Abi al-Khattab.

Regarding Ahmad bin Isma'il al-Sulaymani, he appears in the book Kifayah al-Athar of Ali bin Muhammad al-Khazaz and so does Husayn bin Ahmad bin Shayban al-Qazwini. The latter is considered a Shaykh ul-Ijazah and has also been mentioned in Tarikh Baghdad (Volume 8, #3991) of Khatib Baghdadi. The rest of the individuals are unknown.

This is perhaps the earliest work we have today in which this narration can be found (with many inconsistencies throughout the text). The book itself essentially lists out the important days and dates during the year, alongside any corresponding acts of worship or supplications. The narration appearing in a book belonging to an extremist Shi'i sect with serious theological flaws, and a sect that was known for fabricating plenty of traditions, raises a lot of serious concerns. This fabricated tradition seems to crept its way into mainstream Shi'i works, which is something really not unheard of.

The discussion so far had to do with establishing the reliability of this tradition by looking at how this report has come down to us. We can confidently affirm that with many unknown individuals, inconsistencies present in the chains, names being misspelt or moved around, added or removed, and its earliest version found in a Nusayri text, there is no way to attain any level of assurance that this report is reliable.

Moving on to the content of this narration, it causes even more problems.  All credible - early or later - historians suggest that 'Umar ibn Khattab died in the last few days of Dhi al-Hijjah. There does exists a difference of opinion with regards to the actual date, however, no early historian has ever suggested that he died in a different month. Ibn Idris al-Hilli writes that whoever from among the Shi'as confuse his death date with the 9th of Rabi' al-Awwal is mistaken and is going against the unanimous opinion of all historians.[10] He further references the opinion of Shaykh Mufid to support his claim. This aforementioned report, which is completely solitary in its nature, is the only report that  we have at our disposal today which states the death of 'Umar being the 9th of Rabi' al-Awwal.

Another point in the narration that assists us in determining its fabricated nature is the remark regarding angels lifting up their pens so that no sins of ours will be recorded on the day. When the tradition is seen in light of having its roots in a Nusayri text, it makes contextual sense that they would fabricate something like this. Tabarani in one of his other famous works Kitab al-Ma'arif attributes many fabricated traditions to Imam Hasan al-'Askari, one of them implying that God exempted His creatures from worshiping Him through religious commandments and only wanted them to know Him, for gnosis is the worship of God.[11] With beliefs in such pseudo-esotericism, it is very plausible that a concept such as lifting of the pen was fabricated so that men are not bound by Islamic laws that pertain to the exoteric aspect of one's life.

It seems that the first scholar to insist on 9th Rabi' al-Awwal being the death date of Umar was 'Allamah Majlisi in his Bihar al-Anwar. He brings the opinions of numerous Shi'a scholars and admits that the famous opinion amongst the Shi'a Imamiyah scholars is that 'Umar died in Dhi al-Hijjah, but in a strange statement, uses the fact that in his day and age, people believed (either referring to people in Isfahan or those living under the Safavid government in general) that he died on the 9th of Rabi' al-Awwal, as support for this opinion and chooses this view over the other.

Ibn Ta'us does mention in his Iqbal al-A'maal that he saw a meritorious narration regarding the 9th of Rabi' al-Awwal and that some people express happiness because they believe someone had been killed on this day. While he does not mention any names, from the rest of his discussion it is not far-fetched to assume that he is speaking about the killing of 'Umar. In any case, this narration that Ibn Ta'us is referring to can't be the one that we have already spoken about, because the narration he is speaking about is in one of the books of Shaykh Saduq who is reporting it from Imam Sadiq (as). However, Ibn Ta'us does not mention the name of the book, nor the tradition. Since Ibn Ta'us is not convinced that this individual was killed on the 9th of Rabi' al-Awwal and states that he has not found anything else reliable to confirm this tradition from Saduq, he attempts to make sense of the tradition by giving possible explanations. For example, he says that it is possible that when it is said this individual was killed on this day, it could metaphorically mean that his killer decided to kill him on this day, or that it was the day that his killer arrived in Medina, or it was the day that his killer left his own city to travel towards Medina. Ibn Ta'us even quotes the view of some others who have tried to explain it away by saying: it was the day that the report of the killing of this individual reached the city where Shaykh Saduq lived - although he refutes this explanation.[12]

Ibn Ta'us further suggests that if there is anything to be happy about, it would be that Imam al-Mahdi (as) officially became the Imam on this day (as his father left the world on the 8th).

While there are reports that some people would celebrate the killing of 'Umar in Kashan on this day (where there exists a grave attributed to Abu Lu'lu - though it is highly unlikely to be his actual grave), however at one point in history even that was done on the 26th of Dhi al-Hijjah.[13]

Historically speaking, 'Umar ibn al-Khattab being killed on the 9th of Rabi' al-Awwal was never taken seriously by mainstream Shi'i scholars (since the majority did not believe he was killed on that day to begin with), let alone celebrate it for this reason. It was only during and after the Safavid dynasty that this practice found any fame.

