Jump to content


Veteran Member
  • Content count

  • Joined

  • Last visited

  • Days Won


.InshAllah. last won the day on June 17 2014

.InshAllah. had the most liked content!

About .InshAllah.

  • Rank
  • Birthday 05/02/2005

Contact Methods

  • Website URL

Previous Fields

  • Gender

Recent Profile Visitors

7,176 profile views
  1. When God revealed Himself to Sartre

    This famous atheist philosopher of the 20th century had an incredible experience of God. Instead of welcoming it with awe, wonder and joy, he reacted with indignation and rage and blasphemy. It's really sad. It reminded of another famous atheist philosopher Thomas Nagel writing that he doesnt want there to be a God, and hopes there isnt.
  2. Only once did I have the feeling that [God] existed. I had been playing with matches and burned a small rug. I was in the process of covering up my crime when suddenly God saw me. I felt His gaze inside my head and on my hands. I whirled about in the bathroom, horribly visible, a live target. Indignation saved me. I flew into a rage against so crude an indiscretion, I blasphemed... He never looked at me again. Jean-Paul Sartre
  3. Exposing Imam Shaikh Brother Mohammad Tawhidi

    Who Needs Enemies When the Ummah Has Friends Like Muhammad Tawhidi? Analysing Tommy Robinson’s Interview with the ‘Imam of Peace’ - by Sheikh Jafar Ladak https://themuslimvibe.com/muslim-current-affairs-news/who-needs-enemies-when-the-ummah-has-friends-like-muhammad-tawhidi-analysing-tommy-robinsons-interview-with-the-imam-of-peace
  4. The Fitra

    Why is belief in God so widespread? The Islamic answer is that it's because mankind has a God-given fitra, or innate tendency to believe in God. This wasn't the answer atheists typically gave. For Marx, religion was something propagated by the oppressive ruling class, to control the masses, 'the opium of the people'. The 19th century anthropologist Tyler explained religion as a primitive attempt to explain life and death. For Freud, religion was a means to control the Oedipal complex, wish fulfillment, and means to control the outside world. For sociologist Rodney Stark, religious beliefs act as 'compensators' for failures to attain certain goals. Add to this list all other possible secular sociological explanations and anthropological explanations. Any one of these theories could have been proven to be the true and complete explanation, and refuted the Islamic explanation of fitra. And yet, according to the findings of contemporary Science, in the words of atheist Professor of Psychology Alison Gopnik: Islam is right: we do have an innate tendency or fitra to believe in God. It's not because of class struggle, or compensation, or brain-washing. Does this prove that God gave us this innate tendency? No, I'm not claiming that. For psychologists who aren't keen on religion, it's a mistaken innate tendency to attribute teleology and intentionality to everything - of course they aren't going to say that it's God-given. What I am claiming is that Science has confirmed a claim of religion, specifically Islam and some versions of Christianity, that we have an innate tendency to believe in God. Science has proven the existence of the fitra, in a very basic sense. This is just one of many other instances in which Science has confirmed the religious worldview in some way or another, e.g. Big Bang cosmology showing the Universe had a beginning, fine tuning in its various forms pointing to design, falsity of determinism undermining classical materialism, psi research and NDEs showing that we aren't our brains etc. The list isn't exhaustive.
  5. Rationality of Infallibility (Isma)

