91 replies to this topic

[Ishraq]

Jebreil,

Your attempt to maintain both temporal origination and the immutability of God is puzzling. It seems to me the two doctrines are at odds with each other. IOW, given the definition of change/motion as the actualization of a potential qua potential, you cannot maintain them both. For holding temporal origination effectively ascribes potency to God. And that’s problematic for many reasons, one of which is that He, in creating i.e., in actualizing a given potency, becomes mutable.

Edited by Ishraq, 21 July 2012 - 05:42 PM.

[wundermonk]

Jebreil, on 22 July 2012 - 04:24 AM, said:

The essence is non-existent and it becomes existent because of God.

In what way is the essence non-existent? There are multiple ways:

(1)Essence is non-existent like the square circle.
(2)Essence is non-existent like a lion's horns.
(3)Essence is non-existent like ice is when its material cause water is in liquid form.

[wundermonk]

My point is that both (1) and (2) are errors - they are empty vacuous terms that have no referrents. This is clear to see in case of (1) but can also be seen if one sits down to define a lion. There is no valid cognition that can be aroused by these collection of words - hence, they are to be considered errors.

Edited by wundermonk, 22 July 2012 - 05:43 AM.

[Ishraq]

Greetings,

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Thank you for addressing.

You're welcome.

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Though I was hoping they would merge, they haven't yet. The change, I hold, is in the essence of things themselves. […].

The focus here is not the terminus of God's activity i.e., the essences, but God's activity itself. As such, the change is also in God because His potency for creating becomes actualized once He creates these essences.

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So willing is not a change in God but the alteration from potential to actual of the non-existing essence and nothing else. […].

God, you seem to hold, does not will eternally. If that is so, then when He wills He necessarily changes i.e., from not having willed. IOW, in actualizing the potencies of these essences He actualizes His potency for willing said essences. And given that any transition for potency to act is a change/motion, God would then have undergone change/motion in causing.

[Ishraq]

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God's willing is not a change in Him but in the generation of quiddities.

Again, only provided that this ‘act of willing’ is eternal. Otherwise, you cannot escape change.

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But a concomitant of "actualisation" is a state "prior to actualisation", where there is pure "potential" such that nothing but God exists.

This is incorrect. The state prior to actualization in things which are temporally originated – in this case the world as per your belief - isn’t a concomitant of their actualization. You’ve put the cart before the horse here. A concomitant of a thing is posterior to that thing, but this state of pure potential is prior to the actualizing activity of God. The proof of this is that it is supposed to be explanatory of creation; given that, had it not been prior, then temporal origination would be an impossibility.

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This is based on an analogy between how creatures "will" and how God "wills". This word is equivocal.

Well then, you’ve effectively made God’s activity unintelligible in principle. So this does not help your case in the least.

[Ishraq]

Jebreil,

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I am sorry. When I said 'concomitant', I meant 'prerequisite'.

I see. We’re on the same page then.

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The prerequisite of actualisation is a state prior to actualisation such that nothing but God exists. If creation is actualisation, a prerequisite of it is pure potential prior to actualisation, therefore prior to creation.

I agree with all this. But now, given the above, we have to determine just exactly what the ontological status of this potentiality or possibility is.  In doing this, you will come up, surely enough, against one of Ibn Sina’s arguments for the eternity of creation. Take, he says, any temporally originated object i.e., an object whose existence was preceded by nonexistence. We agree that prior to its existence, the potentiality or possibility for its existence existed. Granted that, what now is the ontological status of this potentiality; that is to say, given that it exists as a real feature of extra-mental reality, what is the nature or mode of its existence. For the Shaykh’s conclusion that its nature is to inhere in a substrate, cf. the discussion here. We’ll go on from there.

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This "eternal willing" is erroneous both philosophically and theologically. Philosophically because, if true, God and creation would both be necessary beings, for creation would not be but for God, and God cannot be conceived of but with some creation. […].

No, the Shaykh draws an important distinction here: God is uniquely necessary through Himself (wajib al-wujud bi-dhatihi) , while creation is necessary through another (wajib al-wujud bi-ghayrihi). That should hopefully mitigate your concerns.

