What Is The Nature Of Logic?
#3
Posted 25 April 2012 - 05:54 PM
I am starting to learn more towards a Wittgensteinian view, but it isn't one that I want to go towards.
For the latter part, I believe language masks logic. Language makes it seem that we are talking about something when we are in fact not talking about anything.
#7 Guest_Jebreil_*
Posted 25 April 2012 - 06:20 PM
It was the early Wittgenstein who also believed that "language masks logic. Language makes it seem that we are talking about something when we are in fact not talking about anything." I have sympathy with this view. The later Wittgenstein, who has convinced me thoroughly, does not have a negative view of language, though it can "bewitch" us when we are philosophising.
Leibniz/Hobbes: reasoning is symbolic calculation, substituting definitions in a syntactical way
Kant: we have a priori concepts of pure understanding which are deduced from the logic of our apperception
Frege/Russell: logical analysis is the chief method of philosophical investigations and Frege's innovations
Early Wittgenstein: logic can only be shown, facts are the "atoms" of logic, limits of language are limits of a world
Later Wittgenstein: grammatical analysis is the chief method of philosophical investigations - logical analysis is a species of grammatical analysis
EDIT: or arguably, it can "bewitch" us because we are philosophising.
Edited by Jebreil, 25 April 2012 - 07:07 PM.
#9
Posted 26 April 2012 - 05:17 AM
The Persian Shah, on 25 April 2012 - 06:19 PM, said:
Where do these 'rules' come from?
Are they built only into our world or do/can they exist separately from us?
Jebreil, on 25 April 2012 - 06:20 PM, said:
It was the early Wittgenstein who also believed that "language masks logic. Language makes it seem that we are talking about something when we are in fact not talking about anything." I have sympathy with this view. The later Wittgenstein, who has convinced me thoroughly, does not have a negative view of language, though it can "bewitch" us when we are philosophising.
Leibniz/Hobbes: reasoning is symbolic calculation, substituting definitions in a syntactical way
Kant: we have a priori concepts of pure understanding which are deduced from the logic of our apperception
Frege/Russell: logical analysis is the chief method of philosophical investigations and Frege's innovations
Early Wittgenstein: logic can only be shown, facts are the "atoms" of logic, limits of language are limits of a world
Later Wittgenstein: grammatical analysis is the chief method of philosophical investigations - logical analysis is a species of grammatical analysis
EDIT: or arguably, it can "bewitch" us because we are philosophising.
You hold all these views? Do they all work together?
#10
Posted 26 April 2012 - 06:11 AM
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They don't 'come' from anywhere..
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(1) Depends on how you define world - they are 'metaphysical laws', so can be said to be part of the 'world' in this sense..
(2) Second part I assume you mean whether it is something 'objective or subjective'. They would be objective. Exists is probably not the best word to use though. We can say they 'hold true' 'independent of the perceiver'..

#11 Guest_Jebreil_*
Posted 26 April 2012 - 06:18 AM
Incognito
I do hold them, and more. Why do you find it strange?
By taking the Later Wittgenstein as the criterion of interpretation, I try to reduce any inconsistency. Arguably, there is logical atomism which is questionable - something he seemed to have rejected later on. However, I haven't found anything wrong with it yet, so I'm retaining it.
Kant's idea of logic is probably the odd one out, but I don't think it contradicts. Rather, it refines the conception of logic by bridging the gap between the self and the world, answering your question:
Are they built only into our world or do/can they exist separately from us?
Edited by Jebreil, 26 April 2012 - 06:22 AM.
#12
Posted 26 April 2012 - 06:53 AM
There is no such thing as an independent logical structure for Wittgenstein (in both cases I believe), therefore when we make arguments we are not saying anything. Logic is only built into objects, there is no logical structure that relates things together other than the objects themselves. Any talk of God, morality, aesthetics is nonsense.
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(2) Second part I assume you mean whether it is something 'objective or subjective'. They would be objective. Exists is probably not the best word to use though. We can say they 'hold true' 'independent of the perceiver'..
