90 replies to this topic

[Quisant]

Jebreil, on 05 July 2012 - 06:20 AM, said:

Fifth, the relation between Omniscience and Free Will is conceptual. Assuming one concept, does it exclude the other?

Dear Jebreil,

Long time no speak. Are you still talking to me?

The existence of an Omniscient Creator God, whose foreknowledge of future events is necessarily correct, completely precludes human free will.

wslms.
*

[Dante Alighieri]

God's omniscience, along with his act of creation, rules out libertarian free will. But why suppose that it is the correct theory of free will? A much more important issue is whether free will in principle is at all possible. Answering Galen Strawson's basic argument to any satisfactory degree seems like a rather difficult task. It certainly rules out libertarian free will at the very least.

[Ruq]

Quisant, on 05 July 2012 - 02:24 AM, said:

Sorry for the late reply, I only spend a little time on the internet.

I often fail miserably at explaining what I mean because I cannot easily identify with the other person's knowledge.
(Also talking to paws is complicated.    and my English could be better)

Time necessitates materiality in the sense that a mental process (consciousness) needs a physical brain (matter) in order to occur.

Time doesn't occur unless something changes. Conversely, Change can't occur without Time passing.
They are 2 sides of the same coin. You can't have one without the other.

I perceive Time, If Time only exists for me then Time still exists.

Events occur one after the other therefore Time is Linear.

Wslm.
*

Please do not be afraid of the paw on such a tiny bear there is nothing to be feared from it. Panda's will projectile urinate on you if you upset them though.

What if a consciousness isnt a 'mental' process?  isnt attached to brain/ matter? for instance, if consciousness continues after physical death, can it then be called a 'mental' process? i associate mental faculties with the processes of the physical brain being influenced by stimuli on it, whether thats other material stimuli or non material.

[Belial]

Jebreil, on 05 July 2012 - 06:20 AM, said:

Belial

I'll make 5 points.

First, nobody can logically prove the existence of a flying elephant unless it really did exist, just as nobody can prove the existence of an electron unless it really did exist. Proof is something infallible. An existing flying elephant cannot be proven by pure idea. Logicians have known this for 1000 years at least.

That is the reason i brought it up.  Nothing that exists that has any physical relation to the world, can be proven to exist, purely and only through an idea. Proven or not.  A triangle is no more real than a magical pink elephant, if neither have any relation to reality.  Thankfully triangles do exist, hence the value in the pythagorean theorem.

Jebreil, on 05 July 2012 - 06:20 AM, said:

Second, the "proof" for Pythagoras' Theorem is utterly not grounded in reality. The argument for it is not based on evidence. No reality is required. Even if there were no triangles in the world (and it is possible, since a triangle is quite a perfect shape), the theorem would stand if there were.

And as I said before, the value is in application, not in simple ideas.

Jebreil, on 05 July 2012 - 06:20 AM, said:

Third, application of mathematics or geometry or conceptual analysis do deal with reality, but application is not the same as proof.

Sure, though application does provide strong support, often for a set of ideas.  Such as, pythagoreans theorem, and not for something like...pink magical elephants.

Jebreil, on 05 July 2012 - 06:20 AM, said:

Fourth, science only deals with the empirical. The purely rational does not require scientific evidence.

For belief in somethings physical existance or any relation to physical existance, I would say it does. Or atleast, it would be strongly helped if it had it.  If Jesus descended from heaven and demonstrated his omniscience, it woud make our discussion of the topic, far easier. It would make proof of it, far easier as well.  Though Jesus never has, just as a magical pink elephant, hasnt shown himself.

Jebreil, on 05 July 2012 - 06:20 AM, said:

Fifth, the relation between Omniscience and Free Will is conceptual. Assuming one concept, does it exclude the other?

There are far more concepts in this discussion than just omniscience and free will that must be considered. Assuming one concept may or may not exclude the other.

You are speaking as if scientific evidence wouldnt be valued if it were found in favor of an omniscient God. As if it werent something that could strongly shift the discussion toward a conclusion.