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[…] a thing changes when it suddenly likes to will or the willed comes to be because of what a thing eternally likes. Creatures' wills are of the former and God's will is the latter.

What do you mean ‘likes’? Do you mean ‘desires’? If so, then note that desire is subordinate to knowledge and in God it isn’t anything apart from His willing. So this is just to say that God’s desire or will is posterior to His knowledge. Now if He ‘eternally likes’ i.e., desires, then, given that the will follows the intellect, He also eternally knows. But God’s simplicity demands that knowing and willing are identical in Him. It would follow then that He eternally wills what He eternally knows. Otherwise, you’d have to, again, posit temporal gaps between His knowing, and His desiring or willing. And doing this will make Him mutable.

Edited by Ishraq, 25 July 2012 - 03:16 PM.

[Ishraq]

Jebreil,

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From that link, I did not understand the proof for the minor. Please explain it if you could

Sure. Basically, the Shaykh’s aim is to deny two views about the status of potentiality or possibility with a view to affirming a third. The views he denies are (1) that it is a substance and (2) that it is a substance-relation complex. The view he affirms is (3) that it exists in a substrate. He denies (1) because, unlike substances, possibilities are always correlative or relational. That is, they’re always related to something else and are hence only, as he says, “intelligible by the comparison” i.e., with the other things for which they are possibilities. A relation after all involves two terms. Substances though do not essentially involve relations; nothing else is needed for them to be completed or exist or be understood precisely as substances. Then he denies (2) because possibility or potentiality, being essentially for something, is also as a result privative; that is, it’s the (relative) absence of some kind of existence i.e., of the thing the possibility or potentiality is for. This I think is the meaning of the Shaykh’s words when he says “possible existence cannot be a substance that has a relation, because that relation is associated with something assumed to be nonexistent [i.e., the thing to which the possibility is related].” In other words, the substance-relation composite, as something that actually exists, cannot as such be identified with possibility; for the latter, as a privation of sorts, lacks such actual existence which characterizes the former. We’re left then with the third view, which he affirms as the correct one.

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Why would you say that God is the Necessary Being through Himself when the only logical way (according to the believers in the eternity of the world) for God to be is through His willing something else?

No, not quite. His willing is not distinct from Him. But the object of His will i.e., creation, is distinct from Him. However, because He necessarily exists through Himself, it means it would be absurd for Him (and Him alone) not to exist. Creation however, although necessary through Him, is only possible in itself (mumkin bi-dhatihi). As such, there isn’t anything absurd in the supposition of its nonexistence considered in itself i.e., in the absence of its cause. It would be absurd, though, to suppose it as nonexistent in relation to its cause, i.e., God.

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Logically, His being depends on His being, through His will, with something else, for otherwise it would be illogical (according to this view) for Him to be. The absurd consequence would be that He Himself alone is not sufficient for His being.

See above.

[Ishraq]

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Ramaḍān mubarak!

The same to you Jebreil.

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I have a question regarding the 3rd view, inherence (?) in a substrate: if x knows y, is it said that the knowledge of y inheres in substance x?

Yes, that would be correct. Knowledge inheres in your soul. But, knowledge is not a relation. Anyway, getting back to the nature of imkan itself, if you’re content with what the Shaykh has said, we can move on and I can list the next steps in the argument.

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If the creature is mumkin bi-dhāt because it can be conceived of as non-existent in itself without absurdity, the requirement for imkān bi-dhāt would be "that, the conception of which does not entail its existence".

The mumkin is that the conception of which neither entails its existence nor its nonexistence.