The Beginning of Imam al-Mahdi's Imamate

Another reason why the 9th of Rabi' al-Awwal is celebrated is because it marks the beginning of the Imamate of al-Mahdi. Ibn Ta'us says in his Iqbal al-A'mal that if anyone wishes to celebrate the 9th of Rabi' al-Awwal, it would be more suitable for them to do so by celebrating it as the beginning of the Imamate of al-Mahdi[14] since it was on the 8th that his father, Imam al-'Askari left this world. While many different dates have been given for the demise of al-'Askari, I do not wish to come to any conclusions as to which date is correct or most plausible. Nevertheless the 8th of Rabi' al-Awwal is the most famous opinion among the scholars and historians. The main point that I wish to allude to is that we know from a report which Shaykh Saduq mentions in his Kamal ul-Din that Imam al-'Askari left this world at Fajr time on the 8th of Rabi al-Awwal.[15] Therefore the actual Imamate of al-Mahdi would have begun on the morning of the 8th itself, not the following day on the 9th as Ibn Ta'us suggests.

The Killing of 'Umar ibn Sa'ad

The actual killing of 'Umar ibn Sa'ad by Mukhtar has been described in a few history books.  However I was not able to find any early historical reference for him being killed on this specific day. The closest thing I was able to find was in Allamah Majlisi's Zaad al-Ma'ad while discussing the merits of 9th Rabi' al-Awwal, he writes one sentence in passing:

And some have said that on this day 'Umar bin Sa'ad - may curse be upon him - was sent to Saqar (one of the names of hell). If this is the case, then this is also a sufficient reason for the nobility of this day.[16]

Majlisi is evidently not sure about this. Mukhtar's reign was from around the middle of Rabi' al-Awwal in 66 Hijri till the middle of Ramadhan in 67 Hijri (around 18 months). We also know that 'Umar bin Sa'ad was killed in 66 Hijri through multiple sources. This means he never lived to see a 9th of Rabi' al-Awwal under Mukhtar's reign.

Dhahabi in his book Tarikh al-Islam writes under the events that took place in the year 66 Hijri that some of the individuals who partook in the killing of Imam al-Husayn were killed this year, namely 'Umar bin Sa'ad bin Abi Waqas, and Shimr bin Dhi al-Jawshan al-Dhababi and a group of others.[17] Ibn Kathir in his al-Bidayah wa al-Nihaya[18] documents the details of the killing of 'Umar bin Sa'ad under the year 66 Hijri. Ibn Khaldun in his Tarikh writes that when Mukhtar was done with the killing in Kufa near the end of 66th Hijri, he sent Ibrahim bin Ashtar to go kill Ubaydallah bin Ziyad.[19] From Ansab al-Ashraf of Baladhuri we know that Ibrahim bin Ashtar began this journey in Dhi al-Hijjah of the 66th Hijri.[20] This means that Umar bin Sa'ad was killed between the middle of Rabi' al-Awwal and Dhi al-Hijjah of the 66th century (most probably closer to Dhi al-Hijjah of 66th Hijri rather).

There are other historical events that can further help us confirm that 'Umar bin Sa'ad was definitely killed before the 9th Rabi' al-Awwal of 67th Hijri and that he never lived to see that day under Mukhtar's reign, but it will unnecessarily lengthen the discussion and we will suffice with what has been written.

Conclusion

Historically speaking, there is no reliable evidence to suggest that 'Umar bin al-Khattab was killed on the 9th of Rabi' al-Awwal and the famous tradition that is referred to is a fabrication, most likely by the Nusayris. The concept of lifting of the pens, so that sins are not recorded, goes against the explicit verses of the Qur'an (99:7-8).  There is also no real evidence to suggest that it is the day that Mukhtar killed 'Umar ibn Sa'ad. In fact it is possible that due to dissimulation, some scholars may have wished to change the focus from the second caliph to 'Umar bin Sa'ad.

The only event that remains is the beginning of the Imamate of al-Mahdi. While his Imamate would have definitely begun on the 8th of Rabi' al-Awwal, but due to it being a day of mourning, it is befitting to postpone any celebrations to the following day and mark the symbolic beginning of the Imamate of al-Mahdi on the 9th of Rabi' al-Awwal.

 

--------------

[1] See Fihris al-Turath, of Sayyid Muhammad Husain Husayni Jalali; Volume 1, Page 573.  Amal al-Amil, of Shaykh Hurr al-Amili; Volume 2, Page 341, Entry #1050. al-Dhari'ah of Agha Buzurg Tehrani; Entry #4136

[2] In some manuscripts his name will appear as Huwayj instead of Jarih

[3] al-Mukhtasar, of Shaykh Hasan bin Sulayman al-Hilli; Page 45

[4] A'yan al-Shi'a, of Sayyid Muhsin al-Amin; Volume 2, Page 268 - he would have been living around 6/7th century as well

[5] Zaad al-Ma'ad, of Allamah Majlisi; page 257

[6] Ithbat al-Huda, of Shaykh Hurr al-Amili; Volume 3, page 211

[7] Anwar al-Numaniyah, of Nematullah Jazairi; Volume 1, Page 84

[8] In light of other chain of narrators, this is most probably a copyist error, and it should be Husayn

[9] Extremist Shi'ites: The Ghulat Sect of Matti Moosa

[10] Kitab al-Sarair of Ibn Idris Muhammad bin Mansur al-Hilli; Volume 1, Page 419

[11] Bar-Asher, Meir M., and Aryeh Kofsky. “Dogma and Ritual in "kitāb Al-maʿārif" by the Nuṣayrī Theologian Abū Saʿīd Maymūn B. Al-qāsim Al-ṭabarānī (D. 426/1034-35)”. Arabica 52.1 (2005): 43–65. Web...