Though if this is what you believe, I would beg to differ.  Without objective evidence, we are left with mere ideas.  Thoughts in our minds that arent necisserily real.

The pythagorean theorem would have little to no value to anyone if there were no physical objects to apply it to.  In my imagination, I see a square, and in that square i can fit two triangles.

Does this idea in my imagination have value? Sure its a truth of geometry.  But nobody really cares, and surely this idea in my imagination, doesnt necisserily exist in reality.

But if i had a physically real square and two triangles, then i could show people, and it would be physically real and everyone would accept its reality.

In this discussion over the problem of evil, what we have are...ideas. Pure ideas.  Thats it.  And even those ideas have a number of complications associated with them, aside from them not having any physically real application or arguably even existance.

Oh hold on , i appear to be mixing the two discussion.  Though they do have relation to eachother...

Edited by Belial, 05 July 2012 - 06:10 PM.

[Belial]

Jebreil, on 05 July 2012 - 06:35 PM, said:

Belial

You misread the first point. It is well-known for a very very long time that the pure idea of a pink elephant or any similar notion do not ever imply its existence. It cannot be proven. It would be a non-sequitur.

I think it could exist.

Jebreil, on 05 July 2012 - 06:35 PM, said:

We are not dealing with existence. We are dealing whether the content of one concept excludes the content of another concept. Religions believe in both concepts as real. The OP attacks the compatibility of these two concepts. Thus, the discussion is on whether the two are compatible or not.

the original statement that you confronted me on, was on the actual existence of the idea. Not just the idea itself.

Jebreil, on 05 July 2012 - 06:35 PM, said:

You have missed the point about geometry's rational underpinnings. It is totally irrelevant that a (Euclidean) triangle exists or does not exist or can be empirically studied for it to have its angles add up to 180. These things do not and cannot prove that "all triangles have their angles add up to 180". The proof is in the purely rational demonstration, clean from any particularity or physicality. Once we have the purely rational proof, it is certain that wherever you see a (Euclidean) triangle, anywhere and at any time, if you calculate the sum of its angles, it will come out as 180. This is known without ever having seen a triangle in nature.

As you have said, clean from any particularity or physicality.  I am not saying that a triangle isnt a triangle.  I am saying, a triangle is only a figment of the imagination until it exists in reality.  I would not consider it knowledge of reality, rather knowledge of an idea.  You can know that X type of triangle will exist in Y type of way with Z angles.  But that has really no necissery relation to what actually exists. And so, its almost useless knowledge unless you can relate it to something that you can show exists.

Jebreil, on 05 July 2012 - 06:35 PM, said:

Thus, rational questions are solved purely on a rational basis and have no need of input from empirical data. Rational theorems are proven solely through Reason and no observation can shift the balance for that theorem.

I can prove that 2+2=4, but it still has little to no value if its just an idea.

And this is why, it is a problem when trying to relate this concept to something like God.  A being that has a relationship with all physical events that exist throughout time.  Its an idea in which people try to take what is purely in their mind, and they attempt to stretch it over into reality without actual knowledge of anything real that could connect the two.

Ya aba stated that, its a simple concept.  But the big picture is not simple at all.  There is really nothing simple about it, which is why I went ahead and said that.

Edited by Belial, 05 July 2012 - 06:49 PM.

[Belial]

Jebreil, on 05 July 2012 - 07:08 PM, said:

Belial



Fine. Please prove it.

I couldnt prove its existance im afraid, i have no scientific evidence. Though in my mind, i could argue in favor of it.

Jebreil, on 05 July 2012 - 07:08 PM, said:

Which statement?

The very first one you responded to me on.  The one I directed at Ya aba. Post number 9.

Jebreil, on 05 July 2012 - 07:08 PM, said:

You are mixing everything with everything. Regardless of use or value or how it sounds as a topic for a Sunday afternoon with the next door neighbour, the proof of a conceptual nature is purely rational and clean from anything empirical data may provide.

I can prove that certain types of triangles have angles adding to 180 degrees in my mind.  But that doesnt bring a triangle into existence.