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But if it is necessary that God is with something else, the conception of God alone would not entail its existence, but for the existence of a creature (which we have excluded from our conception). Therefore, God would be mumkin bi-dhāt. However, it would be absurd to suppose its non-existence in relation to a creature (for a God with creature is what is necessary, according to the eternalist). God would then be wājib bi-ghayrihī. (or more precisely: wājib bi sharti ghayrihī )

This seems to me a bit confused. Again, God is necessary in Himself. He cannot possibly not exist. Creation, on the contrary, is necessary through Him. In itself, it is merely possible. That is, should God, per impossibile, not exist, creation would not exist. But the converse is not true; for, again, in terms of existence, creation depends on God. Hence, to say something like God may be mumkin bi-dhat because He cannot be conceived apart from creation is to misunderstand what it means to be a possible existent. A possible existent in itself, as the Shaykh says, is completely indeterminate with respect to either existence or nonexistence. But something that is wajib bi-dhatihi is assuredly not like this at all i.e., it is existence itself.

[Ishraq]

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I am interested to read the rest of the argument.

Alright, the next steps can be put into the following syllogism.

Given that possibility or potentiality must inhere in a substratum, this substratum will either be (a) immaterial or (b ) material. If (a ), then either (a.1) an uncreated immaterial substratum or (a.2) a created one. But it cannot inhere in (a ), that is, in either (a.1) or (a.2). Therefore, it must inhere in (b ).
As it’s getting late here though, I’ll have to delay the proofs for the major and minor premises until tomorrow.

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I accept that mumkin entails neither existence nor the lack thereof. I think you are saying that "God alone (without creation)" is impossible, much like how "creation alone (without God)" is impossible.

Yes.

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This means "God" and "creation" are mumkin and exist only with the existence of the other.

I'm inclined to object. A cause does not depend for its existence on its effect. You’re equivocating on the term ‘mumkin’ and so the desired conclusion does not follow. That is to say, God does not depend on something else in the relevant way that is required by the term mumkin. He cannot then be considered mumkin. A thing that is possible, you agree, is indifferent to either existence or nonexistence and needs a cause to necessitate the one rather than the other. God would have to be like this, which He is surely not, for you to be able to make the charge you’re making. Otherwise, your objection, based as it is on (1) what you can and cannot conceive and (2) an equivocal use of mumkin, is misplaced. But even (1) is strictly speaking false. See below.

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For something to be a Necessary Being in itself, it would mean that it is sufficient for its own existence and does not require the existence of anything else.

Yet, to say it is necessary that God is with something and it is impossible that God be without a willed thing is to say that God necessarily requires the existence of something else for it to exist; i.e. it is not sufficient for His own existence.

Therefore, God is not a Necessary Being in itself.

I deny the major and the minor and therefore the conclusion. As for the major, it ought to more precisely be formulated as ‘does not require the existence of anything else’ as a cause of its existence. As for the minor, it appears sophistical. From the that fact it is impossible for God to be without His effect, it does not follow that He therefore causally depends on His effect. As I’ve said above, the inference is illegitimate because it is based on an equivocation on the term mumkin. Further, strictly speaking, the assumption of ‘God not creating’ (or ‘God alone’ or ‘the nonexistence of creation’) is false and for two reasons: (1) on my view, in assuming that, you’re effectively assuming an absurdity, and from an absurdity i.e., a contradiction, anything (like e.g., God is mumkin) follows. And (2), it simply isn’t true that God cannot be conceived of apart from creation. In fact, He can be so conceived and creation can be conceived apart from Him. However, it does not follow that in reality He can exist without His effect or that creation can exist without its cause. As the Shaykh says, consider here the way in which a given quiddity can be conceived solely in itself, apart from anything else, e.g., extra-mental existence or mental existence (wujud dhihni). But in reality, it either exists in one of those modes, never in neither. The same is the case with God and creation. To then make the charge of God being possible in Himself based on this fact is not only to, again, equivocate on what it means to be mumkin, but it is also to make a category mistake (with respect to the order of being and the order of conceptualization).

[Ishraq]

Salam,

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The substrate is God's knowledge, which is immaterial.

I deny this. I will present proof for the minor later on tonight. Apologies for the delay. I just don't have the time to write it out at the moment.

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I am not equivocating on mumkin because I have taken its meaning to be the same everywhere: that which cannot be said to be but for the existence of another.