[12] Iqbal al-A'mal, of Sayyid Ibn Ta'us; Section on 9th Rabi' al-Awwal

[13] Masaib al-Nawasib fi al-radd 'ala Nawaqidh al-Rafawidh, a refutation work written by a Shi'i scholar Sayyid Nur Allah bin Sharaf al-Din al-Mar'ashi al-Tustari, on the polemical work of a Sunni scholar Mirza Makhdum al-Sharifi (d. 988 Hijri); Volume 2, Page 240

[14] فيكون ابتداء ولاية المهدي ع على الأمة يوم تاسع ربيع الأول‏ - Thus the beginning of the Wilayah of al-Mahdi (as) on the Ummah is the day of 9th Rabi al-Awwal - Iqbal al-A'mal of Sayyid ibn Ta'us

[15] Kamal al-Din of Shaykh Saduq; Volume 2, Page 473

[16] Zaad al-Ma'ad, of Allamah Majlisi; Page 258

[17] Tarikh al-Islam of al-Dhahabi; Volume 5, Page 50

[18] al-Bidayah wa al-Nihaya of Ibn al-Kathir; Volume 8, Page 272 - مقتل عمر بن سعد بن أبى وقاص و هو أمير الجيش الذين قتلوا الحسين‏

[19] Tarikh Ibn Khaldun; Volume 3, Page 37

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  • Veteran Member
Ibn al-Hussain

Ibn al-Hussain 4,238

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I am not going out of my way to encourage that the reason to celebrate on this day should be the beginning of the Imamate of al-Mahdi (for which other Imam do we ever do this…), but rather I am suggesting that if people do end up celebrating something on this day, it is probably the most valid reason as opposed to the other reasons which are completely baseless.

I did not want to lengthen the post, but there are many other problems with the text as well. For example Hudhayfa was not even in Medina when ‘Umar died, he was in Madain. There is also a lot of textual issues in the content – the oldest text does not mention for example anything about pens (albeit the gist is the same)

  • Veteran Member
Ali_Hussain

Ali_Hussain 6,294

Posted

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After reading this, you really have to question the scholarship of those who believe and spread, and worse curse those who question this Farhat al-Zahra story.

Don'tMakeAس

Don'tMakeAس 2,010

Posted (edited)

I just want to add that the predominant reason I've been given for the celebration of Eid az-Zahra is that it is the day that Imam as-Sajjad actually received either the news of Umar bin Sa'd's death, or received his head itself, from al-Mukhtar. According to popular belief, this caused the Imam to smile, and marked the end of the ahl al-bayt's period of grief post-Karbala. Thus, a proponent of this celebration may say that it does not mark Ibn Sa'd's death itself, but simply Imam as-Sajjad's reaction to the event and the end of his grief.

I've never really heard Umar bin Khattab's death explicitly referred to as a reason for this celebration, and I don't believe it is popularly viewed as such. As you pointed out, this view is largely untenable. It's also important to consider the fact that Huzayfah ibn Yaman- one of the principal figures in the above narration- was one of Umar's foremost generals, and his governor in both Kufa and Mada'in at times during his rule.

Edited by Shaykh Patience101
  • Advanced Member
Mansur Bakhtiari

Mansur Bakhtiari 1,185

Posted

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:salam:

Are you sure that no sins are counted on that day? I hope you are talking about sins committed by accident, right?

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Hameedeh

Hameedeh 22,562

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On 1/31/2017 at 3:03 PM, Mansur Bakhtiari said:

Are you sure that no sins are counted on that day? I hope you are talking about sins committed by accident, right?

Salam. @Ibn al-Hussain mentioned in his conclusion that the concept of sins not being recorded goes against the Holy Qur'an. (99:7-8).

  • Veteran Member
baqar

baqar 1,370

Posted

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On 30/01/2017 at 4:07 AM, Shaykh Patience101 said:

I've never really heard Umar bin Khattab's death explicitly referred to as a reason for this celebration, and I don't believe it is popularly viewed as such. 

Besides, I think there is another date for the second caliph's death that may have wider acceptance, possibly the 29th Zilhij. 

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  • Latest Blog Entries

    • Haji 2003
      Dogs, anthropomorphism and societal implications
      By Haji 2003 in Contemporania
         0 comments
      Introduction
      I asked the reasoning version of ChatGPT the following two questions (in the quotation box).
      The answer to the latter question is presented below.
      This issue is one of many that contrasts the social and economic implications of Islamic injunctions vs. those of other religions. In summary, the Islamic notion of dogs as religiously impure focuses Muslims' attention towards other humans for social and emotional support. I believe that is superior to a society that redirects such attention to animals. 
      @Northwest

      TLDR
      The proposition that an Islamic-oriented society—with religious reservations about dog ownership—places a greater emphasis on human-human relationships than dog-friendly societies finds support in cross-cultural consumer research and Islamic marketing scholarship. The religious designation of dogs as impure curtails intensive anthropomorphic tendencies, leading consumers in Islamic contexts to channel social and emotional resources primarily toward family, friends, and community members. Consequently, marketing strategies and consumer behaviors in these contexts underscore interpersonal bonds, charitable obligations, and group cohesion rather than pet-centric consumption.
      By contrast, in societies that celebrate and encourage dog ownership, anthropomorphism significantly shapes consumer behavior, often shifting a portion of emotional and financial resources to human-dog relationships. These differences highlight how deeply cultural and religious frameworks influence the scope and nature of anthropomorphism, delineating the ways consumers allocate their relational capital between human and non-human companions.
       