Jebreil, on 05 July 2012 - 07:08 PM, said:

Thus, if we are looking at a particular conception of Omniscience and a particular conception of Free Will, we must move on a step-by-step logical basis, analysing the concepts until we reach a final conclusion as to their relation. The original protest I had was that scientific date cannot furnish anything in this discussion.

Id agree that its not necissery to have science when conceptually proving the angles of a triangle.  When discussing Omniscience and free will, if you want to discuss and prove these two concepts, and only these two.  You would have to detach them from many basic theistic ideas that people often associate them with.

Which is fine. I agree, you have to start with the basics.

Jebreil, on 05 July 2012 - 07:08 PM, said:

You mean it has no practical value. It has epistemic value for mathematicians. They love the stuff. Imagine proving the Riemann Hypothesis.

yes, everyone has their own taste i suppose.

---------

Jebreil, on 05 July 2012 - 07:08 PM, said:

You may be mistaking this with the question "do we have free will?" which requires us to be more sensitive to empirical reality.

I think my response to Ya aba was fine.

This discussion truly does have...extensively complex ideas throughout it. I guess we have to start somewhere.

[Belial]

Jebreil, on 05 July 2012 - 08:03 PM, said:

Belial

You have an unhealthy obsession with "existing triangles". Not all knowledge is about the "existence" of a thing. Sometimes the question is "what does it imply?" and not always "does it exist?"

In the OP, the question is "does Divine Omniscience imply the lack of Free Will?"

If religious beliefs were simply about implying things, then id have no problem with that.

Jebreil, on 05 July 2012 - 08:03 PM, said:

My response, post #11, was because you said (in paraphrase) "nobody knows the answer to the question of God's Foreknowledge vs Free Will", and the trace of argument was that you didn't know and people had not reached a consensus on the question and so therefore nobody really knows. It didn't follow. I expressed my hope, clearly sarcastic, that science and scientists don't argue that way.

yes Jebriel.

[Quisant]

Dante Alighieri, on 05 July 2012 - 12:16 PM, said:

God's omniscience, along with his act of creation, rules out libertarian free will. But why suppose that it is the correct theory of free will? A much more important issue is whether free will in principle is at all possible. Answering Galen Strawson's basic argument to any satisfactory degree seems like a rather difficult task. It certainly rules out libertarian free will at the very least.

I had not heard of Galen Strawson, thanks for the information.

Sam Harris also has some interesting views on 'free will', he defines the "I" as the "conscious witness of our lives."
He thinks luck plays a major role in our lives. We are victims of our neurophysiology.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pCofmZlC72g

All the best.
*

~Ruqaya, on 05 July 2012 - 12:31 PM, said:

What if a consciousness isnt a 'mental' process?  isnt attached to brain/ matter? for instance, if consciousness continues after physical death, can it then be called a 'mental' process? i associate mental faculties with the processes of the physical brain being influenced by stimuli on it, whether thats other material stimuli or non material.

I have never seen any evidence or reason to believe that my consciousness might exist other than in myself. You are of course free to think otherwise.

When it comes to everyday phenomena that are incompletely understood, such as consciousness, I believe that an ultimate explanation-as always- will come from within the framework of natural laws rather than stepping outside that framework.

All the best.
*

[Quisant]

Jebreil, on 05 July 2012 - 04:14 PM, said:

Quisant

I am not not-talking to you.

My counterpoint is that you are arguing on the basis of a logical error. You take what is logically simultaneous to free will, apply it prior to free will and derive that free will cannot be, since the will must comply with what is prior.

However, God's knowledge of things is logically simultaneous with the things. Thus the thing, here i.e. free will, does not need to comply with anything and however it is directed, God knows it as it is being directed.

The existentiation of these ideas are temporally posterior to the ideas themselves as well as God's knowledge of them.

Glad to hear we are still talking, I hope you are keeping well.

Logic is not relevant to this argument.
All future actions were designed / included by God in His Creation.
An Omniscient God cannot be unaware of the consequences of His Creation.