God would have to depend on His effect the way an effect depends on its cause for Him to be considered mumkin. But on this view, that isn’t the case. He cannot therefore be possible in the way your objection requires. Again, (1) not only are you committing a category mistake by drawing a conclusion about the order of extra-mental reality from what is the case in mental reality (your conceptualization), but, even more importantly,  (2) the very claim that God cannot be conceived without creation, is false. Regarding (1), something that is true of a quiddity (concept) as it exists in the soul (mind) is not necessarily true of it as it exists outside it i.e., in extra-mental reality. Regarding (2), consider again what I said in my previous post about the quiddity considered in itself. The quiddity can be considered apart from all its determinations, but when it exists, it only exists in one of those determinations, never without them. In the same way, you can consider God apart from creation (or vice versa) in the intellect – that is, you can consider a cause apart from its effect (and vice versa) - but in reality the two do not exist separately. And in this there is no dependency on the existence of the other in the way that a possible thing requires there be.

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The attribute razzāq depends on their being marzūq, but the referent of razzāq can exist without that attribute.

Granted. But the referent of razzaq cannot be razzaq without there being marzuq. And should the referent become razzaq due to the marzuq, then the referent has undergone change.

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Similar with cause.  […]. However, the referent of the attribute may predate the effect - as well as that attribute - which are attributes of action.

On my view, necessary existence is the primary attribute of God. It belongs to Him ‘essentially’, so to speak, and all other attributes follow from that attribute. Hence, God has always had His attributes of action. That is, God was never not al-Razzaq.

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The formulation: does not require the existence of anything else is adequate for the following reasons:

It is not adequate because it does not specify the kind of relation the term ‘require’ is presumably meant to convey. Do you mean, as I’ve suggested, ‘require causally’. If so, then God is not mumkin as He does not causally depend on, or require, creation. If not, then you must mean ‘require for its conceptualization’. If so, then, again, I present the two objections stated above, namely, (1) you commit a category mistake here and (2) God can be conceived apart from creation (and vice versa). If not though, then please specify your meaning as it seems to me there isn’t any other option.

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[…]. The only self-sufficiency an eternalist holds is this complex: God with some creature. Not just God. If God was self-sufficient, it would be the Necessary Being with or without another. (Yet it is being said that "Just God without the other" is absurd, and so God is not self-sufficient).

Again, from the fact that it is impossible that God not create, it does not follow that He is therefore not self-sufficient. Self-sufficiency concerns the non-derivation of existence as from a cause. But this is absent in the God-creation relationship; that is, God is essentially prior to His creation, so how then can you imply that He is causally dependant on it i.e., in the way that He would have to be for Him to not be self-sufficient? You’re objection, it seems to me, is really no better than the one those who say something like ‘God is dependent on His knowledge’; hence He is not is self-sufficient. It’s clearly sophistical.

[Ishraq]

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Take your time. I am grateful that you are working through Ibn Sina's argument with me.

I'm enjoying the exchange Jebreil.

The gist of the proof of the Shaykh for the minor premise i.e., that possibility cannot be located in God’s knowledge, is the following. To say God’s knowledge serves as the ultimate basis of possibility is to say that the mumkinat refer to the contents of God’s knowledge and represent all that can possibly exist. Fine, let’s suppose that. The Shaykh, at VIII.7, 292.8-12 of the Ilahiyyat of the Shifa’, then writes:

“[…] if the intelligibles with Him have […] multiplicity, the multiplicity of the forms He intellectually apprehends would constitute parts of His essence. […] For His intellectual apprehension of His essence is identical to His essence; […].” (Emphasis mine).

That is to say, given God’s simplicity, or more specifically, the identity of God’s essence and knowledge - which you agree with – introducing multiplicity (i.e., the possibilities which have their basis in His knowledge) into His knowledge thereby introduces multiplicity into His essences. If that is so, then His simplicity is jeopardized. He then becomes composed i.e., by the multiplicity of the contents of His knowledge, and as such is no longer the Necessary Being, which is absurd. Therefore, possibility cannot have His knowledge as its substrate.