      1. Anthropomorphism and Relationship Substitution
      Pet Humanization in Secular or Dog-Friendly Societies
      In many societies that promote dog ownership, there is a pronounced tendency to anthropomorphize pets—assigning them human-like traits and emotions (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007; Journal of Consumer Research). Pet ownership often translates into emotional bonds that parallel, or sometimes even substitute for, human-human connections. For example, Belk (2013; Journal of Consumer Research) discusses how dogs are seen as “extensions of the self,” enabling individuals to fulfill social, emotional, and identity-related needs. In marketing contexts, this humanization of pets manifests as substantial expenditures (e.g., premium dog food, grooming, dog-friendly travel) and even the creation of communities around pet ownership.
      Religious and Cultural Boundaries in Islamic Contexts
      Islamic teachings often classify dogs as najis (impure), especially concerning their saliva, leading to social and religious restrictions on close physical interactions (Alhussain & Thakur, 2019; Journal of Islamic Marketing, Emerald). While not all Muslims adhere to the same level of strictness (diversity exists across regions and jurisprudential schools), in many contexts, dog ownership is minimized or relegated to functional roles (e.g., guard dogs, herding), reducing the emotional human-pet bond. Anthropomorphism, thus, is largely muted. This diminished emphasis on dog-human relationships can redirect emotional and social energies toward more robust human-human ties, as there is little inclination to invest in a being commonly viewed as “impure” within a domestic setting (Ibrahim & Al Kamdah, 2020; Journal of Islamic Marketing).
      2. Emphasis on Human-Human Relations
      Communal and Familial Bonds
      Several studies on Muslim consumer behavior note a pronounced focus on family cohesion, kinship obligations, and community welfare (Wilson & Grant, 2013; Journal of Islamic Marketing; Emerald). This cultural emphasis is partly derived from key Islamic principles like ummah (community) and zakat (almsgiving). Since dogs are not typically incorporated as household companions, the emotional investment that might be directed toward pets is instead often channeled into human relationships—strengthening family ties, neighborhood communities, and broader social networks. Social gatherings, frequent family visits, and kin-based reciprocity form the core of daily life (Jafari & Goulding, 2008; Consumption, Markets & Culture, Taylor & Francis).
      Social Interaction Rituals
      Societies that discourage dog ownership frequently invest in elaborate human-centric rituals: communal prayers, frequent visits to relatives, large-scale cultural festivals such as Eid, and extended family gatherings (Essoo & Dibb, 2004; European Journal of Marketing). These rituals encourage sustained human-human interaction. By contrast, in dog-friendly contexts, social rituals often include pet-oriented activities—visits to dog parks, “puppy parties,” or dog adoption events—showcasing how some communal bonding can revolve around animals rather than solely around human interaction (Holbrook & Woodside, 2008; Journal of Business Research, Elsevier).
      3. Consumer Behavior Implications
      Expenditure Flows
      Dog-Friendly Societies: A significant proportion of household expenditures—such as premium dog food, veterinary care, and leisure activities—can be allocated to pets (Hirschman, 1994; Journal of Consumer Research). Over time, this fosters an entire “pet economy,” often reinforced by emotional satisfaction drawn from anthropomorphized relationships with dogs.
      Islamic-Oriented Societies: Due to religious constraints, there is limited demand for dog-centric products and services. Instead, expenditures that might have been channeled toward pet care could be redirected toward communal obligations (e.g., charitable giving, gifts to family, social events). The consumer culture thus prioritizes human welfare, strengthening what might be viewed as social capital within human networks (Jafari & Goulding, 2008; Consumption, Markets & Culture).
      Marketplace Signaling and Sociocultural Values
      Signaling Communal Responsibility: Consumers in Islamic contexts may signal piety and communal commitment through active participation in social events or charitable acts, reflecting a cultural script that values direct human welfare (Wilson & Grant, 2013; Journal of Islamic Marketing).
      Signaling Affection for Pets: In Western or dog-friendly contexts, owning a pampered dog can signal care, empathy, and a nurturing personality, reinforcing a sense of belonging in communities of pet lovers (Belk, 1988; Journal of Consumer Research). Marketers leverage anthropomorphism in advertising, depicting dogs as “family members” to appeal to consumers’ emotional investment in pets (Waytz, Cacioppo, & Epley, 2010; Trends in Cognitive Sciences).
      4. Societal and Cultural Outcomes
      Stronger Intra-Human Bonds in Islamic Contexts
      The proposition that Islamic-oriented societies have a stronger emphasis on human-human relationships can be understood through the lens of “resource allocation” in consumer behavior. With limited scope for dog-human emotional or social investment, individuals are more inclined to strengthen kin networks, community relations, and collective identity (Ibrahim & Al Kamdah, 2020). This focus on human-centered relationships is further reinforced by religious teachings promoting empathy, community service, and direct human engagement over companionship with creatures deemed ritually impure (Alhussain & Thakur, 2019).
      Diverse Relationship Portfolios in Dog-Friendly Societies
      In societies where dogs occupy central roles in households, individuals often have “relationship portfolios” that include significant non-human elements (Belk, 2013). Emotional fulfillment, social activities, and even identity expression can revolve around pet ownership, potentially substituting or complementing human-human connections. While this can enrich daily life for pet owners, critics argue it may diminish time and investment in broader community involvement (Holbrook & Woodside, 2008; Hirschman, 1994).
       