    Salam @Intellectual Resistance You make some very good points, thank you! Regarding blameworthiness, you are right to imply that it is broader than committing sin. So I will amend that portion of the argument to: Even if we only ever commit 1 sin, we become deserving of punishment, unless we repent We ought to never act in a way that makes us deserving of punishment Therefore we ought to never commit even 1 sin. As to being relatable, I agree this is important, so that God wouldnt send robots for example, or beings radically different to us - they would have to be humans who felt the same emotions and suffered the same pain and losses as we did etc. You might think that the best guide is one who is most relatable, but I think that is wrong. Imagine a rapist, murderer, drug abuser, who wants to turn their life around. They might relate most to someone who was also as corrupt as them but has managed to make some small changes. Such a person, although maximally relatable for this individual, would not be a divinely sent guide. This is partly because such a person would be a bad example to lots of others, and would not embody all of the moral virtues required to be a divinely sent guide. This shows that being maximally relatable is not a necessary characteristic of a best guide. Having said all that, sinlessness for us is an achievable goal - why wouldnt it be? In fact that above argument (with bullet points) in addition with the premise that 'ought imples can' entails that we can be sinless. For if we ought to never sin, and ought implies can, then we can live such a way that involves no sinning. It is incredibly difficult, which is why we should value the Prophet and Ahlul Bayt so much. The archer example is not analogous in an important way - there is no moral imperative to always hit the bulls eye, and to never miss, but there is a moral imperative to not sin. Its late here aswell, so I also apologise if Ive misunderstood any of your points : )
  6. 1. All things equal, a perfect God sends the best guides (Premise) 2. The best guides are those who show us how best to live (Premise) 3. We ought to live without sin (Premise) Argument for (3): Even if we only ever commit 1 sin, we become blameworthy (hence the need to repent) We ought to never act in a way that makes us blameworthy Therefore we ought to never commit even 1 sin. 4. The best guides show us how to live without sin (from 2 and 3) 5. The best way these guides can show us how to live, is through example (Premise) 6. Therefore the best guides are sinless (from 4 and 5) 7. Therefore, all things equal, a perfect God sends sinless guides (Conclusion, from 1 and 6)
  7. Zeno's paradox

    He is using a logical argument, so if he wants to undermine logic, then he is undermining his own argument.
  8. I'm a bit confused about the Sayyid's position. He says that if there are necessities of religion, and if one denies them, then they leave that religion. He then gives some possible definitions of necessities of religion, and his main argument is that there is no evidence for any of these definitions. Furthermore, the phrase 'necessities of religion' is not found in hadith or Qur'an. He concludes by saying that we have to look at each doctrine and ruling on a case by case basis, to see if their denial entail kufr or not from the hadith and Quran, What confuses me is that, why doesn't he just say that something is a necessity of religion according to Qur'an or hadith if its denial entails kufr? That seems to be his position. Is his concern a purely a semantic one ,i.e. he just doesn't like the phrase 'necessities of religion'? Or does he think there is no one doctrine the denial of which entails kufr, in which case, what makes someone a Muslim rather than a Jew, Christian or atheist according to the Sayyid?
  9. Thanks @Ibn al-Hussain I'll take a look. Actually I just jumped to the most recent lectures and haven't really watched any from around mid-20s until 79 (apart from a few clips). I was hoping you were still summarizing them as its much easier just to read a summary in English!
  10. I was listening to a lecture by Sayid Kamal AlHaidery (فقه الورأة No 79) and from about 35 minutes he discusses 'the necessities of religion' الضروريات الدينية He argues that there are no 'necessities of religion'. He doesn't tell us what he means by 'necessities of religion', but he does point out that there are many understandings of what this means, and which meaning one chooses is a matter of personal study and reflection. He argues that ironically, it is the very fact that people disagree about the meaning of 'necessities of religion', that entails there are no necessities. This is because if it is an open question what 'necessities of religion' means, then one is open to either accept or reject these necessities. On the other hand, if there were truly necessities, then one would have to believe in them, i.e. they would be necessary to believe in, and it would not be an open question. This is my understanding of his argument: 1. NR: 'There are necessities of religion' (Assumption) 2. NR is itself not a necessity (Premise, based on the fact that there is disagreement and debate about it) 3. If NR is not a necessity, then there are no necessities of religion 4. Therefore, there are no necessities of religion (Conclusion, from 2 and 3) As much as I respect him, I believe his argument here is flawed. Premise 3 is unjustified. To see why, lets assume for the sake of argument that 'necessities of religion' means necessary to be a Muslim, and that these necessities are Tawhid, Nubuwwa, Ma'ad. Then it would be necessary to believe in these in order to be a Muslim. Logically, NR would follow. But what would NOT follow, would be the necessity to BELIEVE in NR. In other words, NR would be true, but one wouldn't have to believe that it is true in order to be a Muslim. They should believe its true because it follows logically, but they could be mistaken, or never have thought about it, and they would still be a Muslim. The same could be said on other interpretations of necessity, such as: -necessity means something everyone readily sees as true -something evident from the scriptures -something that doesnt need syllogistic proof. More interesting is his second point which is that Muslims have had radically different ideas about all theological doctrines. Take La Illaha Illa Allah. A Salafi believes this to mean one things, but a Sufi takes it to mean something radically different, yet they're both Muslim, so what does it mean to say that La Illaha Illa Allah is a necessity of religion. This needs more thought on my behalf, but I would say that there is some basic overlap between even the Salafi and the Sufi. For example, both would say it entails that there aren't two Gods.
  11. Spring & Akhira