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God is not dependent on His knowledge for He is His knowledge, as knowing is His essence, His self. Is creation His essence, His self? How then can He be self-sufficient if He depends on another?

No, creation is obviously not His essence. But His will, just as His knowledge, is identical to His essence. Now given that, as you also agree, He eternally knows His creation, it follows that He eternal wills it. And if He does that, then His creation is eternal i.e., temporally infinite. There are two ways to avoid this conclusion, both of which involve absurdities. The first is to say His knowledge and will are not identical; the second, on the basis of the first, is to posit a (temporal) delay between His knowledge and His will. As for the first, it jeopardizes His simplicity; for He is now a composite being. As for the second, it, as I’ve been saying, introduces a species (see below) of change into Him i.e., from not willing to willing.

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[…]. Neither are my argument. Rather, my argument is this: an Eternalist holds that God cannot be conceived as existing apart from creation. (the conception would be reduced to absurdity, in other words).

Eternalists don’t hold that. That should’ve been clear from what I’ve been saying. God can be conceived as existing apart from creation. But in reality, for independent reasons, He in fact does not exist apart from His effect i.e., creation. As I’ve been saying, ‘conceivability’ with regards to this issue i.e., whether or not God can be conceived as existing with creation, is neither here nor there; that is, it’s inconsequential. To think otherwise is to commit a category mistake.

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Thus, God's existence depends on the existence of creation. I do not say creation causes God. I say creation is necessary for God to exist and without the necessity of creation, God in Himself is impossible. This denigrates His Majesty and renders Him insufficient for His own existence.

No, I don’t think so. It seems you've just now switched from using the term ‘require’ to using the term ‘necessary’. But the same problem remains. That is, necessary in what way? Causally? If so, then God is not possible in the way your objection requires, because He does not causally depend on creation. It’s rather the other way around. If not causally, then it must be conceptually. If so, then, again, (1) you’re making a category mistake and (2) God can in fact be conceived of without reference to creation and vice versa. You can simply do it yourself: think of God, without thinking also of creation, that is, without thinking of their causal relationship. And vice versa.

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A child that suckles the mother's breast becomes Marzūq and the mother and her breast become Rāziq. The mother sits still while the baby suckles.

Before the child suckled her breast, he was not marzuq. More accurately, he had the potency to suckle her breast and the potency to become marzuq. When he came to suckle it, he became marzuq. His potency to suckle her breast became actualized and his potency to become marzuq actualized. The first is a change in place and the second is a change in quality. With the mother, she only changes qualitatively i.e., in becoming raziq. Remember, locomotion is only one species of change. There are three others (for a total of four), namely, qualitative, quantitative and positional. On your view of God’s activity, in becoming raziq after not having been, God undergoes qualitative change.

[Ishraq]

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If quality change was a real change in essence then the change of x from being lone child to sister should be a change in the essence of x. You could say x had the potency to become a sister and then, with the birth of y, this potency was actualised.

First, in this example, though it’s a change, the change is not a change in the essence because the sister’s essence is not identical to any of her attributes or qualities. But God’s being is not like this though. His essence is identical to His attributes, so a change in them is a change in it. Second, the example you’ve chosen (i.e., the relation of sisterhood), although it still requires a change in one of its terms (i.e., in the x), is, I must say, rather tendentious. A closer analogue to what’s involved in the kind of relation that comes to be as a result God’s creative act would the relation of fatherhood. That is, the relation of fatherhood comes to subsist in a potential father after he has generated his offspring. Once he has done so, he has actualized his potential for being a father and is actually now a father. There’s clearly a change here. Just in the same way, your view entails that God undergoes change - even the more so because His essence is identical with His attributes - when He exercises His creative act. The basis of the relation of fatherhood is the generative act of the father; the basis of the relation of God to His creation is the creative act of the Creator. In both cases, something i.e., a relation, comes to subsist i.e., in becoming actualized, in the subjects of both relations i.e., the father in the first and God in the second.