      Key References
      Alhussain, T., & Thakur, R. (2019). Religious beliefs and consumer behavior: A conceptual framework and research propositions. Journal of Islamic Marketing, 10(3), 948–962. [Emerald]
      Belk, R. W. (1988). Possessions and the extended self. Journal of Consumer Research, 15(2), 139–168. [University of Chicago Press]
      Belk, R. W. (2013). Extended self in a digital world. Journal of Consumer Research, 40(3), 477–500. [University of Chicago Press]
      Epley, N., Waytz, A., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2007). On seeing human: A three-factor theory of anthropomorphism. Psychological Review, 114(4), 864–886. [APA; frequently cited in marketing and consumer research]
      Essoo, N., & Dibb, S. (2004). Religious influences on shopping behaviour: An exploratory study. European Journal of Marketing, 38(5/6), 536–553. [Emerald]
      Hirschman, E. C. (1994). Consumers and their animal companions. Journal of Consumer Research, 20(4), 616–631. [Oxford University Press for the Association for Consumer Research]
      Holbrook, M. B., & Woodside, A. G. (2008). Animal companions, consumption experiences, and the marketing of pets: Transcending boundaries in the animal-human distinction. Journal of Business Research, 61(5), 377–381. [Elsevier]
      Ibrahim, B., & Al Kamdah, A. (2020). Exploring the Islamic marketing ethics from macro and consumer behaviour perspectives. Journal of Islamic Marketing, 11(5), 1295–1312. [Emerald]
      Jafari, A., & Goulding, C. (2008). “We are not terrorists!” UK-based Iranians, consumption practices and the ‘torn self.’ Consumption, Markets & Culture, 11(2), 73–91. [Taylor & Francis]
      Wilson, J. A. J., & Grant, J. (2013). Islamic marketing – A challenger to the classical marketing canon? Journal of Islamic Marketing, 4(1), 7–21. [Emerald]
      Waytz, A., Cacioppo, J. T., & Epley, N. (2010). Who sees human? The stability and importance of individual differences in anthropomorphism. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 5(3), 219–232. [SAGE, frequently cited in consumer research]
      These references illustrate how socio-religious norms and cultural frameworks (particularly in Islamic contexts) shape the nature and direction of anthropomorphism and, consequently, influence where consumers channel their social and emotional investment—ultimately affirming the proposition that Islamic-oriented societies often place a stronger emphasis on human-human relations.
    • Haji 2003
      A counterpoint to the Great Replacement Theory
      By Haji 2003 in Contemporania
         8 comments
      [This post was initially published as 'A little conspiracy theory of mine' on Oct 25 2016. I've now retitled it and linked some of the text with the notion of the Great Replacement Theory.]
      Summary
      Britain, after the Second World War ostensibly recruited workers from various developing countries in order to fill skill shortages. However, around the same time, there was a concerted effort by Australia to recruit working-class Britons. A possible explanation to this anomalous situation is that there was a concerted policy by Britain and Australia to ensure that Australia remained white. This is one argument against the idea that inward migration into the West is somehow an attack on white people. The two examples of migration examined here represent the opposite.
      The Great Replacement Theory
      According to Prof Matthew Feldman there is a lite of versions of The Great Replacement Theory and a full-fat one and the latter holds that:
      https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/08/a-deadly-ideology-how-the-great-replacement-theory-went-mainstream
      In this post, I will argue that at least in terms of one example, this is indeed the case, but rather than representing some form of surrender on the part of the 'white race' as the far right claims the policy represents, it is actually the opposite.
      The Windrush Generation
      This is the narrative all Britons have been brought up with (the following is from the UK government's own website):
      http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/citizenship/brave_new_world/immigration.htm
      It sounds very multi-culti, liberal and nice. Britain needed labour, brown people needed jobs and everyone would get along swimmingly in post-war Britain. This was not illegal immigration, it was planned and made good economic sense.
      Here's some more justification from the British Library:
      http://www.bl.uk/learning/timeline/item107671.html
      To help immigration into the UK, the British Nationality Act of 1948 gave rights to all people from the commonwealth to settle in the country. West Indian immigration to the UK from the 1940's to the 1960s was about 170,000. In Britain, there was an increase of about 80,000 people originating from the Indian sub-continent from 1951 to 1961.
      So if there was such a shortage of labour in postwar Britain, surely the British government would have been aghast at the prospect of Britons leaving the UK? And trying to put a stop to it?
      Apparently not.
      The Assisted Passage Scheme from Britain to Australia
      Australia's 'Assisted Passage Migration Scheme' started in 1945 and involved 1 million people migrating from Britain to Australia.
      http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/7217889.stm
      The following paper adds some nuance to this:
      Yet despite the 'reluctance' we still get:
      Stephen Constantine (2003) British emigration to the empire- commonwealth since 1880: From overseas settlement to Diaspora?, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 31:2, 16-35, DOI: 10.1080/03086530310001705586
      From the same paper the following motivation, which refers to policies in the nineteenth century could perhaps explain the flow of people observed at the top of this post:
       