1. God knows you will pick the blue one
2. If God knows you will pick the blue one, you will pick the blue one
3. If it isn't actually possible that you not pick the blue one, then you are not free
4. So, you will pick the blue one...

If God knows you will pick the blue one then it is impossible for you to pick the red one.

Not logically impossible, just "factually" impossible.

Wslm.
*

[Quisant]

Jebreil, on 06 July 2012 - 03:36 AM, said:

Quisant

I am well, thank you. Yourself?

I am not too bad, I am in England for the next few months and I miss some of my regular habits and vices.

Quote

1. I think logic is always relevant. By muddling the logical order, you derive an absurdity.

Logic is a tool we use to make sense of stuff, logic is slave to facts.

Quote

2. You write "All future actions were designed / included by God in His Creation." I agree with included and not designed. I find including an idea into the existing order is not the same as designing the idea.

Will you really not grant that a Creator is by default also a Designer?
After all it is theists who constantly bang on about 'Intelligent design'.

If God is an Omniscient Creator, He has created everything, our actions, our ideas and our intentions.

Whilst quibbling about words, you have not really addressed the issue raised in my last post.
Wslm.
*

[Belial]

Jebreil, on 06 July 2012 - 05:12 PM, said:

No. The Lord does not design a light to be luminous. The idea of light implies luminosity by itself. God existentiates what ideas are by themselves.

You know i always point to natural things.  Light itself, it exists in a very specific way, that if created, could only be designed to be that way.  And so light would be included in creation, and it would by default, have to be designed as well.  Otherwise it wouldnt exist in the way that it does.

Something cant be created from nothing, and not be designed to be that way.

from wiki, i know everyone loves this site.

"Design is the creation of a plan or convention for the construction of an object or a system "

Light is an object.  It is something that exists amongst a plan. Assuming you believe in a creator. Unless you believe that nothing was planned. But that is impossible in Islam.

Edited by Belial, 06 July 2012 - 05:46 PM.

[Belial]

Jebreil, on 06 July 2012 - 06:29 PM, said:

Belial

It's quite clear what I am getting at: the luminosity of light was not added to light by God. Light is by itself luminous. One cannot say "God is responsible for making the light luminous". It is absurd.

The same applies to all ideas. God did not determine the inner angles of a Euclidean triangle 180 degrees. The idea of a triangle contains this truth.

God does not design 1+1=2. Like 1+1 could equal something else, but for God's design. These thoughts are all absurd.

Light, is by itself luminous because it was created as such.  It was designed to be as such. You are comparing light to something like math, however, light is something that exists in a very specific way.

For example.  Light emits its luminosity due to...things like levels of energy being expelled in the form of photons.

Its not like light just shines for no reason. It shines because it is a very specific thing, that exists in a way that allows it to shine. And the energy of these objects, can indeed exist in a way in which they do not shine as well.

Light exists in a very specific way.

Its like a rock.  Rocks are hard because they are created and designed to be such with their very specific crystal structures.  It would have to be designed in order to exist in the specific way that it does.

If not designed, how else would its existence be so specific in creation?

Or are you saying that, after light already exists, it simply is luminous and doesnt need to be designed to be luminous?  Though, who is to say it wasnt created and designed to be that way to begin with?

To say that something like the existance of luminous light, was not planned, just sounds odd to me.  Assuming you believe in creation.

God cannot plan something out like the existence of humanity, while not having had planned it (in other words, while not having had designed it).

Edited by Belial, 06 July 2012 - 06:51 PM.

[Belial]

Well, ill let you go Jebriel, i dont want to pick at you.  Unless you want to...I dunno.  I guess just try explaining to me, in detail, what you mean.

[Dante Alighieri]

Okay, there's not been a lot of progress on this issue here. People are more or less talking past each other. I want to try to show a few things in this post: (i) That libertarian free will is incompatible with the traditional theistic notion of God's omniscience and creative act (ii) that the problem is resolved only by appealing to either open theism or to compatibilism and that both are unpalatable to traditional theism (iii) that libertarian free will is impossible and that this leads to the aforementioned problem. The argument also relies on at least a cursory understanding of modal logic and possible world semantics. Interested folks should look here and here and here for a quick primer.