So logic is a law that comes from nowhere and exists in its own right? We can talk about the logic of a table, because we have the table. We can understand its limitations and its logical possibilities, but what about when we talk about something like ethics? Where is ethics for us to logically analyse it? For me, it seems absurd to assume that there is such a logical structure of world, and if you adhere to this belief then feel free to show me how this is possible.
The second part wasnt so much of a subjective/objective thing, rather can we talk about the logic of things that don't exist?
#13 Guest_Jebreil_*
Posted 26 April 2012 - 08:41 AM
Incognito
My focus here would be the early Wittgenstein, as is his later views stretch beyond the discipline we normally call 'logic'.
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His Tractatus builds on Frege's and Russell's projects of logicism. Why would you think that his project is counter to theirs?
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What do you mean? Please elaborate.
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What do you mean by "object"? What do you mean by "built into"? What do you mean by "logical structure"?
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This is true of Wittgenstein, which differentiates his project from Russell's in aim (not in approach), but it is logical clarification which shows what is sense and what is nonsense - and so philosophy's job is to logically clarify statements as to their sensicality.
One plays chess for entertainment and another plays chess as a profession - both play chess - though what chess means and whether a king can castle in their version or not, whether en passant is a legitimate move, and whether chess is a self-contained system or a metaphor for life, whether chess can express chess itself in its game or can only show it by being played - these are differences between them. Yet, they both want a game of strategy plus the endorsement of checkmate as the end of the game, the number of pieces, the colour of the squares, etc.
What makes me reconcile them is their common wish to construct/derive an ideal scheme designed to logically clarify statements, so that the only questions left to answer are questions of facts.
Edited by Jebreil, 26 April 2012 - 09:17 AM.
#14 Guest_Jebreil_*
Posted 26 April 2012 - 09:48 AM
Incognito
I think I've understood.
That Wittgenstein believed logic is built into objects and is not independent from them is true, I concur. To me, this is a development of the Fregean project, much like how non-Euclidean space is a development on Euclid's geometry (by expanding its horizons outside the 5th postulate).
I would like to correct what I said before: Wittgenstein's project is hugely divergent from Russell's in result (not in basic approach/aim: logical clarification)
Also, while I have deep respect for his "mystical" in ethics and aesthetics, and to a degree agree, but given his profound work in his Investigations, I think he was too quick to forsake the possibility of some sort of ethical/aesthetic discourse - an ethical/aesthetic language game(s).
Edited by Jebreil, 26 April 2012 - 09:56 AM.
#15
Posted 03 May 2012 - 04:44 AM
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What makes me reconcile them is their common wish to construct/derive an ideal scheme designed to logically clarify statements, so that the only questions left to answer are questions of facts.
That is true of the analytical approach to anything. However, there doesnt seem to be many facts about things we find so important according to Wittgenstein.
Jebreil, on 26 April 2012 - 09:48 AM, said:
How can we have language games about nonsense?
#16 Guest_Jebreil_*
Posted 03 May 2012 - 07:05 AM
Wittgenstein, though a powerful visionary, is not god. Why should we accept that ethics is nonsense. In fact, going by his later principles, it makes much more sense to say that ethical language is sensical - just look at how it features in our form of life. I'm assuming familiarity with his later philosophy.
#17
Posted 11 May 2012 - 05:32 AM
Jebreil, on 03 May 2012 - 07:05 AM, said:
Wittgenstein, though a powerful visionary, is not god. Why should we accept that ethics is nonsense. In fact, going by his later principles, it makes much more sense to say that ethical language is sensical - just look at how it features in our form of life. I'm assuming familiarity with his later philosophy.
Maybe it's my lack of understanding as to how his earlier view about nonsense corresponds to his later sayings.
A language games of ethics or religion seems interesting. But we are not really saying anything, still. If we are to take aboard Wittgenstein's ideas, then we cannot have a language games of aesthetics, ethics or religion.
#18 Guest_Jebreil_*
Posted 11 May 2012 - 03:18 PM
If we are to take Wittgenstein completely, then your religious language game - which he does accept - will arguably not refer to God as an independent entity. Nevertheless, I think it is possible to argue that "God" can refer to something which is unlike anything else and from which all things come about and who can be said to "know", but this "knowing" is unlike anything we understand, etc.