      Conclusion
      In sum, Britain was allowed to go a bit brown, because it was essential that Australia, Canada and other dominions remain essentially white. And this racist policy was maintained until the facts on the ground had been established. This point is one counter-arguments to the 'Great Replacement Theory' that has been espoused in some far-right circles in the West.
       
      https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/08/a-deadly-ideology-how-the-great-replacement-theory-went-mainstream
       
      So we have two migration stories. And the funny thing is that the first story is covered in the press, and you'll also find the second story given a lot of attention.
       
      But the two are never mentioned together.
       
      It's when you put, what are otherwise very positive stories together, that something far nastier emerges. Something which is within plain sight but unacknowledged.
       
      https://contemporaniablog.wordpress.com/2016/10/24/poms-and-windrush/
    • Haji 2003
      Religion and cultural resilience
      By Haji 2003 in Contemporania
         0 comments
      I gave ChatGPT the following prompt:
       
      The text below is provided by ChatGPT.
       

      The proposition that Islamic societies have been particularly successful in maintaining their cultural heritage since the 16th-century expansion of European power is complex and nuanced. While many Islamic societies have indeed preserved significant aspects of their cultural, religious, and linguistic traditions, the extent of this preservation varies across regions and historical contexts. To explore this proposition, consider the following key factors:
      1. Cultural Resilience in the Face of European Expansion
      Islamic societies, particularly those in the Ottoman Empire, Safavid Persia, and Mughal India, exhibited remarkable cultural resilience during and after the period of European imperial expansion. Unlike many indigenous cultures in the Americas, Africa, and parts of Asia, Islamic societies often retained their religious, legal, and linguistic frameworks despite external pressures.
      Key Examples:
      Ottoman Empire: The Ottomans maintained their Islamic legal and educational systems alongside modernizing reforms (e.g., the Tanzimat reforms) while resisting cultural assimilation. Safavid Persia (Iran): The Safavid dynasty entrenched Twelver Shi’ism, reinforcing a distinct cultural and religious identity that endures today. Mughal India: Mughal rulers preserved and promoted Islamic art and architecture, influencing the Indian subcontinent despite British colonial rule. Theoretical Support:
      Marshall Hodgson in The Venture of Islam (1974) argues that Islamic societies developed robust institutional and intellectual traditions that enabled them to integrate external influences while maintaining core cultural elements.
      2. The Role of Religion as a Cultural Anchor
      Islamic societies have often placed significant emphasis on religious education and practice, which provided a unifying cultural framework that resisted external cultural influences. The centrality of Islam in daily life—through Quranic education, mosques, and religious practices—contributed to this cultural persistence.
      Key Insight:
      Clifford Geertz’s study of Morocco and Indonesia in Islam Observed (1968) demonstrates how Islamic societies adapted to modernity while retaining religious and cultural traditions.
      3. Linguistic and Educational Continuity
      Unlike many indigenous languages that declined under European rule, Arabic, Persian, and Ottoman Turkish remained central to intellectual and cultural life in their respective regions. Islamic scholars preserved classical texts and continued producing scholarly works even during colonial rule.
      Contrast with Other Societies:
      In Latin America, many indigenous languages and cultural practices were systematically suppressed by European colonizers. In Africa, missionary-led education often replaced local languages with European ones. 4. Selective Adaptation and Cultural Synthesis
      Islamic societies did not resist external influences entirely; instead, they often selectively adopted technological, administrative, and intellectual practices from European powers while preserving core cultural and religious principles.
      Example:
      The Ottoman Empire modernized its military and bureaucracy but retained its Islamic legal structure (Sharia) alongside secular reforms. 5. Regional Variations and Exceptions
      The degree of cultural preservation varies significantly across the Islamic world. For instance:
      North Africa and the Middle East: Maintained strong Islamic and linguistic traditions despite French and British colonization. Central Asia: Soviet policies suppressed religious practices, weakening Islamic cultural heritage for much of the 20th century. Southeast Asia: Indonesian and Malaysian societies retained Islamic practices while integrating elements of European education systems. 6. Comparative Perspective
      When comparing Islamic societies with other non-European societies, such as Native American, Aboriginal Australian, or sub-Saharan African communities, the relative success in preserving cultural heritage becomes more apparent. Many of these societies experienced significant cultural loss due to direct European intervention, religious conversion, and the imposition of foreign educational systems.
      Scholarly Insight:
      Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978) highlights how Islamic societies were often misrepresented in Western discourse, yet this external pressure also galvanized internal cultural reaffirmation.
      Conclusion
      While Islamic societies have indeed shown notable success in preserving their cultural heritage, this success is not uniform across all regions. The resilience largely stems from the centrality of religion, the adaptability of cultural practices, and the selective adoption of external influences. However, regions like Central Asia illustrate how external forces can disrupt this continuity. Ultimately, the proposition holds considerable validity when compared to many other societies that experienced cultural erosion under European expansion.
    • Haji 2003
      Music in Islam
      By Haji 2003 in Contemporania
         0 comments
      In 2010 we did a little project that involved analysing the content of Shiachat posts over the preceding few years to capture what people were saying about Music on Shiachat.
      The final report is attached.
      Music in Islam v.1.pdf
    • Haji 2003
      Prophet Yusuf's (عليه السلام) policy options
      By Haji 2003 in Contemporania
         10 comments
      [amended 19 August 2023 to include references to the Irish potato famine and two Bengal famines]
       