I. Traditional theism and libertarian free will are incompatible

First, we need to understand what is meant by "traditional theism." I take traditional theism to mean that God exists, where God means the eternal, immaterial, personal, omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being who created every concrete particular apart from Himself. The relevant property we care about in this debate is "omniscience." I'm taking omniscience to mean that a being knows all truths, including the future. Secondly, we need to understand what is meant by "libertarian free will." Libertarian free will is committed usually to

• (Causal Underdetermination) An agent's act can be free only if the antecedent conditions up to an agent's act does not causally determine the agent's act.
  
• (Principle of Alternative Possibilities) An agents act can be free only if the agent could have done or refrained from the act; for any initial world segment IWS antecedent to the agent's act, IWS is compatible with the agent committing the act and is compatible with the agent refraining from the act

All libertarians are committed to CU and most all libertarians are committed to PAP. In fact, it is hard if not impossible to see how CU is meaningful without PAP being true. What PAP simply means is that to be free is to be able to do otherwise. You must be able to freely enact or freely refrain from an action to be free with respect to it. Now, another relevant notion to bring to bear is the concept of a contingent counterfactual of freedom. A CFF is of the form

If an agent P was placed in situation S, the agent P would freely do act A

Here's a mundane example of a CFF, such as "If I was offered twice the price my car was worth, I would freely sell it." Now, it must be understood that this is a counterfactual of freedom; it is a subjunctive conditional that asserts what a person would freely do in a given circumstance. This counterfactual is also contingent in the sense there are possible worlds at which a given CFF is true and there are worlds at which the CFF is false. For instance, in another possible world, I freely choose to not sell the car. This idea captures at once two critical theses about traditional theism and libertarian freedom: that a person's free acts are subject to alternative possibilities and are not determined and that God possesses knowledge of what we would in fact do.

We are now in a position to state the argument.

(1) An agent P's act A is free only if A is causally undetermined by antecedent conditions and that there are possible worlds at which the initial world segment IWS obtains that include P performing A and there are possible worlds at which IWS  obtains and P refrains from A. [def. libertarian free will]
(2) CFFs have truth values [from traditional theism]
(3) God knows all CFFs [def. God]
(4) God actualizes all world segments [def. God]
(5) An agent P performed act A at time t. [Stipulation]
(6) There is a CFF C with respect to P's act that <If S obtains, P would freely perform A> [def. CFF]
(7) Hence, there is a particular initial world segment IWS prior to t that obtains containing the maximal state of affairs up to t. [def. of initial world segment]
(8) God knows that C [2,3,6]
(9) God brought about the IWS [4,7]
(10) In all possible worlds that God actualizes IWS, agent P performs A. [7,8,9]
(11) Hence, agent P's performing A is causally determined and there are no possible worlds at which IWS obtains and P refrains from A. [def. causation, 10]
(12) Therefore, P was not free with respect to A [1,11]

Let me try to give a "Cliff Notes" of the argument as to the basic idea here. Let's use a concrete example. Consider myself. Let's say that it is some morning and I have the choice of strawberry or grape jam for toast. I decide to pick strawberry jam. Corresponding to this is the CFF "If Dante were offered strawberry jam or grape jam, he would freely choose strawberry jam." Now, God knows this CFF. Now, if we consider the maximal state of affairs up to my picking the strawberry jam, it includes the situation, myself, and the CFF. This is the initial world segment IWS. God actualized this particular IWS by creative act. Now, there is no possible world at which this IWS world obtains and I decide not to take the strawberry jam. Suppose there is a possible world at which it is so. Then, it is true that "If Dante were strawberry jam or grape jam, he would freely choose strawberry jam,", that I am offered the choice between the two, and that I refrain from picking strawberry jam. This is a contradiction since it is of the form "p → q, p, ~q." p → q is logically equivalent with ~p v q, hence the claim becomes "~p v q, p, ~q," By disjunctive syllogism, it follows that "q & ~q" which is a flat contradiction. Hence it is impossible that I do anything but pick the strawberry jam in any world at which IWS obtains. But, then this fails PAP (since I cannot do otherwise) and it fails CU since God's creative act brought about the IWS that determines my act. Hence, I was not libertarian free with respect to picking the strawberry jam.