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But I hold this to be a mental construct (ar. iʿtibārī ). Similar for the change of quality in the breast and the change of the applicability of the attributes of action upon God.

Exactly what here is ‘i’tibari? The relation of sisterhood that holds between x and y? Or is it qualitative changes? This will get you into absurdities.

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I blame my use of "conception" for the confusion. It could mean that we cannot intellect God separate from intellecting creation. This is not what I mean. I say "it is inconceivable that" intending to say "it is impossible that" or "it is absurd that". I understand an Eternalist believes the idea "God exists and there is no creation" to be absurd and impossible.

Yes, what would be more accurate to say is not ‘conceptualize’ (tasawwur) but ‘make the judgment’ (tasdiq) i.e., the proposition ‘God exists and there is creation does not’ is false and absurd.

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Thus, "God" can be said to be the necessary being if and only if a certain "other-than-God" is said to exist simultaneous to God. (otherwise, the notion of God existing would be impossible)
This results in the conclusion that God's is necessary not just from itself but from the existence of another, for without that other it could not be said to exist - it would be absurd and impossible.

No. To say ‘it is impossible that God should exist without His effect also existing’ does not imply, as your objection suggests that it does, He is necessary only through another – which is another way of saying ‘He causally exists thorough another’. For the question of what is and is not necessary through another is a question of causal dependency. You agree that causes do not depend for their existence on their effects, even in cases where the two are simultaneous, so it isn’t clear to me what your objection here has going for it. Consider the causal relation between the hand and the stick it moves. The stick’s motion is simultaneous with that of the hand. But it is self-evident that it is the hand that is here the cause, not the stick. The stick moves only insofar as the hand moves it. God’s causal relation to His creation is, I maintain, of this sort. Given that, to then say ‘the hand’s movement depends on that of the stick’s’ is to misunderstood the kind of causality i.e., an essential one, involved between God and His effect.

If you object: the hand can exist or move without the stick moving as, say, when the stick is on the ground. I reply: granted, but then it isn’t acting on its effect, which is precisely what is in question here. That is, it is impossible for the hand exercise its causality on the stick (to move the stick) and its effect not come about (the stick moving). So to say, ‘just as the hand can move or exist without the stick doing so, so can God without His effect’ misses the point. The hand qua acting on/moving the stick, the stick is necessarily moving. Moreover, God’s existence is identical with His causality; otherwise, you cannot avoid positing change in Him.

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There is no temporal delay between knowledge and will - for that presumes the reality of time.

But if there is no temporal delay, and, as you say, God eternally knows, then He eternally wills – for there is no temporal delay. The upshot is that creation is eternal.

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Rather, the willing is the temporal change.

I’m not sure what this means. If you can clarify, I’d be great.

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Knowledge and will are not identical.

In God? If so, you’ve made Him composite.

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The will is not a change in Him, but a change in the māhiyyāt which He eternally knows.

The act of willing creation, on your view, also entails that it is also a change in the subject of the will and the will itself. The view that creation was temporally originated entails the exercise of a power i.e., the will, after not having exercised it – for again creation was preceded by nonexistence - and this is a change in the will itself.

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God eternally knows that creation begins and progresses and how. He knows its stages. He knows He wills some and does not will some - how then could it be claimed that the two are identical?

Sure, but the some that He knows that He wills He wills eternally. They are identical because if they weren’t, God would be composed and subject to change. He would be composed because He would consists of an essence and this attribute of will which is distinct from Him. Why He would be subject to change I’ve already explained.

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It does not follow from the multiplicity of known things that knowing them is not simple. There is a difference between knowing and imagining.

I'm not talking about imagining, so if the second sentence is supposed to be a proof of the first, it isn’t at all explanatory. Your piece of knowledge of x is distinct from your knowledge of y. Otherwise, to know x would just be to know y. This is especially true regarding possibilities, for they are essentially distinct from each other. Hence, given that God is identical to His knowledge, to locate their basis in His knowledge is to introduce multiplicity into it. What is needed by you is a proof that distinct possibilities are not in fact distinct. As far I can see, that is absurd.