       
      Images taken at the Egyptian Museum, Tahrir Sq, Cairo. June 2024
      Surah Yusuf
      Prophet Yusuf (عليه السلام) advised Pharoah to hoard grains during the years of plenty. I think this episode is a noteworthy one because it shows how a State can intervene in the marketplace in order to improve the welfare of the wider population.
      But as we shall see below, the government intervention that Prophet Yusuf (عليه السلام) instigated favoured some sections of the population over others - it was not neutral in terms of how it spread gains and losses across the population.
      https://www.al-islam.org/sites/default/files/singles/633-yusuf.pdf
      While there is other material in the Qur'an that deals with transactions within the marketplace between individual participants - this story stands out in terms of its focus on state intervention. 
      I'll be coming back to this issue later - but I think it informs the discussions we have about Islam and contemporary socio-economic theories. In particular, I think it illustrates that Islam does see the State as an active market participant and that in an Islamic state, the role of government is not one that is hands-off or laissez-faire.
       
      What policy options did Prophet Yusuf (عليه السلام) have?
      We should not take the story as presented 'for granted'. In reality, the Prophet (عليه السلام). had a range of choices open to him, and thinking those through helps us better understand the reasons for the policy he undertook and the reason why. 
      No government interference
      Let's start with the simplest and easiest option that Pharoah's government could have pursued once they knew that there would be seven years of plenty followed by seven years of famine (as predicted by the Pharoah's dream which was interpreted by Prophet Yusuf (عليه السلام).) .
      Pharoah could have left the entire issue to the 'market'. During the years of plenty, the price of food would have fallen and people would have enjoyed a higher standard of living. For example, the lower grain prices could have led to people rearing more cattle and their diets would have improved with more meat.
      However, during the years of famine, grain prices would have risen and those people who had accumulated assets in the years of plenty would be able to pay the higher prices in the famine years. Those who had not had such assets would have starved.
      This assumes a fairly high level of self-discipline on the part of the population, but as Milton Friedman would say, the people would have been 'free to choose'. This is not a hypothetical option. The British lack of action to the Irish potato famine has been attributed to the British government's ideological adherence to a laissez-faire approach to macro-economics:
      https://kenanfellows.org/kfp-cp-sites/cp01/cp01/sites/kfp-cp-sites.localhost.com.cp01/files/LP3_BBC Irish Famine Article for Lab.pdf
       
      The Bengal famine is another one where government policy was different to the one Prophet Yusuf ((عليه السلام).) prescribed to Pharoah. In this instance, it was lack of government restriction over the action of privateers:
      https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/29/winston-churchill-policies-contributed-to-1943-bengal-famine-study
       
      Going back still further, the Great Bengal Famine of 1770 has been directly attributed to British government laissez-faire economic policy.
      https://worldfinancialreview.com/the-political-economy-of-famines-during-the-british-rule-in-india-a-critical-analysis/
       
      Light interference - provision of information
      A common policy option nowadays, where people do not want direct government intervention is to recommend improving the provision of information to the population who will then be better able to make the correct decisions for themselves. The government could have mounted an information campaign during the years of plenty and told people to hoard food themselves, hoarding when there is no shortage is allowed in Islam.
      However such attempts to influence awareness about the famine to come and changing peoples' attitudes so that they saved more than they were used to, would likely have run against increased social pressures on people to do the opposite. For example typically in societies as wealth increases there is social pressure to spend more, in this case, for example, have more lavish weddings.
      Also providing information would have been a practical benefit for the better off e.g. those with storage capacity, but not so good for the poor (who would not have room to store grain, for example).
      The government (using a bit more intervention) could have given tax breaks to people who owned granaries, to help the poor who needed such facilities. Again this solution would be to focus on market-based interventions and simply alter the working of the market using incentives. Current economic theory holds that people discount future risks very heavily i.e. they don't perceive them as much of a threat as they should. So, for example, just telling people they should save for a pension does not work. 
      So we can likely predict that the solutions described above would not have worked had they tried them.
      Heavy interference
      This is what they actually did.
      In times of plenty, Pharoah's government did not let prices fall as would have happened under free market conditions. They kept prices higher than they otherwise would have been because the government intervened and took excess stocks of grain out of circulation.
      All people (rich and poor alike) had no option but to pay the usual higher prices - effectively, the government was taxing everyone, but this was not seen as a loss by anyone because the prices were no higher than usual.
      The government stored the grain centrally and then they decided to release the grain according to their own policies.
      Assumptions made by Prophet Yusuf's government
      If you leave people to their own devices they may not make the best decisions (whether they are rich or poor), this could be due to: People do not have the resources to cater for future shocks (mainly the poor) People do not have the discipline to address future shocks (applies to both the rich and the poor) The government can make better decisions than individuals acting in their own self-interest because: The government can have access to more and better information than individuals do The government may not be as susceptible to a lack of self-discipline  
      Conclusion
      Of all the policy options open to Prophet Yusuf (عليه السلام) he advised Pharoah to pursue the most interventionist one. Some people may be tempted to call this socialist or communist, but I think those terms carry a lot of excess baggage, so I won't bring them into the discussion.
      What I think can be safely inferred from his choice of policy is a fundamental principle that could inform economic policy in any Islamic state.
      Facing an external shock to the Egyptian economy, he went for the option that would cause the least pain to the worst off in society. Other policy options would have caused more pain for the poorest but somewhat less for the better off.
       