His later views on morality seem a bit less dismissive, but still outside the bounds of sense. Although, one Wittgenstein tutor I know believes that his later views has the capacity to accommodate moral talk.
As for his later views on Aesthetics, he has pages of lecture notes on the topic. He seems to want to painstakingly sift out the sayable elements of aesthetic language from the showable and unsayable elements. It's a formidable read.
I personally am firmly of the belief that it is impossible that there are no sayable elements in ethics, aesthetics and religion. It is evidently not so. The difficulty is to draw the boundaries of sense and nonsense, because these cases are notoriously vague.
#20 Guest_Jebreil_*
Posted 18 May 2012 - 09:08 AM
Because we use it almost everyday. x is immoral. x is unjust. x is deserved. x is beautiful. The problem is, they look like facts about 'x', whereas it's more complicated than that. That is why they have a misleading form - language can take over our thinking. But if we "look!" rather than "think!", we should see that these are not facts about 'x', or facts about anything. They point to a way of living.
Linguistic analysis will open up these pseudo-facts and shows us the breadth and depth of the ethic and aesthetic realities of human life.
#22
Posted 28 May 2012 - 07:16 AM
Jebreil, on 18 May 2012 - 09:08 AM, said:
Because we use it almost everyday. x is immoral. x is unjust. x is deserved. x is beautiful. The problem is, they look like facts about 'x', whereas it's more complicated than that. That is why they have a misleading form - language can take over our thinking. But if we "look!" rather than "think!", we should see that these are not facts about 'x', or facts about anything. They point to a way of living.
Linguistic analysis will open up these pseudo-facts and shows us the breadth and depth of the ethic and aesthetic realities of human life.
Assuming you are saying what I think you are saying, that sounds pretty good.
#24 Guest_Jebreil_*
Posted 28 May 2012 - 01:14 PM
Incognito
As you may know already, the orthodox view is "no". There have been commentators who have said "yes" - or at least one such commentator. The former understand that philosophy is about sorting out the orders of language-games. Everything else is nonsense, because the language/world relationship cannot be seen from a vantage point. That would be nonsense.
I think playing jigsaw is putting the jigsaw tiles in the proper order. However, I also think that muddling the orders - which most traditional philosophers were guilty of - is a real phenomenon. We do make errors - even nonsensical errors - and we can talk about them. For example, there is no such perfect idea of existence like the Platonists thought. Yet Wittgenstein explains exactly why Platonists made the error. However, in explaining, he is saying "Look! This is what they're doing! Isn't it silly?"
What I'm trying to get at is that everything we do, we can talk about - and philosophy is an activity.
A young atheist comes to you and says, "can God create a stone He cannot lift?"
You reply, "can you clap with one hand?"
He says, "that's impossible, because clapping is an act with two hands."
You respond, "so is your suggestion impossible, because God is a person who cannot be overpowered."
We might then differentiate between philosophically sensical and nonsensical statements. We might also differentiate the above with the following:
A young atheist comes to you and says, "can God create a stone He cannot lift?"
You reply, "a stone that God, the All-powerful, has no power to lift is a contradictory notion and so cannot be a predicate."
We might say that the first dialogue was a "turning-the-tables method" - because you answer his question with an analogous question, which stumps him - and the second dialogue was a "analytic method" - because your answer breaks down his question to reveal a core inconsistency.
So, I think there is philosophical activity, and it arises from our grammatical (in the Wittgensteinian sense) errors. We become conscious of our muddling the language and we then set out to correct it.
However, I am prepared to be corrected on this issue, as I haven't given it too much thought.
Edited by Jebreil, 28 May 2012 - 01:20 PM.
#25
Posted 29 May 2012 - 03:59 AM
Philosophy is an activity, but it doesn't mean it is not nonsense? We can talk about it, but we do not get anything new from it.We are simply rephrasing current problems.
On your God example, can there be nonsense within nonsense? It seems to be what you are trying to say.
On a different note, I have been considering Wittgenstein's comments that he see's everything through a religious view, and it is interesting me. With the existence of God, would there not be a universal logic? Much like Russell's, rather than Wittgenstein's? What do you think?
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