Let us more closely look at the premises.(1) is the definition of libertarian free will. (2) is a doctrine of traditional theism. (3) and (4) are definitions. (5) is the stipulation at hand. They cannot be denied by the traditional theist. (6) trivially follows from the above by definition of a CFF. (7) is also true by definition of IWS. (8) and (9) trivially follow from the above. (10) is true per the argument above, since the IWS is a maximal state of affairs; it includes the CFF in question. Now, to show that (11) is not difficult since PAP is easily shown to be violated here. Now, perhaps the theist might object, like Alvin Plantinga does, that the determination here is not causal but merely logical determination, similar to how it would be absurd to think that the truth of a future contingent somehow causally determines the future (i.e. see Aristotle on logical determinism). However, it seems quite clear that the determination involved here is in fact of a causal nature. First, the IWS is temporally prior to the agents act. Secondly, the IWS obtains by virtue of God's creative act in creating the situations and states of affairs and what not. Third, the IWS is responsible for bringing about the agent's act since the agent acts in accord to the situation and CFF. Fourth, if the IWS failed to obtain, then there are no relevantly similar worlds at which the agent performs the act, hence the IWS is necessary for the agent performing the act. Finally, the IWS evokes a determinative response from the agent; in every world at which the IWS obtains, the agent performs the act. Under virtually any analysis of causation (regularist, singularist, counterfactual, etc), this is a causal relation. Hence, God causally determines an agent's act by virtue of His own creative act. From the above, the conclusion, that the agent was not libertarian free with respect to the act, trivially follows.

Another objection I sometimes see is an appeal to God's timeless knowledge of the agent's act. That is irrelevant to the argument. The argument relies on God's creative act in conjunction with His omniscience to generate the argument. The actual mechanism or nature of His omniscience is entirely inconsequential vis a vis the conclusion. Hence, it follows that traditional theism is incompatible with libertarian free will.

II. The ways out: compatibilism and open theism

There is little the traditional theist can do at this juncture. Absent convincing argument against (11), the theist must reject (1) or (2) in order to retain a robust sense of free action and moral responsibility. Both choices have a significant price. I'll discuss the consequences of rejecting (2) first.

If the theist rejects (2), then CFFs do not in fact have truth values. The argument is bypassed. However, as a consequence of this fact, God no longer has knowledge of the future. This is the position of open theism. To say that such a view is incompatible with traditional theism and is unpalatable with theists in general is to put it mildly. It is at least flatly contradictory with various scriptural theses in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The price for rejecting (2) is quite significant indeed. To retain free choice and moral responsibility, the theist must give up God's knowledge of the future to reject (2). I will say no more of this.

It gets more interesting if the theist bites the bullet and accepts that we are not in fact libertarian free with respect to our actions. However, the theist can assert that this is because the libertarian understanding of free will is incorrect or incoherent and that we should be compatabilists instead. The theist chooses to reject (2) In this sense, the theist may retain a perhaps robust notion of moral responsibility in a compatibilist sense by which free will and determination are compatible. But, a large number of theistic problems crop up elsewhere. With respect to the problem of evil, at the heart of theistic defenses and theodicies is libertarian free will. We must genuinely be able to do otherwise in the sense of libertarian freedom for Plantinga's free will defense to run through or any of the theodicies offered in the debate on the evidential problem of evil. If compatabilistic freedom obtains, then there is no longer question of God being unable to actualize beings who always freely do the right. Hence, not only does the evidential problem of evil gain enormous force, but the logical problem of evil runs through, deductively showing that God does not in fact exist. Another related problem comes with respect to God's own nature and Anselmian theism. On Anselmian theism, God exists in all possible worlds; He is a metaphysically necessary being. However, if God's freedom is compatibilistic, then in every possible world at which God exists, He determinately actualizes a particular maximal contingent state of affairs. But, then, every possible world has the same state of affairs, hence, there is only one possible world: the actual one. But, this is absurd, for facts as banal as "I decided to wear a red T-shirt today" achieve the same level of necessity as "2 + 2 = 4." But such facts are contingent, hence Anselmian theism is necessarily false.  Another option is to deny that free will exists at all, at which God's existence and evil's existence is even more trivially incompatible and God's nature becomes trivially determinative. Hence, rejecting (1) entails atheism.