       
    • shadow_of_light
      From Earth to Heaven
      By shadow_of_light in From Earth to Heaven
         0 comments
      Final part of my book, narrated by my dear friend, Mrs. Solmaz Rezayi
      Music: Below the Horizon by Guy Sweens
      Images created by ai bing image generator
    • Haji 2003
      Surfacing Satan
      By Haji 2003 in Contemporania
         3 comments
      Gains and losses
      It's tempting to think of human experiences, in terms of gains or losses, especially those which involve dealing with other people and groups. Some exchanges lend themselves to this calculus e.g. trade or war. However, a focus on the material element of the equation can often ignore the intangible aspects of the encounter or the trade. The latter can often have longer-term and more profound consequences.
      For believers faced with what can seem to be a loss in the material world, it's worth reflecting on what has been gained in the spiritual world. At the moment, in the Middle East there is a dynamic movement of politics and people being played out. Certain groups are gaining power, others are losing. Some people are dying and others are killing them. It's easy to construct the balance sheet in terms of human casualties, square kilometres of land and who holds power.
      But this ignores the bigger picture.
      Spiritual vs. material
      What is also happening is the surfacing of opinions, standpoints and, most importantly, behaviours. In a world at equilibrium, peoples' discourse can often hide their true beliefs and they can avoid engaging in behaviours which make explicit where they stand. 
      However, standing as we are in a world where there is disequilibrium, where the stakes are high for a reconfiguration of the Middle East as the tectonic plates shift, so people become more willing to disclose who they really are. 
      This is a win for the believers. Tempted by the greed for gain, this is where Satan's mask drops, and reality becomes evident. People motivated primarily by gains in this world no longer hide where they really stand - they believe they can achieve far more by grabbing as much as they can possibly have.
      The speed with which events take place makes it impossible for aggressors to hide their tracks. More importantly they believe that they no longer need to do so because the victory is so overwhelming that they will never be brought to account.
      Understanding reality
      Knowing the objective reality of this world can often be quite difficult; it's usually shrouded by our limitations and weaknesses. Often, believers are tempted to ask God for 'signs' to substantiate their belief. We think how easy it must have been for the ancients who lived in a world of miracles to have belief.
      But the miracles are all around us.
      As Satan's mask drops, we can see the people who would typically protest about human rights as part of their overall 'belief system' but are utterly silent about genocide. We can see that people who were horrified by the death of a single Iranian woman are now completely silent about the deaths of thousands.
      And indeed, it's not just silence - there's active subterfuge on their part to protect the aggressor. We see evidence of social media algorithms being changed. We see evidence of the identify of the aggressor being hidden where typically it would not be. Journalists who held themselves to be paragons of integrity have been seen to be weak and supine. Newspapers that used to criticise other countries for censorship have been found to be self-censoring with abandon.
      It's now been left to ordinary people often those with no interest in that part of the world taking note of journalists who have been summarily removed simply for asking Israeli representatives the wrong questions. And just as technology has enabled aggressors to have superior weapons so we are able to better measure and compare the published narrative and have no doubt about what is happening.
      And that's just the media.
      As for political leaders, we can see the people who claim leadership of Muslims but who show none when world events demand it. We can see the leaders who not only fail to protect the oppressed but who take an active part in the oppression. Their followers are left having to make excuses or alternatively make up new ideologies to replace those found to be wanting.
      Crumbling in front of us is the whole edifice of human rights, feminism, democracy, freedom of the press, international system of crime and justice and all those other things that have been used to beat up Muslims for decades. Of course, there is nothing wrong with them per se - but it's now obvious that there was never any principle underpinning their use. They were only a weaponised tool whose promoters were kept on a tight leash and allowed to attack some countries while we now see them willingly held back from applying the same rules to others.
      Claims of a 'superior civilisation' (whose superiority above Islam we were told we should accept) are now an embarrassment except to those with no reason or shame. Its promoters have traded them for gains in this world and have given up whatever echoes they wished to leave for eternity. And even those gains will prove to be short lived. The moral high ground needs legitimacy which has now disappeared.
      Implications for us
      It's at times like this that we might be saddened by the loss of people and places. But at the same time, our faith should be reinvigorated by the knowledge that what others believe is false, whose hypocrisy is made manifest and most importantly, whose ethical and moral position is so weak that it requires extreme violence to uphold.
      Shias more than anyone know that gains and losses on the battlefield are not the end of the story.

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