    ^Thanks. I dont think these are the original sources though, but books of tafsir that have mentioned the narration
  12. Spring & Akhira

    Salams For many of us, Spring is only round the corner I read this hadith in Man and Universe by Ayt. Mutaharri [r]: اذا رايتم الربيع فأكثروا ذكر النشور The Prophet ص said: If you witness Spring, then increase in the remembrance of the Resurrection* He explains this by the fact that both Spring and the Resurrection are times of renewal. I never made this connection before reading this hadith, perhaps partly because I see Spring as a beautiful time of year, whereas in my mind I associate Resurrection with scary ideas of fear of punishment and hell fire, (as well as positive notions of justice being done, and the good being rewarded.) But I've now come to see Resurrection as a beautiful thing, not because I've learned something new about it, but because renewal is a beautiful process. *He doesn't give a reference for this hadith. Anyone know where he got it from, how many versions there are, and whether we have any ahadith with similar meanings?
  13. Creation of Animals.

  14. Appendix: Is God male? (Page 246 from Five Proofs for the Existence of God by Edward Feser) Being immaterial and incorporeal, God is not an animal, and thus he is not a rational animal or human being. And since he is not a human being, he is not literally either a man or a woman. He is sexless. Nevertheless, the traditional practice has been to characterize God in masculine terms, and I have followed that practice in this book. Some contemporary writers object to such usage, dismissing it as “sexist” and lacking in rational justification. Hence they often adopt the “politically correct” and clumsy practice of referring to God as “he / she / it”. But in fact there are good philosophical reasons for the traditional usage. Consider first of all that as we have seen, there is in God intellect and will, and these attributes are definitive of personality. Accordingly, God cannot appropriately be characterized in impersonal terms, as an “it”. But then, why “he” and “him”, rather than “she” and “her”? The reason is that God’s relationship to the world is much more like a paternal relationship than it is like a maternal relationship. Biologically speaking, a father’s role in procreation is active insofar as he impregnates, and a mother’s role is passive insofar as she is impregnated. There is no change to a father’s physiology as a consequence of impregnation, whereas there is a radical change in the mother’s physiology.92 The mother becomes more physically dependent on the father, who must provide for his mate and for their unborn child—even if, unfortunately, some fathers do not do their duty in this regard. As that sad fact indicates, the father is in no way physically dependent on his mate or their child, which is why he can (even if he shouldn’t) leave the scene. There is also a literal physiological connection between the child and its mother that doesn’t exist between the child and its father, who is literally more distant during the whole process of gestation. Now, there are obvious analogies here to God’s relationship to the world. God is active insofar as he creates the world, whereas the world is passive insofar as it is created by God. As pure actuality, God is entirely unchangeable, whereas the world is a mixture of actuality and potentiality that is continuously changing. The world depends entirely on God at every instant, whereas God in no way depends on the world. The world could not exist without God even though he could exist without it. God is also utterly distinct from the world rather than being identical to it (as in pantheism) or even continuous with it (as in panentheism). So, given the key elements of classical theism, which is the position defended in this book, the most natural and least misleading way of characterizing God is in paternal and thus masculine terms. Maternal imagery would suggest that God is changeable or continuous with the world, which would in turn suggest a panentheist conception of God, or a pantheist conception, or a conception which in some other way is at odds with God’s immutability, immateriality, eternity, and pure actuality.