Hence, the dilemma is thus: either the theist rejects (2) and denies that God has knowledge of the future or the theist rejects (1) and must become an atheist.

III. Libertarian free will is impossible

Finally, I will conclude this post with an argument that libertarian free will is impossible. This position is widely held in philosophy in light of the nature of libertarian free will. The basic notion is thus: in order to be libertarian free, your actions must be causally underdetermined. That you choose to perform some act has no causal explanation. But then, it follows that there is no fact of the matter as to why you choose to perform some act or not. There is no cause as to why you perform an act and hence you cannot exert any causal control over the action. In what meaningful sense can that act be called your act if you exert no causal control over it at all? It is indistinguishable from random eventuation and that is not volition. The complete argument, in my opinion, has been most persuasively presented by Galen Strawson. A good summary of his "basic argument" is in his article "Luck Swallows Everything."

Quote

One way of setting out the Pessimists’ argument is as follows:

(1) When you act, you do what you do, in the situation in which you find yourself, because of the way you are.

But then

(2) To be truly or ultimately morally responsible for what you do, you must be truly or ultimately responsible for the way you are, at least in certain crucial mental respects. (Obviously you don’t have to be responsible for your height, age, sex, and so on.)

But

(3) You can’t be ultimately responsible for the way you are in any respect at all, so you can’t be ultimately responsible for what you do.

For

(4) To be ultimately responsible for the way you are, you must have somehow intentionally brought it about that you are the way you are.

And the problem is then this. Suppose

(5) You have somehow intentionally brought it about that you are the way you now are, in certain mental respects: suppose you have brought it about that you have a certain mental nature Z, in such a way that you can be said to be ultimately responsible for Z.

For this to be true

(6) You must already have had a certain mental nature Y, in the light of which you brought it about that you now have Z. If you didn’t already have a mental nature then you didn’t have any intentions or preferences, and can’t be responsible for the way you now are, even if you have changed.)

But then

(7) For it to be true that you are ultimately responsible for how you now are, you must be ultimately responsible for having had that nature, Y, in the light of which you brought it about that you now have Z.

So

(8) You must have brought it about that you had Y.

But then

(9) you must have existed already with a prior nature, X, in the light of which you brought it about that you had Y, in the light of which you brought it about that you now have Z.

And so on. Here one is setting off on a potentially infinite regress. In order for one to be truly or ultimately responsible for how one is in such a way that one can be truly responsible for what one does, something impossible has to be true: there has to be, and cannot be, a starting point in the series of acts of bringing it about that one has a certain nature; a starting point that constitutes an act of ultimate self-origination.

There is a more concise way of putting the point: in order to be ultimately responsible, one would have to be causa sui - the ultimate cause or origin of oneself, or at least of some crucial part of one’s mental nature. But nothing can be ultimately causa sui in any respect at all. Even if the property of being causa sui is allowed to belong unintelligibly to God, it cannot plausibly be supposed to be possessed by ordinary finite human beings. "The causa sui is the best self-contradiction that has been conceived so far", as Nietzsche remarked in 1886... In fact, nearly all of those who believe in strong free will do so without any conscious thought that it requires ultimate self-origination. But self origination is the only thing that could actually ground the kind of strong free will that is regularly believed in.

From this, either compatibilism obtains or free will is impossible. And the above atheistic arguments then go through.

Edited by Dante Alighieri, 07 July 2012 - 02:48 AM.

[Dante Alighieri]

Hi Jebreil,

Thanks for the response. However, I'm not exactly sure what you're trying to do in that post.

Jebreil, on 07 July 2012 - 09:20 AM, said:

I hold that the libertarian definition is incoherent. I hold that Strawson's objection is refutable

Strawson's argument is only against libertarian free will.

Quote

- The Libertarian takes P to move from square 1 to square 2 without any reason for it. As you mention, "there is no fact of the matter as to why you choose to perform some act or not. There is no cause as to why you perform an act and hence you cannot exert any causal control over the action." This is incoherent on the Principle of Sufficient Reason and it is inaccurate to life.

I agree it's incoherent, although not because of the PSR. PSR is probably necessarily false i.e. see John Post and Peter van Inwagen on this,

Quote

- Strawson does not recognise that P is not separate from natural processes. The movement of amoral particles can lead to a moral entity which can then act, not on the basis of physical laws, but on the basis of moral ideas. Therefore, regardless of the origin of the nature of P, the nature of P as an "agent which chooses what it prefers given a range of moral possibilities" is sufficient to judge P on its preferences.

Both fail to understand that P is loaded (but not causa sui) - P is that which, when given moral possibilities, is inclined towards a variety of choices, but ultimately chooses what better fits its values. This is part of the definition of P, the 'agent with moral dilemmas'. This is not an accident of P. This is the very essence of P. P is not an agent which has been manipulated by an external thing to have moral dilemmas. It is the very nature of P, and God existentiated P.

Thus, it is P that inclines towards what it cherishes. The IWS sets the scene, and each individual agent, P_n, would face dilemmas between doing what is right and what is pleasurable, listening to the conscience or silencing it. Then, according to the accumulated habits of each P_n, they do what they like. Regardless of the origins of their values, as far as the agent is concerned, they are happy with those values - these are the values they choose, knowing and capable of enacting the alternatives, and therefore they ought to be judged by those values.

That's a compatibilistic theory, along the lines of a deep compatibilism that Strawson's father, Peter Strawson, advocates and that Akeel Bilgrami recently defended on an account of self-knowledge. Galen Strawson's argument does not address that, although he does have arguments against compatibilism elsewhere. His basic argument is not intended to address a compatibilistic theory like the one you present above. As I already said, compatibilism completely avoids the problem of foreknowledge and free will, but raises other problems elsewhere besides. So I don't think we are in any sort of disagreement here.

[Belial]

Jebreil, on 07 July 2012 - 09:20 AM, said:

Belial

My example is about the phenomenon of light.
Photon isn't the light we see. Photons are part of the chain (which includes our eyes and neurons) that give rise to the shining thing we know as light - and we've known light since we had eyes, but we've known about photons for not longer that several decades.

The word "design" is tricky. I might say, "I designed your computer", and you might answer, "what a bad design. I want my money back." Here, I can't say, "it's the computer's fault", because the computer has no volition of its own. It is a collection of wires and metals programmed to work in a specific way.

The word "create" is better. I might say, "Beethoven created a beautiful symphony". The beauty of the symphony was not designed. Beethoven did not make the symphony beautiful. He created a "beautiful symphony". Beethoven is the creator and the genius behind the symphony, but the beauty was not added to his work. The work was inherently beautiful.

Well, theres the difference between Bheethoven and God though. And that is, God created that beauty along with the piece. Everything that bheethoven had power and control over, he did design.  Sure he didnt design sound itself. But if Bheethoven were the creator of all, he would have created and designed it as well.

Bheethoven did indeed design his music.  The very practice of music writing, and matching your cords, is "design".  It is a plan.  Bheethoven didnt just create random noises.  He designed and organized his noises to create music.

The sensation and recognition we have of light, could not exist without being designed to exist.  Whether light is recognized through our neurons or nerves in our eyes, or through photons, or wherever, however.  All of these things are very specific things. That can only be specific if designed.  Just as Bheethovens music is very specific in design.

If it were not designed, it couldnt be recognized to exist in any specific way. But it does.

Edited by Belial, 07 July 2012 - 09:55 AM.